


# A Gentle Introduction to




## Pillar of Liberty

A Study of Philippine Society and  
Institutions

+ JMJ +

# A Gentle Introduction to Pillar of Liberty

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.



A Study of Philippine Society and Institutions

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Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

# Preface

## About Pillar of Liberty

Pillar of Liberty began as an online newsletter distributing essays and articles promoting Kapampangan Ethnonationalism. It soon evolved into an outlet analyzing Philippine institutions and society from the Radical Right. The newsletter used to have the name *Sandalan ning Katimawan*, literally meaning 'backrest of freedom' in Kapampangan. The name comes from a verse in the Kapampangan Ethnonational Hymn, *Imnu na ning Capampangan*. It was poetically translated into *Pillar of Liberty* as non-Kapampangans became interested and joined the staff. With this change in staff also came a change in purpose: analyzing Philippine institutions and society, and prescribing treatments. Of course, each problem has a short-term and long-term solution, and each solution may benefit some players and harm others. Hence Pillar of Liberty has a relatively loose editorial policy.

However, writing staff each have relatively similar views, and discussion and discourse happens daily. This text comprises a gentle introduction to Pillar of Liberty's worldview and thought. Our editorial stance relies on Radical Right-wing thought, with special focus on Localism and Neotribalism. This text also serves as background for our quarterly magazine, which Pillar of Liberty became.

## The Radical Right

The Radical Right refers to a loose coalition of right-wing groups who oppose mainstream Conservatism and Establishment Right-Wing interests in general. Some examples of the latter include:

- Bush/Reagan type Neoconservatives,
- Ben Shapiro/Jordan Peterson type influencers,
- Traditional Catholic aestheticists and undogmatic orthodoxists,
- regime libertarians who support affirmative action and atomization,

## *Preface*

- Hispanist monarchism,
- the conservative strand of sincere, unpragmatic Marcos loyalism, and
- so-called “Filipino” Nationalism.

The Radical Right itself comprises members from many groups:

- the post-war New Right led by William F. Buckley or its British Thatcherite counterpart.
- the Old Right eulogised by the late Justin Raimondo.
- the French New Right as embodied by Alain de Benoist.
- the post-war neo-Nazi right of William Luther Pierce.
- the Neo-reactionary Dark Enlightenment, the so-called NRx.
- the old reactionary right of Maistre et al.
- the Traditional Catholic revival in catechism and philosophy.
- the libertarian right as represented by the Mises Institute.
- the old Alt-Right who were prominent between 2015 and 2018.

A new consensus has emerged beyond these base groups, getting ideas from all of them and forming a new canon of literature and thought. Some key texts and ideas now give common ground to these groups:

- The Managerial Revolution, as thought by James Burnham and expanded on by Samuel Francis, or similar ideas from Joseph Schumpeter, Julius Evola, or René Guénon.
- Use of Elite Theory as thought by Gaetano Mosca and Wilfredo Pareto, or similar ideas from Bertrand de Jouvenel or Carl Schmitt, among others.
- Analysis using the oversocialization mechanism, as thought by Theodore Kaczynski or similar ideas from other authors, which is central to the present Establishment’s operation.
- Importance of in-group preference as man’s true inclination over universal brotherhood.

As this text explains and discusses, similar trends as what happened

abroad also happened here. While the Philippine government and its institutions—referred to as the “Establishment” here—have propagated fake history and social science, quite a few people have realized that not all is as it seems. One may only see the local Catholic hierarchy’s lethargic and pathetic campaign against the RH bill relying on emotion and sentiments instead of Catholicism’s millenia-long intellectual tradition, or socially conservative senators putting their feet in their mouth, or social conservatives advocating the welfare state and strong redistribution.

In fact, the first thing that many realize is that the ‘Filipino’ language is nothing but the Manila dialect of Tagalog. Those leading the Commission for the Filipino Language (*Komisyong ng Wikang Filipino*, or KWF) are completely inept in linguistics and philology. One may only see ‘National Artist’ Virgilio Almario not knowing what a pidgin language is when he foolishly said that a ‘Filipino’ language is being born<sup>1</sup>. For those who don’t know, a pidgin language is a hybrid between two languages in prolonged contact, which appears when communication between two groups becomes needed. The hybrid languages killing off native Philippine languages from prolonged contact with Tagalog are in fact mere pidgin languages.

Now that we have established that so-called ‘experts’ can lie and indeed be wrong about their alleged fields of expertise, the floodgates are open to question anyone and anything ‘experts’ say, peer-reviewed or not. Basic examples include the COVID-19 Pandemic still ravaging us as of writing, facts about Philippine history taught in schools, even mere trivia about health. To illustrate<sup>2</sup>, while ‘experts’

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<sup>1</sup>Cecile C. Ochoa, ‘PH language experts say Filipino is being born’, Philippine Daily Inquirer (August 28, 2017): <https://usa.inquirer.net/6216/ph-language-experts-say-filipino-mother-tongue-born>.

<sup>2</sup>Chhabra, Kavaljit H., et al. "Reprogramming the body weight set point by a reciprocal interaction of hypothalamic leptin sensitivity and Pomc gene expression reverts extreme obesity." *Molecular metabolism* 5.10 (2016): 869-881.

Coelho, Marisa, Teresa Oliveira, and Ruben Fernandes. "State of the art paper Biochemistry of adipose tissue: an endocrine organ." *Archives of medical science* 9.2 (2013): 191-200.

El Hadi, Hamza, et al. "Food ingredients involved in white-to-brown adipose tissue

still advocate counting calories and cardio exercise to lose weight, real scientists have realized that weight loss is purely a question of metabolism and how many calories it can process. Weight gain happens when calories increase only when other factors keep the metabolism from adjusting, including stress, environment, and dietary changes. True weight loss happens when metabolism improves and changes, when stress decreases, among many other factors. If 'experts' can be wrong about something well and long known among scientists, what more for more pressing subjects?

To realize what is wrong with the world, we call 'taking a red pill', after the Matrix movie. Many red pills exist for many facets of society, with too many to list here. We advise the reader to explore the concepts we tackle here in depth later on. Many who have 'taken red pills' have joined Pillar of Liberty as writers. Others remain independent, still many more simply want to live normal lives. Thus this text, *A Gentle Introduction to Pillar of Liberty*, serves both as handbook and recruitment tool. If you, the reader, agree to most of our points here, then you are a soldier in the war. While we detest conscription, you, dear reader, have no choice in this war. You either take up arms with us, or you suffer the Establishment's victory. You don't need to join *Pillar of Liberty*, but you need to acknowledge that you will fight a war for the long haul. No one needs to say that this war is not a simple physical conflict, which mere violence can solve. This war seeps into the soul, into institutions, into the abstract itself. Pillar of Liberty's staff, however, are committed to rebutting and refuting the mainstream academic consensus in the Philippines, and in the long-term, building alternative institutions. We aim for what Nomadic Prolet once said in conversation:

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conversion and in calorie burning." *Frontiers in Physiology* 9 (2019): 1954.

Elliot, Diane L., et al. "Sustained depression of the resting metabolic rate after massive weight loss." *The American journal of clinical nutrition* 49.1 (1989): 93-96.

Keesey, Richard E., and Matt D. Hirvonen. "Body weight set-points: determination and adjustment." *The Journal of nutrition* 127.9 (1997): 1875S-1883S.

Leibel, Rudolph L., Michael Rosenbaum, and Jules Hirsch. "Changes in energy expenditure resulting from altered body weight." *New England Journal of Medicine* 332.10 (1995): 621-628.

They have as they say their own think tanks; I also add that they have their own beer halls, theaters, gyms, clubs, etc. Any serious political organization, the default 20th century alternative party, is a parallel state. A militia is an added bonus.

## Structure of this Text

This text shall have four parts. It will take some effort on the reader's part to understand it. If the reader cannot understand some words, please use a dictionary or use a search engine to find its meaning. As this is a gentle introduction, no prior knowledge of scholarly or theoretical concepts are assumed.

The first part gives a crash course on foundational ideas needed for the other parts. Selected topics include Philosophy, basic Political and Social Science, and Institutional theory. These simply give a primer on these concepts, and we encourage the reader to continue studying them at length. The second part deals with the analysis of Philippine society and institutions, as advertised. Certain concepts previewed in the first part are explored at length and applied to the Philippines.

The third part goes through various solutions and strategies to overturn the order today. These concern proposals on what should be done after the Establishment falls. Regarding what must be done to take down the Establishment, we at Pillar of Liberty have deduced that mass politics on the national scale works only to an extent, and at best they distract the Establishment from actors working for a permanent, long-term solution. Counter-elites must form and organize on the local level away from the Establishment's eyes, and these groups must secure power bases of resources and manpower. However, discussing what we think must be done is not for this text.

The fourth part holds miscellaneous articles not part of the main text. They present interesting reading for interested readers. The appendix holds a reading list, which also serves as our bibliography. It also holds selected reprinted articles of interest to the reader.

## About the Writers

**Fellglow Keep** is a Financial Statistician, Mathematician, and Computational Scientist. He started Pillar of Liberty initially to promote Kapampangan Independence, but has since taken the newsletter into a new direction towards scholarly analysis and discussions on Philippine society and institutions from a Radical Right-wing lens. He helped write the first three parts of this book with input and edits from the other writers.

**Nomadic Prolet** is an aspiring historian and political theorist for the Philippines. In his youth, he saw how sugar barons dominated Negros, and how the government turned a blind eye to the plight of people like him. He moved to Manila, and through a scholarship grant, worked his way into the academe. From his roots in Marxist scholarship, he discovered how deep the Leviathan really ran in the government, civil service, and civil society. He espouses decentralization and syndicalism against centralized elitism.

**Vexillum** works in Financial Modeling, and has observed the Walls of Jericho enclosing him since youth. He has since become an avid student of René Guénon, Thomism, and Aristotle.

**Ryan Mello** is a scholar in the humanities, and writes when not working. He has seen the professional-managerial caste's decadence and haughty arrogance towards the working caste from youth, and flirted with Third Positionism. He found himself in the Radical Right from discovering Neoreaction. He studies Philippine institutions and society, and the Radical Right's frameworks and analyses have opened his eyes about how Philippine society really works. He helped write the first three parts of this book with input and edits from the other writers.

I

Elementary Political and Social  
Science

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.



## Overview

In this part, we give short and simplified introductions to political and social science. We first start with an introduction to Philosophy, and Aristotle's philosophy afterwards. This first chapter might prove hard to understand, and the reader might skip it if he sees fit. Afterwards, we discuss conceptions of the state, nations, peoples, and race. Then, we give an introduction to Elite Theory, necessary in a country where platitudes against oligarchs and dynasties prevail yet the true elite remain unknown to the general public. We also give exposition on various ideologies and their historical context. We must also give a primer on the political thought of Catholic writers across the centuries. Finally, we explain our occupational castes theory, which seeks to explain society as divided into three broad lines based on knowledge, skills, and expertise—or *human capital*. Contrary to popular belief, we find that those with middle human capital are the elite today, and not the academe—those with high human capital—as some on the right believe.

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## Aristotle's Philosophy

Philosophy comes from the Greek for 'love of wisdom'. Practically, philosophy is divided into related but separate fields: metaphysics, ethics, political theory, and other less prominent but no less important ones. Our main focus in this text is the last-most field. However, we need to give a brief overview of the first two fields as a foundation to latter concepts. One may skip this first chapter to the rest of the text if it proves too heavy reading, although some context will be lost, and we use Aristotle's terms sometimes.

Metaphysics itself relies on two broad concepts: *motion*, the study of change and causality, and *ontology*, the study of being and thinghood. These are foundational concepts to understand concrete reality on an abstract level. Afterwards, we can discuss *ethics*, or how man lives with himself. Understanding ontology allows us to learn what exactly is virtue, and who is a virtuous person. Understanding motion lets us know how one becomes virtuous. Afterwards, we can finally discuss *politics*, or how man lives with his fellow man in society.

Philosophy is a *deductive* field, which relies on assumed first principles called *axioms*, then uses logic to move forward. This approach contrasts with Empirical Science, which uses *induction*, or formulating hypotheses then gaining enough data to reject or fail to reject them. One may contest that Philosophy and deductive inquiry fail against Empirical science and induction in gaining knowledge. However, in principle Science works with simplified, idealized models of reality as working tools. More so, Science relies on deductive principles—set theory, measure theory, probability theory—to ensure that its inductive validations of hypotheses are valid in the first place. Despite relying on these, Science deals only with the quantitative instead of the qualitative—deductive fields like Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy handle this latter area instead. To put the nail in the coffin, the claim that 'Empirical Science is the only source of knowledge' is in fact *a deductive and philosophical claim*. Specifically, this claim concerns *epistemology*, or the study of how man gains

## 1. Aristotle's Philosophy

knowledge.

Hence one rightfully can deduce the existence of God from deductive principles, barring revealed truths about Him unknowable outside Scripture. Of course, knowing God's existence from grace and revelations surpasses knowing Him from philosophy, but God's grace works with whatever situation, and reason aided by grace works wonders to advance His will, human flourishing, and salvation. However, this text will not tackle this question, and we direct readers instead to Edward Feser's *The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism*.

For further reading on what has been discussed so far, one may read Edward Feser's blog<sup>1</sup>, and the introduction ('Prolegomenon') to his book *Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*. For now, we must give a brief exposition on Aristotle's thought. For centuries, Aristotle's and Saint Thomas of Aquino's philosophies have been conflated and mistaken with each other. It did not help that later Thomist philosophers quoted Aristotle and Saint Thomas side by side. In fact, however, Thomism relies more on Neoplatonism than it does on Aristotle. Saint Thomas, and by extension the Medieval Scholastics relied on shoddy translations of Aristotle into Latin, which also often conflated Neoplatonist terms with Aristotle's. Saint Thomas's thought is in reality mostly original, serving as a complete if somewhat inelegant synthesis of Saint Augustine's Neoplatonism with Aristotle. However, one could dig deeper and find contradictions within Saint Thomas's thought.

### On Motion

Just as we seldom realize that we are growing old until we are already old, so do the contemporary actors in a major social change seldom realize that society is changing until the change has already come.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*

We first define two important concepts:

- *Act*: what a subject *actually* is.

---

<sup>1</sup>Located at <https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/>.

- *Potency*: what a subject *potentially* could be.

To illustrate, we use a baseball sitting on a bench. Its Act is sitting on a bench, being made of leather, having dust, and so on. Its Potency is being picked up, falling over from the wind, and so on. This should give a clear picture of act and potency.

Now one naturally asks: are act and potency distinct? Assume that they are, so that we can define a new concept:

- *Motion* (Thomistic): the actualization of potency in a subject.

Hence, assuming that Act and Potency are distinct, a motion in a baseball is going from sitting on the bench to being picked up. In a river, it is the movement of water from the mountain to the beach. In each case, a potency has been actualized.

However, we find a contradiction from treating act and potency as distinct. Take the case of the river. When the water is 500 meters from the beach, its potency includes being 400 meters from the beach. It also includes being 450 meters, 460 meters, 470 meters, even 499.999999 meters from the shore. Should we think that the river actualizes each every potential point in the river? This definition of motion as actualization of potency is nonsensical, redundant, and damaging to common sense. We leave to the reader thinking of an example for the baseball as an exercise.

We find our conception of *Act* limited, and our understanding of *Motion* completely wrong. As a historical note, this conception of the *Act-Potency distinction* was in fact first thought by Plotinus in his *Enneads*, then used by Saint Thomas of Aquino and all other Scholastic philosophers for their work. It remains one of the 24 Thomistic theses mandated in Catholic seminaries by Pope Saint Pius X.

To have more secure foundations, we need two more concepts. These first definitions are circular, since they rely on *Motion*—a term which we don't even have a proper definition of. We will expound on these concepts and how they relate to *Motion* afterwards. For now, we have these two concepts:

- *Energeia/Being at Work*: a motion's completeness/end in the

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*now*/instantaneously.

- *Entelecheia/Being at an End/Being at Work Staying Itself*: Being at Work remaining persistent and definite, in motion towards a purpose/aim/goal.

The Greek word *energeia* comes from *ergonó*, meaning 'deed' or 'work'. The adjective *energon* means 'active' or 'busy' or 'at work'. An *energeia* thus is simply one's state in the *now*: an instantaneous 'being' *at work*. Other translations to give the proper Greek meaning include 'is at work-ness' or 'doing in the now-ness', but these are obviously clunky. Being at work does not correspond with Act per se, since one's Actuality extends from the 'now'. One better understands Being at Work through examples:

- a fish is a fish because its metabolism keeps it alive. The fish *works to be* a fish.
- a human is a human because it is a *rational animal*—an animal that *thinks*. A human *works to be* a human by *thinking*.

Meanwhile, the Greek word *entelecheia* in fact is mixed from three words:

- *Enteles*: 'Complete', 'full-grown'.
- *Telos*: 'purpose', 'aim', 'end goal' (or simply, *end*).
- *Endelecheia*: 'persistence'.

To add, *endelecheia* comes from the Greek root *hexis*, meaning 'active condition'. To persist in a *hexis* requires continuing action there, such that a Being at Work extends and converges to an *entelecheia*, or a Being at an End over time. A few examples:

- A human remains a human because it persists in definite human activities over time towards its end of *eudaimonia*, or true human flourishing.
- A man is a man, and a woman is a woman because each persists towards his or her respective ends: a man is meant to be reproduce externally and be strong and fit, while women are meant to reproduce internally and be gentle and caring. The observation

that men are methodical and women are intuitive also comes from their respective ends.

- A chair persists in its ‘chair-ness’ towards its end of being sat on.

A Being at an End also extends and converges to a Being at Work since the former requires activity and ‘at work-ness’ to persist. In fact, a subject’s *being at work* and *being at an end* are often times one and the same, although one must note that these two concepts are still different. Thus, we have a stronger definition of *Act*:

- *Act*: the overlap between Being at Work and being at an end.

Now while Being at work and Being at an End are different concepts, practically they function as synonyms in many cases. For this section only, we shall treat them like so as Act.

Now since we know that Act and Potency can’t be distinct lest we have a contradiction, we must consider Potencies that are also Actualities. A man who closes his eyes cannot see, and has the potency to see. However, the man who opens his eyes is in the Act of seeing, but he has *not* lost the potency to see. The man with shut eyes has an *inactive potency* of seeing, the man with open eyes has an *active potency*. A man walking to the room’s other side also has not lost his Potency to be walking even while his Act is walking, making it an active potency.

- *Motion* (Aristotelian): Act (Being at an end/*Entelecheia*) of a Potency as a Potency.

We now return to our first definition of *Being at Work*. It is a motion’s end in the now simply because all motions become complete once the subject has reached a *Being at Work*. We can never say the exact moment that a puppy becomes a dog, but once it has become an adult dog, we know that the motion has completed, and what was once a puppy is now a dog, which remains in motion as it grows. Similarly, a human is the completion of the motion of reproduction. The man who sees arrives at the Being at Work of looking at some definite thing, even if only his immediate surroundings. Similarly, the walking man arrives at the Being at Work of being at the room’s other side. In other words, a motion has Being at Work as its end—how motion

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attains completion and unity.

Similarly, *Being at an End* is the persisting completion of *Being at Work* at motion. A human persists in motion as being human through character development and gaining community towards his goal of true human flourishing. Aristotle discusses how to attain true human flourishing in his *Ethics* and *Politics*, which we summarize later on. A woman and a man persist in their being a woman and a man, respectively, through the motions of puberty and learning how to carry their roles, toward their respective ends. Since *Being at an End* is persisting and definite in its completeness, one cannot leave that state without breaking the whole thing. A human ceases to be a body and soul human after death, and so do men and women stop being body and soul men and women after death. Of course, the soul is simply the body in work keeping itself/at an end, but that discussion is for the next section.

This section gives a simplified gist of Aristotle's *Physics*. The reader should read Joe Sachs's article on *Motion and its Place in Nature*, or Aristotle's book itself for more understanding.

### Being, Thinghood, Matter, and Form

By now one has encountered the word *Being* many times. We know of Being at Work, and Being at an End. We also know of Being in Actuality—Act. However, we must now tackle a more ultimate concept: *Ousia*. In Greek, this word means 'permanent property'. These are not mere goods for consumption, but that which remains: land, houses, investments. To ask for a subject's *Ousia* is to use a metaphor: what estate does a bee inherit from being a bee? More generally, what estate does thing  $x$  inherit from being thing  $x$ ? Using the metaphor's source, one can also ask what estate is. A rich man has wealth that lasts him beyond calamity, but a poor man's wealth feeds and lasts him like the rich man's till calamity strikes. Only a few people have wealth, but everyone has wealth. Thus, *ousia* holds together and makes its possessor somebody—that which remains after removing superflu-

ous traits. A bee's *ousia* belongs to all bees, but directly to a few bees. Thing  $x$ 's *ousia* belongs to all Things  $x$ , but directly refers only to some things  $x$ . To spare the reader more headache, we will translate *ousia* as *Thinghood* from now on.

Of course, what the word *Being* means depends on how its used. If *Being* is whatever is left behind after removing characteristics in which two things differ, then *Being* is not universal. But if all things  $x_1, x_2, \dots$  belong to the group of Beings  $x$ , then one should wonder how said group has subgroups. Distinguishing between beings  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  and so on needs finding out whether one has a characteristic or not, but said characteristic either is a subgroup within Beings  $x$  or a non-being. Having both is impossible, such that *being* something must come already divided. To spare the reader even more headache, we will use the word *thing* instead of being from now on.

Thus Aristotle defines categories which being means: quality, quantity, relation, time, place, action, being-acted upon, among others. If a thing is red, is in the Fire Station, pumps water and sounds its siren, arrives when a fire happens, and is 9 meters or so, then one would point to a fire engine being that thing. For other things, however, we could keep going on and on listing categories, yet never figure out their being. If it is standing up, breathing, 5 feet and 1 inch, and is backstage, then from these traits given to us we would never be able to know that this thing is in fact a Korean college schoolgirl expatriate in Manila. Being is more than the sum of its parts or traits or properties. Aristotle calls this a thing's *Thinghood*, a thing as more than the sum of its logical categories. What lives in a hive is a bee with certain properties. Yet a bee is but an animal with certain properties. Yet an animal is but a living thing with certain properties, and living things are things with the property called life. Similarly, said Korean college schoolgirl expatriate is a woman with certain properties, and a woman is a human with certain properties, and a human is an animal with the property of rationality. Beyond the initial level of that certain bee or that Korean college schoolgirl expatriate, we have what we call *Secondary Thinghood*.



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Now we lay down a few more examples. A word is never just the sum of its letters, but more than it. An organization is never just the sum of its members but more than it. A chair is never just the sum of its wood, but more than it. In these examples, we find that the thing is the sum of its parts, plus something else. This 'something else' Socrates and Plato call the thing's *Form*, but which Aristotle calls its Thinghood. The latter holds that Form is not just some figment of the imagination, whether the look to word's coiner or the member list to the organization's founder or the design to the chair's carpenter, just as imagining a unicorn doesn't make the unicorn a 'Form'. Form in fact exists only with respect to sensible things, whether nonliving thing carved by the environment or by the maker, or living things. These latter are perpetually made and remade after their species' forms yet with no craftsman. They are a compound of material and form, but with material always replaced through cell division, death, and replacement while keeping form intact. Our discussion now turns to what Form really is.

Nonliving things, whether chair or rock or pillar are things, but living things are special for they author their own thing-ness: they eat, drink, breathe, and by doing so hold themselves together. Using as example the Korean college schoolgirl expatriate, she may have a cute birthmark, or she may take Economics, or she may be pretty and kind, but she does not have a cute birthmark or take Economics or is not pretty and kind because she is human. These traits are but incidental to her, for she is a self-sustaining thing who breathes, moves, and most importantly thinks. What *she* specifically is on her own, what she happens to be, are simply from happenstance. She moved to Manila, took Economics, is pretty, and acts kind for whatever reason unique to her.

Now just as a statue comes from wood or stone by reducing wood and stone to the statue's form, so too is a Living thing richer, fuller, and more interesting by removing mere facts about them and digging into what remains. Defining a Living thing is to grasp what it is, beyond the fluff and filler onto its very foundation. We have touched

on material, or *Matter* before, and we now define it properly:

- *Matter/Material*: what underlies a thing's Form; potency straining for Form.

Bricks and lumber are Matter for a house, and are things by themselves only in so far as they are Forms for earth and cellulose. One may notice that we have not yet defined Form yet have used it to define Matter. A proper definition, in fact relies on Matter:

- *Form*: Matter at Work Staying the Same/Matter at an End.

In other words, *Form* is simply the *entelecheia* of *Matter*. The wood in a chair moves to their completeness through being built with the purpose of 'chair' in mind. The human body moves to completeness by the deed of thinking towards the ends of *aretē* (virtue/excellence) and *eudaimonía* (true human flourishing), men and women move to their completeness by their respective deeds as men and women towards the ends of manhood and womanhood, respectively.

Now while things hold together from Being at Work and Staying Itself at an End, we may consider how material, concrete reality keeps together. The universe goes in motion, but this motion must have a source, and must have an end which keeps it together. Aristotle calls this motion's source the *First Mover*, who while motionless is not inert. As life is dynamic, inertia is equivalent with death and nonliving. But how could the First Mover be motionless yet inert? Aristotle answers that He is simply fully at Work and complete at all 'nows' and instants—timeless and eternal. A motion ends in a Being at Work, yet to be fully at Work is to never have moved at all yet cause motion all the same. This First Mover, Aristotle calls God. Through sheer deduction without any aid of inductive knowledge, Aristotle shows the First Mover's existence. The First Mover gives reality both existence and unity from a timeless, eternal work of thinking and contemplation, the same way the act of thinking keeps Forms together (provides them unity). Forms exist for man has subtracted (or abstracted) their existence from concrete reality. At the same time, this eternal work of thinking and contemplation is concrete reality's final goal, just as

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a man contemplating an apple can move himself towards it.

Scholastic philosophy, and by extension Catholic theology have unknowingly abandoned Aristotle both from mistranslations into Latin and from Neoplatonist influence. Thomism, the Philosophy of Saint Thomas of Aquino, owes much more to Neoplatonism than Aristotle<sup>2</sup>. However, one concept in particular still remain valid in Aristotle's thought. The First Mover eternally thinks, and thus must also have eternal self-knowledge. The First Mover who eternally thinks that self-knowledge is the Father. The First Mover as object of self-knowledge is the Son—we will discuss what an *Object* is later on. This eternal activity of self-knowledge is the Holy Ghost. These *Hypostases* are fundamental Divine realities, one in Thinghood, yet with three Divine realities. One may wonder why it takes so much theoretical and abstract knowledge to even have the smallest understanding of a basic Catholic belief. We answer that we ourselves prefer this simpler one: the Father shows Charity (*agāpē*) to the Son, and the Holy Ghost is that Charity.

This section gives a simplified gist of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The reader should read Joe Sachs's article on it, or Aristotle's book itself for more understanding.

### Psychology: Study of the Soul

[etc]

Lastly, perceptive readers will note that we have been using the word *Subject* throughout this chapter. We will define it and another word now:

- *Subject*: that which exists in concrete reality.
- *Object*: that which exists in the mind, and are acted upon by the intellect and emotions (or *passions* in Scholastic usage).

These are Scholastic terms, not Aristotelian, but they are sometimes

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<sup>2</sup>to name a few: the Act/Potency distinction, the limitation of Act by Potency, Form as Actualizing Matter as Potency, God as Pure Act.

useful in discussion. For Aristotle, forms exist in so far as their subjects exist, and he would think the notion of an Object ‘existing’ nonsense. The nearest equivalent, a thing’s *Ousia*, is but an intellectual construct for him. Nonetheless, Objects are still useful when discussing matters of mind and heart. Living, breathing velociraptors don’t exist, and neither do naturally born unicorns barring a weird genetic mutation in horses in the future. However, we can speak of Juan dela Cruz shooting and cooking a unicorn for dinner, or riding a velociraptor into battle against the globohomo hordes, while acknowledging their nonexistence in concrete reality. Thomistic Psychology also holds that subjects of concrete reality are copied and duplicated in the mind as a *sense object*. Saint Thomas calls this a *phantasm*, but we prefer sense object since it sounds less weird.

[etc]

## Outdated revision.

### Virtue and Excellence

The Greek word *aretē* means *excellence*, but is usually translated as *virtue*. Aristotle devotes his *Ethics* to studying how man attains virtue, as prerequisite to his true flourishing, or *eudaimonia*. While an important cornerstone of Western thought, most translations and readings of *Ethics* miss the mark on three concepts: *habit*, *mean*, and the end of virtue as *the beautiful*.

### Virtues are not Habits

The word most attached to Aristotle’s ethics is *habit*. A habit is something done unconsciously, mindless routine made permanent. However, this mistranslation of *hexis* makes life seem nothing but a collection of habits, automatic deeds moving without thought. Mere behavioral conditioning is not enough to make one virtuous. A *hexis*, in fact, is an *active condition*. Habits, meanwhile, are but passive ones. Aristotle does say that one’s character, *Íthos* comes from habits, *ethos*. However, we must realize that human life begins governed by de-

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sires and impulses. While habits lasting conditions, the former are momentary, but strong either way. These desires and impulses, or passions, never weaken or go away. Instead, a human's intellect and will become stronger.

These faculties become stronger through sheer effort, with how we respond to events coming our way. Of course, these efforts add to habits—some become cowardly or brave in face of danger, just or unjust in dealing with others, temperate or impulsive in face of pleasure or pain. Living a virtuous life, however, must not be mistaken with habits approved by society and imposed on the young. Standing up when a teacher comes in the classroom, or bowing to a priest are but shows of politeness, especially when rudeness is truth. A parent keeping a child from bad deeds marks the start for braveness, justness, or temperance, but only in so far as parental training stops the irrational force of impulses and desires.

Now Aristotle notes that an active condition depends on Being at Work in a certain way. The road to virtue begins by growing good habits to counter bad habits: practice bravery instead of cowardice, be just instead of unjust, be temperate instead of indulgent. Balancing one force with another leads to equilibrium and neutrality. Character can now step in the void left from this neutrality, and one's nature begins showing.

A human's nature is that of rational animal—marked both by sensual passions and reason. Irrational impulses, while controlled in youth, are no less human than reason is. However, these impulses get transformed by thinking into choices, desires informed by deliberation. Responsibility thus entails using all the soul's faculties: perception, imagination, reasoning, and desiring. Habituation allows this human nature to come out, with our choices leading us to virtue or vice.

## The True Golden Mean and Beauty

Common accounts of Aristotle's ethics say that he claims that Virtue, or Excellence is a *Golden Mean*. Some say this is a balancing act, similar to Confucius's Middle Path. Others say that this mean lies between two extremes, but not necessarily in the exact middle. This latter understanding, which comes from Saint Thomas, nears yet still misses what Aristotle meant. For what merit is there to thinking that we become excellent by fine tuning from both sides? Being excellent looks nothing like walking on a tightrope, ever in anxiety to keep equilibrium. This tension produces nothing but stress, fear, and tiredness.

Now we know that habits counteract other habits to enter some equilibrium. Restraining from all pleasures lies at the opposite end of yielding to all pleasure immediately. Gluttons, drunkards, and the promiscuous are viceful the same way those with sticks up their asses are. However, is a wrestler or a boxer gluttonous just because he needs more food than an office worker? Does a soldier commit viceful anger for fighting in war, the same way a serial killer commits his crimes? If virtue were a balance between extremes, surely a single standard should suffice. Instead of correct quantities of food or intensities of anger, we should seek a right relation to the food eaten or the angry deed done.

Now a glutton would buy desserts yet offer none to his friend when the latter visits. A boring man would not have desserts at all. Someone truly in a Golden Mean would pay no attention to either devouring the desserts or reject the pleasure of eating them. Sharing the desserts with the friend in fact *multiplies* the pleasure. Hence the *true Golden Means* follows once we have reached neutrality from countering bad habits from good ones: *that we may see a situation for what it really is, unclouded by desire or pressure*. We have calmness and clarity that allows us to see what is best and proper for that moment. Virtue is the mean between two habits, such that one may realize what to properly do in a situation.

Fighting a battle against bodily impulses towards some balance is

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thus not a mean, let alone virtuous. Self-restraint produces fear and anxiety, separating rational and irrational parts with tension only to use up one's energy. Man, being both body (pleasure) and soul (rationality), must reach this state of clarity to transform his desires through deliberation into choices. This state of clarity is also an active condition, and one that must be practiced moment to moment. In other words, objectively good choices exist, but what is objectively good may differ in each situation. One should shoot someone trying to kill him in war, but he definitely should not shoot someone for spilling over a drink. A parent should spank a child for disrespecting authority or provoking a fight with his brother, but never for an accident, or for defending himself, or out of sheer anger. This is what the Greeks called *phrónēsis*, practical reason. A better translation is *common sense*—to be excellent is to be sensible. An excellent man discerns right ends and right ways to achieve those ends for particular—not universal—situations. We also see that Saint Thomas's ethical system still misses the mark by assigning virtue as some optimized point between two extreme vices for a situation. His virtue of Prudence is supposed to direct finding this point, yet Saint Thomas still makes the mistake of discounting whether an extreme can be proper to a situation.

We also see that Aristotle's 'Golden Mean' is completely different from Confucius's 'Middle Path'. The latter thinks virtue a balancing act of constant moderation, such that one must thread this Middle Path in constant anxiety. Aristotle's ethics, however, put the 'mean' in a clear view of the situation. His 'mean' is metaphorical, for it means that one lets nothing cloud his judgement, and can choose proper ends for proper ways. To wit, Confucius would think that showing or venting intense anger or frustration is inappropriate for any situation, for it is a release on impulses that violates moderation. Aristotle, however, would see that threatening to kick someone's groin for uncommunicative, duplicitous, and two-faced assholery—to catch his attention and without the intention of actually doing it<sup>3</sup>—is com-

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<sup>3</sup>In Catholic teaching, hyperbole is not lying. A 'lie' in Catholic teaching has a specific

pletely appropriate<sup>4</sup>.

Moving forward, what Catholic writers call ‘vice’, Aristotle simply calls bad character. Someone with free use of intellect and will can and often does yield to indulgence, or greed, or unjustness. A true glutton is not just one who has a bad habit of eating too much, but also one who has decided on a principle that one must yield to eating when the thought comes. To a glutton, his only alternative is to deny the body all pleasure, and live only as a corpse does. However, a truly excellent and virtuous man arrives at virtue neither from intellect or passions, but from passions infused with intellect. Aristotle calls this *anthropos*, right reason and right passions in unity. However, this unity makes them right only for the sake of what unites them—something only the senses can feel.

Once a man can see things for what they are in the mean of clarity, he can perceive forms more accurately. A thing of real beauty is that which moves one to pleasure only for that beautiful thing’s sake, yet this pleasure must come in said clarity and not under bad habits or vice. Thus one who acts bravely for honor, shame, anger, or even from experience doesn’t have virtue, nor does one who acts temperate out of social standing or flattery. Only deeds done for the beautiful thing at stake count. In Thomism, Friendliness counts as a kind of Justice, the latter virtue involving how one deals with other people. However, Aristotle ranks Friendship as higher than Justice, for the former deals with doing good for the sake of someone else alone. Thus sharing desserts with a visiting friend multiplies pleasure, for it was a beautiful deed. Beauty serves not just for looking at, but to move one into action: thus the beautiful ultimately decides what is virtue and what is not.

This section gives a simplified gist of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. The reader

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definition: the words said must completely be out of touch with one’s knowledge. Displaying frustration in hyperbolic fashion does not count. Please also read: Thomas Slater, "Mental Reservation." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 10. (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911). <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10195b.htm>.

<sup>4</sup>Especially if said someone has been claiming that he shall be ‘doing my mother till she comes’, or that he has a crush on my mother, or that he wants to duel me to the death.



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should read Joe Sachs's article on it, or Aristotle's book itself for more understanding.

### Further Reading on Aristotle

For readers already familiar with Thomistic Philosophy, or short on time in general, one may simply read Joe Sachs's articles included in the appendix:

- Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature, on page 203.
- Aristotle: Metaphysics, on page 220.
- Aristotle: Ethics, on page 244.

If one wants to experience Aristotle as the man himself wrote, kindly refer to the following reading order for his most important works:

1. Physics
2. Metaphysics
3. On the Soul
4. Ethics
5. Politics.

Those who have read and understood the appendix articles may skip to Ethics and Politics, then come back to the other three later on. Aristotle's other works build on those stated, and one may read them after understanding those in the reading list.

## Nation, State, Race, and Ethnos

### Nation, Ethnos, and the State

We saw a state of euphoria created by the feeling of absolute superiority, a kind of modern absolutism, coupled with the low cultural standards and arrogance of those who formulated and pushed through decisions that suited only themselves.

Vladimir Putin, *The Empire of Lies*

Before we continue, we need to explain a few political science terms. Many Filipinos have this idiotic notion that a nation is a population and their territory with administering government. These types who don't know their basic political science are also the type to spout idiotic political opinions on social media, so we doubt that they would lay eyes on this book in the first place. Nonetheless, we define terms for convenience either way.

A *nation* is simply a group of people with common identity, which we call the national identity. A nation is not necessarily an *ethnos*, or a people with similar institutions, culture, and language. Back in the day, nation and ethnos meant the same thing, hence the Kapampangans were known as *Nación Pampanga* by the Spanish. Of course, nothing will stop new *ethnoi* from forming as conditions change, and nothing should stop people of different *ethnoi* from forming a civic nation on their own on their own accord. Murray Rothbard notes that:

a “nation” is a complex of subjective feelings of nationality based on objective realities,

the key word being *objective realities*. These objective realities are manifold, with Rothbard listing “communities, languages, ethnic groups, or religions”, among others. Some so-called nations today come from objective falsehoods and lies, which we shall discuss in Part 2.

By the declarative theory of statehood, a nation, their territory (the *country*), ruled by a government holding sovereignty all make up a

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state. Max Weber came up with an alternative theory for modern statehood, which holds it as a *monopoly of violence* over a certain territory. Susan Reynolds renewed the debate on Medieval statehood with her landmark book, *Fiefs and Vassals*:

I offer the following, which is based on Max Weber, with some modification: a state is an organization of human society within a fixed territory that more or less successfully claims the control (not the monopoly) of the legitimate use of physical force within that territory. If one were to deny statehood on this definition to medieval kingdoms or lesser lordships in general, or even to those of the early middle ages, on grounds of the fluidity of their boundaries, the ineffectiveness of control within them, the autonomy, or partial autonomy, of lesser authorities within them, or their lack of sovereignty (however defined), one would have to deny it to a good many modern states as well.

Reynolds, S. (1994). *Fiefs and vassals: the medieval evidence reinterpreted*. Clarendon Press, Chapter 3.

Of course, both the Medievalist and the International Relations scholarship still debates what constitutes a state. Andrew Latham, an IR academic who focuses on Medieval times, follows Reynolds's example and points to the Crisis of the Twelfth Century as statehood's origin. He further claims that Heteronomy, the idea that no uniform ideal form existed regarding political organization, describes only Early and High Medieval times well. Sovereignty in this time existed, and belonged to the political community as a whole instead of a single entity. Rees Davies points out that most historic states have not possessed a monopoly of organized military force and many have not claimed it, such that modern notions of statehood could distort our view of the past:

What this amounts to claiming is that the categories, assumptions and discourse of the post-1800 state, notably the nation-state, are not fully commensurate with the realities of the medieval world. The "state" was not the fully differentiated organisation which we take for granted today. Power was not necessarily delegated from some putative centre, as contemporary legal formulations (especially by royalist lawyers) and the habits of modern constitutional historians often suggest. Power in most pre-industrial societies was extensive and essentially federal, not unitary, hierarchical and centralist (Mann, 1986–93, I, p. 10). Charisma

was not exclusively a royal prerogative. It could equally be claimed by an aristocracy which, as in Germany, defended and explained its power by reference to divine grace (Reuter, 1993, p. 97). It is the uniqueness of the English experience, not its normality, which stands out in this, as in so many other, respects.

Davies, R. (2003). The medieval state: the tyranny of a concept?. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 16(2), 280-300.

Thus in place of a monopoly of violence, there existed control and regulations over legitimate violence. However, discussions about what Medieval sovereignty and authority comprised shifted as the idea of contested authority popped up. Here, Julia Lopez points to four categories of political authority which caused contests between their holders. Neither the heteronomy nor sovereignty concepts fully explain all details behind court decisions, political actions, and historical events. Lopez further justifies her new approach towards Medieval authority:

I examine a variety of legal books, court decisions, and political documents written by these medieval lawyers in both teaching and the daily practice of politics, and show that political authority in the later Middle Ages is best understood as emerging from the contestation between four ordering categories. As semantically related groups of concepts, each of these categories put forward a distinct view of what rule was and a different understanding of how rulers stood in relation to one another—that is, a different order. More broadly, in these four categories we can not only find reflected some of the arguments of statist and heteronomists but also alternative understandings that have been missed in IR because of how the medieval period was approached. After examining the four categories, a final section illustrates how contestation played out in a thirteenth-century high-profile dispute.

Lopez, J. C. (2020). Political authority in international relations: revisiting the medieval debate. *International Organization*, 74(2), 222-252.

These four points [etc]

Either way, the likes of Mises and Rothbard fix themselves only on the monopoly of violence. Weber himself said that this trait describes states in his day, and by extension our day. We find that the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia began this modern trend.

Even if sovereignty existed in Medieval times as per Reynolds and

## 2. Nation, State, Race, and Ethnos

Latham, one should note that its many differences from modern sovereignty. Its manifestation was muted and decentralized, for the political community held it. Some realms, lordships, and states were externally hierchical. Westphalia concentrated sovereignty to the sovereign, in those times a monarch. Here we see that Absolutism crystalized into its most-known form. The seeds lay in England and France after the Hundred Years' War, as the sovereign commanded all armed forces in the realm in an age of New Monarchies. Louis XIII further centralized powers, while England saw civil strife. Westphalia, however, saw monopolies of violence dominate territories in cartel, externally equivalent and internally hierarchical. This transformation stemmed from the Roman civil law's rediscovery in the West, and monarchs' realignment of kingdoms after the Roman ideal:

New formulations of sovereignty, drawing on Roman law and other sources, became very important for the rising territorial monarchs, especially in France, England, and Spain. There were a number of steps along the ideological way. Since Carolingian times, there had grown up the notion of the *corpus mysticum*—the mystical body of the church—a body for which it might, at times, be rightful to sacrifice one's life. The distinguished medievalist Ernst H. Kantorowicz notes that, as early as the campaign in Flanders undertaken by Philip IV (1285–1314), kings began to claim that such a duty was owed to the sovereign ruler. Thus came back to life the classical world's notion of a duty to die for the state—as a secular *corpus mysticum*.

Stromberg, J. R. (2004). Sovereignty, International Law, and the Triumph of Anglo-American Cunning. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 18(4), 29–93.

Indeed, Scholastic conceptions of the political community as bodies with collective/corporate (from Latin *corpus*, meaning body, unrelated to modern corporations) sovereignty found subversion and perversion by royal power:

Kings had resort, as well, to “organic” or “organological” analogies in which individuals subject to a ruler were parts of a body, whose head was the king. Such analogies, as developed in detail by medieval writers, are now derided, but are somehow persuasive when deployed by moderns such as Hobbes, Hegel, or Lincoln. The new law of corporations was also taken on board to help give King or state a real, legal

personality.” Robert Eccleshall notes “the medieval assimilation of political society to a corporation in which authority was said to reside with the collectivity of the members.” Royalist writers readily claimed such corporate authority for the crown. The kingdom, or state, could now be seen as the most inclusive corporate body of all—and suddenly, membership in it was no longer optional.

Stromberg, J. R. (2004). Sovereignty, International Law, and the Triumph of Anglo-American Cunning. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 18(4), 29–93.

Far detached from the Medieval conception, Enlightenment thinkers took the body politic metaphor and twisted it for monopolistic conceptions of power. Hobbes wanted the Leviathan State to impose its will over the populace into all facets of life, allegedly to prevent “war of all against all”. Rousseau wanted the Leviathan State to unchain man from family, community, and ethnicity to allegedly “free” him. The nation and nationalism, which respectively referred to one’s *ethnos* and allegiance to received customs and language, now saw the *civitas* and allegiance to ideology and so-called identity dominate. Of course, civic nationalism is important for civic functions, for a polis comes together from men who wish a common goal. However, the Leviathan State saw an artificial *ethnos* come up from the *civitas*, which subsumed all peoples under the Leviathan’s wing. Hence civic nationalism overrode ethnic nationalism, and even worse these two concepts have been intermixed as national identity overrode ethnic ones. The Westphalian poison simply is the blurring between *ethnos* and *civitas*, civil society turned Leviathan to impose mass uniformity among the people all to the Establishment’s benefit.

### On Race and Peoples

Beyond the *ethnos*, race constitutes another matter for social identity to develop. Often times, race is conflated with phenotype—the sum of physical appearances in humans. As Medieval writers emphasize, however, race doesn’t involve phenotype alone. It refers to a sum of geographically determined biological factors, including tem-

## 2. Nation, State, Race, and Ethnos

perament and physical appearance, among others. To illustrate, the Indian IT and engineer stereotype already existed in Medieval times, as Saint Albert the Great points out in his *On the Nature of Things*:

“Everything generated in a place,” argues Albert, “derives its natural properties from that place.” This “everything” includes the mental and physical properties of human beings. Heat and cold are especially formative: Indians are good at mathematics and magic, because a little heat leads to mental subtlety.

Bartlett, R. (2001). Medieval and modern concepts of race and ethnicity. *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 31(1), 39-56.

Medieval writers themselves distinguished between different races in an ethnos. The Scottish people had the Germanic-speaking lowlanders and Gaelic-speaking highlanders, their respective environments affecting their temperaments and the way that they interact with their received Scottish culture. One chronicler writes thus:

The race of the sea coasts is domesticated, civilized, faithful, patient, cultivated, decently dressed, refined and peaceable, devout in church worship, yet always ready to withstand any harm done by its enemies. The island or mountain race, however, is wild, untamed, primitive, intractable, inclined to plunder, leisure-loving, quick to learn, skilful, handsome in appearance but vilely dressed, and continually fiercely opposed to the English people and language, but also to their own nation, on account of the difference of language. Nevertheless they are loyal and obedient to the king and the kingdom, and also easily subdued to the laws, if they are ruled properly.

In Aristotelian language, race is thus an *entelecheia*, a persistent active state, determined at birth, moving towards the *telos* of biological environmental adaptation for a people at large.

Some may contend that all humans are born blank slates, and that solely nurture determines their behavior, strengths, and weaknesses. Contrary to this growing belief, biological determinants of behavior are well-known in the academe. For starters, temperament is well-known to be genetic. This study confirmed how genetic determinants of temperament existed in different cultures and environments:

We confirmed the replicability of the 51 Finnish single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) sets in healthy Korean (90%) and German sam-

ples (89%), as well as their associations with temperament. The identified SNPs explained nearly all the heritability expected in each sample (37-53%) despite variable cultures and environments. We conclude that human temperament is strongly influenced by more than 700 genes that modulate associative conditioning by molecular processes for synaptic plasticity and long-term memory.

Zwir, I., Arnedo, J., Del-Val, C., Pulkki-Råback, L., Konte, B., Yang, S. S., & Cloninger, C. R. (2020). Uncovering the complex genetics of human temperament. *Molecular psychiatry*, 25(10), 2275–2294.

Temperament is only one part of race. One will see different health markers, like Indo-European descendants having lactose tolerance against the rest of humanity's intolerance, or Chinese people being more at risk when obese to obesity-related illnesses<sup>1</sup>. Many physical racial traits also come from nutritional differences on top of genetics. In one example, the average height of 19-year old Chinese males reached 5 feet and 9 inches in 2019 thanks to increased dietary meat and dairy<sup>2</sup>. In Northern China, long known for taller people on average than Southern China, this change is more pronounced, with many men taller than 6 feet. For another example, the Maori man in 2009 reached 5 feet and 9.1 inches<sup>3</sup>, while other Austronesians like Filipinos remain shorter—in this case, the average Filipino man stands at 5 feet and 4 inches. While genetics do play a large role, one should never discount nutritional factors in making up racial traits.

Now one may also contend that while environmentally-influenced biological differences do exist, they don't amount to broad classifications out of arbitrary classifications, like in America. Modern American racial classification is indeed rife with errors and falsehoods, like

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<sup>1</sup>Dong Wang, Yanping Li, Simin Gharib Lee, Lei Wang, Jinhui Fan, Gong Zhang, Jiang Wu, Yong Ji, and Songlin Li. "Ethnic differences in body composition and obesity related risk factors: study in Chinese and white males living in China." *PloS one* 6, no. 5 (2011): e19835.

<sup>2</sup>Andrea Rodriguez-Martinez, Bin Zhou, Marisa K. Sophiea, James Bentham, Christopher J. Paciorek, Maria LC Iurilli, Rodrigo M. Carrillo-Larco et al. "Height and body-mass index trajectories of school-aged children and adolescents from 1985 to 2019 in 200 countries and territories: a pooled analysis of 2181 population-based studies with 65 million participants." (*The Lancet* 396, no. 10261 (2020): 1511–1524).

<sup>3</sup>Te Ara, Average heights and weights: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/body-shape-and-dieting/page-1>



## 2. Nation, State, Race, and Ethnos


lumping all Turkic tribes under the Caucasian heading, or lumping Southeast Asians with East Asians instead of fellow Austronesian Pacific Islanders, among many other quibbles. This fallacious system, however, does not refute the realities of phenotype and race. In fact, using genetic distance gives a great overview of generalized phenotypes. Whatever accidental properties exist from different habitats, the popular conception of race as phenotype is solidly founded in concrete reality as these people's ancestors congregated in specific areas. For so-called Caucasians, these peoples come from steppe nomadic Indo-European admixture with local hunter-gatherer and farmer populations. A long line of descent from these cultures persists through history. The Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese also share a common ancestry, despite their pre-Confucian cultures being wildly different.

### Outdated revision. Total revamp in 2023.

Biological Essentialism and Aristotle  
The Latin word *Essentia* as used in Scholastic philosophy is a corrupted concept of the Greek *Ousia*. Biological Essentialism is simply the idea that biology determines behavior. From the name alone, we can use an Aristotelian lens to see this question. Aristotle himself said the following regarding the influence of environment on biology, and the latter's influence on behavior:

the nations in cold regions, particularly those in Europe, are full of spiritedness but deficient in thinking and art, which is why they are more successful at staying free, but are nonpolitical and not capable of ruling their neighbors. But those in Asia [Anatolia and Iran], though they have an aptitude for thinking and art in their souls, are unspirited, which is why they stay subject and enslaved. But just as the race of Greeks is in the middle in terms of places, it likewise has a share in both temperaments, for it is both spirited and thoughtful; this is why it both stays free and is best governed, and it is capable of ruling everyone if it were to unite in a single government. And the same distinction holds among the Greek peoples in relation to one another, since some have a one-sided nature while others are well blended of both these capacities. Aristotle, Joe Sachs (ed). Politics. (Hackett Publishing, 2012).

### 2.3. Biological Essentialism and Aristotle



Genetic distances among East Asians, North Asians, and Austronesians. From Yang, M. A. et al. (2020). Ancient DNA indicates human population shifts and admixture in northern and southern China. *Science*, 369(6501), 282-288.

History shows us, however, that the Germans eventually adopted Roman institutions in the 3rd Century, and rule over Western and Central Europe starting from the 5th Century in face of the Late Antique Little Ice Age. Similarly, the non-nomadic Iranian peoples saw upheaval after the Islamic conquests, and this ancient stereotype fell away. However, Aristotle's point that environmental conditions and thus biology affect behavior still stands as we see from the previous section, just not to the complete deterministic extent that he proposes.

We have that biology is our Matter, and behavior is this Matter at Work Staying Itself. Hence biological sex, temperament, and racial traits necessarily compose that which becomes Form for humanity.

## 2. Nation, State, Race, and Ethnos

However, we must remember that some ingredients have a larger effect than others. Biological sex is the most important here since its *telos* goes further than mere environmental adaptation but into an entire life purpose itself. On the other hand, racial traits' effects on behavior may be noticeable, but this aspect of biology can be corrected, fixed, and indeed may ultimately change after a few generations. More important than environmentally-determined traits is a people's Culture—their institutions and values. Environment is our matter, and Culture is our Form. In the next chapter, we will discuss what institutions are, but everyone reading at least should have even a grasp on what Culture is without further explanation.

Societal differences do exist regarding questions of sex, race, and other biological realities. These social constructs, as some would prefer, were indeed constructed by cultural developments. However, these constructs as Form used real, concrete materials as Matter. They developed in response to concrete reality, and people went along since it gave them leverage to living as a community. People naturally have different strengths and weaknesses, and social constructs made best, efficient use of them given their environment, societal context, and responses to changing conditions.

Aristotle would disagree with using hard set rules for Biological Essentialism as a general concept. Rather, its practical applications depend on the context. For sex, gender norms are simply the logical cultural conclusions for real, biological differences between men and women. Nature, whether in the sense of concrete reality, or the Aristotelian/Catholic meaning of *telos*, endowed man with strength and logical thinking, and women with nurture and intuition. For race, biological essentialism is not a hard deterministic rule. Environmentally-adapted biology will affect behavior, but not to an extreme extent as sex. The *telos* of race being environmental adaptation, Medieval writers knew that after a few generations of living somewhere else, a race may disappear simply because the old stimulus that made the race no longer exists.

Regarding the question of intelligence differences, IQ as a statistic is

patently false for its assumed normal distribution without empirical validation. IQ in fact probably follows a fat-tailed distribution. Additionally, confusion exists between verbal intelligence—which use school-learned knowledge, and non-verbal intelligence—which uses abstract thinking and spatial awareness, among others. ‘Inheritance’ in traits also refers to factors not controlled by the inheritor—not necessarily genetic ones<sup>4</sup>. Cultural inheritance confounds studies on IQ among races. Additionally, one must note that IQ differences are mitigated in actual cognitive ability by what we call *metacognition*, or understanding and being aware about one’s own thought processes. A study among primary school students<sup>5</sup> showed that regardless of IQ and prior knowledge, more metacognitive students solved problems better.

Real intelligence differences between races, among other potential differences, need to be measured using correct measurements of intelligence, and correct definitions of races. The classification used by the Human Phenotypes website<sup>6</sup> is a good start for phenotypes. 19th Century classifications also conform to the website’s classification more than the American or many other modern ones. We also need controls for sex, culture, environment, age, and so many other factors.

Above all else, one should account for received wisdom and concrete reality when decision-making. One does not task a man to become pregnant, even if ‘it wasn’t his fault’ that he wasn’t born a woman. Analogously, one would not task a lawyer to perform Mathematics, even if ‘it wasn’t his fault’ that he chose Law over Mathematics. We leave to the reader how this applies to different cultures and peoples as an exercise for now, and will save the question of Multiculturalism for Part 3.


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<sup>4</sup>For a Mathematical discussion of the IQ Fat-tail as a result of genetic and cultural inheritance, see Michael Grabinski and Galiya Klinkova. “Scrutinizing Distributions Proves That IQ Is Inherited and Explains the Fat Tail.” *Applied Mathematics* 11.10 (2020): 957.

<sup>5</sup>H. Lee Swanson. “Influence of metacognitive knowledge and aptitude on problem solving.” *Journal of educational psychology* 82, no. 2 (1990): 306.

<sup>6</sup>Human Phenotypes: <https://humanphenotypes.net/>

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Analyzed genetic clusters. Statistically, six genetic clusters were found to be most significant. However, the sixth discovered cluster was a subdivided South American population. Five broad genetic clusters across the human population are the most feasible. From Rosenberg, Noah A., et al. "Clines, clusters, and the effect of study design on the inference of human population structure." PLoS genetics 1.6 (2005): e70.

## Institutions and Elite Theory

The elitist thesis does not merely assert that in a society the minority makes the decisions and the majority obeys. This is an obvious truism with no power to explain political relationships. That fewer people issue laws, orders and instructions than receive and obey them is a fact scarcely worth commenting upon. The elitist argument is a much stronger one. It is that *the dominant minority cannot be controlled by the majority wherever democratic mechanisms are used.*

Geraint Parry, *Political Elites* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 31

Our next subject shall be the fact that popular movements have resulted in no tangible effects without directions from a minority group.

Elite theory views liberal democracies with suspicion, placing the real source of power to corporate executives, think-tank heads, and lobbying groups. Elections in this viewpoint are a sham to deceive the populace, with elected leaders scapegoats for the unelected elites. Indeed, despite the Philippines adopting elections for leadership succession, a select few with similar backgrounds and interests more often than not gets elected.

Of course, in popular consciousness this unelected elite are boogeymen dynasties and business oligarchs. Taking apart the Manila Establishment to see its inner workings and machinations reveals otherwise. Elite rule lies not in that small minority, but an entire subsection of Philippine society: corporate executives, corporate managers, PRC-regulated professions, government bureaucrats and civil servants, so-called “experts” with little theoretical background, and many more drawn from the professional-managerial caste. The dynasties and oligarchs are but strawmen meant to direct the Outer Party’s hatred towards. We will explore this assertion at length later on in Part 2.

For now, we summarize Elite Theory’s findings. We will discuss how society must have ruling and ruled classes, how mass politics fails in setting policy, how institutional change happens only with

elite changes, and how elites gain and preserve their power.

## The Iron Law of Oligarchy

Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies—from all societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled.

Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Khan (1895; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939)

The first lie we need to demolish is that of popular sovereignty. The ‘people’ in themselves are never sovereign. More importantly, power never rests in the people by themselves. Civil society, like all large organizations, necessarily relies on a minority to handle decision-making. Where sovereignty rests depends on the time period. Medieval states, with localism the norm and the monopoly of violence absent, held sovereignty in the community as a whole. This did not stop communities from relying on admittedly numerous elites and community leaders to give direction using clout. Meanwhile, Early Modern States saw it in the monarch’s person, and present times kept it with the bureaucratic Leviathan. As we see, larger polities and communities necessarily have power and sovereignty rest in proportionately smaller minorities—the “Elite”, so to speak.

The elite’s formation rests in the so-called Iron Law of Oligarchy—organizations which grow large enough need centralized power and authority to maintain cohesion. This centralization manifests in institutionalized bureaucracy and specialization—organization members delegate command to a select few, who divide leadership roles among themselves in different departments. However, this select few inevitably accumulate more power than the governed body despite their election. The members as a whole meet only sometimes, like in elections. Leaders, however, are in constant contact to make plans, carry out programs, and iron out disagreements. These may happen

in private personal negotiations, behind the scenes of session meetings and conventions. But since the leaders operate in close contact with each other, out of the sight of the general membership, they tend to develop their own ways of looking at things. As such, they handpick new leaderships who have similar worldviews and interests to carry their goals.

Now, a minority may have power and force (whether of arms, resources, or whatsoever), but majority assent remains vital to ensure that society operates well. Majority assent to elite rule rests on what Gaetano Mosca calls a *political formula*. In Medieval times, this was the idea of the community as the body politic. This kept fragmented authorities and the community folk in general from tearing each other apart without an external coercive force. In Early Modern Times, the Divine Right of Kings held sway. Imperial China has the Mandate of Heaven, applied post-hoc by victorious dynasts. These days, we have the so-called ‘will of the people’. Political formulas need not exist in community or state politics only. Companies have merit and connections as political formulas, and schools have scholarship and academics, to name two examples.

The elite also have incentive to get a subclass of aides and assistants to help them rule. Vilfredo Pareto calls this subclass the ‘non-governing elite’, contrasting with the publicly visible ‘governing elite’. The same story permeates Western history: sovereigns and governments, whether King, Emperor, Aristocracy, local cities and communities, all came to rely on civil servants and bureaucrats to handle daily actions. Beyond civil society, companies, corporations, universities, media organizations, all these came to rely on a class of assistants, managers, and associates to handle overhead. In time, this subclass itself became the dominant force in society—and this is the main thrust of the *Managerial Revolution*, which we shall explore later in Part 2.

Therefore, the main thrust of Elite Theory is that popular opinion and mass politics matter not beyond some notion of assent to the ruling class. Most decision-making happens without input from the



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people. To illustrate using the United States,

Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy, our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America's claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened.

Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. *Perspectives on politics*, 12(3), 564-581.

In a more relevant case, Philippine state policymaking rests more on input from connections and hierarchical pressure than from popular opinion:

Providing statistically significant evidence for the effects of political influence (or presidential appointments) and hierarchical pressure (or the vote of the Chief Justice) on related networks, our analysis suggests a continuing tension on the Supreme Court bench between professionalism and informality.

Dressel, B., & Inoue, T. (2018). Informal networks and judicial decisions: Insights from the Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1986–2015. *International Political Science Review*, 39(5), 616-633.

One can summarize Elite Theory like so: *Culture is downstream of politics*. Societal institutions, if they are not created by the Elite, are preserved and maintained by them. Hence Curtis Yarvin points to Medieval times, where secular aristocracies, landowners, guild masters, and fathers kept the Catholic Faith alive and well beyond physical churches. This *Cathedral* over Europe, as he metonymically calls it, lasted for centuries until increasing centralization among European powers put the Church's grip on society under threat. Absolute monarchies curtailed the Church's powers, and the so-called Cathedral was no longer the Catholic Church. In this day and age, the Cathedral is but the Professional-Managerial Elite mentioned earlier, not just over Europe but over the entire world. Of course, individual nation-states still have separate interests. The United States

seeks its unipolar powers' preservation, Russia and China contest it for multipolar goals. However, these nation-states and many others have the Managerial Revolution's shadow lingering over them, and the Philippines is no exception.

## Elite Circulation and Counter-Elites

The essence of oligarchical rule is not father-to-son inheritance, but the persistence of a certain world-view and a certain way of life, imposed by the dead upon the living. A ruling group is a ruling group so long as it can nominate its successors. The Party is not concerned with perpetuating its blood but with perpetuating itself. Who wields power is not important, provided that the hierarchical structure remains always the same.

Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism

The process of elite creation now explained, a more pressing question is how elites are replaced. The greatest danger facing a large organization is when a leadership develops values at odds with members at large. Ordinary members may take an interest in the organization from time to time, but otherwise the organization is not the center of their lives. However, powerful leaderships may receive salaries and prestige from their role. They seek stability and risk aversion. Organizational cohesion becomes their prime motivation. Short-sighted comfort-seeking behavior soon brings them into conflict with members. Prime examples are union leaders who mingle too much with corporate executives, socialist deputies sitting with sons of powerful men. Removing corrupted leaderships becomes hard for leaderships retain monopolies of power, authority, and sometimes even force. Most damagingly, leaderships are better organized and equipped for their status merits their position in the first place.

Thus popular uprisings and rebellions rarely succeed. For every George Washington or Adolf Hitler, revolutionary leaders backed by a small yet strong and organized supporting group, a thousand unorganized and unlead rebellions smoldered. No rebellion suc-

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ceeds excepting leadership by a counter-elite. In Medieval Nantes, Count Hoel III faced rebellion from discontented citizens. England sent Geoffrey of Anjou, cousin to King Henry II, to aid the rebellion and depose the Count. The Nantaise asked the King whom to invite as count, to which Henry suggested Geoffrey. Rebellions in this time without a monopoly of violence could not succeed without an elite leadership—what more for today, when states wield Leviathan power?

Though congruent with history, Pareto forms from first principles his concept of *Elite Circulation*, or how societal elites are replaced. He bases his analysis on his concept of *residues* and *derivatives*, which we shall explain.

#### Residues and Derivatives

Pareto begins his deduction from noticing that human action is divided into 'logical' and 'non-logical' action. The former must satisfy these criteria:

1. aims towards some goal
2. said goal is possible
3. appropriate steps conducted towards said goal.

Much of human action, being spur of the moment, habitual, or routine, necessarily fails to satisfy these. Pareto now sees 'non-logical' human action as manifesting from what he calls 'sentiments'. Pareto calls these manifestations *residues*, which he calls such since they *remain* after what he calls *derivatives* are stripped away. A *derivative*, simply put, is the cultural rationalization of residues. For example, sentiment leads to the residue of the family. Cultural rationalizations—or derivatives—of the family differ. To illustrate, Chinese Neo-Confucianism sees filial authority as divine law, trumped only by that of the State and Emperor. Meanwhile, Medieval Scholastic thought emphasizes parental duty and obligation towards children, and how parents who fail their task will reap consequences later in life. How-

ever, these cultural differences fail to erase the common residue between these two cultures.

In an Aristotelian lens, both what Pareto calls ‘sentiments’ and ‘residues’ simply correspond to man’s *telos*, and form part of his being at an end. We must never forget that man, being body and soul, has biological needs and drives animated by cognition. Real virtue needing body and intellect in one unified motion, so-called ‘logical action’ thus moves to these residues as its goal.

These residues ultimately reduce into six classes. Pareto himself lists 40 residues corresponding with 20 sentiments, but these six form the gist of his thought.

1. Instinct for Combinations
2. Group persistences
3. Self-expression
4. Sociality
5. Individual integrity
6. Biological sex.

Most relevant to our discussion are Class 1 and 2 residues, which correspond to progressive and conservative tendencies, respectively. Class 1 residues represent man’s capacity to combine or manipulate objects from sense perception. At its most basic level, Class 1 residues revolve around man’s ability to subtract from concrete reality. Memory leads to experience, which is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge and art. The latter, however, depends more on knowledge than on experience, and subtraction allows knowledge to exist in the first place.

Beyond mere cognition, Class 1 residues drive man to do financial manipulation, merge businesses, make or break political units, or form and reform empires. In short, this residue deals with systems, its resulting quasi-logical combinations of ideas leading to ideologies and philosophies. These residues also let derivatives to exist.

Class 2 residues, meanwhile, represent man’s impulse to keep al-

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ready existing combinations. Familial, tribal, community, or even national ideas belong to this class. Hence we also find the idea that property is part of a person's being, and ideas like God, natural law, progress, and civil society to fall under this class. This residue is again built into man's being at an end, as Aristotle elegantly writes:

Since we see that every city is some kind of association, and every association is organized for the sake of some good (since everything everyone does is for the sake of something seeming to be good), it is clear that all associations aim at something good, and that the one that is most sovereign and encompasses all the others aims at the most sovereign of all goods. And this is the one called the city, the political association.

Politics, Book 1, Chapter 1

Men who benefit from current combinations must want to keep them, and this conservative tendency thus pops up. Families and communities aim for mutual benefit among all members, and naturally persist through time.

Of course, these two residues do not necessarily correspond to left-wing or right-wing ideas. Men with strong Class 2 tendencies may easily perpetuate Leftist ideas in society, and those with Class 1 tendencies could agitate for dissent against Leftist institutions, as the Radical Right easily attests to. What indeed happened over the past century was an incremental Class 1 programming of the social order, and Class 2 institutionalization of the former. Robert Conquest's Three Laws of Politics summarize this trend:

1. Everyone is conservative about what he knows best.
2. Any organization not explicitly right-wing sooner or later becomes left-wing.
3. The simplest way to explain the behavior of any bureaucratic organization is to assume that it is controlled by a cabal of its enemies.

The first law refers to Class 2 tendencies, the second law refers to the Class 1 programming of Leftist ideas. The third law, however, needs more explaining, which we shall do later on.

## The Circulation of Elites

Niccolo Machiavelli once wrote that any organizational leader must combine two natures within him:

There are two ways of striving for mastery: the one by the law, the other by force. The first method is proper to men, the second to beasts, but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. . . it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, one must be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to fend off wolves.

Niccolo Machiavelli

In Pareto's theory, the fox corresponds with Class 1 residues, while the lion corresponds with Class 2 ones. Just as any leader must strive to be *both* feared and loved, he must also adopt both natures within him. However, a leadership or rather elite at large may not all successfully reconcile bodily impulses and cloud-reaching intellectual pursuits. Division of labor has that some elites prefer using subtlety and guile to maintain institutions, while others use directness, frankness, and even force.

Elites being divided among these types, the ratio of primary foxes and lions necessarily changes time and again. How open or closed an elite is rules how much elites circulate. An elite that gets too greedy for power will keep their ranks closed, and sooner or later this lack of new blood makes the elite stagnate. Internal revolutions and external threats will make a closed elite collapse. Note that new blood doesn't necessarily mean literal bloodlines. Schools of thought, ideology, and practice also become "bloodlines" and have become such today. The United States, for example, always meant for an Aristocracy to appear. On paper, merit becomes this Aristocracy's determinant. However, institutional changes have made a strand of Liberalism to become the Elite's 'bloodline'. We discuss this at length when

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discussing the Managerial Revolution.

Now, organization and planning means that foxes rise to the elite sooner or later. Lions, or those with Class 2 tendencies, tend to reside among the rules rather than the elite. Nonetheless, Class 2 residues must exist in the elite to keep their power using force, and a healthy circulation will keep the elite from complacency. We see, however, that Class 1 elites often predominate in society. In fact, Class 1 residues have become overproduced today. Many men with Class 1 residues thus become excluded from the ruling strata. Because of this, conditions today are especially relevant, for ideology and a certain personality determine 'bloodline'. A replacement of elites thus happens when enough foxes get lumped with the masses such that the latter organize and plan effectively, then use their superior Class 2 residue numbers to overthrow the current elite with force.

Hence the American Revolution relied on landowners, merchants, and military veterans for leadership. The French Revolution relied on the First and Second Estates until crafty figures among the Third Estate hijacked the Revolution and took power for themselves. Vladimir Lenin spent over two decades building organizational infrastructure for his faction of Bolsheviks to take over when good conditions appeared in 1917. The Philippine Revolution itself depended on Tagalog young professionals as its organizing force, convincing the Tagalog nobility and merchantry to form a new elite, which dominates the Philippines until today. Provincial and ethnic figures served and still serve as vassals and puppets to this new elite.

Once an elite are in place, they must craft a narrative to justify their hold on power. Ideologies and political formulas only work so far, and give good cause to expose the elite as hypocrites. This need for a narrative now gives rise to what we call the *High-Low/Middle Mechanism*.

## High and Low Against the Middle

When a strong man, fully armed, mounts guard over his own palace, his goods are left in peace; but when a man comes who is stronger still, he will take away all the armour that bred such confidence, and divide among others the spoils of victory. He who is not with me, is against me; he who does not gather his store with me, scatters it abroad.

Luke 11:21–23

While an elite may have force and resources, it still needs popular support to keep society running smoothly. Whatever the political formula, power remains in the elite out of an unspoken alliance between high and low. Here, the narrative speaks that an oppressor group, the ‘middle’, poses threat to the low. The high stays in power to keep the low safe from the middle. While it is clear who the high and the low are, the middle’s being is ambiguous from the name alone. They are not necessarily the middle class, or any middle strata for that matter. The middle form an aristocracy of their own, and can easily stand independent of the high’s grasp. In other words, the middle pose a threat to the high whenever the former remains independent. Hence the high keep them in check, while maintaining their grasp on the low. The middle may be called ‘subsidiaries’, for the high, or “center”, give them even nominal grasps on power to remain satisfied:

These subsidiary centres can be seen as delegates of the centre, and act in its name and under its authority. Jouvenel termed the elements that comprise this category ‘social authorities’, and by this he meant such entities as the nobility, families, corporations, trade unions, and any other institution within an order which can demand the obedience and allegiance of those within that order in conjunction with the central governing apparatus, or Power.

C. A. Bond, *Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. The Liberal Model of Human Orders* (Perth: Imperium Press, 2019).

What we call the middle class today simply compose the higher strata of the low. Small business owners and small landowners fall under this strata today. From families here, bureaucrats, civil servants, so-called ‘experts’, and young professionals may rise to the power center and form the lower strata of the high. The most competent and



### 3. Institutions and Elite Theory

skilled of this lower strata, however, may pose a threat to high when left unchecked.

This mechanism thus caps elite theory in general. The ruling class justifies their political formulas as keeping the middle away from the low. The circulation and replacement of elites happens when a power center becomes too weak, and the former middle becomes a stronger high to keep their hold. The middle provide a convenient boogeyman for the high to point against. Later on, we shall see how society today forms itself around three rough occupational classes. We shall also see that in the Philippines, the so-called “oligarchs” and “dynasties” serve as subsidiaries for the regime, and provide it and its enforcers a convenient boogeyman to rattle sabers against. These problems are simply symptoms of a much bigger disease.

#### Institutions against Individual Action

A fault in the interpretation of observations, seen everywhere, is to suppose that every event (defect, mistake, accident) is attributable to someone (usually the one nearest at hand), or is related to some special event. The fact is that most troubles with service and production lie in the system... I should estimate that in my experience most troubles and most possibilities for improvement add up to proportions something like this:

- 94% belong to the system (responsibility of management)
- 6% special [from fleeting events]

Deming, W. E. (2018). Out of the Crisis. MIT press.

A *social institution* simply refers to established practices and customs. Many institutions arise from needs among people, including the family and civil society. Pareto's residues lay fertile ground for institutions to be derived, with variations from local or tribal needs and wants.

Institutions may exist spontaneously, whether the family, language, or so-called 'gender' norms. These are what we call *informal institutions*. Others exist from force of law, which we call *formal institutions*. This second class ranges from bureaucratic regulations to al-

lowed ideas and schools of thought. Nonetheless, whether informal or formal institutions prevail, what is common is that they exist only through elites.

An elite that rules society can dictate what practices will continue and what becomes obsolete. Informal institutions remain and are preserved because an elite lets them remain and be preserved. If these rub an elite the wrong way, they will use force and coercion to impose formal institutions on society. Most of all, institutions requiring two parties to abide and agree require an external enforcer. An elite dictates who this external enforcer will be. In modern times, the State acts as external enforcer, while in Medieval times elites existed to regulate and control market-derived enforcers. Even an anarcho-capitalist society is not ‘anarchic’ in the word’s proper sense, for private security agencies and alternative dispute resolution agencies will appear to impose order.

Now one may contest that individual action matters more than institutions, and personal change have more effects in the long run. Only the most sheltered and most privileged would unironically think so:

The usual explanation offered by the man on the street for recall of automobiles is careless workmanship. This is entirely wrong. The fault, where there is any, lies with management. The fault may be in the design of some part, or in failure of management to listen to the results of tests, being too eager to put a new product on to the market before the competition beats him to it. Management may disregard early warning from tests conducted by the company’s own engineers, and reports of trouble from customers. No amount of care or skill in workmanship can overcome fundamental faults in the system.

Deming, W. E. (2018). *Out of the Crisis*. MIT press.

Institutional ailments not affecting a small subset of the population in fact benefit this small subset. One need only see how Bongbong Marcos’s victory was greeted with disgust from those who benefit from existing conditions. While Marcos will only maintain the past 30 years of institutions, his image of being of another ‘bloodline’—popular perceptions of being illiberal and undemocratic—is enough

### *3. Institutions and Elite Theory*

to rile the ruling class against him. Institutional controls, however, will definitely stop someone trying to impose radical change through legitimate means.

Indeed, the electoral process can only provide short-term victories against a regime, which while important, will never snowball without organized resistance to said regime. Institutional change happens only with elite circulation and replacement, and individual actions are better directed to fostering a counter-elite's formation rather than useless pursuits beyond such actions that benefit the counter-elite. We shall discuss later on how ideology has become a contemporary 'bloodline' which makes one viable for 'inheritance' from the elite today. For now, we shall present exposition on the historical development of different ideologies, and lay down their basic points.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## On Ideologies: A Historical Note

*by Ryan Mello*

[etc]

Absolutism: From Medieval to Modern

[etc]

Absolutism, Managerialism, and Revolution

[etc]

Liberalism: Classical and Modern

[etc]

Classical Liberalism finds its roots in the Enlightenment, although fully manifests in the 19th century. As the French Revolution's excesses

The Liberal conception of the State as monopoly of violence follows:

1. Originally, in the state of nature, mankind had lived outside of any social relations, i.e., in exclusively extrasocial relations, side by side with each other and in a state of complete freedom and equality.
2. However, in this state of affairs the natural human rights and liberties were not secure.
3. Hence, people associated with each other and delegated the power to arrange for and assure general, all-around protection and security to one or several people among them.
4. Through this institution of a state [as monopoly of violence], then, the freedom of each individual would be better and more securely safeguarded and protected than before.

#### 4. *On Ideologies: A Historical Note*

[etc]

### Conservatism and Reactionaryism

[etc]

### The Many Libertarian Strands

[etc]

### Socialism, Communism, and Historical Materialism

[etc]

### Fascism and National Socialism

[etc]

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.  
The Paleo Alliance, Neoreaction, and the Radical  
Right

[etc]

## Catholic Political Scholarship

Catholicism's intellectual tradition inherits a long line of political theory, with basic thought coming from the Church Fathers themselves. Saint Augustine summarizes the Church's stance in his *City of God*:

Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, "What you mean by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, while you who does it with a great fleet are styled emperor."<sup>1</sup>

Thomist thought follows this line, putting the *telos* of political governance in *distributive justice*—a community rendering dues to its members. This, by the way, differs from *commutative justice*—rendering dues between two people, from simple friendship to buying and selling. Now, modern readings of Catholic thought and infallible Church teaching lends itself to many errors. For example, many think that the Church teaches *Distributism* as its political theory. This reading comes from GK Chesterton's and Hillaire Belloc's own misreadings of encyclicals *Rerum Novarum*. Further confusion comes from misreadings of *Quadragesimo Anno*.

[etc]

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<sup>1</sup>Saint Augustine of Hippo, *City of God*, Chapter 4—How Like Kingdoms Without Justice are to Robberies. Translated by Marcus Dods. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series*, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight.

## Authority and Coercion

Civil authority simply refers to the moral power of command.

[etc]

An authority figure thus have access to coercion to ensure civil society's cohesion.

[etc]

## Civil Society as the State

[etc]

One definition of the state comes from Scholastic philosophy, and is congruent with Right-libertarian private-law societies:

The common view of Scholastic philosophy, so ably developed by Francis Francisco Suárez, S.J., sets [the state] in the consent of the constituent members, whether given explicitly in the acceptance of a constitution, or tacitly by submitting to an organization of another's making, even if this consent be not given by immediate surrender, but by gradual process of slow and often reluctant acquiescence in the stability of a common union for the essential civil purpose.

Macksey, C. (1912). Society. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. New York: Robert Appleton Company.

This line of thought is an old one, with Medieval societies

No man may make himself a king, for the people have the option to choose him for king who is agreeable to them: but after that he has been hallowed as king, he has power over the people, and they may not shake his yoke from their necks.

Aelfric of Eynsham. *The homilies of the Anglo-Saxon church*. (Project Gutenberg, 2011).

Another definition comes from Karl Ludwig von Haller's *Restoration of Political Science*, and is also congruent with Right-libertarian private-law societies:

Luigi Taparelli, S.J., borrowing an idea from Karl Ludwig von Haller of Berne, brilliantly developed a theory of the juridical origin of civil government, which has dominated in the Italian Catholic schools even to the present day, as well as in Catholic schools in Europe, whose pro-

fessors of ethics have been of Italian training. In this theory civil society has grown into being from the natural multiplication of cognate families, and the gradual extension of parental power. The patriarchal State is the primitive form, the normal type, though by accident of circumstance States may begin here or there from occupation of the same wide territory under feudal ownership; by organization consequent upon conquest; or in rarer instances by the common consent of independent colonial freeholders.

Macksey, C. (1912). Society. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. New York: Robert Appleton Company.

These two Catholic views differ in their primitive juridical determinant of authority. Otherwise, [etc]

The encyclical *Rerum Novarum* also offers this definition

By the *State* we here understand, not the particular form of government prevailing in this or that nation, but the State as rightly apprehended; that is to say, any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law, and to those dictates of the divine wisdom which we have expounded in the encyclical *On the Christian Constitution of the State*. The foremost duty, therefore, of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the commonwealth, shall be such as of themselves to realize public well-being and private prosperity.

Now we must learn what Anarchy is in the Catholic sense. Here, *Anarchy* is simply the absence of laws or their enforcement. It does not concern mere monopolies on violence or coercive actions—this definition of Anarchy is the complete lack of restraint on man, including contracts.

As a corollary, we find that the label ‘Anarcho-capitalism’ is useless and misleading. Its proponents define terms different from what most people do. A ‘state’ in political science is simply the four concepts of people, land, ruler, and autonomous control (*not* monopoly) over violence. In Catholic terms, a ‘state’ is simply Hoppe’s and 90s Rothbard’s private law societies going beyond the NAP. ‘Capitalism’ also has different definitions, whether the Marxian sense of hierarchical businesses, the Weberian sense of markets and property, or informal, daily use which conflates both. Some strands of so-called ‘Anarcho-capitalism’ which are strict with the NAP are better



## 5. Catholic Political Scholarship

off calling themselves ‘Propertarians’—with ethics and law reduced to a question of property rights. Other strands recognizing the role of tradition, community, and civil society—like Hoppe, Rothbard, and Rockwell—should drop the label entirely and instead give a bullet point list of what they believe in. We save discussion on whether the NAP is any good, however, for Part 3.

### Distributism is Socialism with a Blanket

*Rerum Novarum* explicitly says that its purpose stays in the context of Medieval institutions being abolished, most notably that of guilds:

In any case we clearly see, and on this there is general agreement, that some opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class: for the ancient workingmen’s guilds were abolished in the last century, and no other protective organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion. Hence, by degrees it has come to pass that working men have been surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hardheartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition. The mischief has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is nevertheless, under a different guise, but with like injustice, still practiced by covetous and grasping men. To this must be added that the hiring of labor and the conduct of trade are concentrated in the hands of comparatively few; so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the laboring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself.

Contrary to popular beliefs that the guilds were restrictive regulatory cartels, this modern notion only became truth in Early Modern times. In Medieval times, guilds were voluntary brotherhoods and associations of producers and entrepreneurs. They swore to uphold by-laws as one body, and [etc]

## 6


### What is a Midwit?

What makes man a *rational animal* is his *cognitive faculty*. In other words, man can think abstractly beyond what he can sense. Aristotle calls this ability *subtraction*, but for convenience we stick with the modern term.

Being wise means that one abstracts better than others, and that one can work with abstract concepts well. As Fr Garrigou-Lagrange writes, “why is it said that the wise man knows the most difficult things? It is... because he knows the first and most universal causes, which are the most difficult to know, for they are far above the level of sensible things, which are the first things that we know.”<sup>1</sup>

Since wise men exist, unwise men necessarily also exist. Hence some people have better abstract reasoning than others. This is not bad, for a division of labor between physically and intellectually stimulating tasks will happen. However, there are some people who fall in the middle.

Vox Day coined the word “midwit” to mean those with above average IQ yet also below genius level<sup>2</sup>. Whatever problems the IQ concept has, one cannot deny that midwits do exist, and they have a certain style of thinking. Let me give an extreme example: suppose a midwit named Maurice was asked what would come next in this pattern:



<sup>1</sup>Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP. *The Sense of Mystery: Clarity and Obscurity in the Intellectual Life*. Emmaus Academic, 2018.

<sup>2</sup><https://voxday.net/2012/02/17/tragedy-of-mid-witted/>

## 6. *What is a Midwit?*

Maurice would answer that “we cannot infer from repeated observations what will happen next!” He answers this for he has read about Hume’s Problem of Induction, and now knows better than the one who asked him this question. Unfortunately for Maurice, he was given a question from an abstract reasoning test, where patterns were designed to be reliable and repeated. His job was to use his brain to figure out the pattern, for abstract reasoning separates man from beast. Instead, he applied a completely different framework than what fit the situation.

I often say that midwits “focus on accidents over substances.” For those who don’t know philosophy, this simply means that midwits look at the surface level and jump to conclusions. Yet this phrase is wrong, for midwits not only focus on the surface level: they think that the surface level is a general truth. Take for example a former friend of mine. He thought that the word “fallow” was too deep for him. Therefore, Medieval farmers surely also didn’t use the word in their daily work – because my former friend thought it was too deep for him. Never mind that “fallow” is an agricultural word well-used by farmers, or that “fallow” comes from Anglo-Saxon, or that just because a word is deep for him, it doesn’t mean that it’s deep for others. My former friend went on to give typical excuses. “Yeah, but only smart literate farmers used that word.” “Yeah, but most people were too dumb to know that word.” Compare this to Uniqlo employees claiming that their wares were made in Japan, only to be told that the print says that they were made in China, then to wave it off as being of “Japan quality.” Midwiterity is a pox that ruins friendships, and by extension societies.

One may see that many Millennials and their Zoomer followers glee in contradictory statements. “You’re just like me with my difficulties, so I’m nothing like you.” “I must be worthless without your looks or your talents. But if you can accept yourself for who and what you are, then you are cool and self-assured.” “You can do anything yourself as long as you don’t judge yourself or anyone else, because judging is bad. By the way, you are yourself, only if you wear the right

clothes that reflect your own unique identity.”

From these examples, the reader can surely get an idea of how midwits act. In general, the midwit loves aphorisms and out-of-context quotes, thinking that they substitute as philosophy. This trait generalizes to a love for bureaucratic definitions, rules, and regulations. Midwits will point to Senate bills’ definition of terms, and they will think that the way the Senate uses words is how most people use words. Midwits especially love red tape, for it lets them squeeze their butts out of tight situations. They don’t want to exercise prudence or thinking, only to have convenient rules and regulations. This passivity in decision making extends to passivity in other areas of life: security, welfare, livelihood, etc. The overbearing welfare state is a midwit invention first and foremost.

Aristotle gives virtue as the cure for midwitory: virtue is not some hard rule of a middle ground between two extremes. Virtue is having both right reason and right desire that lets a man view a situation with clarity. To be virtuous is to make the right decisions for particular situations, to know when to apply rules and not just to follow them. Vox Day ends his essay on the midwit like so:

Genius is neither a state of being nor the possession of potential, it is the completion of material intellectual accomplishment. Mozart had enormous musical gifts, but even such a prodigy would not have been a genius had he not troubled to take the time and effort required to compose his music. Newton had one of the most astonishing minds ever possessed by man, but he would not have become one of the most awe-inspiring geniuses of history had he never stopped to think about his casual observations of the material world. Genius is not born, it is self-created.

I suggest that before you can reach a place that requires effort, you must first realize that you are not already there.

Unfortunately, midwits rule society today. We shall now explore how they do so by discussing what we call the *Three Occupational Castes*.

## The Three Occupational Castes

While popular discussion focuses on income classes, material wealth rarely amounts to anything by itself. Indeed, good looks and physical strength matter too, as well as character and psychology. Till recently, no one called for equality and affirmative action for these traits. However, as marks humans as rational animals, what economists call *human capital* provides a great indicator for castes and classes today. Unlike what most would think, however, the highest strand of society comes not from the highest strands of human capital.

### Modern Castes

If we define *caste* to be a social group with its own status system, then one immediately notices that contemporary society does have its own caste system. Curtis Yarvin attempted his own classification in 2007 for the United States. While inaccurate in many respects, we find it a convenient starting point for our own analysis.

- Brahmins: defined by scholarly achievement, intellectual profession, and a position of civic responsibility. This caste comprises everyone from doctors and lawyers to artists and scientists.
- Dalits: gain wealth and power through extralegal means, with men working in shady professions and women receiving welfare or payments from men. This caste comes from immigrants, like the Italian mafia or Mexican cartels or Black American gangs. What few White American Dalits exist today do so in remote areas like the Appalachians.
- Helots: an imported peasant caste from Central America, with hard work, money, and power determining standing. Women gain standing through attractiveness and motherhood. The children of Helots tend to grow up as Dalits, which we discuss below.

## 7.2. *Human Capital as Society's Organizing Line*

- Optimates: the United States's fallen elite determined by breeding, personal character, and to an extent birth and wealth. These served as America's intended non-hereditary Aristocracy from the Revolution to around World War 2.
- Vaisyas: centered on 'Middle America': small-town Americans with stable employment, family life, and standing from wealth. Vaisya women gain standing from attractiveness, motherhood, and social participation, although recently they have also started working in unintellectual white-collar jobs.

Conflict between these castes, the BDH-OV conflict, is supposed to fit with the left-right divide. However, this system has many flaws when applied to reality. To start, Optimate children now go into professional jobs, and have a notion of meritocracy from their profession. Scholarly and professional work have also diverged a lot, for they need different requirements and use different rule and skill sets. Professional and technical work especially sees increased competition from the college degree oversupply problem. The influence of 'Dalit' crime families and cartels has decreased, barring exceptional areas like parts of Mexico or run-down city blocks. Finally, one can see an increasing number of Helots and even 'Vaisyas' relying on subsidies and welfare.

Thus, instead of mere wealth or profession, we present a new system which uses *Human Capital*—skills and knowledge—as society's organizing line.

### Human Capital as Society's Organizing Line

This is the secret which civilization has guarded—that power and influence come through the acquisition of useless knowledge. The answer is, therefore, to destroy the effect of education—by making it relevant. Replace pure by applied mathematics, logic by computer programming, architecture by engineering, history by sociology. The result will be a new generation of well-informed philistines, whose charmlessness will undo every advantage which their learning might otherwise have conferred.

## 7. *The Three Occupational Castes*

Roger Scruton, 1983

Using human capital as our organizing line, we can posit a right-skewed distribution along which three castes emerge:

- Working caste: these work jobs that require low theoretical knowledge. They are not necessarily just peasants or proletariat in the Marxian sense, since our typology includes the petty bourgeoisie, kulaks, and other small-scale traditional factor owners. The main draw between the working castes is their little need for theoretical knowledge, supplanted by experience in the field, boots on the ground decision making, craft dedication, and character shaped by their work.

Except for a brief period in Soviet Russia before Lenin's New Economic Policy among other brief time periods, this working caste has never been much suited for rule without the other two castes. This caste thus corresponds much with Pareto's Class 2 residues, although we do not discount crafty schemers emerging here.

- Academic caste: these work jobs that require high theoretical knowledge, whether researchers, academics, or scientific consultants. Once again, ownership of traditional factors of production is not a requirement. This class works in theoretical fields, using their expertise on bigger picture matters. May be deficient in ground level matters, but knowing these lets them direct all strands to a whole tapestry. This caste clearly corresponds with Class 1 residues, but in times past physical prowess and social conservatism also marked its ranks.

In Classical and Medieval times, members from the Academic caste ruled in partnership with members from the Working caste for a good mix of Class 1 and 2 residues. Greek rulers emphasized philosophy and skill in letters, Roman rulers recited poetry and read literature, Medieval city states allowed only Enterprise Owners ("Master Craftsmen") or those with Licentiate degrees (today's Master's degree) to rule, and Chinese, Korean,

and Japanese aristocracies demanded knowledge in Confucian, Taoist, or Buddhist classics, depending on the era. Kings and Emperors, Medieval magnates, provincial governors and *daimyo* were also expected to have high theoretical knowledge alongside martial and physical prowess. Throughout Modernity, however, academic excellence declined in the ruling class. At best, members of this caste reach the non-governing elite today. Otherwise, the Academic caste is relegated to shaping the Establishment's narratives and dogma.

Within this caste itself lies the Jannisaries, academics who act as handmaidens, cheerleaders, and ultimately disposable foot-soldiers to the Brahmin elite. Their battleground, the journal articles, requires payment just to fight in. Like the historical Ottoman jannisaries, these receive white elephant of approbation, elevation, and castration for their services. The Jannisaries represent the academe's decline and fall, and we shall discuss this caste's fate as a whole in the next part.

- Professional-managerial caste: these work jobs that require middling theoretical knowledge, with what little existing justifying standards, ethics, codes of conduct, and other regulated rules. They are neither proficient in the bigger picture nor the ground level, and are instead very self-centered and competitive. This caste is the focus of much of this book.

One should forego considering formal and legal credentials when considering our typology. Clark Maxwell had no formal education, yet definitely belongs to the academic class for founding Electromagnetism. Similarly, doctors and lawyers who engage with biochemical and political theory also belong to the academic class. Doctors and lawyers who did so were the standard in pre-industrial times, where academics also performed white-collar services as consultants. Lastly, engineers and architects used to rely on quick calculations and rules of thumb before advances in Physics and Mechanics made engineering a more exact craft. They thus comprise a working caste occupation transformed into a professional-managerial one. An en-



## 7. *The Three Occupational Castes*

gineer who works in theoretical mechanics would immediately ascend to the academic class, and engineering as a whole would have become a subject worthy of proper academic scholarship if not for institutional changes after World War 2. As Aristotle would think, it is what the worker does that matter, not what he is called.

The professional-managerial caste came from centralizing power and authority, with absolute monarchs and corporate boards needing obedient, subservient workers to manage what they own. Like mamelukes, however, this class subsumed the centralized monarchies and turned them into oligarchies, as the Iron Law predicts. Now, the professional-managerial elite display their midwifery anywhere they go, to anyone they meet. Vapid platitudes matter more than passed-down knowledge or theoretical frameworks. Out-of-context quotes and aphorisms now count as philosophy—just see Nietzsche's and Sartre's, Einstein's and Carl Sagan's popularity over political theorists, economists, mathematicians, and scientists. No professional-managerial would know who Menger or Mandelbrot were, or know the difference between a homeomorphism or a hylemorphism. They wouldn't know to measure twice and cut once, what side of a tool to use. Instead, they have arrogant knowledge of codes and standards, which require no thinking and all application, a prime practice to purge prudence from their ranks.

Hence Machiavelli defines three types of intelligence:

- One who makes new knowledge.
- One who appreciates others' made knowledge.
- One who neither makes nor appreciates' others' new knowledge.

Of course, all three types exist in all classes. However, the Managerial Elite's nature—what they do, how they do, and for what purposes—makes the third type concentrate in their ranks. Type 1 and 2 intelligences in the Managerial Elite will be more drawn to the academe, or the very least escape their midwifery. The working caste produces new knowledge on the ground, the academic class produces new knowledge in the world of forms. Both appreciate what their

colleagues do, and can definitely appreciate what the other class does for society. The professional-managerial caste envies not just other classes, but each other within their ranks—the rat race to the top is prime breeding ground for this kind of behavior.

### Alliance of High and Low Against the Middle

To be sure, the first obligation of any decent person is to himself and his family. He should—in the free market—make as much money as he possibly can, because the more money he makes, the more beneficial he has been to his fellow man. But that is not enough... The more successful they are as businessmen and professionals, and the more others recognize them as successful, the more important it is that they set an example: that they strive to live up to the highest standards of ethical conduct. This means accepting as their duty, indeed as their noble duty, to support openly, proudly, and as generously as they possibly can the values that they have recognized as right and true.

Hans Hermann Hoppe, *Natural Elites, Intellectuals, and the State*. (Mises Institute, 2006).

We can now return to Curtis Yarvin's BDH-OV conflict. Here, the BDH castes comprise the Leftist academe, professional-managerials, and working caste, respectively. Our typology breaks from his by casting the Dalits as the ruling elite, the Brahmin academe being priests who pay obeisance to the ruling professional-managerials, and Helots being their peasant caste for votes and support. So-called "science" becomes dogma, the rulers justifying them by cherry-picking verses from their Scripture—indices and metrics. If any Brahmin falls out of line, however, they will be kicked down to their proper place as dogs bowing to the Dalits. Indeed, the latter have a messy catechism guiding their religion, their standards, regulations, and best practices being repeated without thought. The Helots are where they farm votes, and give them subsidy and welfare on the basis of 'progress', only to condemn them to permanent crutches and set up their own downfall. To keep them down, the Helots are fed whispers of how the OV castes are their oppressors, and how they must be fought against.

## 7. The Three Occupational Castes

On the other side, we have we have the OV castes comprising the right-wing academe and working caste. One immediately notices that no professional-managerial presence exists. In reality, one on the Right can be only either a pleb or an aristocrat: one who knows no theory, or all of it. Right-wing members of the professional-managerial caste either have advanced to the academic caste by sheer excellence, or are a fifth column that will set up the Right's own downfall.

For our following analysis, we restate Bertrand de Jouvenel's theory of power, the *High-Low/Middle Mechanism*. Here, the high appeals to and patronizes the low, protecting them from tyranny by the middle. This 'middle' is not necessarily the economic middle class, nor mere peripheries in society. The middle in fact forms an oligarchy in itself by acting as subsidiaries—delegates of the high, and potential rivals.

Today, the Academic class is in fact the Middle. The Brahmins are but delegate priests, who shape, disseminate, and control the Managerial Establishment's narratives, myths, and political formulas. Instead of colleges and universities setting their curricula and practices, oversight from the Department of Education ensures that the party line spreads to students everywhere. The Optimates are sidelined into the center's peripheries for their heresies against the Walls of Jericho, forced to be low-ranking professionals and bureaucrats far below their rightful station under the Establishment's watchful eye. Those acting independently, like the Mises Institute or Imperium Press, are targeted by the Establishment for subversion and coercion. Academics who are obedient and cooperative enough may climb to the non-governing elite, but otherwise are used as footstools.

Meanwhile, the professional-managerial caste takes the most economic income, and indeed the most political power. It targets academics who, say, refuse to tow the COVID regime line, or refuse to acknowledge the unity of Filipino peoples as brothers, or refuse to denounce Austrian Economics. The Establishment points to them as conspiracy theorists, takes away their credentials, and exiles them from journal articles and academic lectures. The narrative benefits

the professional-managerial caste entirely, and society bends to the latter's will. Just see Doctor Robert Malone slandered and ostracized for opposing mandatory COVID vaccination, despite more than anyone being the most qualified to talk about them by inventing the mRNA vaccine himself. Thus Radical Right vanguards must come from an intellectual counter-elite ready to take action against the Establishment.

A ruling class will fall when weaknesses in its system are exploited and liquidated by a stronger counter-elite. The professional-managerial caste has many such weaknesses:

- its overreliance on overly-abstracted metrics and indicators instead of Prudence for policy and decision making,
- its homogenization program causing friction among constituents and interest groups,
- its members' tendency to escape responsibility and fall on rules, regulations, and standards, and
- its innate moral failings and godlessness.

What is happening right now is not Elite Circulation, but *Elite Overproduction*: the elite's blood has become stagnant for it demands one ideology and one overreaching worldview. Many Class I types have become left out, especially those from the Optimate Class. Hence the counter-elite must be well-versed in scholarly matters. The Brahmin caste's dogmas and superstitions must be eradicated, censored, and refuted. The working caste should be courted as the low Vaisyas, and the professional-managerial Dalit caste denounced as the tyrannical Middle, ready to trample on the Vaisyas if not for the Optimates' assistance. The Helots needs to be converted, or expelled when they refuse to submit to the Optimates.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## II

What is Happening Today

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## Overview

To say that the ruling class is the managers is almost the same thing as to say that it is the state bureaucracy. The managers will exercise their control over the instruments of production and gain preference in the distribution of the products, not directly, through property rights vested in them as individuals, but indirectly, through their control of the state which in turn will own and control the instruments of production. The state—that is, the institutions which comprise the state—will if we wish to put it that way, be the “property” of the managers.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*

What is happening in the Philippines today? Many have tried explaining this—semi-feudalism, oligarchies, kleptocracies, quasi-fascism, neoliberalism, patriarchal clannishness, regionalism, lack of unity, dynasties, and so on. All these explanations fail to account for much of Philippine society, lack basis in history, and finally are unsatisfying in their scope.

In this part, we first expound on a notion that many know—that ideology plays no part in political contests. However, we show that politicians today *do* subscribe to an ideology—the same one that Ferdinand Marcos Sr holds. Next, we show that this ideology is the fruit of a global trend called the *Managerial Revolution*, where the professional-managerial caste replaced the propertied elite as the rulers today. We then explore how the professional-managerial caste expand their reach into Philippine society. We also explore how the ‘Filipino’ identity is an artificial one, constructed and imposed to help the Managerial Revolution. Finally, we explore how the Managerial Revolution damaged the university, and how Philippine society today suffers from this fallout.

## An Ideological Analysis of Philippine Politics

Let your word be Yes for Yes, and No for No; whatever goes beyond this, comes of evil.

Matthew 5:37

One common trend in Philippine politics is the small role that ideology plays. Truly, all political parties pander to no bigger idea than vague platitudes about the “people”. What attracts little attention, however, is that all parties do subscribe to an ideology. This specific one, however, has fallen into obscurity since its main proponent and founder has fallen out of the establishment’s favor.

### The Baker’s Home

What emerged was a mixture of free enterprise and governmental regulation. In theory, however, all property was potentially liable to the control of the state. If certain economic transactions were left uncontrolled, it was not because of intrinsic right. Rather, the social interest presumably was being served in the absence of regulation.

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*, Chapter 3

In the 1970s, president Ferdinand Marcos justified his New Society on the basis of *Democratic Revolution from the Center*. This ideology’s main thrust is to use the government as instrument of social change. Marcos trounces Marxist revolutionary thinking, saying that

I can see and appreciate the social and economic good of communism. But I find it difficult to understand how its political society can be called democratic when a single party, the Communist party, or a group of men who control it, has a monopoly of political power. ‘The party knows best,’ is the simplified dictum of the communist political order.

*Democratic Revolution in the Philippines*, p 54

As an alternative, Marcos bases his Revolution off Liberal Revolutionary ideas—a constitutional state admits more people and groups into the establishment, establishes egalitarian ideas, and unites a state under one nation and one spirit. The New Society was the first manifestation of this ideal. Marcos explains seven threats to the New Society



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on page 134:

- Communist revolutionaries, now divided into the “traditionalists” and the “Maoists”;
- right-wing groups with supposed plans for a coup d’etat;
- Muslim secessionists in Mindanao and Sulu (the “southern backdoor”);
- private armies and the political warlords, which Marcos calls the old society’s power brokers;
- criminal elements promoting and taking advantage of the chaos;
- oligarchs maintaining the status quo and possibly allied with the right-wing conspirators; and
- foreign intervention, with funding allegedly wired through banks in Japan, Hong-kong, and the United States of America.

To allay these threats, Marcos proposes wide representation from all societal sectors in a “Technocracy of the People”. While not abolishing private property and wealth, he plans to abolish free enterprise and impose redistributionism to ensure an egalitarian collective:

An oligarchic society may sincerely believe in equality of opportunity, but so long as there is a wide economic gap, the opportunity does not in fact exist. True equality of opportunity begins at the starting line, when a human being is born. This simply means that a few should not be born “with everything” while the many start life with nothing. When we proceed from this premise, everything else follows: the radicalization of society begins.

Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 105.

To that end, business and industry are nationalized. Samuel Francis’s warnings came true: all economic transactions happened under the State’s watch, only leaving some free to serve the State’s interests. Public-private partnerships, government subcontracting to selected monopolists, thus became norm:

It was also during the Marcos regime when a policy of coordination between public and private social service organizations was adopted by the social welfare sector in order to expand clientele outreach and

## 8.2. *People Power as Bread and Circuses*

maximize the efficient use of resources. However, for the most part, government assigned a very utilitarian role to civil society, that of efficient user of resources.”

Victoria Bautista, Governing the Social Welfare Sector.

Beyond economic matters, the State’s interference grew in other sectors of society. School curricula became standardized and state-mandated. A fictional language, “Pilipino”, got instituted as national language. Democratic Revolution from the Center demanded that all ‘Filipinos’ unite in one nation and one spirit under a New Society.

Towards his book’s end, Marcos boasts of the Moro National Liberation Front’s dismantling and government intervention leading to great results in the economy. Hindsight lets us know that the former emerged victorious through the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region’s establishment. About the latter, Marcos fell prey to the Keynesian fallacy, borrowed billions from abroad to increase GDP without end, and printed money to repay his debts, the resulting inflation causing economic collapse in the early 1980s.

In the last section, Marcos admits to authoritarianism for the so-called “common good”. He claims that his grip would remain for as long as the need existed. His reign was typical of 1970s Radical Centrism, which dominated States worldwide. We shall now show that these policies, eschewing both the left and the right for the radical center, continue today.

### People Power as Bread and Circuses

Come Marcos’s fall, the new administration promised to return democracy and reform the government. This so-called “People Power Revolution” promised a new order, the Fifth Republic. However, many of Marcos’s innovations remained. His political system returned under new names—only without a prime minister. The national language changed nothing but its first letter, remaining the Manila dialect of Tagalog. The government still exercised its intervention into the Economy, freeing enterprise only for those who

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could satisfy its countless requirements. The government still tries to incorporate all people under one nation, one spirit, if not under a New Society, then under whatever administration rules the country.

No doubt, Philippine institutions remain exactly as they were in the Marcos regime. Governance still goes through the same lines and slogans. To illustrate, paranoia against both right and left-wing subversives remains a hallmark of the Philippine government:

This was the only possible explanation why reactionaries and radicals, rightists and leftists, could get together, as they did, with of course their own respective plans for dealing with the situation. The reactionaries needed the radicals to harass the government with their demonstrations in the cities, and with their armed comrades' terroristic sorties in the countryside.

Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 126-127.

Compare this to Gloria Aquino's justification of the 2006 State of Emergency:

...over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists—the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State—who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004.

Proclamation No. 1017

Compare Cory Aquino's institutionalization of dynastic politics in Philippine municipalities, cities, and provinces to Marcos's cartelization of the Philippine Economy. Compare Fidel Ramos relinquishing control of public utilities to sanctioned monopolies to Marcos's installation of cronies in the exact same companies under a nationalized facade. We find that the Philippine Establishment looks out only for itself—its political games serve the order which has existed since the Philippine Revolution. Elections see contenders with no ideological differences for only one ideology has remained dominant since the Marcos regime. Thus we see welfare subsidies and high taxes—Marcos was a fan of the Scandinavian model. Thus we see little busi-

ness creation till recently. Thus we see platitudes about social welfare every election. Thus we see each president rattle endlessly about “the people” despite living in comfort and security for all their lives. Liberal, Nacionalista, whatever regimes came afterwards, these labels comprise one motion with a unified purpose—Democratic Revolution from the Center. The accidents differ, yet the same substance remains.

Beyond all these, the Fourth and Fifth Republics see continuity by their encouragement of the *Welfare State*. The *Welfare State* takes on the Modern Liberal task of ‘liberation’ from intrinsic needs, such that people may do what their passions urge them:

The new liberalism, in fact if not always in formal theory, tended to see the individual not as the basic moral agent and unit of society but as a product of the social environment. Neo-liberal theorists in the idealist tradition such as Green in England and Josiah Royce in the United States “developed and made coherent the criticism of individualism that began with Rousseau’s theory of the general will,” and the purpose of their theory “was to show that personality is ‘realized’ by finding a significant part to play in the life of society.” Since society and its political organ, the state, are in this view prior to the individual, this reformulated version of liberal thought rejected the classical liberal view that restrictions on the activities and functions of the state liberated and assisted the individual. [This] Liberalism was a frank acceptance of the state as a positive agency to be used at any point where legislation could be shown to contribute to “positive freedom,” in short for any purpose that added to the general welfare without creating worse evils than it removed.

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*

We shall now show that Marcos’s welfare state remains under new names and labels in the Fifth Republic.

## The Philippine Welfare State

Marcos’s most pressing legacy was his emphasis on the government as broker for social welfare. The so-called “common good”, far from the community’s distributive justice as properly understood, had be-

## 8. *An Ideological Analysis of Philippine Politics*

come the sum of welfare and utility across homogenous, atomized individuals “unchained” from family, community, and *ethnos*. The Philippine Welfare State became his, and later on the Fifth Republic’s arm to enhance the Leviathan’s power over the country.

But how did the Welfare State begin? Social welfare played little role in the immediate post-war period—only a single executive office, the Social Welfare Administration, handled the whole country. This office played a more reactive role, with welfare seen as rehabilitative. The Garcia administration began enlarging the office’s role, with social security and livelihood programs sprouting. The Marcos administration, however, elevated the Social Welfare Administration to the Department of Social Welfare in 1968. After Marial Law, increased state planning and supervision in private matters manifested in the New Society’s Five Year Plans, done in the Soviet Union’s mold. For the second plan in 1978, government-funded social services would be extended unilaterally to the lower 30 percent of the population. The first public-private partnerships also found their origins in the renewed welfare state—the private sector and civil society were seen as tools to allocate state resources. Truly, Marcos finalized Modern Liberalism as the State’s official ideology:

A more proactive stance was taken under the Marcos administration when social welfare services started to be conceived of as "development" activities rather than as mere treatment and rehabilitation of remedial cases such as orphans, juvenile delinquents and disaster victims. There was a shift in focus on organized groups such as families and barangays, rather than on disadvantaged individuals, to be able to provide a holistic perspective in responding to potential or actual problems of the marginalized—economically, psychologically, physically and socially.

Victoria Bautista, Governing the Social Welfare Sector.

In a way, Marcos’s loyalists are right about the man’s legacy: he built Philippine society as we know it, for good or for ill. The government now saw itself as the primary caretaker of society. Neither family, nor community, nor parish mattered, only the Leviathan. Democratic Revolution from the Center necessarily propped up the welfare state

as society's start and end. What more, social welfare was seen as a tool for development, not just rehabilitation. Thus we have the Philippine welfare state's roots.

From tracing how it began, we must now watch how the Welfare State grew. After the Aquino administration took power, the only difference made to the welfare state was an increased priority for women. The 1987 Constitution specifically panders to feminism and female empowerment:

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 14

The emphasis on social welfare and development remained, changing little from the Marcos administration's policies:

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 10

If any other changes occurred, these were additions and enhancements rather than modifications. The Aquino administration continued public-private partnership in welfare by constitutionally institutionalizing the role of NGOs and "sectoral organizations":

The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 23

Aquino's institutionalization of the political dynasties found legal backing in the Local Government Code—municipal, city, and provincial governments received powers to handle matters of social welfare:

Every local government unit shall exercise the powers... which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and

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preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, Section 16

Section 17 of the code details a long list of specific, niche powers allotted to local governments. One may only read it to see how the welfare state has intruded into people's lives: details as trifling as sports stadiums, beautification, multipurpose places, to larger powers like housing projects and infrastructure like jails, parks, hospitals, and the like. The reader may note, however, that executive, legislative, and judiciary powers remain only with the central government. This is how the dynasties became entrenched—paternalist politicians giving the populace bread and circuses through allotted welfare programs, while Manila messes up important matters.

Speaking of political dynasties, we find that their bad reputation is undeserved. What most fail to grasp is how the political dynasties have done much more for their native lands than the national government ever has. Their repeated success in elections points to nothing but revealed voter preference. If dynasties pose problems to their lands, the 1987 Constitution in fact *worsened* the dynasty problem for it restricted what they could do. No longer do they compete for votes through effective administration and rule, for they had been reduced to arms of the welfare state which had been planted under the Third Republic, accelerated under Marcos, and now finally bore bitter fruit. The dynasties may only parade bread and circuses to remain in power, rather than do anything worthwhile for these real powers have been subsumed by the national government.

Marcos details how Liberal ideas led to his vision of the overbearing Welfare Leviathan ruling today. However, a sinister undercurrent lines his thought, and by extension the Fifth Republic's policies. Bureaucratic Liberalism in fact finds its headwaters from societal trends in motion since the 19th Century, and arguably much earlier. James Burnham points to what he calls the *Managerial Revolution* as causing what happens in the world today.

## The Managerial Revolution and its Consequences

Modern liberalism, for most liberals is not a consciously understood set of rational beliefs, but a bundle of unexamined prejudices and conjoined sentiments. The basic ideas and beliefs seem more satisfactory when they are not made fully explicit, when they merely lurk rather obscurely in the background, coloring the rhetoric and adding a certain emotive glow.

James Burnham, *The Suicide of the West*

One key point in Marcos's Democratic Revolution from the Center was its nature as a liberal revolution from above—a top-down process like the French and English revolutions, Marcos claims. As such, technocratic and bureaucratic dominance made its headway in the Philippines. However, beyond the Fourth and Fifth Republic's institutions, we see this predominance creep into other sectors of society. The professional-managerial caste is the premier caste in Philippine society, which everyone aspires to join, and which parents wish their children to join. This order, like many other aspects of Philippine society, finds its roots in the Revolution against Spain. However, this order forms only one manifestation of a global trend in process since the 19th century. Beyond Democratic Revolution from the Center, James Burnham's thesis of the *Managerial Revolution* explains many aspects about Philippine Society from Bonifacio to Marcos to Duterte.

### A Revolution in Mass and Scale

Aristotle writes that man is built for community, that true human flourishing comes not just with virtue, wealth, or power, but with a stable and upright community. However, Aristotle wrote only for the city-state at largest. Saint Thomas, Saint Robert Bellarmine, and the other Scholastics may have written about a Christian Commonwealth (Republic), but they thought such as a confederation of small com-



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munities. They never believed in Mass Society, only in small, closed-knit communities of people who knew each other well. Indeed, all classical forms of government work best in these small communities.

After Medieval times, however, new ideas regarding man's earthly life spread. Now, these new ideas sought man's uprooting from family, community, and parish, then thrust as "free" into the atomized order. Civil society would fall apart, replaced by a Leviathan State to ensure that these atomized units work well with one another in the Liberal ideal. The so-called "common good" is now the sum of welfare and utility across these atomized individuals. Hence the welfare state began to replace traditional institutions in catering to man's earthly needs. Like false alchemists who sought gold from lead, the Leviathan State seeks god from man. As society became more massive in scale, traditional elites and institutions faded away. Cottage industries, home workshops, and the like fell prey to clustered factories, sky high offices, and other monstrosities. The capitalist entrepreneurs fell to mass corporations dictated by shareholders, providing value to them instead of consumers. Local governors, master tradesmen, and city councils fell to mass states and bureaucracies, hoping to put a show with people's taxes. Local news and word of mouth now rank second to reliable mass corporate news sources. This *Revolution in Mass and Scale*, as Samuel Francis puts it, brought man away from his earthly *telos* into an arena where at once everyone is special, and no one is.

These ideas began in the Enlightenment, and the absolute monarchs of Europe practiced them. Indeed, States expanding in power ran concurrent to mass society spreading. After the Hundred Years' War and England's War of the Roses, France and England each adopted central standing armies from roving mercenaries and bandits. The Holy Roman Emperor fell in standing against increasing power from centralizing subdivisions. Absolutism became this trend's end. Here, the monarch became sovereign over the political community, and became the sole judge over all matters. Of course, one man may not rule alone, so a non-governing elite of bureaucrats and counselors

took over daily management. Never before did so many people and so much land come under any one government, yet this stage served only as stepping stone to further State expansion.

The European monarchs failed to sustain this project of managing mass society by themselves. As the State expanded, these horrid ideas strained their coffers and treasuries, and the French Revolution came about from the bureaucracy's mismanagement. After nearly two centuries of expanding State power, the Three Estates gathered and demanded a return to pre-Absolutist times. However, King Louis XVI made his folly when he tried fleeing to Austria, and certain young professionals from the Third Estate took advantage of public anger to catapult themselves to the top. While the Jacobins' project ultimately failed, their ideas about society birthed Liberal Democracy.

The kings failed in their project, and neither the liberal democracies that replaced them nor the capitalist entrepreneurs that flourished in both times could also size up to the task. Instead of kings, counselors and advisors dominated the state before the French Revolution. Instead of popularly elected officials, bureaucracy and so-called "experts" now dominate the state. Instead of executives and directors, a corporate hierarchy of managers and associates rules businesses. Of course, the masses still needed management, whether subjects, citizens, or employees. Through the Iron Law of Oligarchy, the professional-managerial caste came out on top.

## Leviathan and its Enemies

Mass society demanded civil society's rearrangement, for its traditionally smaller and more compact structures failed to accommodate the physical, social, and psychic needs in a new scale of population. Adequate material, labor, education, communication, and culture needed enlarged government and organization scale. Of course, not only did the public sphere come to this—the private sphere saw mass and scale enlarge too. Hence mass organizations like corporations, unions, and bureaucracies needed management through pub-

## 9. *The Managerial Revolution and its Consequences*

lic finance and administration, “scientific management,” mass public relations, and the uses of psychology, sociology, political science, and economics. No personal skills or character, no legal relationships, no status categories would suffice. Highly specialized skills and knowledge, conforming to rules, regulations, standards, best practices, and acquired through formal training, became the standard on which a new elite would base itself on. Hence the United States fell from its founders’ dreams:

The 20th century also saw what one historian has described as the “degradation of work.” The dream of the United States as an independent producers republic, which had inspired Americans from Thomas Jefferson to the Knights of Labor in the 1870s and 1880s, had long been dead. As early as 1877, two-thirds of American workers were wage laborers, with little hope of opening their own shops or owning their own farms. By 1940, no more than one-fifth of the population of the United States were self-employed. Wage labor—underpaid, demanding long hours, and subjecting workers to dangerous conditions (approximately 35,000 workers died in accidents annually at the turn of the century)—had become a permanent condition. Not only were the benefits of the wage economy unequally distributed, but the very nature of work became both more demanding and less satisfying. A profound contradiction emerged that arguably continues to shape workers’ lives in the 21st century: “The scientific-technical revolution and ‘automation’ requires ever higher levels of education, training, the greater exercise of intelligence and mental effort in general,” which is accompanied by “a mounting dissatisfaction with the conditions of industrial and office labor.”

Helgeson, Jeffrey. *American Labor and Working-Class History, 1900–1945*. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History*, 2016.

This managerial elite displaced traditional propertied ones, as mentioned above. Mass, centralized control displaced local, community-driven power. Small business and local government exist only when big business and national government allow them. The Revolution of Mass and Scale outpaced and displaced traditional power structures, and the professional-managerial caste swooped in to take the prize. The old order was localist, and focused only on their respective jurisdictions. Now, mass society of atomized individ-

uals paradoxically leads to collectivist undertones and influences—nothing extrinsic makes anyone special, hence everyone intrinsically must dictate each other to be special.

Of course, this order could have happened only once the old propertied elites stopped understanding the specifics of what they owned or ruled—no skin in the game, as Nassim Taleb puts it. The professional-managerial caste put on fake skin and made everyone focus on their facades. This was a classic alliance of high and low against the middle, with the professional-managerial caste using indices and metrics as scriptures, unlearned theory and practice as dogma. Hence regimes today maximize GDP growth, focus on abstracted policy metrics with little real world bearing, and demand the charade of metrics and indicators keep playing. The masquerade demands that these numbers go up yearly, despite their respective theories being value-free. Truly, while technical expertise defines the professional-managerial caste, its members have but blinded grasps on theory, empirics, and methodology. One may indeed call them ‘midwits’—they have smidgens of academic concepts, and use their granular knowledge to justify their ascendancy over the unwitting working caste. Real academics would know the truth behind their assertions, yet are neither flashy nor confident enough to be noticed.

Of course, one may object that property-owners still dominate business and government, with Managerialism simply their governing function. The existence of a small number of property owners matters not, for their interests have been forced to align with the professional-managerial caste’s. To illustrate, here are only a few examples of propertied officials losing to professional-managerial action:

1. Tripwire Interactive’s CEO and co-founder, John Gibson, was forced to step down just 53 hours after tweeting his support for a ban on abortion in Texas<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Matt Egan, ‘Video Game CEO is Out After Praising Texas Abortion Law’, CNN (8 September 2021): <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/07/business/tripwire-ceo-texas-abortion-law/index.html>.

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2. John Schattner, founder of the Papa John's pizza chain and with billions in net worth, was forced out of his own company by the board after making racially insensitive comments on a conference call in 2018<sup>2</sup>.
3. Brendan Eich, CEO of Mozilla, was forced to resign after 11 days when employees discovered that he had donated to a political campaign against gay marriage, and launched a social media campaign against him<sup>3</sup>.

One may list similar examples indefinitely, but the point stands either way:

This perfectly explains why virtually none of the so-called *grand bourgeoisie* have taken a firm stance against what is today called 'woke capitalism'. Whether they are propertied elites or not, executives who dare take a stance against the official managerial ideology are quickly removed...there can be no doubt that Burnham and Francis are correct while Mills and Domhoff are wrong about whether power finally rests in the hands of the managers or the owner. The managers have primacy. If an owner does not adhere to managerial ideology—if the company in any way depends on managerial capitalism—they will find themselves removed in short order.

Neema Parvini, *The Populist Delusion*. (Imperium Press, 2022).

Hence we see a discrepancy between *ownership* and *control* over property. The Managerial Revolution is simply the break between these two, the latter mechanism dominating society. The economic and financial literature also noticed this discrepancy, as *Agency Theory* shows:

In a joint stock company, the ownership is held by individuals or groups in the form of stock and these shareholders (principals) delegates the authority to the managers (agents) to run the business on their behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973), but the major issue is whether these managers are performing for the owners or themselves.

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<sup>2</sup>Ewan Palmer, 'Papa John's Founder John Schnatter Says Board Conspired to Oust Him, Vows "Day of Reckoning Will Come"', *Newsweek* (26 November, 2019): <https://www.newsweek.com/papa-johns-john-schnatter-interview-1474073>.

<sup>3</sup>Alistair Barr, 'Mozilla CEO Brendan Eich Steps Down', *The Wall Street Journal* (3 April 2014): <https://www.wsj.com/articles/mozilla-ceo-brendan-eich-to-step-down-1396554132>.

Brahmadev Panda, and N. M. Leepsa. "Agency theory: Review of theory and evidence on problems and perspectives." *Indian Journal of Corporate Governance* 10.1 (2017): 74-95.

Of course, this *principal-agent problem* need not be limited to corporate governance. We may see entire networks of citizens, nation-states, elected officials, lawmakers, executive officials and departments, courts, NGOs, diplomats, bureaucrats and the civil service, soldiers and policemen, even those regulating these networks fall prey to the problem<sup>4</sup>. We reserve a list of peer-reviewed empirical evidence for the professional-managerial elite's existence in the appendix.

What is peculiar to the elite today is their use of Liberalism as doctrine for its political formulas. Liberalism's proper origins lay in a reaction against the French Revolution's excesses—a guided progress instead of shock therapy. We thus see an optimistic vision for man, belief in his inherent goodness, and a desire for an overclass to guide humanity. Particular social, biological, regional, and national identities were now anathema, and universal brotherhood was now a goal. Hence mass society began with nationalism and the nation state, where family and community fell to the wayside and allegiance to the state and to the 'nation' were the most important civic virtues. Of course, nationalism would also fall to the wayside, as all stepping stones do. As Samuel Francis wits,

The subordination of national interests to those of 'Society at large' paralleled the subordination of individual economic interests to collective interests that characterized the fusion of state and economy within the managerial regime.

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*, Chapter 6

Everyone was special now, in their own individual ways. Economic Liberalism—a Catholic heresy with a specific definition only tangibly related to Economics—found that every man could be himself and move forward in his own special way without attachments, voluntary or not, to his peers or his community. And when everyone is special,

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<sup>4</sup>Susan P. Shapiro. "Agency theory." *Annual review of sociology* (2005): 263–284.

## 9. *The Managerial Revolution and its Consequences*

no one is. Liberalism reinforces this order twofold. First, it provides political formulas that reflect the managerial function's goal:

- Meliorism: progress is a real concept leading to the world's improvement.
- Utopianism: we can achieve a perfect world, including the end of scarcity and all pain.
- Scientism: we can achieve progress and perfection through science.
- Hedonism: utopia means we can pursue bodily pleasure without constraint.
- Cosmopolitanism: the universal brotherhood of man, no more divisions or separations between man and woman, Tagalog and Filipino, Filipino and global citizen.

Second, Liberalism also justifies the Managerial regime as implementing these political formulas. Samuel Francis thus writes:

Legislation and policies associated with and implemented by liberal forces have promoted the fusion of state and economy, the growth of managerial bureaucracy in state and corporation, the rise of managerial Caesarism in the form of an "imperial Presidency," the centralization of government and the diminution of state and local authority, the homogenization of society, the diffusion of mass education, the secularization of religion, and other aspects of the managerial regime.

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*, Chapter 3

Modern Liberalism has thus provided the Managerial Establishment a uniformity unseen in any elite or ruling class through history. It also allowed the professional-managerial caste to get its interests on top. Ideology has made public relations and communication vital parts of any organization. Whereas before, quality in goods and services was enough, today organizational image ranks more in determining which ones succeed. These developments also made the old propertied elite bow down to the professional-managerial caste's will. Elected officials serve as salesmen to bureaucratic and managerial policies, and those elected serve as the managers' fallguys and scapegoats. Elections have become a sham for the Managerial regime

to keep pushing forward their ideas with little connection to reality. One could call these ideas *gnostic*: the Gnostics were ancient thinkers who thought concrete reality evil, and sought to correct it to their own vision—a world which existed only in their heads. Modern Liberalism continues this Gnostic program, as the Woke cancer, transgenderism, biology denial, and similar ideas would have it<sup>5</sup>.

One may only witness how Ferdinand Marcos Jr's election win spurred John Oliver, an American comedian, to make a special segment on his comedy show. The professional-managerial caste raved over this event showing how 'shameful' Marcos's win was. Never mind how absurd it would be for someone like Kuya Germs to start dictating national policy—conformity to the regime's message is what matters. Ideology has thus become the 'bloodline', so to speak, for today's elite.

## Outdated revision.

### From Bonifacio to Marcos

As real history tells us, Andres Bonifacio was a manager in a multinational British corporation, who also had a lucrative side-gig selling canes, fans, and other luxury items. As a typical Millennial today would, he spent his free time reading vapid philosophical works—Voltaire, Victor Hugo, Eugène Sue, among others. Indeed, the Katipunan's core membership came from similar backgrounds:

Most commonly and typically, therefore, the Katipunan activists were clerks, employees, agents, tobacco workers, printers and service personnel. They were indubitably proletarians in the Marxist sense, because they did not own any means of production and had to sell their labor in order to earn a living. Nevertheless, it is clear that Isabelo de los Reyes, Teodoro Agoncillo and others were wrong to classify them as collectively belonging to "the lowest stratum of society." Their wages or salaries were either around or above the median for the city in the mid-1890s.

Jim Richardson. *The Light of Liberty: Documents and Studies on the*

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<sup>5</sup>These ideas came from the Frankfurt School of social science, whose followers infiltrated and subverted American institutions after World War II to enact Antonio Gramsci's plan of culturally preparing the working class for a socialist revolution.



## 9. *The Managerial Revolution and its Consequences*

Katipunan, 1892–1897. (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2013.)

In Tagalog provinces, the Katipunan recruited from the middle and upper classes. In fact, the Tagalog nobility led many Katipunero chapters by Revolution's outbreak, and provincial owners of the factors of production joined the Katipunan in droves:

The majority of Katipuneros, observed Domingo Franco, the former president of the Liga Filipina, came from *la plebe ó pueblo bajo*, but their leaders were “people of a certain status, or who held or had previously held municipal positions”. By actively seeking middle class recruits in the provinces, the city-based Katipuneros themselves sowed the seed of the subsequent ascendancy of rural-based leaders in the revolutionary movement... In the city, as we have noted, the majority of the middle-class Katipuneros were not “bourgeois” in the Marxist sense. Class relations in the countryside, though, were very different. There, a much larger proportion of the middle class could legitimately be called “bourgeois” because they grew cash crops, employed wage laborers, or both. Many of the principales, the municipal office holders whose support was specifically solicited by Katipunan leaders like José Dizon and Pio Valenzuela, fell into this category themselves. It is common knowledge that in 1896 principales came to head many KKK sections in the provinces surrounding Manila, and that when the main locus of the revolution shifted to Cavite, as we have seen, the principalia faction led by Emilio Aguinaldo took control of the movement and had Bonifacio executed... In the KKK sections based in the city itself, only two activists are known to have held municipal positions—Julian Nepomuceno was at some time *teniente tercero* of the *gremio de mestizos* in the district of Santa Cruz, and Valentin Diaz, before moving to the capital, had reportedly held office in the town of Tayug, Pangasinan. In the province of Manila, however, principales are recorded as being active in the local KKK branches in virtually every town for which information is available, including Caloocan, Mandaluyong and Pasig, the three towns where support for the organization was strongest. (Ibid)

In other provinces, recruitment was relatively small, and centered around nobles inducting loyal men and retainues. What's clear, however, is that the Katipunan began among the nobility and the growing professional-managerial caste. Their sense of envy and insecurity showed itself when the Philippine Revolution began: not in a

glorious battle against Spain, but in banditry. On 25 August, 1896, Bonifacio and his associates first targeted Chinese shopkeepers by the village of Banlat, near Balintawak. The revolution's first casualties were 12 shopkeepers who died defending their shops. Nine more were taken prisoner, along with two Tagalogs. After Bonifacio interrogated them, the Tagalogs were released. The shopkeepers, however, were used as human shields against the Spanish the next day. They were initially supposed to have been thrown into a ravine to their deaths, but the Guardia Civil's arrival made the Katipuneros change their plans.

The Guardia Civil negotiated for the hostages' release, but the Katipuneros would not budge, and they demanded the native *guardias* to kill their Spanish officers first. A stand-off lasted till the afternoon, when the hundred Katipuneros rushed the thirty *guardias*, who fled. The hostages lived only by the *guardias*' heroism. The Revolution went on for two more years, with few lulls in fighting. While more from the Tagalog working caste, and many native soldiers and *guardias* would join, the Katipunan's leadership stabilized around professional-managers and principales. Daniel Tirona and Edilberto Evangelista are two prime examples: one a lawyer, another a Belgian-educated civil engineer. The provincial nobility also joined in hopes of advancement.

The Revolution's most curious outcome is the exact opposite of what Burnham and Francis noticed. The traditional elite—nobility and retainers—joined forces with the professional-managerial caste to form the post-Revolutionary Establishment. While the working caste languished and the Church fell into ruin, the new Establishment dominated the country and set to work accelerating mass society. Instead of local autonomy and elections, national sovereignty and leadership became the norm. The army, instead of a small national contingent with local volunteers and militias, became an entirely national one. People from far-away places were now expected to die for and defend those who spoke different languages, had different worldviews, and practiced different customs and culture. The

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Filipino's atomization from his community and family had now begun.

Democratic Party influence started America's war with Spain over Cuba, and by extension the Philippines. The Revolution convinced Spain to sell more, in the Treaty of Paris, than Luzon as was originally planned. The Americans had always been in conflict about what to do with the Philippines, with the isolationist Old Right demanding exit against war hawks and Democrats demanding to "civilize" the locals. Eventually, local government was allowed to prevent further American political turmoil. As with the Maura Law (1895), local elections would go on, but now with the new Establishment in place.

Going forward to the 1960s, we see a decade of power struggle in the Establishment. The Philippines still had its old nobility, but struggle over Manila saw two factions form: those allied with Diosdado Macapagal, and sugar barons allied with the Lopez family. Playing into this power struggle was the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP-1930), which had recently disarmed and now sought peace with the government. The PKP adopted *Stalinism* as a peaceful way to achieve Socialism:

Stalinism was the programmatic expression of the political interests of privileged layers of the ruling party bureaucracies in Moscow and Beijing. Seeking to defend and expand the social basis of their positions, the bureaucrats put forward the nationalist perspective of building socialism in one country as the paramount political task. World socialist revolution was subordinate to this end.

Joseph Scalice, Fifty years since the publication of Philippine Society and Revolution

Diosdado Macapagal's commitment to globalism saw him support free trade with America, implement land reform as drafted by a Ukrainian Jew<sup>6</sup>, and crack down on a national strike against government ports. Jose Maria Sison and Ignacio Lacsina, true to Stalinist principles and contrary to the PKP's leadership, continued support-

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<sup>6</sup>specifically Wolf Ladejinsky, a Ukrainian Jew who had left the shtetl in 1921 during the Russian civil war, migrated to the United States and studied at Columbia University in 1926.

ing him to fight so-called semi-feudalism:

From the political perspective of Sison and the PKP, this economic state of affairs was the fundamental ill of Philippine society. The problem could be characterized as the lack of autonomous industrial development. This industrial development, along with its political expression, bourgeois democracy, was being thwarted by imperialist capital and its local allies and the task of the unfinished revolution therefore was to resume the autonomous development of Filipino capitalism.

Joseph Paul Scalice. *Crisis of Revolutionary Leadership: Martial Law and the Communist Parties of the Philippines, 1959–1974*. (University of California, Berkeley, 2017.)

Macapagal's public image also revolved around support for Indonesia against Malaysia's founding. The PKP had thought that they could influence Macapagal's administration towards better relations with Jakarta's Sukarno and with Beijing in exchange for supporting the land reform program and strike crackdown. Privately, however, Macapagal's real sympathies lay with America, and he would support Malaysia's founding eventually. This turnaround prompted the PKP to support Ferdinand Marcos Sr instead.

While he lost the PKP's support, Macapagal managed to get one Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino Jr into his camp. Aquino's in-laws, the Conjuangco family, had just seen splintered loyalties: Danding Conjuangco remained with the Nacionalista Party, while Peping Conjuangco shifted to the Liberal Party. To preserve his economic power, Aquino followed Peping under Macapagal's oversight. As Ninoy himself says, "I was promised the Liberal Party leadership in Tarlac and five million pesos for the province. That was a bargain nobody could resist. I flipped."<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, Ferdinand Marcos Sr already had links in the PKP. Lacsina, a CIA agent, would become his informant on labor movement activities. Marcos's platform to support local industry, to open ties with Moscow, and to oppose the Vietnam War also made him especially favorable to the PKP. The PKP would demonize Macapagal as a 'Reactionary' not long after they were hailing him for his

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<sup>7</sup>John E. Koehler. "The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt." (1974): 187-190.

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revolutionary land reform project. Sison hailed Filipino industrialists as allies against ‘imperialist feudalism’, saying that

at the present stage of our national history, the single immediate purpose to which the nationalist movement is committed is to achieve national democracy. On this single purpose, all are agreed, irrespective of social class... Unless one is a landlord or comprador, one aspires to have his nation free from colonial and imperialist exploitation. Every patriotic Filipino wishes to liquidate imperialism and feudalism simultaneously in order to achieve national democracy among the people. (Ibid)

Marcos Sr especially denounced Macapagal’s aid to South Vietnam as displaying the latter’s “penchant for totalitarian control—and dictatorship.”<sup>8</sup> Upon taking office, Marcos Sr immediately announced that it would welcome moves by Moscow to start diplomacy, while also opposing relations with Beijing. Also after taking office, Marcos Sr changed tune about Vietnam and sent troops there. The PKP as a whole refused to comment on this latter action, for many opposed Beijing’s actions against Moscow, and the party hoped to gain from having supported Marcos in 1965. Sison himself continued along this line for a while:

Sison delivered a speech in March 1967, “Socialism and Nationalism,” in which he repeatedly stated that the tasks of the revolution were not yet socialist: “it would be an error of dogmatism or sheer ignorance of the real conditions of our country if we insist on making socialism our immediate goal.” Sison was instrumental in the formation of the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) in February 1967, which brought together the heads of major banks, the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industries, the Chamber of Filipino Retailers, a nationwide franchise of pawnshops, and other leading capitalist interests, pledged to them the loyalty of labor in a nationalist alliance.

Joseph Scalice. “The geopolitical alignments of diverging social interests: the Sino-Soviet split and the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, 1966–1967.” *Critical Asian Studies* 53.1 (2021): 45–70.

In 1967, however, political intrigue saw Sison and his allies expelled from the PKP. Ninoy Aquino saw this split, and he realized that he

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<sup>8</sup>Philippines Free Press, 79, “Marcos On Vietnam.”

could gain from it. An associate, Jose Yap, traveled to Beijing in July of that year to collect Maoist literature. He supplied this literature to Sison and his allies, notably giving a copy of Mao's Little Red Book to Bernabe Buscayno—later Commander Dante of the New People's Army. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was founded in Pangasinan in January 1969. In its first Congress, Sison condemned Revisionist Marxism in the PKP and by extension Moscow. On paper, the CPP sought an agrarian revolution by a people's army confiscating land from landlords. In reality, the CPP's first allies were sugar barons who had first opposed Macapagal, but now opposed Marcos.

Ninoy Aquino's *Hacienda Luisita* (Luisita estate) in Tarlac province proved safehaven for the CPP to establish a New People's Army (NPA). The initial CPP cadre was full of Kapampangans that Aquino and his allies courted away from the PKP, and Sison himself had married the Kapampangan daughter of a landlord. Aquino needed the NPA for Faustino del Mundo—Commander Sumulong of the PKP's *Huk-bong Magpapalaya sa Bayan* [People's Liberation Army], or 'Huks' for short—served as Marcos's enforcer in Central Luzon. Having their own private army let Aquino and Yap contest Marcos's Huk allies, and the NPA served as one from its Hacienda Luisita foundation. The recent Sino-Soviet split gave Aquino a way to build ties with those angry at the PKP's direction. These ties lasted from before the CPP's and NPA's foundations:

The ties between Yap and Aquino, on the one the hand, and Dante on the other, had long been cultivated by the politicians. Aquino allowed Dante to move freely throughout his Hacienda Luisita, and Yap, on returning from a visit to China, had given Dante a copy of Mao's Red Book.

Joseph Paul Scalice. *Crisis of Revolutionary Leadership: Martial Law and the Communist Parties of the Philippines, 1959–1974*. (University of California, Berkeley, 2017.)

The 1960s' social unrest, however, would burst in a series of mass protests and uprising as the 70s came. The CPP grew in this time, channelling anger towards Marcos into its growth. It had built a sprawling network of alliances and front organizations among industrial-

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ists and businessmen opposed to Marcos Sr, incidentally including publisher Chino Roces. Streetfights and gang brawls dominated the streets as Aquino and the Lopez family tried vying for power. The PKP, however, needed a way back into political relevance, and they needed Marcos's plans for ties with Moscow to come true. The latter point was especially important to them:

The political line of the Soviet Union gave to Sison's rivals a set of choice economic incentives to offer Filipino capitalists: loans and trade relations which could serve as a form of capital in a renegotiation of relations with the country's colonizer, the United States.

Joseph Scalice. "The geopolitical alignments of diverging social interests: the Sino-Soviet split and the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, 1966–1967." *Critical Asian Studies* 53.1 (2021): 45–70.

On the other hand, Marcos Sr, aware that his rival Ninoy Aquino had help found the NPA, strengthened relations with the PKP. In 1971 and 1972, the PKP's militias orchestrated bombings and assassination attempts, which Marcos publicly blamed on the CPP. Martial law was declared, the CPP's front organizations were gone, and its allies were imprisoned or in exile. The PKP gleed in this outcome, for its rival was gone, and it had gained prominence in Marcos's book. The PKP had worked hard to achieve this outcome, and it had collaborated with Marcos to craft and secure Democratic Revolution from the Center:

[To Lenin,] Cristobal attributed Stalin's theory of a two-stage revolution, and *Today's Revolution: Democracy* put in the mouth of Ferdinand Marcos the phrase 'To Lenin we owe the statement that there could not be revolution without a revolutionary theory... Lenin conceived of the revolution in two steps: the first the bourgeois, then the proletarian.' (Marcos 1971, 60) Cristobal's Marcos asserted that the democratic revolution in the Philippines was 'nationalist,' (64) and entailed above all dealing with social inequality, and stated that 'The dominant characteristic of our society which demands radical change is the economic gap between the rich and poor.' (78–79) This, he argued, was rooted above all in the Philippines' 'oligarchic society.' Not all of the wealthy were oligarchs, he continued, and '[w]hen I speak, therefore, of oligarchy, I refer to the few who would promote their selfish interests through the indirect or irresponsible exercise of public and private power.'

Scalice, Joseph. "Cadre as informal diplomats: Ferdinand Marcos and the Soviet Bloc, 1965–1975." *History and Anthropology* (2021): 1–17.

The Soviet influence on the Philippines' own Managerial Revolution cannot be understated: the New Society brought in social welfare programs, the Professional Regulatory Commission, Five-Year plans in Soviet vein, and much more. PKP leaders joined the government as policymakers and researchers, and they drafted studies and plans on how the PKP could help government programs. Many Huks also joined the Philippine Constabulary and military intelligence, and these were responsible for many abuses committed under Marcos's rule<sup>9</sup>.

At the same time, this time period saw Philippine commitment to globalism finally come. As Scalice notes, "Washington readied to accept either side as victor; it had numerous assets in both camps and would endorse whichever man finally sat secure upon the 'throne of bayonets.'" He further notes how a Stalinist bureaucracy would have come into power whether Marcos or Ninoy won the power struggle:

Had history proceeded along an alternate track in which Aquino outmaneuvered Marcos, Martial Law was just as inevitable. The rival Stalinist parties had allied with the leading contenders for the throne, and both were positioned to ride the coattails of dictatorship. Neither scenario—victory for Marcos and the PKP or Aquino and the CPP—provided a way forward in the struggle against dictatorship and repression.

Richard Nixon sought warmer ties with China, and the Philippines would follow. Two years after Nixon's visit, Imelda Marcos visited Beijing, and she met with Mao Zedong himself. Ties with China not only stopped the CPC's funding of the NPA, but also pleased America, who facilitated Marcos's disastrous loans.

Capping the Managerial Revolution, Marcos ordered the Professional Regulation Commission's establishment in 1973. This step brought the current Establishment's rule to the Philippines. Mar-

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<sup>9</sup>Joseph Paul Scalice. *Crisis of Revolutionary Leadership: Martial Law and the Communist Parties of the Philippines, 1959–1974*. University of California, Berkeley, 2017., p 804.



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cos himself was a successful lawyer, with the added benefit of family ties—his grandfather was an Ilocano nobleman during Spanish rule, and his father was a congressman in the American period. The PRC further cemented barriers to entry for the professional-managerial elite and serves as a gatekeep. However, elite overproduction carries on, with the PRC's judges resting on graduate professional credentials and arbitrary exam judgements beyond machine checking. The PRC is a cult symbol to many Filipinos, who break down in tears after seeing their children on passers' lists. Marcos explicitly lays out this endgame:

There is another type of revolution, one which is carried out by the assimilation of the revolutionary classes into the existing order, resulting as in the case of the other type, in a different social order. This is the liberal type of revolution.

The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines, p 57.

The professional-managerial caste's assmilatory attitude is something Nomadic Prolet will tackle later. In the present, the professional-managerial caste's dominance makes its way even in so-called 'political dynasties'. To illustrate, one may just look at current big-name politicians:

- Gloria Arroyo: former NEDA bureaucrat
- Rodrigo Duterte: a lawyer
- Leni Robredo and her late husband: lawyers
- Francisco Pangilinan: has an MPA
- Noynoy Aquino: was a manager in Hacienda Luisita before entering Congress
- Sara Duterte: went into Pediatrics before law.

In Pampanga's case,

- Mayor Carmelo Lazatin of Angeles: has an MBA
- Governor Dennis Pineda: has a Business Management degree
- former Mayor Edgardo Pamintuan of Angeles: a lawyer
- Mayor Emmanuel Alejandrino of Arayat has a Bachelor's degree.

Incidentally, these last two are descendants of noble families that betrayed the Kapampangans and sided with the First Republic. All except Arroyo have neither academic nor working caste backgrounds, while Arroyo herself remained in a bureaucratic capacity without branching into theory or empirics. Even Mayor Isko Moreno of Manila, despite coming from a working caste background, joined the Managerial Establishment's ranks, with an MPA to prove it.

Burnham contests that the Soviet Union realized that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat could not bring about real Communism, and shifted to a managerial bent late in Lenin's time. Stalin would accelerate this push, at the same time when Nazi Germany and the United States began adopting Managerial policies:

Nevertheless, it may still turn out that the new form of economy will be called "socialist." In those nations—Russia and Germany—which have advanced furthest toward the new economy, "socialism" or "national socialism" is the term ordinarily used. The motivation for this terminology is not, naturally, the wish for scientific clarity but just the opposite. The word "socialism" is used for ideological purposes in order to manipulate the favourable mass emotions attached to the historic socialist ideal of a free, classless, and international society and to hide the fact that the managerial economy is in actuality the basis for a new kind of exploiting, class society.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Chapter 9: The Economy of Managerial Society

This same Managerial bent influenced Communist parties worldwide, including the PKP. Marcos hypocritically denounced the Soviet Politburo for handling all affairs technocratically, while he himself implemented technocratic Managerialism for the so-called common good.

Of course, Managerialism could have only taken off in the Philippines after the Revolution of Mass and Scale. Mass society in the Philippines has certainly gone beyond cementing into curing. Nationalism in Westphalian mold now is the most important civic virtue, the so-called nation more important than the family, or the community, or the *ethnos*. National myths, like those of Rizal, or

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Bonifacio, or the Commonwealth, get more attention more than local histories. Burnham himself first noticed this tendency in Russia:

But the death of all the early leaders was an important ritual act in establishing the mass attitudes of managerial society and in strengthening the foundations of the managerial institutions.

James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Chapter 14: The Russian Way

Hence local histories present Marxian analogies and concepts, and foreign historians trained in the Annales School remain the gold standard for Philippine History, yet remain obscure and unknown. Mass society also manifests in the president being for all “Filipinos”, speaking Tagalog to everyone except his native people, the mass national media dominating ratings and sales, among so many other hallmarks. The Filipino has been atomized into only being a Filipino, with obligations only to the Philippine State. One surely sees how popular it has become to blast provincials for prioritizing their families, or for being “regionalist”, or for being “clannish”. The Managerial Establishment’s prime directive is to turn humanity into a uniform blob of conformity, all to maintain and preserve its power.

### Managerial Liberalism against Community and Culture

Mass production requires not only homogeneous goods and services but also homogeneous consumers, who cannot vary in their tastes, values, and patterns of consumption, and who must consume if the planning of the corporations is to be effective. The moral formula of managerialism is [therefore] a justification of mass, the legitimization of immediate gratification of appetites and desires, and the rejection of frugality, thrift, and the postponement of gratification. Mass advertising serves to articulate an ethic of hedonism, and modern credit devices and the manipulation of aggregate demand serve to encourage patterns of hedonistic behavior in the mass population.

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*

Liberalism has always stood against localism, traditional family relations, and the importance of community. Hereditary competence

and familial connections stood and still stand as roadblocks to the myth of unchaining man. Liberalism's overly optimistic view of man makes its adherents believe that they as men can remake and reshape their world. Hence for them, all evils fade when all men live in environments suited to their innate goodness.

Of course, this overly optimistic view has paradoxically fostered institutions that promote high time preference—preferring present gains over future ones by rejecting frugality, and promoting instant gratification, hedonism, and promiscuity. Classical Liberals believed that they could shackle the Leviathan and use it to protect life, liberty, property, and true human flourishing. Of course, the Leviathan's powers grew, and selective management, nepotism, and favoritism let inequality and low wages spread. Just see Lincoln using Southern slavery as an excuse to enhance Federal powers, a clear parallel to modern American interference abroad in the name of its values. Meanwhile, Modern Liberalism abandoned Classical Liberalism's individualist notions. It now emphasizes man's social and collective nature. Self-actualization now happens only when man plays fully into his collective, and the State should serve to assist man in self-actualizing. Whether Classical or Modern, however, no one can deny how high time preference institutions spread in Liberalism's wake. The State as nanny encouraged high time preference and mass consumption, all in the name of human 'progress'.

Managerial Liberalism's destructive pursuit bore bitter fruits after its Philippine arrival. Like the French Revolution, working caste religiously-motivated counterrevolutions erupted against the new Establishment. Compare the Kapampangans and Guardia de Honor with Brittany and the Vendee. The new government even asked the native Ilocano priest turned Freemasonic Bishop Gregorio Aglipay to suppress the latter as the Americans neared Tarlac. Meanwhile, the former fell into ruin and famine before the Americans even set foot from their ships. Starting from Macabebe, Kapampangans enlisted into the US Army to revenge their losses. Working men conscripted by traitorous Kapampangan nobles deserted en masse once

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the Americans entered their lands. These had neither interest nor incentive to fight or work for a foreign government, and they saw working with the Americans as necessary to remove foreign influence from their lands.

It is also clear that the Philippine War was not a “people’s war” either in the Maoist or the popular sense. In every district studied, with the exception of the Tagalog region, the Army was able to enlist and utilize a substantial number of Filipino supporters. Some of these were ethnic or religious groups disenchanted with the abuses or policies of Aguinaldo’s government. They joined the Americans for reasons which they viewed as more important than the cause of independence. In the 1st District the Guardia de Honor allied with the Army to protect itself from revolutionary persecution. In the 4th District a number of Ilocanos joined the Americans both from fear of Tagalog domination and because the guerrillas had murdered their leader. In the Bicol region many townspeople, including a substantial number of policemen and volunteers, joined the Americans to protect their towns.

Brian McAllister Linn. *The War in Luzon, US Army Regional Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1900–1902*. (Ohio State University, 1985.)

Most of the nobility kept fighting for Aguinaldo in hope for advancement and prestige. We know from history, however, that having no moral unity between ruled and ruler starts a society’s downfall:

However, it is not enough for the ruled majority alone to have this moral unity, they could show great courage but will still likely fail if they are not met by an equal moral unity in the ruling class. Mosca gives the example of the kingdom of Naples against the French in 1798–9 where the people were united, but they were betrayed by the pro-French sympathies of their ruling class: ‘Treason, therefore and, more than treason, the unending suspicion of treason, paralysed all resistance, disorganized the regular army...and diminished the effectiveness of a spontaneous popular resistance...which might have triumphed.’

Neema Parvini, *The Populist Delusion*. (Imperium Press, 2022).

Managerial Liberalism requires a homogenous populace sharing the same values and traits. Thus the Philippine State tries to impose one nation and one spirit among its citizens. Agencies like the National Economic Development Agency (NEDA) and the Philip-

#### 9.4. *Managerial Liberalism against Community and Culture*

pine Statistics Authority (PSA) chart this project's course, ensuring that homogenous goods and services satisfy a homogenous populace. The Keynesian fallacy carries on, with only few controls appearing to avoid Marcos Sr's most blatant mistakes.

Managerial Liberalism's bitter fruits also appear thus: 'regionalism' and 'clannishness' are hated by the professional-managerial elite. For them, the 'nation' must take precedence over family and community. Just see the news airing pieces about why the 'Filipino' must abandon his roots and conform to the larger collective. This allegedly will bring 'progress' to the 'nation'. To these types, however, 'progress' means high time preference and irresponsibility. The Philippine government glees in and maintains this order.

Hence Ferdinand Marcos Sr not only instituted Tagalog in the 1973 Constitution as National Language, but gave it a new name to further the illusion of a "Filipino" identity. Marcos's technocratic ideal kept up the illusion for a while, till his Keynesian mismanagement and money printing led to economic disaster. The professional-managerial and working castes to unite for the first and only time in all of Philippine history for the Managerial facade had fallen. Ironically, Marcos succeeded in attaining one nation, one spirit by being overthrown rather than by his actions per se. Of course, the new Establishment was still only a facade, and kept all the inner workings from Marcos's time. The professional-managerial caste was still the dominant elite in Philippine society, with the working caste none the wiser. Tagalog culture had finally completely succeeded in atomizing the Filipino as just the Filipino.

However, this new order now stands to crumble. Erap's reign proved to be the first break in the temporary caste alliance. Contrary to professional-managerial stereotypes, the working caste rank education, experience, platform, and track record as their most important criteria in voting<sup>10</sup>. Hence in 1998, Gloria Arroyo won a ma-

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<sup>10</sup>Sheila S. Coronel and Yvonne T. Chua, 'The poor vote is a thinking vote', Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (April 26, 2004): <https://old.pcij.org/stories/the-poor-vote-is-a-thinking-vote/>.

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jority victory among income Classes D and E, whose working caste jobs were still in large supply before (explaining their lower incomes). She was well known as NEDA's chief, and her calculating rationality was supposed to balance Estrada's soft-heartedness. However, Erap's populist policies made the professional-managerial caste feel a threat to their position. The following circus of an impeachment trial led to urbanites massing in EDSA and removing the populist president. The working castes themselves gathered in EDSA a few months after to bring their chosen president back. Water cannons and bullets greeted their assault on Malacañang, quite unlike what happened a few months before.

Despite being the Establishment's pick, however, Gloria Arroyo found herself entangled in too many scandals to remain in good company in the Establishment. The professional-managerial caste rallied hard against her, for letting her remain in power was proof that EDSA 2 was a mistake and EDSA 3 was legitimate. They brought in Noynoy after her, and the professional-managerial caste prospered while the working caste suffered. The latter, disenfranchised for almost two decades, worked with a bitter Arroyo to bring their final revenge on the professional-managerial caste by voting in Duterte. The professional-managerial caste ranted and rambled about the people's ignorance and stupidity. Thus this caste demands permanent revolution through the Leviathan's dominance over civil society. They want to accelerate the present order's spread, fulfilling what de Jouvenel warned of:

Where will it all end? In the destruction of all other command for the benefit of one alone, that of the state. In each man's absolute freedom from every family and social authority, a freedom the price of which is complete submission to the state. In the complete equality as between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master, the state. In the disappearance of every constraint which does not emanate from the state, and in the denial of every pre-eminence which is not approved by the state. In a word, it ends in the atomization of society, and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man, whose only bond is now their common bondage to the state. The extremes of individualism and so-

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cialism meet: that was their predestined course.

Bertrand De Jouvenel. On power: Its nature and the history of its growth. (1949). Book 4: The State as Permanent Revolution, Chapter 9: Power, Assailant of the Social Order.

However, disaffected working castemen and academics will challenge the Leviathan's acceleration. They have started seeing that professional-managerial metrics and indicators have little bearing on reality, and competitors to the Leviathan's services, like security, courts, or welfare, can enter this market. As the Liberal order continues failing, we may see ethnic divisions and localism resurface. Ethnic consciousness will return, and counter-elites should encourage this trend while also maintaining localism. Beyond *ethnos*, a focus on small, closed-knit communities should also take priority. Having the same customs and practices as another pales to friends and family that one knows intimately, no matter the origin. Universal brotherhood happens only when all are homogenous, and this project should have never started in the first place. Universal brotherhood among Filipinos failed, and so will universal brotherhood among all peoples, nations, tribes, and *ethnoi*.

### Dynasties and Oligarchs as Straw Boogeymen

In some precolonial societies, circulation in elites was enshrined as tribal law. Brother Juan de Plascencia, OFM, records how any noble or freeman could claim rule over a Kapampangan polity after a public challenge. In colonial times, elite circulation was enshrined in some areas, like Tondo and Pampanga, through *gobernadorcillo* elections by taxpayers. In 1696, however, these elections were restricted only to current and former *cabezas de barangay*. While the electors could not vote for anyone within fourth degree relations, a steady state formed where local elites had more or less the same interests. The native elite gradually became lethargic and stagnant:

And, as the backward state of agriculture in Filipinas proceeds also from the fact that, notwithstanding there are many industrious, laborious and charitable persons in the villages, there are also many others



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in whom sloth and idleness reign—for instance, many chiefs and their sons, and the heads of barangay;...all these caring only to subjugate the common people by compelling them to work without pay in their fields, and trying to exempt themselves from common labor [polo] and from the other burdens to which those who pay tribute are subject...

Governor General José Basco y Vargas

Coincidentally, the 19th century saw Tagalog culture and practices spread among non-Tagalog elites. The gap between ruler and ruled gradually became the gap between cultural Tagalogs and cultural natives, respectively. One salient example happened in Pampanga:

In terms of culture, social orientation, and wealth, the gap between the elite and the lower class widened. The former, through their knowledge of Spanish and Tagalog, associated with members of the colonial establishment and with upper-class Filipinos from other areas. The latter almost never spoke any language but Capampangan and did not participate in any of the life outside the province. The large stone houses with European furnishings and the nipa hut almost bare of furniture respectively identified the landlord and his tenants.

John Larkin. *Pampangans: Colonial society in a Philippine province*.

University of California Press, 1972. Chapter 4: Crash Crop Society.

A new, popularly elected post, the municipal captain, replaced that of the *gobernadorcillo* in 1895 to foster local autonomy. However, this threatened the order that had persisted for the past two hundred years, enticing many nobility to ally with the Tagalog professional-managerial caste during the Revolution. As we have said, this hybrid elite became the Philippines' ruling class. However, local elites' power gradually faded as the bureaucracy expanded its own power.

Standard narratives of Philippine institutions thus depict a stereotypical squabble between so-called dynasties, oligarchs, and warlords on one hand, and the technocratic bureaucracy on the other. These narratives of power point to the former as power brokers holding monopolies on policy, and the latter as helpless victims in a failing state. These talking points even made way into Marcos's so-called visionary thinking—his *The Democratic Revolution* calls for Liberal Revolution against them. Truly, oligarchs and dynasties have become the main boogeyman in popular professional-managerial consciousness.

However, dynastic officials remain top picks despite hatred against them—just see the hysteria for Leni Robredo and Kiko Pangilinan among the professional-managerial caste before the 2022 elections. No one has also questioned whether there exists anything inherently wrong with having oligarchs and dynasties in power. History shows that hereditary rule worked for centuries back when society was more localist. Intergenerational wealth and governance provided stable pillars for local communities and civil society. Those on the Radical Right have no business clamoring against so-called oligarchs and dynasties per se. Any fault in elite rule lies in what sort of elite rules a polity, not the presence of an elite itself.

In all reality, the national government can *easily* do away with these local power brokers. One can just look back at 2009, when the Ampatuans screwed up what was supposed to be a typical clan war, and instead involved civilians and bureaucrats in the mess. The AFP was able to clear out the Ampatuans' private army in less than two weeks. One must draw the conclusion, then, that the national government cannot be bothered at all to clear other private armies—including that of the Mangudadatus, for that matter—and the so-called oligarchs, dynasties, and warlords in general.

While the Establishment media and educational system, among other government-sponsored and approved institutions, denounce oligarchs and dynasties, it *must* keep them alive. At least two reasons exist why:

1. Dynasties and oligarchs are subsidiaries for the national power base. They do the national government's dirty work, and in exchange, they get to keep some power.
2. These subsidiaries can easily be kept in check. The Local Government Code, for example, allots only fiscal welfare powers to LGUs. The AFP, PNP, and the bureaucracy in general can also contest LGUs and other informal power subsidiaries, like corporations.

One may see how Bertrand de Jouvenel's High-Low/Middle mech-

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anism plays out to great effect here. Rulers present themselves as saviors to the low against the oppressive middle, who are a threat to rulers if left unchecked, and needed subsidiaries and representatives if indeed checked. Thus, Stalinism allows the capitalist class to exist for national industrialization, while the ruling bureaucracy portrays itself as the savior against the very people they allow to exist in the first place. In the Philippines, the national bureaucracy portrays itself as the savior of Liberal Democracy against so-called oligarchs and dynasties.

The subsidiaries are kept on their toes, intimidated to work for the regime so that they keep their small grasps on power. Their shadowy yet never faltering presence serves as Emmanuel Goldstein to Malacañang. They obviously act as subsidiaries to the welfare state, and the 1987 Constitution with the Local Government Code ensures that they perform *no task than to be subsidiaries*. The national media, with government blessing, airs documentaries and newspieces slandering the dynasties and oligarchs as oppressors and tyrants. Regime academics, as priests, preach against them in their pulpit of newspieces, and craft theology against them in journal articles and books. Just to give one example of a regime priestess preaching the regime's gospel:

...technocracy cannot remain "apolitical" in a society under an oligarchic rule. The only way it can hope to successfully combat corruption is to sustain its support from the vast majority of Philippine society, particularly its social movements, in confronting a rapacious elite.

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. "Philippine Technocracy as a Bulwark against Corruption: The Promise and the Pitfall." *Philippine Social Sciences Review* 64.1 (2012).

Popular consciousness rails against them, and demands their downfall. This allows the national government to step in and hail itself as savior against the local bullies. LGUs are declawed and defanged to ensure that they pose no threat to Malacañang, and to ensure that most taxes flow to Manila instead of the provinces. Provincial elites, however, glee in being arms of the welfare state, for they know that they have either this little power or none at all.

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Despite all the propaganda, the bureaucracy's red tape poses much more direct danger to the people than any dynastic action, as those paying VAT, or lining up in government offices, or dealing with law enforcement know, among many other instances. In fact, it is the bureaucracy that enables business cronyism and local political-economic monopolies, for their policies and ideologies dictate who comes out on top in these areas. Only the privileged or naive would think that having rulers focused on technical skill will stop them from having interests contrary to the ruled. A technocracy has all the same incentives as politicians and big business to engage in corruption.

De Jouvenel's mechanism not only acts on the middling dynasties and oligarchs, however. Fear of the middle keeps the low forever faithful to the high, and the Establishment uses *oversocialization* to keep this fear ingrained. Like in the novel *1984*, the ruled and lower sections of the rulers express their fears and doubts in ritualized slacktivism as two-minutes' hate.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## Oversocialization in the Managerial Republic

Psychologists use the term “socialization” to designate the process by which children are trained to think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that society. It may seem senseless to say that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a rebel. Nevertheless, the position can be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 24

While Theodore Kaczynski’s thought is riddled with holes and problems, arguably his most enduring contribution to Radical Right-wing thought is his concept of *oversocialization*. In a nutshell, oversocialization plays out like so:

1. For its own efficiency and security, the Establishment needs to bring about deep and radical social changes to better manage mass society.
2. Frustration under the Establishment’s requirements leads to rebellious impulses.
3. The Establishment co-opts these impulses in service to its required social changes: activists “rebel” against old and outmoded values no longer useful to the Establishment, and in favor of the new values that the Establishment needs us to accept.
4. Rebellious impulses, otherwise dangerous to the Establishment, have an outlet not only harmless to the Establishment, but useful to it.
5. Public resentment resulting from social changes gets drawn away from the Establishment and its institutions, and now directed instead at the radicals who spearhead the social changes.

Individuals are incentivized to act as the Establishment requires, and will shame and vilify those who do not. One should notice that those overeager for high school cheering competitions, high school class plays and activities, and all other trifles of their sort also promoted hysteria for Leni Robredo and Kiko Pangilinan in the 2022 elections.

This rebellion mechanism meant to soften pain from homogenization is institutionalized, similar to *two minutes' hate* from George Orwell's 1984. Those from the professional-managerial caste will gladly direct and meddle with rural affairs in a sham rebellion against 'injustice' for the 'common good'.

We save a fuller critique of Theodore Kaczynski's primitivist ideas for later. For now, we analyze how oversocialization plays a large part in driving not just Manila's but professional-managerial citizenry in general.

### Liberal Dominance in Manila and the Cities

As we have discussed before, Manila and the cities follow global trends in Managerialism rather well. Oversocialization, in fact, took root much faster after Tagalog culture accelerated in spread and growth. In fact, the Tagalog virtue of *pakikisama* is a direct, natively-grown translation of oversocialization. Oversocialization as virtue spread through the Philippines along with other Tagalog cultural traits after the Philippine Revolution. Native cultures and traits were ruined by oversocialization demanding that other peoples conform to the Establishment's standard. To illustrate Kaczynski's point, Marcos implemented Managerial Liberal institutions in the Philippines, causing backlash later on in his reign. This backlash, however, served only to pacify the populace. His institutions carry on, with the so-called 'People Power Revolution' only enhancing these institutions' control and leverage. At the same time, the Establishment directs people's anger towards Marcos as these institution's spearhead rather than the insitutions themselves.

The Managerial Republic's oversocialized character had kept itself to the cities till recently. The impulse to rebel, of course, grew ever larger, allowing the Establishment's neatest trick to play out:

All of us in modern society are hemmed in by a dense network of rules and regulations. We are at the mercy of large organizations such as corporations, governments, labor unions, universities, churches, and

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political parties, and consequently we are powerless. As a result of the servitude, the powerlessness, and the other indignities that the System inflicts on us, there is widespread frustration, which leads to an impulse to rebel. And this is where the System plays its neatest trick: Through a brilliant sleight of hand, it turns rebellion to its own advantage.

The System's Neatest Trick, Part 2 Paragraph 1

Atomization causes an imbalance in social capital, where attaining such incentivizes professional-managerial behavior. Of course, doing so puts load on them, and an impulse to rebel causes herdlike behavior among the lucky few. To live in a society today thus means to follow the crowd's impulses and be lucky to have social capital.

Many advantages do exist to social capital today, much more than human capital. Universities and colleges favor those with friends among faculty and seniors, not just here and abroad. Meritocracy in fact is no longer as highly favored—being a “people person” and “team player” is more important than skills or experience. Indeed, Kaczynski notes that the professional-managerial caste prioritizes applications and standards more than thinking and prudence:

It is enough to go through a training program to acquire some petty technical skill, then come to work on time and exert the very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements are a moderate amount of intelligence and, most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes care of one from cradle to grave.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 40

Instead of technology, however, we point out that what kept ennui from dawning on the academic caste in preindustrial times was that Managerialism never existed, the service sector was divided between the academe and the working caste, and known men served public administration and judgement, instead of far-away bureaucrats. The mid-tier technical knowledge never came to be for either theory, experience, or both sufficed. Hence the professional-managerial caste today seeks an outlet through Leftism. No better rebellion exists than fighting a government which supports one's ideals, for it is a rebellion against reason (*logos*) itself. No better example exists than Manila's underbelly.

Manila is a fine example of a hive of scum and villainy, where the working caste and the academe have followed the professional-managerial caste's behavior and now seek to cut the tall poppies, hammer down the proud nails. Tagalog culture as espoused by the Managerial Regime distills itself to its rawest, not caring about ancestry or work or sex or age, but envy and oversocialization transcending these all. A true collectivist society where no one goes against the grain while aestheticizing it, no one thinks out of the box while encouraging it, no one rebels against the government while shouting and screaming for it. Manila is where entropic Tagalog Managerialism found its final form, and is steadily approaching it. Creative destruction falls prey to envy, and the big corporations are both targets and brothers in arms.

Now news coverage sensationalizes those worthy of sensationalizing, politely mentions big news, and covers up important items. Anger and hatred flow out as the tragedy unfolds on-air, ending up as post-play catharsis as the hero falls to hubris, and the tragedist media collect tips from watchers. Senator so-and-so never should have stolen the money, President this-and-that never should have made that comment. All this while big business and big government swallow up what remaining pie there is.

As the Managerial Elite would have it, they would rather follow the rules and regulations of what to do when tragedy strikes rather than study why it happens and how to avoid it. Give thoughts and prayers, criticize those who air their thoughts and prayers as platitudes. The working man would get into action and fix the problem through persistence and trial and error. The academic would know how to fix the problem and fix it when conditions are right (sometimes even through trial and error, like with real Mathematics). The professional-managerial, however, idles by and has a higher up fix it.

Ego-boosting and posturing mark the professional-managerial caste, and two-minutes hate form only one ritual in this grander *telos*. These would never study history, or political theory, or even the most basic logical reasoning, yet would clamor for a great leader only



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to eat him (or her) up after a year. The cycle continues, yet never ends for they would never take the courage to leave their comfort zone and learn proper political theory—they would rather post “leave your comfort zone” on social media, then try (then fail) to do something of note. Excellence requires persistence, to remain active, not to decline into entropy. As Aristotle puts it,

But it is necessary to say not only this, that it is an active condition, but also what sort of active condition it is. And something one ought to state is that every virtue, as well as bringing that of which it is the virtue to completion in a good condition, also makes it yield work of a good kind, as the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work first-rate, since by means of the excellence of the eye we see well. Similarly, the excellence of a horse both makes it a first-rate horse, and makes it good at running, at carrying its rider, and at holding still in the face of enemies. So if this is the way things are in all cases, then also the virtue of a human being would be the active condition from which one becomes a good human being and from which one will yield up one's own work well.

Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.  
A Case Study among Traditional Catholics

We turn now to local Traditional Catholics as a case study regarding Manila. Here we see professional-managerial tendencies—aestheticism, oversocialization, and entropy—all converge. One finds these types easily, whether in the Diocesan Mass in Cubao, the FSSPX Priory, or elsewhere.

Aestheticism manifests in their need for a sense of the sacred. True, the liturgy's aesthetics serve to let all mortal flesh keep silent for the intellect to witness Calvary's immortality. However, the sense of the sacred as end in itself is not the *telos* of the liturgy. Hence why many traditionalists declare that *lex orandi lex credendi*—they think that having good aesthetics suddenly clears their mind, that liturgy is a testing ground for the Faith's doctrine, and that doctrine's merit comes from having produced piety and sanctity through the liturgy. We let Pius XII explain better:

## 10.2. A Case Study among Traditional Catholics

We refer to the error and fallacious reasoning of those who have claimed that the sacred liturgy is a kind of proving ground for the truths to be held of faith, meaning by this that the Church is obliged to declare such a doctrine sound when it is found to have produced fruits of piety and sanctity through the sacred rites of the liturgy, and to reject it otherwise. Hence the epigram, “*Lex orandi, lex credendi*”—the law for prayer is the law for faith. *But this is not what the Church teaches and enjoins.*

Pius XII, *Mediator Dei*, Paragraph 46

Indeed, to favor the Traditional Latin Mass for its aesthetics, and to claim that the sense of the sacred produces good doctrine, is no better than Pentecostals or Charismatics blurting gibberish for the emotional high—that is the sense of the sacred for them, and claiming *lex orandi lex credendi* means that the Pentecostals had it right.

Instead, Pius XII notes that *lex credendi legem statuat supplicandi*—doctrine informs prayer. To work with the sense of the sacred first is inductive, to work with doctrine first is deductive—a complete difference. Indeed, the Traditional Mass is replete with Scriptural symbolism in its actions and gestures, such that doctrine informs prayer. Twentieth century innovations like dialogue Masses, singing congregations, and more only serve the illusion that the Mass is a social meal, whose social aspect is important.

This aestheticism, however, is typical of professional-managerial oversocialization looking for an outlet. The world is ugly and dirty, so traditional aestheticism serves as yet another example of the impulse to rebel. This serves at once as belonging to an identity following atomization, and keeping a safe facade to hide behind.

Next, one can find oversocialization in action when seeing how their views favor the Managerial Establishment. Strong government, collectivist tendencies, dichotomous support for/against the military/government/institutions, a lack of Aristotelian prudence to follow the crowd. Hence Leni Robredo is so popular among them—we need to show mercy and compassion to sodomites, we need to enact social justice for the (non-Aristotelian/Thomistic) common good, we need to favor a lack of corruption over Church teaching or politi-

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cal pragmatism or realism. And of course, these tendencies are extremely rebellious, and everyone who believes in them is favored by everyone else who believes in them. Provincials who just want to be left alone will now be forced to wear pink alongside rainbow colors, and get atomized more than they already had been from Manila's influence. Of course, if the great strongwoman says that vaccines aren't mandatory, then forget if I hardheartedly supported them for the past year—let Leni lead!

Unfortunately, Robredo and many other candidates serve only one goal: mass society serving the state. The “country”, the “people”, any other abstract ideal are all myths that hide the pursuit for power. This Managerial Establishment has nothing else in mind but self-preservation and tax collection. Unfortunately, these midwits who prefer the sense of the sacred cannot see past accidentals into universals, and stick to a Nominalism-lite with their motte-and-bailey tactics and utter disregard for theory.

Finally, these tendencies ultimately stabilize in entropy. They wish not to go past their comfort zones and stick only to an aesthetic traditionalism, hence their hatred for reactionary tendencies. They wish not to study further theory, and only to stay in their professional-managerial rules and regulations. It doesn't matter if you provided nothing to society by studying films and movies on taxpayer money for 13 years, at least you followed your passion and sought to preserve the Establishment. Getting hurt is a cardinal sin, even in pursuit of growth. Pursuing growth is a necessity even if it leads to hurt. Don't waste your energy on useless things. Do useless things even if they waste your energy. Contradictory feel-good statements typical of millennials (properly defined to be born 1980-1995, not Generation Z), whose conciliation comes only with Prudential thinking: whether doing something is worth it or not. Entropy, of course, pervades their thinking, leading them to support the Establishment, to pursue Managerialism, to have a higher-up decide for them, to not bear the consequences of their action. Manila's actions have converged to this for a century, and the coming decade will see its end results.

## Democracy's Failure in Late State Managerialism

by Ryan Mello

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is notorious for brawls among lawmakers. These fights happen between competing parties, and they start from debates over bills heating up too much. However, outside observers miss one detail: these fights are mostly for show.

A local journalist explains this process to the BBC<sup>1</sup>: "The legislators are partly acting—trying to show their constituents they're working hard to fight for their cause." These brawls cover up real important issues fenced behind meters of red-tape: important bills too long-winded for the general public to understand. One infrastructure bill under review in 2004 even covered 10,000 pages. Before legislators can even debate on a bill, they need to understand it. How can one expect legislators—let alone the public—to understand them if a major infrastructure bill alone can cover up to 10,000 pages?

These creatures in the legislature are more a creature of their staffs than anyone else. Civics and political science classes give their students a quaint model of how politics works: everyone votes candidates who will enact policies and enforce laws, the State holds a monopoly on violence to secure life, liberty, and property, etc. This on-paper model serves as a useful smokescreen that works wonders in selling to people that Liberal Democracy is the best system in the world. What lies behind said smokescreen serves a useful purpose that rubber stamp legislatures in autocracies don't have: it provides the bureaucracy some honest non-garbage input about public wants, so that they can tailor their plans around it and sell it to the public as legislation by their salesmen (elected officials).

However, the public buying into the democratic system gives professional-managerial "strivers" another method of exerting control around the margins. The veneer of debate allows people to air out their grievances and have free(er) discussions in public, but strivers in

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<sup>1</sup>Cindy Sui. "Taiwan's Brawling in Parliament Is a Political Way of Life." BBC News (18 July 2017) (2017).

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the private sector thoroughly regulate the public square. Free speech is either a time lag between the public square's technological abilities and strivers' ability to worm its way into the system and co-opt it, or a cultural lag between when the public and strivers are at each others' throats, and the former hasn't been brought to general compliance with the latter yet.

The system is resilient in such a way that it doesn't require that too repressive a system that would retard economic development, or demolishing of autonomous, functional communities. The rot sets in, however, when people find that they can vote in power for themselves, such that these people can direct specific targets to be extorted and/or vilified. Conflicts within strivers also play in to this, as losers will converge and rally around public discontent to outmaneuver the well-off winners, who are much less motivated to fight back.

Since conflicts among strivers in democratic societies are usually less bloody, a slow but deep fracturing of society sets in between those who do well in the System and those who do not. Note that this is not purely a class conflict, and ethnic and cultural tensions also factor in. Socialism thrives in this environment by promising cold hard cash, and by promising to expropriate the expropriators. The professional-managerial caste can gloss this over by gaslighting people under the guise of 'justice' (whatever that means), since your average Juan simply isn't bloodthirsty enough in an environment with relatively 'free' elections and 'civilized' society.

Hence we see what happens as Liberal Democracy's Managerial system of governance fails. Managerialism's failure is encouraging public erosion of trust in Liberal Democracy's institutions. Societal trust vanishes, and we see our society increasingly becoming low-trust. While older times had blood ties ranking first, institutional and ideological alignments have become more important in judging whom to trust. Patronage networks have already emerge, and the free for all conflict within the professional-managerial caste has already seen winners: a mixture of state institutions, state-funded institutions, and private trusts and charities. They voted in power to

themselves by funding the right candidates and lobbying the right bills, and now they reap their patronage's fruits. Taiwan's legislative adventures are but the most bitter fruit of Managerialism's failure; the Philippines gives a good example too.

While conflicts among strivers are indeed not too bloody, Managerialism's failure has led to what Samuel Francis calls *Anarcho-tyranny*. Managerialism needed a monolithic culture which ironically came in the name and form of *multiculturalism*. The regime's distributed tyranny holds a broad mix of different cultures and backgrounds in suspension, and thoroughly politicizes it. This politicization happens through top-bottom ways (providing specific recognition and funding, selectively enforcing laws to ensure that the restrained culture would develop into the desired state), or through bottom-top ones (campaigns by regime supporting actors to make the culture more 'inclusive', 'intersectional', or whatever pseudo-neutral ideological qualifier that can be used to nudge the captive culture into compliance and convergence).

By setting up its own ideal for the captive cultures within the 'multicultural' plurality, the regime extends its power, while also portraying to gullible observers or subjects that it actively cedes power. Rejecting the monolith becomes an empty slogan used to hide the process of capture, being able to identify itself as a superior alternative to the backward, oppressive ways of the past. In a superficial sense, multiculturalism achieves its goal of providing diversity to social life the same way one offers varieties of junk food against the alternative of one or two kinds of stale bread. In a deeper sense, the monolith also claims superiority by exerting far more pernicious and total control than the brute force monolithic ways that it is denouncing.

By spreading this 'multiculturalism', conflict among different ethnic and interest groups happens. Self-regulation among these groups fails, so restraint now comes from the outside. Hence people become passive in securing their own protection, and they rely only on the State to protect them. This outcome is only one part of Managerialism's failure, for that system made people too passive in their soci-

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etal roles and duties. Everyone now relies on mass corporations for jobs, mass media for information, and mass political parties for illusory mass political action. Telling people that they are too stupid and reckless to feed themselves, let alone defend themselves, has made them give up these societal roles fall to the State.

One may see the outcome in the Philippines: the Philippine National Police relies on Manila's command and control, with no input from LGUs unless political connections allow them. Local politicians cannot promise to restore law and order. Only the national executive can do something about problems like drug use, for only they can direct law enforcement. LGUs have to make do with anarcho-tyranny, for the most they can do is perform social welfare actions as the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code state.

Most people, however, are sick of anarcho-tyranny. While strivers detest vigilantes, working caste 'chuds' romanticize them as countless action movies attest. Duterte's drug war somewhat legitimized vigilante action, although striver pushback ended this stride after a year. Managerialism's failure will only encourage violence and conflict as people know not whom to trust. Divisions among ethnic lines, soft secessions through private communities, and the rise of private states seem inevitable. Nomadic Prolet once spoke about what Filipinos really want in face of Managerialism's failure:

- quasi-libertarian and anarchistic distrust of government institutions;
- anti-globalism;
- want to be left alone for the most part; and
- crave for decisive leadership, irrespective of anything.

The people want in every election someone to stop the country's anarcho-tyranny through unity; we may yet see further division and anarcho-tyranny's acceleration as Managerialism resists its own death throes.

## The Empire of Lies

The empire of lies proceeds in its policy primarily from rough, direct force... We all know that having justice and truth on our side is what makes us truly strong.

Vladimir Putin

Oversocialization is the Establishment's tactic in enforcing its doctrines among the people. A closer look at history will allow one to trace how it developed. In all reality, the Philippine case is but one example of Elite Theoretical concepts becoming reality through the *Empire of Lies*.

The *Empire of Lies* refers to the neoliberal, globalist, and socially progressive order ruling today. Arguably it began when Abraham Lincoln instituted absolute Federal Power in the United States by suppressing the Confederacy. This aggression constituted the beginning of unnecessary American intervention and interference abroad. American commitment to the growing Empire set in stone in 1913, when the Federal Reserve began, when the income tax was imposed, and when popular election of state senators became norm. The Old Right faded, with the Republican Party cementing its New Right shift with the Southern Strategy and resulting neoconservatism. The Empire of Lies ensured that America lose its small-town and localist values in favor of liberal mass society.

Rousseauan and Hobbesian values made their headway in the Philippines earlier with the Revolution. The Managerial Establishment's futile ascent through the Tower of Babel, however, will not change that man's end is not mass society. His earthly end lays in closed-knit communities, where he can grow in virtue and friendship. Ideological particulars had come from mass society's growth. The Revolution of Mass and Scale, growing from Late Medieval times, had ruined man's conception of civil society and his earthly end. Indeed, whatever form of government works best at a small scale. Local government trumps national government in all things, especially in regulation and taxation.



## 11. *The Empire of Lies*

But the Empire of Lies sees that man is homogenized in nation-states imposing artificial identities. The Westphalian poison, blurring the line between *ethnos* and *civitas*, would spread across the world. Special interest groups— the Rothschild family, the Rockefeller group, George Soros, the World Economic Forum, the Gates Foundation, among many others—lobby for the American government to keep this order going. These ideas' spread benefits them to keep the Managerial Revolution going. What used to be common interests among the professional-managerial caste within countries has now become common interests in their number *among* countries. Other than surface level traits like place and language spoken, a homogeneity before unseen now exists in so-called 'libtards' both in the Philippines and the United States. This homogeneity is neither ethnic nor racial, of course, but sociocultural. Diversity and multiculturalism become the bludgeons to beat the professional-managerial caste's prospective enemies, then cloak themselves in being the mainstream all for the mantle of legitimacy. This trend has now branched out and even surpassed its more conventional Marxist class-war compatriots.

Using one case example far removed from the Philippines, we can easily show how far-reaching the Empire had become.

### Artificial Identity in Ukraine

Modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people as inexhaustible material for their social experiments.

Vladimir Putin, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. (OSTEUROPA, 71(7), 51-65, 2019).

After the First Migration Period ended, a group of people called the Slavs settled a large stretch from between the Baltic and Black Seas to the Balkans. They followed the initial Germanic and Hunnic migrations, and they carved themselves new realms bordering both them and the Eastern Roman empire. From the first three tribes of Wendes, Antes, and Sclaveni came many smaller tribes, forming their own

confederations. One such confederation formed after the chaos of war between Norsemen and Turks.

The land immediately between the Baltic and Black Seas paid host to numerous tribes, whether Slavic, Turkic, Norse, Baltic, and so on. One tribe, the Rus, started as Norse traders who would dominate the Volga River area:

By the 800s groups of Gotlandic Varangians had developed a powerful warrior-merchant system. They began probing south down the waterways controlled by the Khazars. They were in pursuit of the Arabic silver which flowed north through the Khazarian-Volga Bulgarian trading zones. The silver coins were obtained as payment for among other things slaves, furs and swords. Gotlandic mercantile fleets passing Atil on the Volga were tithed, as they were at Byzantine Cherson. The Gotlandic Varangians settled inside the East Slavic area. They forced their subordinates to feed them and obtain merchant goods.

Gannholm, T. Gotland, Home of the Varangians.

Of course, great trade also paved a way for great riches. A group of traders establishing colonies and empires abroad happens often through history, and the Rus Norse were no exception. A few former raiders and vikings would establish their own realm among the Slavs. The locals called their Rus rulers as khagans, borrowed from the Turkic Khazars and meaning great khan:

Once the volume of the trade, and other possibilities in the East was realised at home, the enterprises became increasingly attractive for Norse chieftains. It was enough that one leader among them had strong charisma and sense of purpose to give the activities quite a new character—the creation of a political structure, a hierarchic military organization. An organization of this kind came into being in the early ninth century and is known in historiography as the “kaganate of Rus”.

Duczko, W. (2004). *Viking Rus: studies on the presence of Scandinavians in Eastern Europe*. Brill.

By the 860s, however, an uprising commenced against the Rus Khaganate. Four tribes overthrew the Rus Khaganate, possibly in response of Christianization efforts. However, the chaos and lawlessness that followed forced the locals to offer princeship (“firsthood” in Latin, first citizen) to a Norseman, Rurik.

## 11. *The Empire of Lies*

Prince Rurik, his brothers, and their descendants commenced conquest over the rest of the East Slavs. Any tribe remaining from the initial migrations fell under the Rus sway. Rurik had made his steading in Kiev, once a border fort between Rus and Khazar domains. From that city, the Rus expanded their domains before itself fracturing throughout Medieval times.

The Rus remained a united people, although their East Slavic language fractured into numerous dialects. Two main strands emerged: the Great Russian dialect, and Ruthenian. The Ruthenian dialects themselves steadied into four: Little Russian (Ukrainian), White Russian (Belarusian), and Rusyn (sometimes counted as a sub-dialect of Ukrainian). Kiev had become a Lithuanian possession, while Moscow rose in prominence by defeating the Turkic hordes.

The steppes north of Crimea were sheer wilderness, the borderland between Russia, the Crimean Khanate, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Wallachian Principality. Over time, however, the Commonwealth had groups of poor, landless peasants settle the borderland. These groups came from free bands of men who would roam the borderland on horses, called Kazakhs by the Golden Khanate for they were free. The Russians called them the Cossacks in their own language. These Cossacks built stockades to defend themselves against Turkic raids. The borderland, or Ukraina in Slavic, now paid host to these settlers.

Eventually, however, one Bohdan Khmelnytsky led a rebellion against Polish magnates and governors who wished to take the Cossacks' freedoms. This rebellion had Russian support, and despite Polish successes late in the rebellion, the Cossacks had their independence under Russian suzerainty.

Despite the Cossacks having their own realm in the Ukraine, note that no tangible Ukrainian identity ever emerged on the steppe. Most folk called themselves either Cossacks or Little Russians, and not as Ukrainian except as for living on the borderlands. Even as Russia dismantled the Hetmanate's autonomy, the Cossacks responded by migrating, either into the Carpathians or further East—their combined

descendants live as Kuban Cossacks. However, Modern Ukraine has co-opted the Zaporozhian Cossacks as “Ukrainian”, despite Khmelnytsky fighting for Cossacks’ and locals’ freedom under his rule. The Russian Empire’s attempts at stamping out Little Russian identity proved imprudent because it stirred Ukrainian sentiments among the elites, but this shows that Ukrainian identity never took hold at this time.

It took the 19th Century for conceptions of a Ukrainian identity to form among nobility and the wealthy living on the borderlands. Poets and activists were the first to think of Ukraine as anything beyond borderlanders. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a Bolshevik sympathizer, wrote the modern doctrine of Ukrainian national identity, from which myths of Ukraine’s continuity with the Kievan Rus came from. The common people, however, thought themselves just as Little Russians, brothers to all Rus and East Slavs in general.


Ukrainian identity, never anything beyond a descriptor for people living on the borderlands, took on new life as a mythical ethnos that had lived since the Kievan Rus. As we discuss above, however, the Kievan Rus gave life to all modern East Slavs, and the Ukrainian language was one of many Ruthenian dialects. Indeed, modern Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian have high mutual intelligibility, so much so that they can be considered broad dialects of one East Slavic continuum.

The results show that the respondents with L1 Estonian were quite successful in understanding Ukrainian via their knowledge of Russian. Based on average percentages for self-reported text comprehension (62%) and measured success (70.55%), there was no significant discrepancy; however, the participants provided a slightly lower percentage for self-comprehension than the actual results showed. Furthermore, we will look more closely into the performance results of each separate group of words using the participants’ comments and explanations. The last subsection will be dedicated to extra-linguistic factors.

Branets, A., Bahtina, D., & Verschik, A. (2020). Mediated receptive multilingualism: Estonian-Russian-Ukrainian case study. *Linguistic approaches to bilingualism*, 10(3), 380–411.

11. *The Empire of Lies*

Co-opting Khmelnytsky for modern Ukrainian identity is like North Macedonia co-opting Alexander the Great just because both figures just happened to live where the modern states now live. Putin exaggerates by ascribing the modern Ukrainian state to the Soviets, for Elite pro-Ukraine movements popped up earlier. Their first attempt through the Hetmanate of Ukraine already prefigured modern Ukrainian policies, the state’s very name co-opting Khmelnytsky’s movement. Soviet control emerged as the Hetmanate’s deposition, and a Bolshevik council stepping in to replace it.



Ukrainian national identity has subsumed all Russians living in the borderlands, whether White, Little, Great, or even the Rusyn subgroup living in the Carpathians. Here we see that civic national identity has subsumed and replaced ethnic ones, with the *telos* of convenience adored as ethnogenesis. In other words, Ukrainian identity is based on no objective realities beyond convenience and consent. These

facts, that modern East Slavic dialects are so mutually intelligible, and that these peoples have an interlinked history, just shine brighter light at how artificial the Philippines' own concept of national identity is.

## The Revolution's Westphalian Poison

At best, Ukrainian identity rests on living on the borderlands in a time far removed from historical struggles and conflicts there. The modern Ukrainian ethnos is fictional and artificial. One may say the same about 'Filipino' identity. At best, a real, concrete Filipino national identity rests on men living on islands named after King Philip II. This national identity came from a historical accident, and nothing more.

However, a fictional and artificial identity sprang up in the latter half of the 20th century, with roots dating to the Revolution itself. As one can easily see, this is simply Tagalog culture, values, and language. The Philippine government has this goal as its foundation. The Katipunan itself began this goal:

The objective pursued by this association is noble and worthy; to unite the inner being and thoughts of the Tagalogs through binding pledge, so that through this unity they may gain the strength to destroy the dense shroud that benights the mind and to discover the Path of the mind and to discover the Path of Reason and Enlightenment. The word Tagalog means all those born in this archipelago; therefore, though Visayan, Ilocano, Pampango, etc., they are all Tagalogs.

Emilio Jacinto, Primer to the Katipunan

Assent to this idea kept not just to some idealists from the Katipunan's initial cadre, but even to the Revolutionary government's highest levels. Carlos Ronquilo, secretary to Emilio Aguinaldo himself, writes thus:

This is what the readers must understand: by what we refer to as Tagalog, a term which may be found on almost every page of this account, we do not mean, as some believe, those who were born in Manila, Cavite and Balacan, etc. no, we wish to refer to the Philippines... because, in our opinion, this term should apply to all the children of the Filipino nation. Tagalog, or stated more clearly, the name "Tagalog"

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has no other meaning but “Taga-ilog” (from the river) which, traced directly to its root, refers to those who prefer to settle along rivers, truly a trait, it cannot be denied, of all those born in the Philippines, in whatever island or town.

Carlos Ronquilo, *The Revolution of 1896–1897*

Hence here begins the motte-and-bailey tactic that the Tagalog-built Establishment uses in carrying out its Entropic policy. Government-backed historians see this paltry goal and jump to the conclusion that since the Katipunan and the Revolutionary government applied “Tagalog” to all Filipinos (whose connotation had shifted from *insulares* to all people living in Filipinas in the late 19th century), all “Filipinos” joined the Revolution for the Spanish called it the *Tagalog War*. A nonsensical motte-and-bailey statement fit only for a matriarchal race.

Truly, the Philippine tribes share only your typical Austronesian commonalities:

- dorsal slit circumcision (where no foreskin is removed)
- matriarchy,
- collectivism,
- outrigger boats,
- stilt houses,
- pottery style, and
- warrior tattoos.

That said, a few Austronesian tribes have already broken against these commonalities in prehistory. See the Maori who abandoned circumcision and matriarchy after landing on New Zealand, or the Toba Batak who adopted patriarchy and ritual cannibalism, or even the Kapampangans who followed the same lines as the Maori. True, Malaysia and Indonesia formed from colonial lines, but civic national identity never subsumed individual *ethnoi*, and unity in diversity remained important to them. Civil Malaysian and Indonesian nationalism also sprang from different dialects of bahasa being common along those colonial lines. In the Philippines, however, the only lin-

guae francae that existed historically were Spanish and English. In fact, Spanish usage only increased during the American period:

There is, however, another aspect in this case which should be considered. This aspect became evident to me as I traveled through the islands, using ordinary transportation and mixing with all classes of people under all conditions. Although based on the school statistics it is said that more Filipinos speak English than any other language, no one can be in agreement with this declaration if they base their assessment on what they hear. Spanish is everywhere the language of business and social intercourse. In order for anyone to obtain prompt service from anyone, Spanish turns out to be more useful than English. And outside of Manila it is almost indispensable. The Americans who travel around all the islands customarily use it.

In the meantime, the use of Spanish, instead of declining in the face of the propaganda promoting English, seems to spread by itself. This fact has merited the attention of the government. The Education Director's report for 1908 says in page 9: "Spanish continues to be the most prominent and important one spoken in political, journalistic and commercial circles. English has active rivals as the language of trade and instruction. It is equally probable that the adult population has lost interest in learning English." I believe it is a fact that many more people now know the Spanish language than when the North Americans sailed for these islands and their occupation took place.

The Ford Report of 1916. No. 3: The Use of English.

These facts the Katipunan and by extension the Tagalog Establishment routinely ignores. Like with Ukraine, civic nationalism subsumed and replaced ethnic identities within the Philippines. An artificial ethnos sprang from seeds planted by the Revolution. The Westphalian poison crystalized in the 1950s, thanks to likes of Carlos P Romulo. One can only look at his infamous newspaper article to see how the poison spread.

From his words we find the same narrative that repeated in schools and colleges across the state: one Austronesian people, homogeneous except in so-called dialect, fighting for a united cause against Spain for centuries, with Tagalog heroes at the forefront. These Westphalian efforts resulted in the Tagalog language being renamed Pilipino in 1959 to be more palatable to the population at large.



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Of course, no one bought into it, especially Kapampangans and Visayans. Diosdado Macapagal, himself the scion of traitorous Kapampangan noblemen, moved the national Independence Day in an act of Tagalista obeisance. These efforts culminated with Marcos' Democratic Revolution from the Center, with the 1973 Constitution providing for a conlang called Filipino to become the new national language. Here we see desperate attempts to impose a national ethnic identity on a disparate populace. Of course, uniting disparate peoples with almost nothing in common happens only when one culture trumps all others. Marcos and later Aquino's efforts resulted in Tagalog culture and language becoming the norm. Government-backed historians write thus:

In his patriotic writings, Bonifacio expressed his concept of nationhood. In K.K.K Katungkulang Gagawin ng mga Z.Li.B., Pagibig sa Tinubuaang Bayan, Hibik ng Filipinas sa Ynang España, and Ang Dapat Mabatid ng mga Tagalog, he referred to the Philippine islands as sangkapaluan (archipelago) or Katagalugan (Tagalog Nation). In a revolutionary leaflet printed in Cavite during the first quarter of 1897, Bonifacio wrote: "Mabuhay ang Haring Bayang Katagalugan" ("Long live the Great Tagalog Nation").

In Focus: Andres Bonifacio and the 1896 Revolution

This Westphalian poison of blurring the lines between *ethnos* and *civitas* bears its intended fruits today: national identity is important to the liberalist professional-managerial caste, and atomization resulted in the Leviathan State grabbing power. We have discussed at length the Revolution of Mass and Scale brought by Westphalian poison, and how the liberal Establishment demands that Filipinos put their so-called nation above their homes and their communities. Indeed, the Philippines' case is sheer proof of Elite Theory's validity.

### Nation-building, and Culture as Downstream of Politics

There cannot be a firmly established political state unless there is a teaching body with definitely recognized principles. If the child is not taught from infancy that he ought to be a republican or a monarchist,

### 11.3. Nation-building, and Culture as Downstream of Politics

a Catholic or a free-thinker, the state will not constitute a nation; it will rest on uncertain and shifting foundations; and it will be constantly exposed to disorder and change.

Napoleon I

Nation-building refers to the process of establishing national identity using state power. That is, the state imposes values, preferences, and language on all citizens. Contrary to the maxim that politics is downstream of culture, we have the exact opposite: nation-building proves that *culture is downstream of politics*.

Strong, centralized states use nation-building out of necessity, for this allows efficiency through sheer application of rules instead of thinking and prudence. As we have quoted Samuel Francis before, mass society relies on homogenous goods and services peddled onto homogenous consumers. The manager or the bureaucrat finds his wealth from his ability to apply rules and regulations to situations, his managerial skill trumping his productive ability. He has no skin in the game regarding property rights or proper administrative prudence, so his on-paper successes may translate to concrete failures. Nation-building is the manager and the bureaucrat's most important tool, for consumption-based identity allows state powers to increase. Rulers today need society to prefer instant gratification, including attaining such through lip service against instant gratification as social media can attest to. Oversocialization makes bowing down to homogenization attractive, and the impulse to rebel gets expressed through mass consumption. The liberal professional-managerial caste indulges in popular media and sloganeering. No better slogan better describes the Philippines' current state than the Tagalog *Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa*: "One Nation, One Spirit".

Similar patterns emerge in history, not just in Ukraine or the Philippines, but even Europe and the United States. French, a dialect of the langues-d'oïl from Ile-de-France, and Italian, a Tuscan Romance variety, went from minority languages to "national" ones out of managerial assent. These were elite initiatives, and not popular ones: the French Revolutionaries imposed a top-bottom reenvisioning of

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France as nation-state, and Italy unified from Savoyan Freemasons who wanted to unite the Italian peninsula under their rule. We see that Bretons, Corsicans, Occitans, Venetians, Sicilians, and so on had their peoples, communities, and families subsumed under one civic identity transforming into a new *ethnos*. This Westphalian rot expanded in the 19th Century as governments strove to enhance their Leviathan powers:

Almost all European governments eventually took steps which homogenized their populations: the adoption of state religions, expulsion of minorities, institution of a national language, eventually the organization of mass public instruction.

Tilly, C., L. Tilly and R. Tilly (1975) *The Rebellious Century 1830–1930*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

The Managerial Elite is doomed to fail for their indices and metrics fail to conform with reality. Both Louis XVI and Nicholas II faced this themselves. While their deaths were tragic mistakes, we must remember why the people rose to support an elite vanguard of Montagnard Jacobins for the French and the February Freemasons and later October Bolsheviks for the Russians: their leaderships had grown decadent, while counselors and managers had taken over for their monarchs.

Liberal Democracy as the god that failed sees homogenization as a must. Managerial liberalism sees that man, unchained from his home and heritage, must be further freed from material need by joining the hivemind:

The intuition for homogenization under a democracy is immediate if we interpret homogenization in terms of roads, infrastructure, or public schools teaching a common language. The “preference” interpretation of homogenization, literally speaking, implies that an individual “chooses” a policy that changes his preferences, knowing that after the change he would feel happier in the country in which he lives. This argument becomes more plausible if we think of a dynamic extension in which parents transmit values and educate their children in such a way which makes them fit better in the country in which they live by adopting certain social norms and types of behavior. Strong attachment to cultural values can be captured by very high costs of homogenization.

### 11.3. *Nation-building, and Culture as Downstream of Politics*

Alesina, A. F., & Reich, B. (2015). Nation building.

The Leviathan State holds its constituents hostage by demanding excessive tribute, and forcing the populace to conform in mass lest they lose access to their lost taxes. Anarcho-tyranny by the majority develops, for the Managerial Establishment lets multi-culturalism's ills develop to accelerate mass conformity:

You can accuse the federal leviathan of many things—corruption, incompetence, waste, bureaucratic strangulation—but mere anarchy, the lack of effective government, is not one of them. Yet at the same time, the state does not perform effectively or justly its basic duty of enforcing order and punishing criminals, and in this respect its failures do bring the country, or important parts of it, close to a state of anarchy... This condition, which in some of my columns I have called “anarcho-tyranny,” is essentially a kind of Hegelian synthesis of what appear to be dialectical opposites: the combination of oppressive government power against the innocent and the law-abiding and, simultaneously, a grotesque paralysis of the ability or the will to use that power to carry out basic public duties such as protection or public safety.

Samuel Francis, Anarcho-Tyranny, U.S.A.

Oversocialization, as Theodore Kasczynski calls it, provides the mass populace with a kind of comfort and security. Yet costs from homogenization need an outlet. Sexual revolution, feminism, student activism, all outlets for the need to rebel result in cultural decay and stagnancy as the Establishment makes its mark. Hence the System's Neatest Trick plays out:

The only way to deal with guilt among those who refuse to repent is the palliation that comes from social activism. Involvement in social movements like the civil-rights, abortion-rights, and gay-rights movements became a way of calming troubled consciences.

Eugene M. Jones, *Libido Dominandi: Sexual Revolution as Political Control*

Mass atomization from Nationalism, while tragic, is only the first stepping stone to further Leviathan control. Hence the Westphalian order is already being violated: see America's suppression of the Confederacy, its countless interventions abroad, its cultural stranglehold on the world order. Russia and China, in their multipolar pursuits,

## 11. *The Empire of Lies*

have done likewise lest they fail the Prisoner's Dilemma. Similar actions will prevail in the future, and by Schumpeter's Gale even the Empire of Lies and other nations' Managerial Establishments will tire. A new order will set in through mass conformity, for a global government can easily restrict access to resources for those who fail its standards.

Hence the Manila Establishment demands one nation, one spirit: mass society, mass uniformity, and mass homogeneity. Democratic Revolution from the Center took the god that failed and made it this project's wellspring. The Empire of Lies found willing puppets in Malacanang to impose its globalist agenda on the Filipinos, and its movement will not be stopped—unless a new vanguard takes steps to halt its advance.

### Appendix: Excerpt from Carlos P Romulo's Article

I am a Filipino—inheritor of a glorious past, hostage to the uncertain future. As such I must prove equal to a two-fold task—the task of meeting my responsibility to the past, and the task of performing my obligation to the future.

I sprung from a hardy race, child many generations removed of ancient Malayan pioneers. Across the centuries the memory comes rushing back to me: of brown-skinned men putting out to sea in ships that were as frail as their hearts were stout. Over the sea I see them come, borne upon the billowing wave and the whistling wind, carried upon the mighty swell of hope—hope in the free abundance of new land that was to be their home and their children's forever.

This is the land they sought and found. Every inch of shore that their eyes first set upon, every hill and mountain that beckoned to them with a green-and-purple invitation, every mile of rolling plain that their view encompassed, every river and lake that promised a plentiful living and the fruitfulness of commerce, is a hallowed spot to me...

I am a Filipino. In my blood runs the immortal seed of heroes—

#### *11.4. Appendix: Excerpt from Carlos P Romulo's Article*

seed that flowered down the centuries in deeds of courage and defiance. In my veins yet pulses the same hot blood that sent Lapulapu to battle against the first invader of this land, that nerved Lakandula in the combat against the alien foe, that drove Diego Silang and Dagohoy into rebellion against the foreign oppressor.

That seed is immortal. It is the self-same seed that flowered in the heart of Jose Rizal that morning in Bagumbayan when a volley of shots put an end to all that was mortal of him and made his spirit deathless forever, the same that flowered in the hearts of Bonifacio in Balintawak, of Gregorio del Pilar at Tirad Pass, of Antonio Luna at Calumpit; that bloomed in flowers of frustration in the sad heart of Emilio Aguinaldo at Palanan, and yet burst forth royally again in the proud heart of Manuel L. Quezon when he stood at last on the threshold of ancient Malacañan Palace, in the symbolic act of possession and racial vindication.

Romulo, C. P. (1941). *I Am a Filipino*. Malacañang Palace Presidential Museum and Library. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## The Professor Cartel and the Entropic Academe

Pareto as well as Gaetano Mosca recognized that an elite or ruling class composed of only one or a few dominant social forces is likely to represent a danger to social and political groups outside the elite... The elite of the soft managerial regime closely resembles the kind of contracted, monolithic social force that Mosca discussed. Unlike the aristocratic and bourgeois elites of the past, the soft managerial elite bases its social dominance almost entirely on the single social force of modern managerial and technical skills.

Samuel Francis, *Leviathan and its Enemies*, Chapter 9

A quick look at colleges now paints a grim picture. Professors have grown too powerful compared to students, with schoolwork and grading ultimately the professor's call. Tuition refunds need effort to take, often through bureaucratic red-tape ridden work. Little choice may pop up in choosing professors, and information is scarce barring connections with those who have taken them. On the production side, seniority and tenure matter more than merit and skill in faculty pecking order. No real meritocracy exists, only brahmins lordling over the department, and jannisaries fighting for the former's scraps. Above everything, colleges and universities cater to the professional-managerial elite's production more than deductive inquiry. Hence, "novel" knowledge from p-value hacking, faulty statistics, shoehorned assumptions, and inertia from received knowledge matters more than critiquing assumptions, reviewing papers, deduction, and objective analysis, except for Pure Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science which still see important developments. Much worse, the university's resources are strained between catering to the professional-managerial caste and promoting deductive inquiry.

This fall makes more sense once one sees how the professional-managerial caste dominates society as the elite. This caste usurped capital-owners and traditional elites to dominate society. Their Establishment relies on credentialism and oversocialization to present legitimacy—thus, college degrees and state licensure are necessary

tools to ascend. This shift to the professional-managerial caste's interests has brought about *Elite Overproduction*, seen most pressingly in the college degree oversupply and professional jobs' decreasing wages. The Philippines failed to escape this spiral downwards, and we shall trace how this situation happened.

## A Substantial Change

The European universities began as brotherhoods and associations for theoretical learning. Initially, this meant medicine, law, and theology—unlike their modern professional and managerial (modern seminaries train would-be priests in both administration and academic theology) counterparts, biological, political, and theological theory pervaded these institutions. Later on, mathematics, mechanics (physics), and other fields entered the university's purview. Their main similarity was focusing on deductive inquiry, something lost today. Even up to the 19th century, deductive inquiry pervaded all disciplines, with induction and empiricism serving to inform what assumptions and axioms to deduce from. Faraday was famous for his experimentation, but this served only as basis to develop theory—induction informing deduction. Empiricism cannot be pursued for its own sake, since man as rational animal obtains sense objects and phantasms from reality to apply subtraction (or abstraction according to Saint Thomas) and discern universals. Falsifiable hypotheses are useful in so far as they concern thinking about material reality, but beyond that, deduction, logic, and philosophy take precedence. Hence one easily refutes scientific realism, the philosophical view that scientific models accurately and objectively describe concrete reality, by pointing to two mutually contradictory models that both accurately describe reality. In nuclear physics, the shell and liquid-drop models of atomic nuclei suffice. Both contradict each other, yet have the exact same predictions regarding reality.

After World War 2, however, the university's purpose slowly began changing. Managerialism's rise needed a caste of capable profes-



## 12. *The Professor Cartel and the Entropic Academe*

sionals, managers, and bureaucrats who had loyalty and a showing of theoretical knowledge. The GI bill also subsidized numerous veterans who wanted a better life. The university needed to cater to both trends, and adapted to the changing environment. However, doing so meant trading off its original purpose in fostering deductive inquiry. The Managerial Revolution saw the university's fall from grace in a Faustian bargain for short-term influence and gain.

As the university fell from its original purpose, the professional-managerial obsession with standards, metrics, and best practices over prudence and thinking infected nominally theoretical fields. Hence engineering no longer relies on prudence, thinking, or originality, but focuses on applying codes, standards, and regulations. Hence Physics has stagnated for half a century, with old ways dying hard, and pointless theorizing like String Theory taking over. Hence social science and biology students apply statistics without checking their assumptions or running diagnostics on data and results.

More pressingly, journal articles have exploded in number, with only a few being of any use or contributing anything useful. Publish or perish is the game, and nonsensical results that can be justified on ad-hoc assumptions or pleading to novelty matter more than contributing anything useful to theory. This operations research method of performing basic research has captured the so-called academe, another sign of the Managerial Establishment's stranglehold. You will see the Industrial Engineer and the empiricist academic using the same tools and running the same methods. However, is the former does so to help his company profit. The latter goes aimlessly, hoping for some new result that he can p-value hack.

### The Managerial University

The academe's fall coincides with the university catering more to the professional-managerial caste. Useless degrees, like Business Administration, Marketing, Accountancy, and so on have captured part of the university's resources and brought strain in management. Even

once theory-heavy fields, like Medicine and Law, now discuss best methods, regulations, and standards over both theory and practice. Medical residency and legal internship should have been done under a professor, with him explaining his craft to a few students. In their audacity, however, universities now outsource this important practice. The classroom dispenses wanton bits of theory to keep the face of holistic, technically competent graduates. However, the fact that practicums are needed demolish the point of classes, for students should have taken their practicum under a professor instead of wasting time and sometimes even money.

The Managerial University has even forced professional-managerial ideals and roles onto on-paper theoretical subjects. In the Philippines, all bachelor-degree candidates need to take a practicum/internship course, even those taking History, Mathematics, Political Science, or whatever else theoretical field. Social science majors will take them as stewards in some government museum or library. Mathematics majors, who should be in labs like Santa Fe, or the RAND Corporation, or the Institute of Advanced Study, have to contact some Manila corporation to do their practicum. In America at least, Mathematics majors can join a research internship out of their own free will. In the Philippines, being a professor's research assistant is a no-go for practicums. Even worse, universities now offer increasingly specialized degrees and programs. Biotechnology, biochemistry, biophysics, these should all be electives in a biology program. We will not be surprised if Mathematics further splinters into programs dedicated to Real Analysis, Complex Analysis, and so on. This development parallels the professional-managerial need for increasingly specialized roles and titles to be one cut above the rest, one position others fail to fulfill.

The professional-managerial caste enticed many young people with promised wealth. However, supply and demand would see these credentials lose value over time. The college degree oversupply problem had once “prestigious” engineers, doctors, lawyers, among other professions see falling wages. In the Philippines, an entry-level engi-

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neer makes much less than what his forefathers earned. Some universities even offer BS-MS (combined bachelor's and master's) engineering programs to help students stand above other job candidates, all for the price of another year's worth of tuition. Other universities offer a straight medical school option, making six years of studies instead of eight. This oversupply problem has definitely made even a small impact if these changes have occurred. Indeed, some have noticed that the demand in working caste jobs (requiring little to no theoretical knowledge) has mismatched with the oversupply in college degrees, with one example in China:

The excess of college-educated workers has created a structural mismatch in the labor market leading to an oversupply of college graduates and a shortage of vocational and technical school graduates. It can be observed that the oversupply of college graduates has lasted about a decade. The supply of college graduates from educational system has exceeded labor demand from corporate side since 2006, exceeding the oversupply vocational and technical school graduates in 2009, and remained negative through the present. In contrast, as indicated by positive demand-supply gap, demand for vocational and technical school graduates has grown rapidly and entered a labor shortage period in 2011.

Yifan Hu, "Oversupply of college graduates? Structural mismatch." (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013)

Managerialism has conquered the faculty and administration too. Office politics not unlike a corporate setting has set into faculties and departments. Red tape and bureaucracy dominate as department managers wish to blanket apply best practices and regulations to fields that rely on originality and prudence.

Indeed, these inefficiencies in the university make us believe that competition is due. Already, think tanks provide an alternative in producing basic research. University strain from professional-managerial catering may also incentivize think tanks to capture the teaching market in theoretical, deductive fields. The academe will see division later on, as useless fields get culled and alternative outlets increase their influence. This last point becomes relevant in the next section.

## War in the Academe: Brahmins vs Optimates

Now we return to Yarvin's BDH-OV conflict, which we first discussed with the Three Occupational Classes. As mentioned, Yarvin himself admits that his notion of castes is rather antiquated—his notion of Optimates has in fact merged with his notion of Brahmins. The trust fund kid stereotype reflects this well. As such, we have used his caste system in conjunction with our Occupational Classes system to better explain the Left-Right divide. To illustrate, no one would seriously consider culturally right Mises Institute staff to be either Optimates or Vaisyas by Yarvin's standards, pointing to our system's realism.

A more pressing difference between Brahmins and Optimates exists. In another piece, we pointed out how women and choleric focus on accidents, while men focus on substances—entropic nature seeks stability, dynamic nature seeks completeness. We find a similar theme in the academe. Leftists academics prefer induction and empiricism—whether personal, subjective experience, or formless, aimless statistical meandering masquerading as science. Right-wing academics prefer deduction and rationality—analysis and deduction, critiquing assumptions and axioms. Hence Marxian analysis tries to shoehorn reality into their materialist dialectical framework, while Austrian analysis uses the human action axiom—human action goes towards some end (“purposeful behavior”), with consumption, production, and exchange being means toward that end (utility/benefit given preferences).

The Mises Institute is relevant in another way—they have recently launched an online graduate program in Austrian Economics, staffed by known faculty across America. This is simply one early example of a trend that we see starting soon: think tanks replacing the university in relevance. The RAND Corporation has a graduate program in public administration, which places focus on quantitative methods, deductive inquiry, and historical literature. More importantly, there is large emphasis on practical training on the job, with faculty supervising students in public administration efforts. Since the University

has betrayed its original purpose, competition is ripe, and think tanks will be the way to go.

## Elite Overproduction and Cultural Revolution in the Philippines

Indeed, the Philippines provides an important case study for the Managerial Revolution's effects on the university and the academe. In the 1970s, as part of Democratic Revolution from the Center, Marcos established the Philippine Regulatory Commission (PRC) to oversee licensing for professionals nationwide. The PRC requires professionals for many fields to have a college degree before even thinking of taking an qualification exam. These exams have become a cult symbol, with parents and well-wishers breaking down in tears after seeing their child on the passers' list. Even worse, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) acts as the PRC's priesthood, dictating ordinations through colleges and universities. The professor cartel collects fees and favors, CHED's mandated oligopoly keeping fresh blood minimal. In return, they grant charlatans' blessings: scraps of paper and good words for corporations. Before, lawyers, doctors, and engineers formed a trinity of stable, secure, and prestigious jobs. These days, however, wages have started falling exactly because of these promises, supply now reaching into surplus.

Cultural Revolution has been taking place since universities became the go-to key for success in Manila. The Academic Agent calls atomized individualism revolving around success through the university the *Boomer Truth Regime*. The Boomer Truth Regime crystallized in Martial Law, as baby boomers filled universities and got better lives for themselves. They sincerely believed in Marcos's promise, and support his son to win with sincerity in hopes for past good times. They formed the basis of modern society's lack of cohesion as Martial Law and Democratic Revolution from the Center let them pursue short-sighted ends. Generation X was the last to witness Managerialism's fruits, and focus more on stable living then achievement. Mil-

lennials saw the Boomers and envied, spreading social liberalism and degeneracy where they set foot as rebellion. However, Managerialism began faltering with them as the Great Recession took a toll on their coming of age. Generation Z also stands to face much loss, and despondency has set upon them with polarization. One side continues the millennials' march leftwards, spreading degeneracy and entropy in millennial mold. The other side comprises a mish-mash of vaguely right-wing travelers, espousing some sort of social conservatism yet are all over the place in their views and thinking. Most importantly, however, the Managerial order has not lost even one step in marching through time. The PRC and CHED's stranglehold over jobs and teaching remains. The local Managerial Establishment may grow only more powerful, even if other places' Managerial Establishments see their fair share of enemies.

Now social liberalism and atomized individualism gain currency through university curricula and social capital. However, think tanks and alternative outlets pose the biggest potential to threaten this stagnant order. New institutions and new organizations must rise to attract peripheral populaces from the Establishment. Thus we discuss what must be done.

## What Must be Done

Those still young must act on the world for what it has become, not rely on idealized conceptions of what should be done. Formerly secure jobs have become meaningless not just in purpose, but in matter through low wages, long working hours, and oligopsonistic labor markets, among other factors. The academe must reclaim its rightful place as the real brokers of knowledge, and the working caste its rightful place as brokers of technique. These castes present fertile ground for up and comers. There is no middle ground when it comes to human capital—inheriting a long line of technical craftsmanship and improve upon it whether in concrete or abstract reality. Do not settle for mediocrity with the professional-managerial elite. Midwits would

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call the word “fallow” deep and complicated just because it sounds deep and complicated to them. Never mind that it has long been in farmers’ and peasants’ vocabulary for centuries till now, yet midwits will think that farmers and peasants a thousand years ago would get confused at the word just because midwits do.

Truly holistic men, both theoreticians and men of action, must stand together against the Managerial government’s stranglehold. CHED and the PRC need to be contested, and universities competed with. New think tanks should serve as alternatives to Establishment power bases in urban centers, fighting the Establishment itself, not just their representatives. New publishing presses should spread cheap copies of important texts and resources. This is what must be done—start fighting the Establishment by fighting its priests.

Beyond clearing out the academe of degenerates, we must discuss what some have proposed to cure civil society of its ills—which the next part does. Regarding our own plans and strategies, we here at *Pillar of Liberty* have varying perspectives on what the future holds. However, preparations will go on for whatever may happen, and we will leave it at that.

### III

What Will Happen

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.



## Overview

If no one can appeal to justice except to government, justice will be perverted in favor of the government, constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding. Constitutions and supreme courts are state constitutions and agencies, and whatever limitations to state action they might contain or find is invariably decided by agents of the very institution under consideration. Predictably, the definition of property and protection will continually be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the government's advantage until, ultimately, the notion of universal and immutable human rights—and in particular property rights—will disappear and be replaced by that of law as government-made legislation and rights as government-given grants.

Hans Hermann Hoppe, *Rothbardian Ethics*

In this part, we start with a critique of Curtis Yarvin's patchwork. Yarvin's Neoreactionary project, comprising him and his successors from Nick Land to Spandrell, gained traction in 2017–2019 among radical right-wing figures. However, Yarvin's recent work in *Gray Mirror* has tarnished his image for his increasing pro-regime stances. Here, we must show that the Neoreactionary proposed order, whether a mere love for absolutism or dictatorships, or even the sophisticated proposal in *Unqualified Reservations* fails to scrutiny.

We refer heavily to Aristotle's *Politics* in critiquing Yarvin and by extension the Neoreactionary project. Afterwards, we must show that a better alternative exists. While we sometimes use Paleolibertarian authors, we rely on Aristotle first to present our case. We encourage readers to read his *Politics* in the Joe Sachs translation for more insight.

We at *Pillar of Liberty* do have our own plans and strategies, but they are not for this book. We do, however, leave the reader with sage advice.

## Critiquing Curtis Yarvin's Patchwork

While he has fallen out of grace from many on the Radical Right, Curtis Yarvin's early ideas remain influential. Some, like Andrew Pierce<sup>1</sup>, still use some of his ideas with little modification. Yarvin's proposed political organization is his *Patchwork*: small patches of land ruled by corporate monarchies, their citizens joint stockholders in the corporate state. Yarvin plans for *order*—in contrast to Leftism as *chaos* (or as he calls it, *entropy*). He plainly states his rationale:

if you want stable government, accept the status quo as the verdict of history. There is no reason at all to inquire as to why the Bourbons are the Kings of France. The rule is arbitrary. Nonetheless, it is to the benefit of all that this arbitrary rule exists, because obedience to the rightful king is a Schelling point of nonviolent agreement. And better yet, there is no way for a political force to steer the outcome of succession—at least, nothing comparable to the role of the educational authorities in a democracy.

Curtis Yarvin, "Patchwork: A political system for the 21st century." *Unqualified Reservations* (2008).

Some of Yarvin's observations, like human flourishing peaking when humanity lived in small polities, hold water. However, Yarvin's proposal goes beyond historical examples into something entirely new.

## Neocameralism and Corporate Citizenship


### Entropy's Real Nature

A common thread pins Yarvin's thought in that he wants order over chaos. He compares Leftism and Progressivism to *entropy* by way of their chaotic force leading to society's destruction. He purports Progressive ideas, including egalitarianism, liberal democracy, feminism, among others to destabilize order in society. Hence, democracy's introduction became a social cancer, as he explains:

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<sup>1</sup>Founder of the GOP Mises Caucus, a Republican PAC.

### 13. Critiquing Curtis Yarvin's Patchwork



A uniform distribution. Despite being 'orderly' and 'stable', a uniform distribution *maximizes* the entropy function.

Thus we see two unidirectional effects—ratchets, arrows, etc.—that should lead, as time advances, to fragmentation of sovereign authority. Boltzmann's law, anyone? Indeed it is quite reasonable to describe coherent (or, in democratic parlance, "absolute") authority as orderly, and divergent (or, in democratic parlance, "plural," "open," "inclusive," etc.) authority as disorderly. The trend from coherent to divergent is thus a case of entropy. Cancer, corrosion, infection, and putrefaction are all entropic processes.

Curtis Yarvin, "A Gentle Introduction to Unqualified Reservations: Chapter 5: The Modern Structure." (Unqualified Reservations, 2009).

His Neocameral Pathworks of land should stop or limit this destructive force. In doing so, however, Yarvin completely misses the mark about what *entropy* is.

Unlike what popular science texts say, entropy is *not* chaos. It is simply a measure of how dispersed energy in a dynamic process becomes. The more spread out energy is, the higher a dynamic process's entropy is. It may be defined statistically through a probability distribution, or it may be defined through other thermodynamic processes. The pictured uniform distribution *maximizes* entropy for energy has been spread out through all parts of the dynamic process in equal probability. Yarvin's wanted 'order' can only come about by maximizing entropy.

In other words, entropy is the increasing *lack* of activity and movement, till the dynamic process reaches equilibrium. This is the Left's true goal: a static order, no motion, no hierarchies, no divisions, no property, no markets. Yarvin's proposal resembles more a Commu-

nist Politburo theoretically accountable to the people. Instead of economic matters, a neocameral leadership would micromanage disputes and cases and enforcement. The patchwork system continues

## Plato against Aristotle

[etc]

What is a “city” for Aristotle? A city is simply a voluntary association of friends who work for mutual well-being. Aristotle holds that a city aims for beautiful acts in friendship—not just for living together, or for single ends or goals, but for *whole* well-being. However, some associates necessarily contribute more to an association. The same holds for citizens in a city. These play a greater part than those equally free, or of superior birth but unequal in political virtue, or those richer yet less virtuous.

Since inequality is given, a city stabilizes into the high and low. For Aristotle, a mixture of imperfect rule by the high—an “oligarchy”—and imperfect rule by the low—a “democracy”—produce what he calls “the middle regime.” This middle regime is the best practical form of rule for it is the mean—the state of clarity, neither moderation nor the middle—between favoring the ruled and the rulers. In the state of clarity, one may go as far in either direction as suits a particular situation, just as virtue is the state of clarity between two opposing habits: far from some middle path balancing act that one treads with anxiety, the “mean” lets one see particular situations clearly, and decide what’s best.

A city in the middle regime thus needs constant deliberation, choice, and discretion on part of rulers and ruled. Neither bureaucracy nor absolute rule nor free-for-all emergent action let a city achieve this.

[etc]

The rich...consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own convenience, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of

### 13. Critiquing Curtis Yarvin's Patchwork

all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessities of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.

Adam Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*

[etc]

Liberalism extols welfare and development in the name of the people, while draining them of true human flourishing using every coin paid in taxes. A lethargic lull sets in the populace, with differences and hierarchies dispersed in true equilibrium. The Universe's heat death is not death by heat, but heat's death itself: energy has so far dispersed, that no life, no vigor, no dynamism remains. The ancients associated heat with life, and warmth with energy, for its absence only settled in the dead. Today, we see bureaucratic buildings in their cold, gloomy facades, their lifeless interiors, and their employees lethargic and indifferent.

## Enlightenment writ Dark

[etc]

This Liberalism is best observed in three aspects of the Neoreactionary project: first in the rejection of violence as an existential horizon of human political life, second in the subsequent depoliticizing turn towards formalism and markets as the key legitimizing mechanisms, and finally in the emphasis towards migration and egress rights. Moreover, I suggest that it is this essential Liberalism that explains why Neoreaction was never able to pose a successful challenge to the Liberal Democratic order.

Courtney Hodrick. From Dark Enlightenment to Alt-Right. (Telos Press, 2022). In 'The Political Theology of Dark Enlightenment'.

We would take Nick Land's *Dark Enlightenment*, and repurpose it as Yarvin's *Enlightenment writ Dark*. Nothing separates Yarvin's proposal

from Acemoglu's, and by extension Enlightenment philosophers. One cannot and should not shackle the Leviathan with mere institutions, whether cultural, traditional, or even with Formalist Neocameralism. The Leviathan should be locked up, surrounded by an electric fence, with guns and harpoons pointed at it for all its living moments. Once it tastes blood, it will stop at nothing to get more and more. Bertrand de Jouvenel says it best:

All command other than its own, that is what irks Power. All energy, wherever it may be found, that is what nourishes it. If the human atom which contains this energy is confined in a social molecule, then Power must break down that molecule. Its levelling tendency, therefore, is not in the least, as is commonly thought, an acquired characteristic which it assumes on taking democratic form. It is a leveller in its own capacity of state, and because it is state. The levelling process need find no place in its programme: it is embedded in its destiny. From the moment that it seeks to lay hands on the resources latent in the community, it finds itself impelled to put down the mighty by as natural a tendency as that which causes a bear in search of honey to break the cells of the hive.

Bertrand De Jouvenel. On power: Its nature and the history of its growth. (1949). Book 4: The State as Permanent Revolution, Chapter 9: Power, Assailant of the Social Order.

[etc]

## Civil Society and Creative Destruction

[etc]

The Circulation of Elites sets in only when no monopoly of violence exists. We need to abolish it, and we shall explain at length why nothing can make up for it.

[etc]

## Appendix: What is Entropy?

*This section is technical and mathematical. Do not read it unless you can understand it.*

Intuitively, entropy is simply energy in a dynamic process dispers-

### 13. Critiquing Curtis Yarvin's Patchwork

ing along a probability distribution. This definition lends itself to other fields: in Information Theory, for example, entropy is a measure of uncertainty in communication. A uniform distribution means that energy is at its highest dispersion, and that uncertainty in a message has maximized. One may intuitively see why: energy has dispersed so much that all states have the same amount, and uncertain information has corrupted the message in transit that communication has become useless.

J Williard Gibbs gave a convenient formula for entropy in Statistical Mechanics. This formula relates a single state and its greater system. For  $X$  a discrete random variable, its *entropy*  $S$  is its average information content:

$$S = - \sum_{x \in X} p(x) \ln(p(x))$$

With  $|X|$  being the cardinality (number of outcomes) of  $X$ , we see that this value is maximized when  $p = \frac{1}{|X|}$ , which is just the probability mass function of the uniform distribution.

Each outcome in the random variable is equally likely, and this probability distribution maximizes entropy. Probabilities can be seen as ratios of individuals to the whole—for example, assigning an individual one percent probability means that he owns one percent of total wealth. One can derive economic measures of inequality from the entropy function: the Theil index, the Generalized Entropy index, among many others. Doing so makes perfect sense: entropy can be used as a measure of inequality since it concerns a single state's relation to the whole system. A uniform distribution, the most orderly and stable distribution, necessarily maximizes equality among all men. Curtis Yarvin's pursuit of order has led him into paradoxically promoting entropy, whether his support for Chinese measures in the pandemic, or for gay marriage, or for countless Leftist positions to come.

## Abolishing the Monopoly of Violence

Montesquieu must have thought himself very smart saying that Legislators, Bureaucrats and Judges should be independent and in constant conflict. Well yeah, but where do they send their kids to school? To the very same places. And pray tell, *cher Marquis*, how do you plan on having those judges and bureaucrats and legislators and teachers and journalists and bankers and industrialists, who have all grown up together, shared a secluded life as a unified ruling class; how the hell are you gonna make them check and balance each other? That can't work. And it isn't working. They marry each other and send their kids to the same schools. Yeah, they'll do some show and play politics theater, or Kabuki as the American like to say for some reason (as if only Kabuki was fake and other theaters were real), but in the end they are an endogamic ruling class and they know it.

Spandrell. "Leninism and Bioleninism." Bloody Shovel (2018).

[etc]

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

### The Need for Coercion

Violence, naked force, has settled more issues in history than has any other factor, and the contrary opinion is wishful thinking at its worst. Breeds that forget this basic truth have always paid for it with their lives and their freedoms.

Robert Heinlein

[etc]

### Who Coerces the Coercer?

[etc]

There are no exceptions. No theory, no promises, no morality, no amount of goodwill, no religion will restrain power. Neither priests nor soldiers, neither labor leaders or businessman, neither bureaucrats nor feudal lords will differ from each other in the basic use which they will seek to make of power. *Only power restrains power*. That restraining power is expressed in the existence and activity of oppositions. When all opposition is destroyed, there is no longer any limit to what power may do.



#### *14. Abolishing the Monopoly of Violence*

James Burnham. *The Machiavellians, Defenders of Freedom*. New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1943. Part 7: Politics and Truth, Chapter 2: The Meaning of Democracy

We cannot reiterate enough. One cannot and should not chain the Leviathan with mere institutions. Yarvin and his fellow walkers, Acemoglu and his fellow Liberals agree more with each other and with Enlightenment thinkers than with Medieval scholastics. A true Reactionary movement should pay more heed to those studying Medieval times than to random thinkers on the internet who have picked up a hundred books on theory yet have not an ounce of historical background.

[etc]

Civil Society as Sovereign in Itself

[etc]

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## Neotribalism and Localism against the Empire of Lies

[etc]

### Radical Decentralization

[etc]

A state, whatever definition one uses, necessarily needs a people and a land. Coordination between these needs coordinators—call them the ‘government’ or the ‘rulers’ or the ‘elite’ or whatsoever. As the first two factors grow too large, the coordinators become hard-pressed to efficiently handle everything.

[etc]

Outdated revision.  
The NAP’s Folly  
Total revamp in 2023.

[etc]

Economic Liberalism entails disastrous consequences: increased hardships and poverty for the wage-earning class, i.e., for the workingman, economic dictatorship which enslaves civil authority and makes it the docile instrument of the passions and ambitions of a few men of great wealth, or, as it is said, of the vested interests; economic nationalism, or even, in the other extreme, internationalism, i.e. international imperialism, whose guiding principle may be stated thus: the country which offers the greatest advantages to me is my fatherland. Finally, economic Liberalism prepares the way for class warfare, Socialism, and Communism. As an economic doctrine, it contradicts itself, for, *in order to safeguard liberty, it refuses the liberty of organizing associations.*

Grenier, Henri, and John Peter Emmet O’Hanley. Thomistic Philosophy. 1948.

[etc]

## A Good and Virtuous Elite

[etc]

With rejecting NAP-alone necessarily comes rejecting societal Democracy. Readers should note that in Political Science, two kinds of Democracy exist: *representative*, where assemblies choose leaders, and *direct*, where decisions are conducted in assembly. Medieval Europe relied on to an extent on both kinds of democracy, whether in assemblies choosing leaders or affirming heirs, or assemblies handling decision-making on the most local level. Modern states, however, rely on Liberal Democracy as gospel. Liberal Democracy presumes that [etc]

Murray Rothbard summarizes how redundant and useless voting is:

What would voting be like in a totally privatized society? Not only would voting be diverse, but more importantly, who would really care? Probably the most deeply satisfying form of voting to an economist is the corporation, or joint-stock company, in which voting is proportionate to one's share of ownership of the firm's assets. But also there are, and would be, a myriad of private clubs of all sorts... If I am a rank-and-file member of, say a chess club, why should I worry about voting if I am satisfied with the way the club is run?

Murray Rothbard, *Nations by Consent*

Liberal Democracy, as the god that failed, infringes on *both* liberty from coercion, and liberty to choose good as follows:

1. As more people exist, more wants and needs exist. Voters will necessarily vote for the ruler that benefits them—on a wide scale, this will lead to mess.
2. Democracy on a wide scale infringes on these kinds of liberty since different wants and needs exist. Here, even a small plurality could potentially dictate what the majority can do. Even if a majority get what they want, the minority still should have the option to secede if they refuse to follow.

Liberal Democracy also encourages high-time preference and short-term behavior through length of terms and repetition of terms.

The electorate will favor wasteful actions and quick fixes to societal problems which take years to fix. Fixing this problem while keeping Liberal Democracy needs an unelected, ill-regulated bureaucracy insulated from the democratic process. This bureaucracy acts autonomously from elected officials, and they can even exert their own power over their elected bosses given proper coordination and delegation of power. This solution, especially on a wide scale, is self-defeating, for the Liberal Democratic process becomes obsolete when the real rulers are unelected.

[etc]

Clearly...as more and more areas and parts of life become either privatized or micro-decentralized, the less important voting will become. Of course, we are a long way from this goal. But it is important to begin, and particularly to change our political culture, which treats "democracy," or the "right" to vote, as the supreme political good. In fact, the voting process should be considered trivial and unimportant at best, and never a "right," apart from a possible mechanism stemming from a consensual contract. In the modern world, democracy or voting is only important either to join in or ratify the use of the government to control others, or to use it as a way of preventing one's self or one's group from being controlled. Voting, however, is at best, an inefficient instrument for self-defense, and it is far better to replace it by breaking up central government power altogether.

Murray Rothbard, *Nations by Consent*

[etc]

It is usually assumed that club decisions are made on the basis of one vote per member, but that is generally untrue. Undoubtedly, the best-run and most pleasant clubs are those run by a small, self-perpetuating oligarchy of the ablest and most interested, a system most pleasant for the rank-and-file nonvoting member as well as for the elite...And if I am interested in running things, I would probably be asked to join the ruling elite by the grateful oligarchy, always on the lookout for energetic members. And finally, if I am unhappy about the way the club is run, I can readily quit and join another club, or even form one of my own. That, of course, is one of the great virtues of a free and privatized society, whether we are considering a chess club or a contractual neighborhood community.

Murray Rothbard, *Nations by Consent*

[etc]

## The Virtue of Disliking Foreigners

[etc]

...a totally privatized country would not have “open borders” at all. If every piece of land in a country were owned by some person, group, or corporation, this would mean that no immigrant could enter there unless invited to enter and allowed to rent, or purchase, property. A totally privatized country would be as “closed” as the particular inhabitants and property owners desire. It seems clear, then, that the regime of open borders that exists de facto in the U.S. really amounts to a compulsory opening by the central state, the state in charge of all streets and public land areas, and does not genuinely reflect the wishes of the proprietors.

Murray Rothbard, *Nations by Consent*

[etc]

Eugene Michael Jones writes at length how the Pharisaic Jews’ rejection of Christ as Logos (the natural order and reason of the universe at large) led to their entropic culture and institutions. Hence Jewish patriarchy, Jewish argumentativeness, stereotypical Jewish greed, and other Jewish cultural hallmarks imitate the choleric and the woman at large.

[etc]

Of course, while the Jews are especially marked out for their rejection of Christ, entropic cultures exist everywhere. Before the Indo-Europeans came, Old Europe paid host to the Gravettians, Magdalenians, and other peaceful, non-confrontational, and matriarchal cultures. Old Europe in many ways resembles modernity:

The modern is “nothing new”: it is the return of a very ancient subjection and brokenness under new branding, promoted by new concepts and justifications. If you want to see our future look to Europe as it existed before 1600 BC, or much of the world as it was until recently and still is... the communal life of the longhouse with its young men dominated and broken by the old and sclerotic, by the matriarchs, the blob and yeast mode in human life overtaking and subjecting all higher as-

#### 15.4. *The Virtue of Disliking Foreigners*

piration... It is no different if they use the doxies of Reason and Logos to cart us off to this life.

Bronze Age Mindset, Chapter 32

The Indo-Europeans, bolstered by the chariot and their ability to digest lactose, ensured that no matriarchy would rule in Europe for millennia after pouring in. The Old European elite was replaced by an Indo-European one, and the Old Europeans admixed with the newcomers. Mass migrations themselves are a fact of history, with the Mongol invasions arguably being the last mass migration event in Eurasia before the Westphalian order. The Austronesian migrations brought a consistent cultural patterns around the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

[etc]

German migration into Roman lands was also subtle [etc] violent mass migrations would not begin till later on [etc] the Germans adapted and assimilated, having loved Roman institutions all their lives. Indeed, the Germanic tribes already adopted Roman institutions by the 3rd century, as latter Roman sources noticed from their more organized armies and administration. [etc]

Roman values, customs, and institutions not only survived but flourished after the invasions. [etc]

Mass migration and race mixing are regular historical occurrences, and by themselves deserve no sanction. These occurrences, however, do not happen by themselves today. [etc]

[etc]

## What *You* Must Do

Unless you have the power to take over the system, which none of us do, you gain power through individual responsibility: building wealth, power, and influence—preferably in a method you enjoy. Then, you help others do the same thing—family and friends, and build up communities to prop each other up to weather the coming storm/collapse. Build autonomy, practice agorism when applicable, learn self-sufficiency and practical skills. Prepare for the worst, hope for the best. You have to build security inside the system, so when it falls, you can remain and rise from it.

Manufacture Liberty, in conversation with Kingpilled

The ‘red-pilled’ are far and few in the Philippines. Whereas abroad, one may simply go on Twitter and look for like-minded folk, right-wing thought has not developed here owing to the past half-century of Democratic Revolution from the Center. A blessed few have broken from oversocialization and left Plato’s cave; our merry band in *Pillar of Liberty* themselves met through Twitter. But most citizens are not as blessed as us.

Thus this text, *A Gentle Introduction to Pillar of Liberty*, serves both as handbook and recruitment tool. If you, the reader, agree to most of our points here, then you are a soldier in the war. While we detest conscription, you, dear reader, have no choice in this war. You either take up arms with us, or you suffer the Managerial Establishment’s victory. You don’t need to join *Pillar of Liberty*, but you need to acknowledge that you will fight a war for the long haul. No one needs to say that this war is not a simple physical conflict, which mere violence can solve. This war seeps into the soul, into institutions, into the abstract itself.

### First Steps

You must first find a good community and good friends with similar interests. No one can fight a war alone. No one can attain true flourishing alone, either. Virtue, while necessary is not sufficient. One may

become virtuous and righteous yet never flourish or be happy for institutions and environment dictate that on top of individual prowess. Hence finding a crew will help you, dear reader.

We in *Pillar of Liberty* met in unlikely circumstances, and you may find your own crew in similar circumstances. You may yet join us, but we demand not just a certain worldview, but similar interests and hobbies. Psychological compatibility among friends ranks first. Both you, *Pillar of Liberty*, and many others may benefit from distant transactional relations more than friendship if our psychologies fail to mesh.

Of course, the individual also matters. Aristotle's *Ethics* suffices, though *The Imitation of Christ* or *The Spiritual Combat* may suit a beginner more. You must also learn rigorous logic—from fallacies to propositions to proofs. The Left and the Liberal Establishment both think that reason and rationality side with them. They will yet find them fair weather friends once you have learned proper argumentation and enough subject matter.

And you need to learn many subjects. We have taught you only a gentle introduction to political theory, and many more texts remain unread. You also need to learn history—Medieval Studies, Early Modern times, the Annales School of historiography, the French Revolution, the American Civil War, the real origins of the Second World War, so many time periods see themselves butchered and broken in DepEd-sanctioned curricula. You have too much to learn for this section to handle; please see our appendix for a reading list instead.

Finally, abandon your old vices. Stop watching pornography, stop eating too much junk food, exercise more, learn the real science behind weight loss, develop mental fortitude, take herbal nootropics if need be. Your first online stops are YouTube's HealthyGamerGG, reddit's nootropics subreddit, and quite a few more places. Beyond that, you will need to learn how to use the American National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) and read journal articles in general. The modern mental health industry and medical practice in general have devolved into a shell of its former self. Your doctor may



## 16. *What You Must Do*

prescribe what drugs you need, but at day's end the medical technician has done more towards solving your problem just by identifying it. Imagine a doctor who knows that you have a fungal problem, yet keeps prescribing you antibiotics—this is what the regime offers. If you don't have an independent MD free of the regime's indoctrination, then you must take up the task yourself. Of course, this is not medical advice: *caveat emptor* (to practice independence, please read that proverb's meaning yourself).

Now once you have developed virtue and learning, and made a circle of friends, you will need patience. Earn money from your job, start a business, employ your friends, make a cooperative, start a business together, find a wife/husband, do what helps you flourish. Homeschool your children if you can, or find a good international school if you can't. Teach them virtue, morality, and learning, and set a good example for them. Finally, you must accumulate physical and financial capital to build new communities, new clubs, new schools, and so much more. Virtue and friendship are one thing, but remaining in virtue and friendship are another. Develop the environment that will let you do so.

### Working with Institutions Today?

Some may contest that we can work with Liberal Democracy to win our goals.

#### Elections against Institutions

#### Infiltrating Institutions

Leftist and Modern Liberal infiltration aided institutions' downfall to Managerialism. Antonio Gramsci wrote whole tracts to aiding would-be infiltrators and their handlers. One thus would think that a sort-of 'reverse Gramsci' could aid our cause. However, this plan helped Managerialism only because these institutions were neutral at first. As

they accepted more and more infiltrators, these captured the institutions and kicked out the competition. Now, these institutions would immediately kick out anyone even remotely right-wing. These infiltration efforts also received backing from special interest groups, whether Wall Street hedge funds or international NGOs. Any sustained effort on our part to recapture institutions through infiltration needs power and resources that barely anyone on our side has.

Recapturing institutions through infiltration lastly credits Liberal Democracy too much.

## The Long Defeat

I do not expect ‘history’ to be anything but a ‘long defeat’—though it contains (and in a legend may contain more clearly and movingly) some samples or glimpses of final victory.

JRR Tolkien, in writing to Amy Ronald

How long we glimpse victory ultimately depends on how much we are willing to cooperate with God’s grace. His passive will, letting evil men do evil acts, aims for us to learn lessons we have paid no attention to, tests that we have been failing. His passive will is no excuse to be a bugman, or to screw around all day. Certain midwits, those programming software for Android phones, act haughtily all while losing their chance at glimpsing that victory which the brave and just inch closer to.

Be sober, and watch well; the devil, who is your enemy, goes about roaring like a lion, to find his prey, but you, grounded in the faith, must face him boldly.

1 Peter 5:8–9.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

IV

Miscellany

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## Overview

These are articles from our online newsletter that didn't fit with the rest of the book. We place them here for convenient citations.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## Critique of “Industrial Society and its Future”

by Fellglow Keep

Theodore Kaczynski’s manifesto *Industrial Society and its Future* posits that the Industrial Revolution ruined man’s *telos* with regards to survival, and forced him to adopt surrogate *teloi* to pass the time. As points regarding his claims, Kaczynski brings up the logical extreme of what he calls Industrial Society.

Leftism, he notes, comes from a specific psychology with two tendencies. The first tendency he calls “feelings of inferiority”, which we call envy. Self-hatred from having less drives leftists into masochistic tendencies, whether getting run over by a carriage to promote women’s suffrage or obeying society’s strict rules and regulations no matter how overbearing just to present oneself as politically correct.

The second tendency is much more relevant to our discussion. Oversocialization both comes from and leads to the first tendency. Kaczynski himself explains it best:

Psychologists use the term “socialization” to designate the process by which children are trained to think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that society. It may seem senseless to say that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a rebel. Nevertheless, the position can be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 24

It is cliché to say that democracy is fake and is bread and circuses for the masses. Of course, one easily also sees that Leftism, despite being rebellious, is a dominant force in society today.

The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his psychological leash and assert his autonomy by rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most basic values of society. Generally speaking, the goals of today’s leftists are NOT in conflict with the accepted morality. On the contrary, the left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then accuses mainstream society of violating that principle... These values are explicitly or implicitly ex-

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pressed or presupposed in most of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and the educational system. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel against these principles but justify their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that society is not living up to these principles.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 28

Hence those who lead society today were rebelling against it decades ago, while those rebelling against society today will lead it in a few more. Cancel culture is but a temporary yet telling acceleration of this tendency—creative destruction halts more and more, and entropy now starts setting in as differences and all cause for envy dissipate.

Kaczynski now paints Leftism as but a symptom of a larger disease. He claims that Industrial Society, as he calls the post-Industrial Revolution world, let man get basic needs much easier, and man started looking for *surrogate activities* to cope with this loss of purpose. With Existentialism, man now needed to look for his own purpose, to go above good and evil, and make his own path lest he fall to his despair and become the hedonistic last man. This self-serving hunt for purpose, however, failed for higher ideals mixed with passion led to failed utopias and even greater conflict. Kaczynski claims that modern technology needs to go away not in a political, but an anti-technological and social revolution, to ensure that man returns to good psychological processing and living.

### Missing the Trees for the Forest

Unfortunately, Kaczynski diagnosed the illness to cause the pathogen. His painting of Industrial Society is simply one sketch of Centralization and Managerialism. As Elite Theory shows, culture is downstream from politics, not the other way around. The conditions which Kaczynski points to are a consequence of the Revolution of Mass and Scale and eventual atomization, spurred on by a top-bottom process.

To illustrate, we use one of what Kaczynski calls surrogate activities. Science and academia in general has existed for much longer than Industrial Society. Hence the Scholastics discovered precursors to modern calculus, political theory, and physics, among others. Imperial Chinese bureaucracy favored those proficient in Confucian classics. The Roman Stoics, Plotinus and his students, Socrates and his lineages, all these engaged in so-called surrogate activities without an inkling of Industrial Society. Neither were they always free of worry from food or other basic needs. In the most extreme case, the Great Famine and the Black Death hit Europe in the 14th Century, when the Scholastics continued their thought and growth. The Renaissance saw the death rate skyrocket, while painters and musicians idled away performing their surrogate activities. Song Dynasty China faced multiple threats from the North, eventually falling to Mongol invaders. Indeed, Kaczynski overestimates how much effort biological basics need, for man has always found other ways to pass the time besides survival.

Indeed, Kaczynski repeatedly blames on technology its users' actions. An overbearing government needs no industrial technology, only that people are subservient and unintelligent enough to not see cracks in the facade. The more powerful in a land dispute will always bully the other one, whether with a stone, a sword, an AK-47, or a nuclear missile. Great irony pervades his manifesto, for he talks repeatedly about government interference, yet never stops to think that top-bottom processes have been spiraling modernity ever downwards. So while Kaczynski's *The System's Neatest Trick* describes the Establishment's actions and needs well, it never accurately describes the Establishment itself. Elite Theory and the Iron Law of Oligarchy see Industrial Society as yet another manifestation of how power affects human action. It thus quite unfortunate that Kaczynski has fallen into the midwit trap of missing the trees for the forest.



## Technology can be Used against its Master

Kaczynski claims that modern technology is too important for modern society to embrace only the good parts instead of the bad. For one example,

Conservatives and some others advocate more “local autonomy.” Local communities once did have autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local communities become more enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, computer networks, highway systems, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. Also operating against autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects people at other locations far way. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contaminate the water supply hundreds of miles downstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 118

Unfortunately, Kaczynski has blamed the consequences of the Revolution of Mass and Scale once again on technology. Sure, one can blame the Revolution on technology, but one needs that link in-between lest the whole chain fall apart. A factory affecting a downstream community is no more or less different than those washing their clothes or dumping manure upstream. The difference is that the latter knew not to do that there, or at the very least suffered the consequences from the village. That factories

Managerialism simply used technology the same way the Manila Establishment used Tagalog culture. However, one can be used against its master while the other cannot. Tagalog culture lies in the World of Forms—an abstraction from common institutions and practices that the Tagalog people cherish. Using it will gain the same results as “liberals are the real racists”-type argumentation, for its *telos* lies elsewhere. Similarly, voting and elections will not work, for the Establishment was built to support its makers only.

Technology, however, used to be a bottom-top process, a consequence of ingenious men and their patrons. Today that patron is the government, who funds all basic research without regard to risk or reward, only how premise interests the judge. Private patrons, however,

are more selective, more choosy. They knew what basic research or invention to fund for they had purpose. Even the purest of Mathematics can be pursued for its own sake, or even for baser reasons, for Mathematics' deductive nature ensures that further works needs to be done whatever the application. Indeed, technology is completely accidental to a society, or to time period, or to a family—it is how they use it, for what purpose, and for how long that sets it into form.

### The Managerial Establishment as the Real Culprit

Aristotle knew that true human flourishing entailed the right ingredients going for the right purpose. A man had his body and biology going not just for external procreation, but for leadership, strength, camaraderie. A woman had hers not just for internal procreation, but for harmony, warmth, support. True human flourishing thus needs the right mix as Aristotle explains:

And the same thing appears to follow from its self-sufficiency, for the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. And by the self-sufficient we mean not what suffices for oneself alone, living one's life as a hermit but also with parents and children and a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, since a human being is by nature meant for a city. But one must take some limit for these connections, since by stretching out to ancestors and descendants and friends of one's friends they go beyond all bounds; but this must be examined later.

Ethics, Book 1 Chapter 7

Kaczynski's idea of self-sufficiency now falls apart, for man needs these goods, and technology serves one way to obtain them. One needs no internet to meet friends, but a conversation by the local bus stop or train station may suffice. Technology's being has no *telos* built into it beyond what it was built for—it is value-free, and only the purpose of its use itself needs to be scrutinized. Hence why Tagalog culture cannot be salvaged—it was built from the start to benefit women and their managerial husbands. Same with the Managerial Establishment, or Communism, or anything else similar.

Kaczynski thus fails to see how atomization came about from the

## 17. Critique of “Industrial Society and its Future”

Revolution of Mass and Scale, and itself lead to crowding and mass society. Top-bottom procedures with their rules and regulations were needed not to preserve technologically-built societies, but to serve the Managerial Establishment and the professional-managerial caste. Envy and oversocialization are necessary for the professional-managerial caste to proceed. Hence why being “professional” is suddenly a civic virtue—the professional-managerial caste made it so. Straightforwardness, curtness, and directness—typically masculine traits—fell prey to the woman-propped Establishment which made subtlety, meandering, and doubletalk important. Indeed, Kaczynski fails to see that Big Government and Big Business go hand-in-hand:

Conservatives’ efforts to decrease the amount of government regulation are of little benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the regulations can be eliminated because most regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation affects business rather than the average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the government and give it to private corporations. What this means for the average man is that government interference in his life is replaced by interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for example, to dump more chemicals that get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just taking the average man for a sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of Big Business.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 65

In fact, most regulations are only necessary because the government allows joint-stock limited liability corporations in the first place. These regulations themselves now need more regulations, because the government believes that only it can solve what itself caused. The only reason the government lets these entities even exist is because letting someone else manage one’s wealth is so much easier—bureaucracies popped up in Early Modern centralized absolute monarchies for this exact reason. Again, like Mamelukes, this caste usurped traditional society and made themselves rulers. Modernity is ultimately the age of bureaucracy, of professionals, of managers, of rules and regulations—technology is only accidental to it, and could help either that or traditional society. In fact Kaczynski

himself shows that he gets this to some degree:

Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by the government. Control is often exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or manipulation, and by organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most large organizations use some form of propaganda to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. Propaganda is not limited to “commercials” and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously intended as propaganda by the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment programming is a powerful form of propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we have to go to work every day and follow our employer’s orders. Legally there is nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people or from going into business for ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and there is room in the economy for only a limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only as someone else’s employee.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 73

However, Kaczynski instead blames technology instead of its users, which makes sense considering his rather deterministic and even materialistic view of how institutions and history work. Indeed, Kaczynski contradicts himself in two points:

Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters that are irrelevant to the functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can believe in any religion (as long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We can go to bed with anyone we like (as long as we practice “safe sex”). We can do anything we like as long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our behavior.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 72

Here Kaczynski shows how he knows that culture is downstream of politics. Despite saying this, Kaczynski goes on to claim that this kind of action is impossible and falls to despair:

A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to do.

Industrial Society and its Future, Paragraph 105

## 17. Critique of “Industrial Society and its Future”

Economically speaking, this is true. Culturally speaking, however, top-bottom changes happen regularly—the Managerial Establishment and its dominance is but one proof of this. Only power restrains power, but the lack of other powers through the monopoly of violence allowed this system to succeed. Priests of power who treat it as God will do their best to keep it, hence why the Party members were the most monitored, most pressured in 1984.

Kaczynski goes on to set forth a plan to overthrow Industrial Society. In simplest terms, he advocates acceleration by letting a One World Economy form and installing dictators in industrially advanced states to let the inevitable inefficiency break everything down. He sees history as a straight line of instead of cyclical, and similar to Marx, envisions only one dialectical outcome through simultaneous revolution. As O’Brien would put it, the manifesto is true “as description, yes. The program it sets forth is nonsense.” We cannot pin all blame to him, however, since he had no access to the Scholastics, and Joe Sachs had not yet published his translations. Hence, we find great value in his analysis of Leftist psychology.

Quintated revision  
Total revamp in 2023.

### True Human flourishing

Since we see that every city is some kind of association, and every association is organized for the sake of some good (since everything everyone does is for the sake of something seeming to be good), it is clear that all associations aim at something good, and that the one that is most sovereign and encompasses all the others aims at the most sovereign of all goods. And this is the one called the city, the political association.

Politics, Book 1, Chapter 1

The Managerial Establishment is doomed to fall, for its focus on abstract metrics and indicators can hide the rot underneath for so long. China is not a threat to anyone since its own Managerial Establishment is too busy holding together the falling enterprise. War-mongers need only wait if their real goal is to defeat the CCP, for the CCP is doing a much better job with much better results than they ever could. Making pacts with China ought not to stir trouble, since

it is best to benefit from them before they fall. The same goes with the Establishment here—it is doomed to crack this decade, and collapse in the following. Its *telos* serves it and only it, and no leader can salvage it. To think that elections can manage the Establishment well are futile—a chair is not meant to travel the air, a boy is not meant to fight in war, a despotic Establishment is not meant to serve or lead the people.

Hence the problems of Industrial Society need not be stamped out, for doing so only prolongs the process. One need not accelerate it either, for the shock will come too strongly for people to cope. Hence we prefer *Parallelism*: building new institutions and incentivizing local populaces to switch to them. Violent insurrections might be necessary, but building new institutions will make them much easier to carry out.

Kaczynski fell into despair and enacted an ultimately fruitless campaign of terrorism. Those who wish to see the Establishment's fall must instead work, study, exercise, and pray—the restored order will have much use of these kinds of people who value themselves, their families, and their local communities.

## The Unabomber Manifesto: A Generation Hence

*by Nomadic Prolet, in reply to the previous essay*

It was the year 1995. Four years after the dissolution of the USSR, six years after the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc and scarcely sixteen years since the first Great Reset of the contemporary era, known as the Volcker shock. Within this ephemeral timespan, observers and commentators heaved a sigh of relief. The time, they proclaim, for ideology is over, and the human species will no longer argue nor entertain other modes of organization, for liberalism has triumphed. Politics is devolved into either cultural identifications or in standard operation procedure; the (heavily-rigged) market is foisted as the tool for central planning and for a moment, the establishment assumed that whatever disagreements that one can have in this new millennium, it will be resolvable through means-testing and the bipartisan consensus. Only a few marginal individuals desisted for what they saw as a grand delusion. Ted Kaczynski is one of them.

It is important to have a sort of a background when discussing Industrial Society and its Future, much how every single monograph is a product of its era. They tend to embody a moment in the present, mostly absent of a concrete vision of what is to come, and Ted's opus is not exempt from it. While those who bought into the narrative of the end of history did trash the venture as screeds of a mentally ill man, they are only partially correct, and Ted himself admits this openly. He is after all, a participant in one of the most notorious experiments conducted by the Deep State in select persons; MKULTRA as they referred it. As such, it is no that surprising to deduce that Ted's ramblings are a consequence of these processes that he himself had been subjected; for the government, he is nothing but a lab rat. As a materialist, my focus will be the unfolding of contradictions as they happen, and I do not claim that this assessment is all-encompassing; what it may give us is a sketch.

Another highlight of his essay is his virulent opposition to technol-

ogy, that understandably fell on deaf ears. The postmodern West has accepted the same premise of its prior modernist mom or dad; that technology is a force of progress and goodness. Ted is not the only person to show that this is a load of bunk. The philosopher Martin Heidegger already foresaw its implications as early as his *Being and Time*, where the view of technology by the West is always geared for utility; utility being as pure ends. In his *The Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger invoked that its instruments have been converted as a standing reserve; a standing reserve in pursuit of an optimistic end, if this optimism is positive to begin with. Despite not being openly acknowledged unlike Jacques Ellul, whose conclusions on technology have trekked the same path as Heidegger, Ted's genesis can be understood as an attempt to simplify the jargons of both; that technology, contrary to the expectation that it is value-free or a force for good that can be switched off and on, is a representation of a civilization's priorities; it therefore correct for him to point out that conservatives and progressives in this regard are both sides of the same coin, who share a common *telos* and whose assumptions are hinging to the journey of technology as a replacement for human agency itself. The evidence for this turn is obvious enough, with the development of new surveillance methods to predict human behavior via the algorithm.

As for the culprit, Heidegger never named names, nor did Ellul or Ted. They have somewhat concluded that this is an all-implicating and an all-consuming enterprise, where everyone is both the victim and the perpetrator. The managerial state, if viewed through these lenses, is just a symptom, and not a bug. Deconstructing or deprogramming will be of little consequence, as these forces are already outside at least of any human endeavor; for it has been running on autopilot for a century or two. The journey of this vision of technology is therefore resistant to any reforms in its schema, nor can it be halted. We can only observe it accelerating, and try our best to respond to it. Even the elites who knows its ways and means are detached from its levers; it can only extract the copper wires at this



point, and not much else.

It is therefore understandable to viciously oppose this reading, and have a natural stimulus of trying to refute its assertions. I do claim however, that this understanding is essential if we are to retrace our steps for achieving genuine human flourishing, if the cards are laid out at the right place and at the right opportunity. The realization of our technology as naturally entropic becomes a task of overcoming that entropy. Every civilizational system uses its technology in distinct and particular methods, either in harmony or in discord with its environment. The anthropologist Joseph Tainter, in his *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, perused through this question through historical case studies. While we can never be quite certain if this is accurate, its contents are in line with much of the evidence in store: that civilizations tend to develop intricate bureaucracies in line with their necessity of maximizing their technological efficiency in correlation with the availability of materials. What Rome, the Mauryans, the Mayans and the Greeks have in common is that their structures tend to be aligned with their energy consumption; their conquests and their innovations are often a consequence of the altered landscapes that they are into.

More recently, David Graeber argued in *The Dawn of Everything* that there is indeed no smooth stages of evolution nor approximations. While we can doubt the agenda and the fact that this is the default in many specialized anthropology courses, he convincingly presented the case that for much of prehistory, varied social organizations have existed, though most are of the hunter-gatherer peoples/tribes. These groups are characterized by periodic fragmentation to small bands and their coherence into a temporary settlement wherein they will distribute the loot, with the excesses immediately put into use, or destroyed in symbolic rituals. This act meant that no surplus can be rendered permanent, and that the roles and obligations of a collective are to remain horizontal. As late as the 19th century and beyond, these patterns of behavior are still evident; hierarchies do exist, but as provisional measures that can be mended

or folded by circumstances.

The rise of agrarian societies would then correlate with the need of capturing the technology of the former hunter-gatherers into a consistent paradigm and practice. Still, instances of consensus driven governance and decisions have persisted as far as 9,000 years ago. This supposed default of many homo sapiens would be strained and severed in responses to climate degradations; in some locales, people simply moved out; in others, the constant rote of life has led to the subjects in those clans or confederations to merge into more centralized and vertical arrangements, concentrated in oligarchies or monarchies, with the management and imposition of coercion as their primary means to gain acceptance; the Egyptian pharaohs for instance, had their legitimacy affixed to the fortunes of the River Nile, and so did the Balinese chiefs with their trading outposts. It is also not strange that in this very ground, the seeds of currency as tools would begin to cohere, and with it, the questions of ethics, most specifically of justice or the endowment of desserts to a person or a group.

This loss of human variety is unconsciously echoed by Ted, and we must grudgingly come to terms with its significance. Rather than just an act of shitposting, the industrial revolution is indeed a harbinger of disasters upon mankind. But he does not extend this further, perhaps due to his pre-existing mental imbalances or some other factors that we may neither know or care. Not only was the industrial revolution a disaster, modernity by its very extension is a disaster, since this would be responsible for the dissolution of whatever bonds that have persisted unmolested from family to family, from generation to generation.

The process of modernity, which first reared its ugly head on the ruins of Europe in the Great Plague, is the accelerator to a train with little to no breaks. The social roles and mores, understood as customs, were put in strain. It is therefore not surprising that the managerial state, so endemic today in our institutions, both public and private, will have its first application in military terms. The diminishing role of the cavalry was made possible with the advent of more sophisti-

cated artillery pieces, the same guns that either made castles adapt to its ways or outrightly demolished. The ideological visions of Liberalism, Socialism, Fascism, Nationalism and Anarchism would culminate in a reign of blood and uncertainty. And when Ted ruminated about these legacies, he is answering to the misguided euphoria and utopianism that characterized these frameworks. For ideology is not just a buffet on a platter; it is the very language, the very technology and the very eyes that we make sense of our reality as it has been set ablaze to make way for its place.

With these realizations, what is to be done? Before we even ask that 69 million-dollar question, we have to remove the splinters impeding our sight. Here are some of the parting observations in my part.

I will claim, as a matter of provocation, that only a few hold ‘coherent’ political views in this contemporary day and age. Most are cultural manners or aesthetic preferences. And it is nobody’s fault really. The neoliberal reforms from the top over the past 30-40 years, which included a preference for management over direct action (for it is beneficial to the functioning of a consumer economy with the credit-debt cycle as its fulcrum), have punctured the role of ‘the state’ so much that we hardly noticed it. It can explain why our relationship to the government is more negative than positive as a consequence (this is a global phenomenon as well, not just locally; though nations with strong community ties or organized labor are able to resist this effectively).

If we are political (in the modern sense of the word), we then subscribe to these 2 aspects below, and this sentiment was dominant for much of the late 19th to the 20th centuries, until its implosion in the late 70s and the entirety of the 80s:

1. That politics follows a template of tradition to a party or a group (aka their history as background), and:
2. That you are assured that the entity you adhere will take care of the distribution of resources and give you a piece of it.

Today’s current setup is bereft of the two, since if we are going to

somewhat accept that Francis Fukuyama is correct, we are living in an epoch where history has ended, liberal democracy is the only path and that there is no alternative (until very recently). It is therefore in this scenario where the 'politics' that we claim to espouse is not that different from fandom, and the discourse, both offline and online, is specifically designed to give you hysteria, as bad faith argumentation is everywhere, and you are always put on the defense.

Therefore, nothing except your sanity changes. We are thus trapped in this matrix and stuck in Plato's cave. It is not that far to even conclude that this is why everyone is panicking like headless chickens, for this is something that operates in our subconscious, whether we like it or not. If this premise of mine is perhaps grounded and cogent, this can somewhat explain the prevalence of cancel culture, initially in the evangelicals who are angry about He-Man being 'satanic', and then it got transferred to the liberals and their constant policing of language.

Realizing this may give us some clarity. Absent a class project if you are a socialist or a collective vision of anything (for everybody else) since we are living in spiritually impoverished times, every 'advocacy' that we hold so dearly becomes sterile and impotent, absorbed and coopted by a system engineered to do it. And so long as this is the case, it is not that surprising that we are just reckoning with the implications of this process and its effects in our social fabric.

In short, recognizing this process, this very contemporary process is integral to the objectives that we want to accomplish, if we really want to square the circle. Ted's contribution to this revival of interest must not be underestimated. Modernity has been the apocalypse; we must push through it, and out of it, if we really want to live.

## Temporary Disengagement and Abstention from Voting, and the Futility of Caring

*by Nomadic Prolet*

I have consciously and intentionally refrained from publicly commenting or expressing my sentiments to an electoral cycle, which I do think is frankly pointless. I even doubt if I will even show up to the polls. And this is for a reason; the less our politics is transformative and the more we take these conditions that we have as unalterable, incapable of changing our lives and be sterile as a consequence, the more it becomes entertainment. And this is nobody's fault: we have not received the memo that our practical engagement within this sphere is largely performative, often for the benefit of the true kingmakers that drive most of the campaigns of the candidates that we are enchanted about. And for a lot of us, this venture is a matter of replacing who is in charge, and that's the end of it, with the same valence and repercussions as a Pacquiao fight. If Marx, in what I considered as his best work (*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*), once referred to the French who backed Napoleon III as a sack of potatoes (meaning, we are all atomized, individuated from each other and our relationship to the apparatus is indirect), in our context, we are for all intents and purposes, a stack of Piattos sealed in a plastic container.

We are however aware of this glaring fact, that what we are seeing and feeling is the miasma of terminal decline, in which all of us are reckoning (thus horrified), no matter where we find ourselves, and whether we are comfortable or precarious. Unfortunately, basing our advocacies purely from a moral outlook will never square the circle and even resolve it, and we are terrified of this realization, most importantly in this ongoing conflict between the sadists (conservatives) and the masochists (progressives), who are fighting this bridge battle while the world burns and sinks into oblivion, learning nothing. This is the effect of a dead and a lumpenized social fabric experienced by

the upper, middle and lower strata, in varying stages of graveness and its accompanying pain expressed through cultural grievances. This, with a few exceptions, is the global condition for the moment. It is not a decline in the romantic sense, where we quickly witness the collapse of our foundations, but rather, it is a slow and gradual descent into a puddle of filth.

As such, a genuine response to this dislocation will and shall come outside of the Robredo-Failson (Alamano) mirage. It shall be propelled from the bottom as it has been in the 19th and the 20th centuries; class formation (the material basis, and not the affect of class) however, is yet to cohere once again, as it has been viciously disemboweled by the establishment for the past 30–50 years, be it from the professionals or from the workers. It shall be composed of a reinvigorated militancy, imposing its demands preferably from the tip of both the pen and of the sword, which is to be forged through struggle. It will be largely shorn of the cultural neurosis that posited itself from a largely idealist conception of the state, the market, the government and the populace, a residue from the largely professionalized 60s counterculture manifested on the Satanic panic of the 1980s and wokeness of our present epoch; therefore, demonstrating a credible threat to the established disorder in the years to come.

Understandably, there will be those who will clamor beyond electoralism. But one cannot expect a direct confrontation to prosper, absent the pillars for mass participation and the necessary commitment to uphold it. Leody De Guzman's campaign for this year, which is focused on sending a message or a signal that this can be done, may be its catalyst, for it is the first anti-elitist movement to converge openly for more or less than a hundred years (the Lapiang Sakdal was the last of its kind; the rest existed as clandestine tendencies) and once I have sorted out my personal woes, I will gladly contribute to its inception and growth. And if this fails, the common ruin is our likely conclusion, and it will be the outcome of the lack of our vision for a future where we can finally get out of this bubble and start anew.

As a further accompaniment to these musings, I can direct every-


one who has read this piece to this YouTube video of ironically, a stand-up comedian who is more clear-eyed consciously of this apparent discontent, which differs from our unconscious obfuscation of this revelation: *Why George Carlin Doesn't Vote*.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.



## A Biblical Typology for our Age

*by Fellglow Keep*



The centurion bears witness to Christ as God, and the Temple veil splits into two. Jerusalem falls, and Rome replaces her.  
The first will be last, etc (Daniel Long)

Between the end of 2 Maccabees and the Four Gospels, roughly a century passed with little Biblical insight. Other sources fill in for this gap; take for example Flavius Iosephus and his *Antiquities*. The rebel turned Roman collaborator gave a still lengthy summary of the Septuagint, notably including so-called deutero-canonicals in his account of ancient Hebrew history. The more interesting portions come after his account of the War of the Maccabees. Take for example, this passage:

Now for the Pharisees, they say that some actions, but not all, are the



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work of fate, and some of them are in our own power, and that they are liable to fate, but are not caused by fate. But the sect of the Essens affirms, that fate governs all things, and that nothing befalls men but what is according to its determination. And for the Sadducees, they take away fate, and say there is no such thing, and that the events of human affairs are not at its disposal; but they suppose that all our actions are in our own power, so that we are ourselves the causes of what is good, and receive what is evil from our own folly.

Antiquities of the Jews

Too often, opposing groups within discussion circles throw petty ad hominem accusations of rigidity and Pharisaicism. Counter-arguments often try to address the abuse, never the abusers. Our Lord, when prophesying the Temple's destruction and Jerusalem's razing, knew that a Jewish rebel would escape his comrades' suicide in an isolated mountain fortress. Such destruction and death in the Holy Land was unfortunate, yet our Lord's infinite wisdom allowed great good to come out of this - reliable historical accounts of details glossed over in Scripture.

These sources give insight and context to the Good News, even though His Word ought to suffice. Nonetheless, Scripture took centuries for a canon to emerge. An authority in Earth, though not of it, set the canon in Carthage, after so many Saints had received their reward, around three centuries after the city's destruction by Rome. So did the city repay for its centuries of infantile sacrifice, but we digress. A careful student of History and Historiography would notice how our Lord's Hand guided events.

A random man on the internet is no reliable authority to interpret primary sources. Thus, we move to secondary ones to fill in the gaps. Quoting Max Dimond in *Jews, God, and History*:

The Pharisees represented the middle ground of Jewish religious thinking. They were exceedingly tolerant in their religious views, totally different from the New Testament picture of them as narrow-minded bigots. The Pharisees believed in the resurrection of the dead, in the coming of a messiah, and in the immortality of the soul. Whenever two interpretations of the Torah—the Law—were possible, they always chose the more lenient view. They developed the tradition of

Oral Law, a sort of portable “do-it-yourself” jurisprudence kit to keep up with the changing times.

#### Chapter 7

One could see how this passage could bring the much used phrase “weaponized ambiguity” to mind. We forego discussing such interpretations for now.

The Sadducees could also use more context. Quoting from chapter 6:

The Sadducees represented the liberal, enlightened political viewpoint. They felt that neither their country nor Judaism would be jeopardized by a reasonable amount of Hellenic cultural influence... When Jesus preached in Galilee and Jerusalem, the Sadducees did not regard him as a radical, but as a zealot—in other words, as a Pharisee.

#### Chapter 6

Already, we see how our Lord tangled with progressive-minded folk. The Sadducees today would use cherry-picked verses such as “judge not” or “love thy neighbor” while doing them all the same.

However, one still needs to know what the Essenes were. We turn to Josephus again for answers.

The doctrine of the Essens is this: That all things are best ascribed to God. They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for; and when they send what they have dedicated to God into the temple, they do not offer sacrifices because they have more pure lustrations of their own; on which account they are excluded from the common court of the temple, but offer their sacrifices themselves; yet is their course of life better than that of other men; and they entirely addict themselves to husbandry. It also deserves our admiration, how much they exceed all other men that addict themselves to virtue, and this in righteousness; and indeed to such a degree, that as it hath never appeared among any other men, neither Greeks nor barbarians, no, not for a little time, so hath it endured a long while among them. This is demonstrated by that institution of theirs, which will not suffer any thing to hinder them from having all things in common; so that a rich man enjoys no more of his own wealth than he who hath nothing at all. There are about four thousand men that live in this way, and neither marry wives, nor are desirous to keep servants; as thinking the latter tempts men to be un-

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just, and the former gives the handle to domestic quarrels; but as they live by themselves, they minister one to another. They also appoint certain stewards to receive the incomes of their revenues, and of the fruits of the ground; such as are good men and priests, who are to get their corn and their food ready for them. They none of them differ from others of the Essens in their way of living, but do the most resemble those Dacae who are called Polistae.

Antiquities of the Jews

One would see how the Essenes prefigure the type of devoutness so scourged today. In fact, Max Dimond writes that the Pharisees saw them as rigid zealots and extremist faithful. One may be naturally tempted to associate them with Traditionalists today. However, one must face reality. The Essenes' peacefulness and harmony completely fails to appear when one looks at Traditionalists from afar. Only discord, conflict, and insults show up. In fact, one could find many parallels with the original Zealots in The Jewish War, they who rebelled against Roman rule so many times:

And now there were three treacherous factions in the city, the one parted from the other. Eleazar and his party, that kept the sacred first-fruits, came against John in their cups. Those that were with John plundered the populace, and went out with zeal against Simon. This Simon had his supply of provisions from the city, in opposition to the seditious. When, therefore, John was assaulted on both sides, he made his men turn about, throwing his darts upon those citizens that came up against him, from the cloisters he had in his possession, while he opposed those that attacked him from the temple by his engines of war. And if at any time he was freed from those that were above him, which happened frequently, from their being drunk and tired, he sallied out with a great number upon Simon and his party; and this he did always in such parts of the city as he could come at, till he set on fire those houses that were full of corn, and of all other provisions. The same thing was done by Simon, when, upon the other's retreat, he attacked the city also; as if they had, on purpose, done it to serve the Romans, by destroying what the city had laid up against the siege, and by thus cutting off the nerves of their own power. Accordingly, it so came to pass, that all the places that were about the temple were burnt down, and were become an intermediate desert space, ready for fighting on both sides of it; and that almost all that corn was burnt, which would have been sufficient for a siege of many years. So they were taken by the

means of the famine, which it was impossible they should have been, unless they had thus prepared the way for it by this procedure.

#### The Jewish War

After the Abomination of Desolation entered the Temple, the Zealots came in and imprudently destroyed the whole courtyard instead of just the offending image. The Faithful risk doing the same today without careful study and practice. The Zealots themselves would see some of their members morph into a twisted group, the Sicarii:

When the country was purged of these, there sprang up another sort of robbers in Jerusalem, which were called Sicarii, who slew men in the day time, and in the midst of the city; this they did chiefly at the festivals, when they mingled themselves among the multitude, and concealed daggers under their garments, with which they stabbed those that were their enemies; and when any fell down dead, the murderers became a part of those that had indignation against them; by which means they appeared persons of such reputation, that they could by no means be discovered. The first man who was slain by them was Jonathan the high priest, after whose death many were slain every day, while the fear men were in of being so served was more afflicting than the calamity itself; and while every body expected death every hour, as men do in war, so men were obliged to look before them, and to take notice of their enemies at a great distance; nor, if their friends were coming to them, durst they trust them any longer; but, in the midst of their suspicions and guarding of themselves, they were slain. Such was the celerity of the plotters against them, and so cunning was their contrivance.

#### The Jewish War

Just as the Sicarii had no shame in murdering their high priest, so too do Sedevacantists have no fear in maligning his Holiness and the hierarchy. In the end, the Sicarii faced retribution in Masada fortress, famous for the last stand and final suicide of its defenders. Time will tell whether something similar shall happen again.

Christ tells us to be in the world, not of it. Much has been said how the Benedict Option is a book-sized practical joke, that its proposal is basic Christian living in the world promoted by a baiting premise. However, one may still find comfort in nearby family and friends, despite still being in the world. Private revelation claims that Saints

Joachim and Anne were Essenes. Such a claim holds great merit, for as Max Dimond writes:

The Essenes, who had started their withdrawal from political life as early as the beginning of the Hasmonean dynasty, continued that withdrawal under Roman occupation. By the time the war against Rome broke out, they already had separated themselves into their own communities on the periphery of the smaller cities... Like the Pharisees, the Essenes believed in the immortality of the soul, in resurrection, and in the concept of a messiah. They also believed in the punishment of the wicked in an everlasting hell, and reward for the good in heaven. They developed elaborate purification rites, one of which was baptism, that is, immersion in water for remission of sins, or a rebirth into a new life. The Essenes preferred celibacy, and in the words of the historian Josephus, "they reject pleasure as an evil, but esteem continence and the conquest of our passions to be virtue." In order to preserve their numbers, they held, like the Apostle Paul in later years, that it was "better to marry than to burn," and therefore permitted occasional marriages. Most new members, however, came through the adoption of children from other sects who then were trained in the ascetic ways of the Essenes.

It is no wonder then, that the Essenes had disappeared by the first century's turn. They had all converted to Christianity, having their hopes and prayers fulfilled in the living Word.

## Ten Principles for Regime Change

*by Fellglow Keep*

Political Science has a long tradition of theorizing on regime change. The reader can read on such in his own time. However, one can take Mao Zedong's Ten Major Military Principles<sup>1</sup> and derive more general principles for regime change and counter-elite upheavals. To show that these principles apply anywhere, we use the Nazi Party's rise—being ideological rivals to Mao—as an example. We also note that the Nazi Party rose mostly peacefully, barring militia violence against Communists, Socialists, and criminals—giving these principles more empirical backing that they succeed outside a violent/military context.

1. Take over the regime's peripheries first, where the Center's hold is weak. Focus on the Center later on.

The Nazi Party first went to places where hatred for both the Weimar Regime and Communists was high. Where exactly they went to is the focus for the next principle.

2. Focus on extensive rural areas, and small and medium cities before bigger cities.

The Nazi party began in Munich and took its first members from big Bavarian cities, but its main power base became rural Protestant areas—Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg, Pomerania and East Prussia<sup>2</sup>. Social Democrat and Communist parties dominated the big cities from working class votes, while Catholic areas wanted their old monarchies back. Nuremberg, the second biggest Bavarian city, would become the first real Nazi city in the late 1920s.

3. Whittle down the Center's will to keep power in a locale. Be content with any victories and don't be attached—the Center always

<sup>1</sup>Mao Zedong, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks." (1947).

<sup>2</sup>Charles P. Loomis, and J. Allan Beegle, "The spread of German Nazism in rural areas." In the American Sociological Review 11, no. 6: 724–734. (1946)

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has a trick up its sleeve. A locale may change hands many times before becoming secure.

After an extremist upsurge in Munich, the Nazi Party gained rapid support there. However, Munich would change hands many times before finally becoming a powerbase.

### 4. Defeat the Center in detail.

The Nazi party first opposed growing Communists and Socialists before finally taking on major Weimar political parties.

### 5. Take no project which you are unsure of completing. Prepare to finish any project before starting it.

The Beer Hall Putsch failed, but it made an impression on the German people. There was also precedent in thinking that it would succeed - Mussolini did the same thing when he led WWI veterans to march on Rome. After it failed, however, the Nazi Party took less risky approaches to gaining power, by following the points above.

### 6. Absolute courage, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue. Prepare to take many projects in quick succession.

The Nazi Party remained the laughingstock of Germany for a decade, but in that decade it steadily built an electorate and manpower base. They had loyal and organized men who took on political campaigns in quick succession. When the Great Depression hit, the Nazi Party easily conquered elections.

### 7. Mobile warfare: don't be content with only having power over locales as long as the Center exists. Your power may wax or wane. When waxing, keep it waxing. When waning, wax it somewhere else.

When pushed out of Munich, the Nazi Party focused on Nuremberg. When pushed out of Catholic Bavaria, the Nazi Party focused on Protestant states. When pushed out of the cities, the Nazi Party focused on rural areas. When they gained a foot in the door, the Nazi Party followed with the entire body.

### 8. When taking over a city, your institutions must become domi-

nant over the Center's. A city's weakest institutions must be the first to be outcompeted, or even taken over. For stronger institutions, wait till conditions are ripe then be rid of them.

The Nazi Party took advantage of economic insecurity, and provided alternative institutions in small cities and rural areas. These institutions looked strong compared to Weimar Germany's.

9. Use the Center's resources left and forgotten to replenish your own.

Major Weimar parties tried to use the Nazi Party as puppets. The Nazi Party accepted, only for the puppet to become puppeteer.

10. Rest, study, and organize between major projects. These time periods should ideally not be very long, for the Center will gain breathing space otherwise.

The Nazi Party campaigned in a locale, celebrated for a short while, recruited new members, trained them with Mein Kampf, then immediately campaigned in another locale.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.



## Credential inflation, and Philippine education's coming crisis

*Ryan Mello*

The K-12 experiment has mixed results so far. No one hires Senior High School graduates, and credential inflation has caused even entry-level jobs to demand years of experience from recruits. Experience need not be job experience, with school activities and extracurriculars counting, but the problem has grown either way. The only reason that I see for this trend to become pervasive is simple social imitation. In the West, qualifications inflation was driven primarily as a way to clamp down indirectly on the need to raise wages due to the post-war economic recovery, as well as to justify the raised costs on jobs due to the implementation of Social Security. For this country, without any economic growth that actually makes meaningful gains to the middle classes apart from technology, Social Security is left as one of the prime drivers for this phenomenon. But this does not answer why even your carinderias and small-time malls are starting to require college diplomas even after K-12 had been shoved down our throats as a way out of credential inflation.

The way I see it, the public has venerated college degrees to the point that many people want to unthinkingly copy what their upmarket peers do. 'If X is asking for college degrees for its employees, then so can I.' Is there any logic to this? None, but your average Juan is motivated by a mixture of contradictory half-baked and half-reasonable motivations that on average, they'll push through with degree requirements. Sure, the K-12 experiment may see fruits in a few years, but two problems will persist: the rising number of college graduates, and free tuition. The window fast closes for the trough to be taken, and one would have to imagine what choice your average parent will make decide between a long-coveted college degree, or some paid vocational course or K-12 certificate.

The average Juan also has a love-hate affair with knowledge itself,

wanting it on purely materialistic terms, or as a crude signalling tool. Striverism, as we call it, is further compounded by degraded intellectual faculties that are further diminished by the so-called need to adapt to modernity's (re: employment standards). Your average Juan knows that his fellows are idiots, but he would never admit himself as one, and he cannot put two and two together to understand why simplistic policy solutions would never work. He would instead compensate, and indirectly defend or absolve himself through the tried and true canard of 'working hard'.

There is also a certain cultic behavior about how he regards the ideal of 'working hard' or '*sipag at tiyaga*'. There is no brute-forcing your way to industrialization without gulags and mass graves, and the peaceable kind requires not just your inner 'moxy' (a boomer equivalent of girlboss dream), but also favorable foreign markets (in the United States, RedGov was busy tussling with the auto industry, Big Agriculture, and the electronics sector just to get Japanese goods back in the late 50s–early 60s).

Discipline is usually the second buzzword, and is more correct, but hides the deeper need for *low-time preference behavior*. That is something you can't just brute-force even if you implement Singaporean laws on a Filipino populace. You need to have a culture that discourages signalling contests, and makes sure that the populace rejects fast-paced consumerism.

At day's, if you ever try explaining this to your average Juan, his eyes typically glaze over, or he reboots into parroting hard work and discipline like a malfunctioning recorder. Had they made TESDA courses free before even talking about making college free, then we could have seen these problems's impact soften as K-12 gets implemented. For now, private schools are being crushed under the lockdowns, and free public education becomes less of an option than as the only viable choice. The government effectively shot itself in the foot by destroying its hope of incentivizing college as a job requirement.

There is a silver lining to this, knowing your average Juan, as it may end up that some opportunistic public schools may decide to

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become diploma mills (or the closest that they could get to doing so within state regulations). Generally, however, this will not bode well at all given how the economy is structured against snowballing graduate expectations (both pre K-12 and K-12) to achieve middle class lifestyles without the economy to support it. The American Empire of Lies will have a field day unless some other big power somehow gets a need for youngish workers with barely passable resumes.

Another thing: the spread of virtual learning may offer a medium-term solution, as some ambitious entrepreneur or shyster may start a low-cost or free university platform online, then undercut higher staffed and higher costing mainstream colleges. The risk is that they'll have to be able to fend off the entire educational establishment and the generations of strivers and their supporters who would accept no challenge to their supremacy.

In summary, the situation is far more messed up now than ever before. We're not even talking about other social pressures regarding university (nationalism, striverism, etc.). And as with all inflation, this train can't be stopped simply by hoping to lay down more and more tracks in hopes of tiring it down, or printing our way into overheating the printer. I can't yet imagine it now, but there has to be some other way out of this mess without feeding the beast any further through forcing a devaluation of the college degree.

## Striverism, Jose Rizal, and Philippine society's illness

*Ryan Mello*

I had a thought once about how and why Filipinos seem ill-disposed to leftist agitation so far, even with many well below the poverty line. One may pin it on fervent Catholicism, the lack of a large and sufficiently dispersed industrial base to build a discontented proletariat (not that this stopped Mao, but that's a different story), etc.

But I think we also need to add striverism to this phenomenon. Similar how to the explanation for this in America is that it is common to regard oneself there as merely a 'temporarily embarrassed millionaire', your average Filipino is proud and conceited enough not to ascribe to utopianist/revolutionary impulses when individual self-interest is well enough established to advance yourself. To go into the mountains requires an insurmountably high or deranged sense of self to overcome the desire to try and make it big somewhere. The downside to this is that this phenomenon is much more vulnerable to subversion given how parents or your average Juan isn't really going to give a damn about diversity, ESG scoring, or globohomo, and will even cheer for it depending on the circumstance, as long as they get paid.

Without the presence of a strong cultural/religious/political backstop to this bourgeois affectation, it leaves you with an extremely vulnerable populace that is especially prone to materialist consumerism and status signalling spirals. Most leftists, and mainstream academia, usually get lazy and attribute this to some mixture of capitalism and colonialism, without acknowledging it as an all too human tendency, a particularly persistent strain that bodes ill for people without the intellectual aptitude or low-time preference to temper it and make it socially beneficial. While I do think the "sipag at tiyaga" sentiment is admirable, applying it to its full extent today—especially when divorced from higher principles—gets you into all sorts of dumb stuff.

The vlogger/“content creator” becomes an admirable character. The sentiment now is cut off from its rightful end, as hard work is encouraged so that people can become rich and indulge oneself. Family is still tacked on, usually by boomers, after talking about money, but people don’t even get to that part while daydreaming of becoming an American. The common and normie-effective answer is usually the lines of: “As long as they’re having fun/trip nila yun eh,” “They aren’t hurting anyone/wala naman silang tinatapakan o sinasaktan,” or its positive corollary of “At least they aren’t stealing from anyone, unlike X (usually unsavory government official types)/marangal ang trabaho ko, hindi naman ako magnanakaw tulad ng iba ryan.”

Yet this sentiment is a close sibling of the blind worship of degrees, credentials, and education. “They can’t take that away from you/hindi yan mananakaw sa’yo.” The economic effects are something we regularly discuss and need no further elaboration. The social effects are equally as corrosive. The whole pandemic should make it crystal clear how this blind worship of the degree leaves people vulnerable to institutional capture and language control. Your dad can complain about the fags all day, but his kids are up to their eyeballs in videos where the rainbow mindset is inculcated under the framing of ‘tolerance’ and ‘anti-discrimination’. It’s one thing for the legitimization process to occur on the base level, where its fags that you see on TV that disarm public sensibilities, it’s another when Dr. Goldblattbergstein from X Institute in America is giving a lecture on video that’s being shown to HS students and their eyes glaze over while the rainbow programming is installed. The quaint sensibilities provided to you by your family are helpless simply because the other guy has been doing his studies with a lot of fancy graphs and credentials attached to his name. Suddenly, God, dad, and your inhibited sensibilities aren’t enough to cut it anymore as credible sources.

You get some degree for anything and everything these days, but what is the exact value of this knowledge? A degree in STEM has far more practical and social utility than anthropology, but parents lap it all up all the same when they’re kid gets that certificate not knowing

or caring that their kid learned how to be a degenerate in college.

There seems to be an imaginary hope here that somehow, the kids are going to grow out of it and become a typical bourgeoisie salary-man. When you try explaining to them about the degeneracy that is to come, they shrug their hands and say that nothing can be done and the degree is still needed to make it in life. Worse, they try to diminish the problem and start defending their kids: “hindi naman siguro, alam ko ang ugali nyan”, “ganyan na ang panahon ngayon, kailangan mong makibagay”, etc.

And here we can trace these social conventions to Jose Rizal himself. I glean one example from his *Noli* to show what the government makes schools and universities teach. “You say that they have given us the faith and have brought us out of error,” he writes. “Do you call those external practices faith? Or the commerce in cords and scapulars, religion? Or the stories of miracles and other fairy tales that we hear every day, truth?”

I get a sense of irony in reading Rizal’s words through Elias in *Noli*. Father John Schumacher, SJ, just so happens to have a compilation of readings in Philippine Church history. From this collection, I can’t help seeing here how those of Chinese descent were seen as the Eastern equivalent of the Jews, as the quote really reads to me as some kind of wedge screeching against the Faith, from a people that gave the country Feng Shui and entire shops dedicated to trinkets dedicated to warding off bad luck and evil spirits. At least the Church doesn’t actually tell people to ‘buy X and Y’ or reorder/change the items your house to repel negative energy. I’m willing to bet that Chinese shops make far more money than the sum total of the religious article shops here in the country. More than that, I’m trying to parse together the problem here, and I can’t help but think that this is cosmopolitanism breaking through.

Rizal goes on to speak through Elias. His argument against ‘superstition’ is interesting, since it reminds me of basic-tier Protestant objections to Catholicism. “Is this the law of Jesus Christ? A God did not have to let Himself be crucified for this, nor we assume the obliga-

tion of eternal gratitude. Superstition existed long before this; all that was needed was to perfect it and to raise the price of the merchandise.” Other than these ramblings, there is also a part in *Noli*, I think in the first Tasyo chapter, where Rizal basically writes Reddito dialogue to dunk on certain Church practices. Going by historical friar criticisms of folk Catholicism and dodgy priests as one could read from Schumacher’s collection, one would think in hindsight that Rizal and the friars would get along better. But no, Rizal is too committed to Third Worldist Filipino-as-virtuous-victim narratives to even consider how the Filipino shares in the blame for the Red Queen signalling race of piety. We at *Pillar of Liberty* have the tools and frameworks to see and understand this phenomenon now, but for countless other people, this garbage can somehow sound downright appealing, even if the proposal itself is nonsensical.

Rizal finishes his ramblings like so. “You will tell me that imperfect as our present religion may be, it is preferable to that we had before. I believe this and agree with you. But it is too expensive, because in return for it we have renounced our national identity and our independence. In return for it we have given its priests our best towns and our fields, and we are still giving our savings for the purchase of religious objects.”

If I lived in Jose Rizal’s time, here’s how I’d answer him: Who are you to renounce the sacrifices made by the martyrs and saints of the Church? To diminish their witness to the Faith and the blessings which they share from the divine? Yes, the sacrifice encompasses all of the articles of the Faith, material and spiritual, but rather than denounce the thieves surrounding the Temple, you assail the Temple itself. You insidious vipers talk of independence and national identity, and yet forget basic Scripture, “For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?”

## Reflecting on the Modern World's Crisis

by *Vexillum*

No one can question that the modern world today is in crisis. One can see what the world faces just by watching a few minutes of evening news. Wars, famines, and other problems are a regular feature. Of course, one could object that this is merely the news cycle being itself, drumming up spectacle for views and airtime. But even beyond this, the feeling of a crisis is palpable, bringing to mind speculations on the end of the world from doomsday predictions to the so-called 'Rapture'. The Traditionalist philosopher René Guénon writes thus:

...the belief in a never-ending 'progress', which until recently was held as a sort of inviolable and indisputable dogma, is no longer so widespread; there are those who perceive, though in a vague and confused manner, that the civilization of the West may not always go on developing in the same direction, but may some day reach a point where it will stop, or even be plunged in its entirety into some cataclysm.

René Guénon, *The Crisis of the Modern World*

He wrote this in 1927, almost a century ago, in a time where mass media's stranglehold over people's minds did not exist yet. If one could see a crisis back then, what more so now?

### Introducing Guénon

To analyze our crisis today, we need to learn two abstract ideas. Many see *Quality* and *Quantity* together, with one correlating to the other. As cliché as it sounds, the saying 'Quality is better than Quantity' actually reveals a deeper truth. Guénon has the two as essential principles upon which existence rests on. Guénon defines *Quality* as the *principle that makes a thing what it is*, and *Quantity* as the *supporting substratum upon which Quality inheres in*. Guénon's thesis in his *The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of The Times* is that modernity heads towards the Reign of Quantity, dissolving and overthrowing Quality.



## 24. Reflecting on the Modern World's Crisis

The modern world negates the 'higher', and affirms that only 'what is there' is all there is. We often speak of the 'death of God', and no matter how abused the phrase is, it reflects the modern world's state. Man, divorced from Tradition and the higher things, rejects God—the First Principle—and becomes a first principle unto himself. But how can this be? To be a principle is to be universal. If every particular man is a first principle unto himself, then the essence of being a principle—a universal—vanishes. Modernity exalts this contradiction, then finds itself in chaos and disorder. We see that 'truth' no longer exists, that all viewpoints are valid, among other views prevailing today. Modernity allegedly emphasizes the individual's 'potential' towards self-actualization, then allows the opposite to happen.

In *The Reign of Quantity*, Guenon also distinguishes between *Unity* and *Uniformity*, analogous to Quality and Quantity, respectively.

- *Unity*: that which accounts for difference in qualities but still binds the different things into a coherent whole. For example, divine and human powers and authority are qualitatively different, yet divine law and reason command their cooperation and unity for a higher end—the good of the realm.
- *Uniformity*: that which accounts for no differing qualities in binding things into a whole, seeking only its end without thinking of how to achieve it properly.

A reversion to mediocrity happens in Uniformity—the qualitatively higher thing gets reduced to something lower, and the qualitatively lower rises undeservingly to something higher. Guénon sees democratic society as an example of the pervading rule of uniformity, and again it illustrates the Reign of Quantity contra Quality.

From the above ideas, we come into what Guénon calls the illusion of so-called *ordinary life*:

...a life in which nothing that is not purely human can intervene in any way, owing to the elimination from it of any sacred, ritual, or symbolical character (it matters little whether this character be thought of as specifically religious or as conforming to some other traditional modality, because the relevant point in all cases is the effective action

of 'spiritual influences'), the very words 'ordinary' or 'everyday' moreover implying that everything that surpasses conceptions of that order is, even when it has not yet been expressly denied, at least relegated to an 'extra-ordinary' domain, regarded as exceptional, strange, and unaccustomed.

The Reign of Quantity and The Signs of the Times. Chapter 15.

Man retreats into ennui, for he has lost all purpose in existentialist hubris. A complacent cynicism about the situation of the world settles—see how many say “that’s life”, or “that’s how things are”. These sayings show man’s resigned despair, for he knows neither what he is, nor what his place in the grand order of things is. In fact, man’s view of the world has become so limited, that he not even considers the possibility of there even being a ‘grand order’ in the first place. He sweeps aside any arguments, expositions, or statements to the contrary, no matter how cogent, instead answering ‘that’s what you believe’, or ‘that’s your truth.’

Nevertheless, modern man persists in this and this is where the illusion comes from. All qualitative character to life becomes reduced to quantitative concerns which are supposedly more ‘immediate’, this immediacy more or less pertaining to contingent things at the expense of necessary ones.

## Guénon for the Filipino

As Guénon writes, the Reign of Quantity manifests in modernity. What was said above will help us understand the Reign of Quantity as it manifests specifically in Philippine society. It specifically manifests in political, social, and religious aspects of Philippine life.

Pillar of Liberty has often talked about the hollowness of a ‘Filipino identity’, and on an analysis using the concepts explained by Guénon, this still certainly rings true. The Filipino identity represents *the rule of Uniformity over Unity*. Differences are a manifestation of *Quality*. It is by differentiating that we can judge and know what a thing is apart from another thing. Thus there are differences between the different

ethnic groups—a Kapampangan is not a Tagalog, a Tagalog is not a Visayan, a Visayan is not a Bikolano, and so on. To ignore such differences is to give way to Uniformity, which as we said does not take into account the differences when ordering things towards a certain end. The totalizing character of Filipino culture—in reality merely a puffed-up version of the Tagalog culture—imposes itself on other ethnic groups and ignores their differences and thus their qualitative significance. A veritable Reign of Quantity prevails. What exists here is not unity, no matter how the Philippine state tries to make it to be. It is uniformity, a disregarding of qualitative characteristics that makes people what they are in the wrongheaded pursuit of trying to make the country a coherent whole. The effort to derive Unity from Uniformity, to Quality from Quantity, will always be doomed to fail, much like building a castle on quicksand. A ‘unified Filipino’ culture will not really come about unless at the cost of totally obliterating regional identities, and even then it wouldn’t be a truly unifying principle for it lacks the inherent qualitative significance that an organic culture has.

A look at Philippine politics also confirms the reign of Quantity. The politicians’ promise every election cycle is always centered upon ‘more’—more jobs, more handouts, economic growth and other such promises that more or less are forgotten once the politicians in question have taken power. Very rarely are Philippine political organizations centered upon values or principles—most are big-tent movements with principles and objectives that are either so vague that they are indistinguishable from the other organizations or so common that they really aren’t worth voting for more than the next organization. Let the reader understand that this is ultimately what a modern democracy is—atomized masses of individual units voting for their own supposed ‘self-interest’ or ‘good’, with the Good largely ignored. In this, democracy can truly be said to be the reign of Quantity.

Now, one could object that this scheme would actually be better since it allows citizens to have more freedom in exercising political actions. We answer that such a conception is false since man is a so-

cial animal with organic ties to his community, first on a small scale then progressively going to a larger scale. Man first has responsibility towards his immediate community—first his family, then his neighbors, then his village, then his town, and so on. Modern democracy does away with these principles and would inevitably posit that it is a game of ‘all-against-all’. This is precisely what we have seen with the recently-concluded national elections initiating fights within families and among friends. The Gospels speak of the Lord saying that He had come to set father against son and daughter against mother, for the cost to follow Him is that great. Democracy does the same, but for an infinitely lesser reward.

Speaking of faith, the most obvious and the most grave proof of the reign of Quantity is found in the domain of religion. Our dear Catholic readers would agree, seeing the state of the Church and her faithful in the current year. Relativism reigns. The doctrines and traditions of the Church are forgotten, a grave matter for a nation where the vast majority of inhabitants profess the faith. Morals are lax. The great decline of the Catholic religion and its doctrines has caused a certain cynicism for matters of the spiritual and the metaphysical—a cynical outlook that this world is all that is, that man cannot transcend it, and that there are no higher principles that he must follow for his own good.

This trend is the illusion of ordinary life that we spoke of earlier. Aside from this cynical agnosticism there exists a fideist pseudo-mysticism that puts God’s supposed Charity above all, even justice. It is the conception that God is Love, that indeed He is so loving that He would be willing to overlook all of man’s wrongdoings. In practice this is a radical individualism that gives way to antinomianism, or believing that God has given man a ‘blank check’ for his deeds so long as we believe in Him. This belief has its roots largely in sentimentalism. We see this mostly in Protestant sects, though it worryingly increases among the Church Faithful itself.

## The Age of Dissolution

Guénon writes that the decline we perceive is part and parcel of the age of *Kali Yuga*—the last phase in a ‘world cycle’ where chaos and strife reigns. The *Kali Yuga* is a concept from the Hindu tradition and for our purposes we shall term it, as Guénon also does, the *Age of Dissolution*. It is an age where higher principles will be forgotten and the traditions handing down those principles will be lost. Quality will be dissolved into Quantity. Christian writings also speak of an Age of Dissolution, as our Lord speaks of calamities, wars, famines, persecutions of the faithful, and that ‘the charity of many will grow cold’. Saint Peter says that many will be scoffers in the last days. Many false prophets will arise. It will get worse more than any of us can think of.

But Guénon leaves us with these words:

Those who might be tempted to give way to despair should realize that nothing accomplished in this order can ever be lost, that confusion, error and darkness can win the day only apparently and in a purely ephemeral way, that all partial and transitory disequilibrium must perforce contribute towards the greater equilibrium of the whole, and that nothing can ultimately prevail against the power of truth.

Rene Guenon, *The Crisis of The Modern World*

Meanwhile, our Lord Jesus Christ, Truth Itself, says:

In the world, you will only find distress. But take courage, I have overcome the world.

John 16:33

## Appendix

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

## A

### Further Reading

As this text is a synthesis of all of Pillar of Liberty's thought, this reading list is also to be taken as bibliography. Pillar of Liberty's scholarly foundation rests on the sum of all knowledge and learning from these sources.

#### Empirical Evidence for a Professional-Managerial Elite

- Panda, Brahmadev, and N. M. Leepsa. "Agency theory: Review of theory and evidence on problems and perspectives." *Indian Journal of Corporate Governance* 10.1 (2017): 74–95.
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- Mintzberg, Henry. "The nature of managerial work." (1973).
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- Pettigrew, Andrew M. "On studying managerial elites." *The Value Creating Board*. Routledge, 2008. 179–207.
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- Valsan, Calin, and Robert Sproule. "The invisible hands behind the student evaluation of teaching: the rise of the new managerial elite in the governance of higher education." *Journal of Economic Issues* 42.4 (2008): 939–958.

Among an entire body of literature not included. We encourage the reader to use Google Scholar and/or Library Genesis to keep reading.

## Political Theory

- Bond, CA. *Nemesis: The Jouvenelian vs. The Liberal Model of Human Orders*. Perth: Imperium Press, 2019.
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Total revamp in 2023.

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### *A. Further Reading*

- Reynolds, Susan. *Fiefs and vassals: the medieval evidence reinterpreted*. Clarendon Press, 1994.

## Roman History

## Modern History

## Economic Theory

## Philippine History

- Richardson, Jim. *Light of Liberty: Documents and Studies on Katipunan, 1892*-Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2013.

## Modern Catholic History

- Amerio, Romano. *Iota unum: a study of changes in the Catholic Church in the 20th century*. Sarto House, 1998.
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## Philosophy

- Feser, Edward. *The last superstition: A refutation of the new atheism*. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2008.
- Feser, Edward. *Scholastic metaphysics: A contemporary introduction*. Vol. 39. *Editiones Scholasticae*, 2019.
- Grenier, Henri, and John Peter Emmet O'Hanley. *Thomistic Philosophy*. 1948.
- Sachs, Joe, ed. *Physics*. Rutgers University Press, 1995.
- Sachs, Joe, ed. *Metaphysics*. Green Lion Press, 1999.
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## B

# Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature

by Joe Sachs

Aristotle's account of motion and its place in nature can be found in the *Physics*. By motion, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) understands any kind of change. He defines motion as the actuality of a potentiality. Initially, Aristotle's definition seems to involve a contradiction. However, commentators on the works of Aristotle, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, maintain that this is the only way to define motion.

In order to adequately understand Aristotle's definition of motion it is necessary to understand what he means by actuality and potentiality. Aristotle uses the words *energeia* and *entelechia* interchangeably to describe a kind of action. A linguistic analysis shows that, by actuality, Aristotle means both *energeia*, which means being-at-work, and *entelechia*, which means being-at-an-end. These two words, although they have different meanings, function as synonyms in Aristotle's scheme. For Aristotle, to be a thing in the world is to be at work, to belong to a particular species, to act for an end and to form material into enduring organized wholes. Actuality, for Aristotle, is therefore close in meaning to what it is to be alive, except it does not carry the implication of mortality.

From the Middle Ages to modern times, commentators disagreed on the interpretation of Aristotle's account of motion. An accurate rendering of Aristotle's definition must include apparently inconsistent propositions: (a) that motion is rest, and (b) that a potentiality, which must be, if anything, a privation of actuality, is at the same time that actuality of which it is the lack. St. Thomas Aquinas was prepared to take these propositions seriously. St. Thomas observes that to say that something is in motion is just to say that it is both what it is already and something else that it is not yet. Accordingly, motion is the mode in which the future belongs to the present, it is the present absence of just those particular absent things which are about to be. St. Thomas thus resolves the apparent contradiction be-

tween potentiality and actuality in Aristotle's definition of motion by arguing that in every motion actuality and potentiality are mixed or blended.

St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's definition of motion, however, is not free of difficulties. His interpretation seems to trivialize the meaning of *entelechia*. One implication of this interpretation is that whatever happens to be the case right now is an *entelechia*, as though something which is intrinsically unstable as the instantaneous position of an arrow in flight deserved to be described by the word which Aristotle everywhere else reserves for complex organized states which persist, which hold out in being against internal and external causes tending to destroy them.

In the *Metaphysics*, however, Aristotle draws a distinction between two kinds of potentiality. On the one hand, there are latent or inactive potentialities. On the other hand, there are active or at-work potentialities. Accordingly, every motion is a complex whole, an enduring unity which organizes distinct parts. Things have being to the extent that they are or are part of determinate wholes, so that to be means to be something, and change has being because it always is or is part of some determinate potentiality, at work and manifest in the world as change.

## Introduction

Aristotle defines motion, by which he means change of any kind, as the actuality of a potentiality as such (or as movable, or as a potentiality — *Physics* 201a 10-11, 27-29, b 4-5). The definition is a conjunction of two terms which normally contradict each other, along with, in Greek, a qualifying clause which seems to make the contradiction inescapable. Yet St. Thomas Aquinas called it the only possible way to define motion by what is prior to and better known than motion. At the opposite extreme is the young Descartes, who in the first book he wrote announced that while everyone knows what motion is, no one understands Aristotle's definition of it. According to Descartes, "mo-

tion . . . is nothing more than the action by which any body passes from one place to another” (Principles II, 24). The use of the word “passes” makes this definition an obvious circle; Descartes might just as well have called motion the action by which a thing moves. But the important part of Descartes’ definition is the words “nothing more than,” by which he asserts that motion is susceptible of no definition which is not circular, as one might say “the color red is just the color red,” to mean that the term is not reducible to some modification of a wave, or analyzable in any other way. There must be ultimate terms of discourse, or there would be no definitions, and indeed no thought. The point is not that one cannot construct a non-circular definition of such a term, one claimed to be properly irreducible, but that one ought not to do so. The true atoms of discourse are those things which can be explained only by means of things less known than themselves. If motion is such an ultimate term, then to define it by means of anything but synonyms is willfully to choose to dwell in a realm of darkness, at the sacrifice of the understanding which is naturally ours in the form of “good sense” or ordinary common sense.

Descartes’ treatment of motion is explicitly anti-Aristotelian and his definition of motion is deliberately circular. The Cartesian physics is rooted in a disagreement with Aristotle about what the best-known things are, and about where thought should take its beginnings. There is, however, a long tradition of interpretation and translation of Aristotle’s definition of motion, beginning at least five hundred years before Descartes and dominating discussions of Aristotle today, which seeks to have things both ways. An unusually clear instance of this attitude is found in the following sentence from a medieval Arabic commentary: “Motion is a first entelechy of that which is in potentiality, insofar as it is in potentiality, and if you prefer you may say that it is a transition from potentiality to actuality.” You will recognize the first of these two statements presented as equivalent as a translation of Aristotle’s definition, and the second as a circular definition of the same type as that of Descartes. Motion is an entelechy;

motion is a transition. The strangeness of the word “entelechy” masks the contradiction between these two claims. We must achieve an understanding of Aristotle’s word *entelechia*, the heart of his definition of motion, in order to see that what it says cannot be said just as well by such a word as “transition.”

### *Energeia and Entelechia*

The word *entelechia* was invented by Aristotle, but never defined by him. It is at the heart not only of his definition of motion, but of all his thought. Its meaning is the most knowable in itself of all possible objects of the intellect. There is no starting point from which we can descend to put together the cements of its meaning. We can come to an understanding of *entelechia* only by an ascent from what is intrinsically less knowable than it, indeed knowable only through it, but more known because more familiar to us. We have a number of resources by which to begin such an ascent, drawing upon the linguistic elements out of which Aristotle constructed the word, and upon the fact that he uses the word *energeia* as a synonym, or all but a synonym, for *entelechia*.

The root of *energeia* is *ergonó*: deed, work, or *actó* from which comes the adjective *energon* used in ordinary speech to mean active, busy, or at work. *Energeia* is formed by the addition of a noun ending to the adjective *energon*; we might construct the word is-at-work-ness from Anglo-Saxon roots to translate *energeia* into English, or use the more euphonious periphrastic expression, being-at-work. If we are careful to remember how we got there, we could alternatively use Latin roots to make the word “actuality” to translate *energeia*. The problem with this alternative is that the word “actuality” already belongs to the English language, and has a life of its own which seems to be at variance with the simple sense of being active. By the actuality of a thing, we mean not its being-in-action but its being what it is. For example, there is a fish with an effective means of camouflage: it looks like a rock but it is actually a fish. When an actuality is attributed to that

fish, completely at rest at the bottom of the ocean, we don't seem to be talking about any activity. But according to Aristotle, to be something always means to be at work in a certain way. In the case of the fish at rest, its actuality is the activity of metabolism, the work by which it is constantly transforming material from its environment into parts of itself and losing material from itself into its environment, the activity by which the fish maintains itself as a fish and as just the fish it is, and which ceases only when the fish ceases to be. Any static state which has any determinate character can only exist as the outcome of a continuous expenditure of effort, maintaining the state as it is. Thus even the rock, at rest next to the fish, is in activity: to be a rock is to strain to be at the center of the universe, and thus to be in motion unless constrained otherwise, as the rock in our example is constrained by the large quantity of earth already gathered around the center of the universe. A rock at rest at the center is at work maintaining its place, against the counter-tendency of all the earth to displace it. The center of the universe is determined only by the common innate activity of rocks and other kinds of earth. Nothing is which is not somehow in action, maintaining itself either as the whole it is, or as a part of some whole. A rock is inorganic only when regarded in isolation from the universe as a whole which is an organized whole just as blood considered by itself could not be called alive yet is only blood insofar as it contributes to the maintenance of some organized body. No existing rock can fail to contribute to the hierarchical organization of the universe; we can therefore call any existing rock an actual rock.

*Energeia*, then, always means the being-at-work of some definite, specific something; the rock cannot undergo metabolism, and once the fish does no more than fall to earth and remain there it is no longer a fish. The material and organization of a thing determine a specific capacity or potentiality for activity with respect to which the corresponding activity has the character of an end (*telos*). Aristotle says "the act is an end and the being-at-work is the act and since *energeia* is named from the ergon it also extends to the being-at-an-end (*entelecheia*)" (Metaphysics 1050a 21-23). The word *entelecheia* has

a structure parallel to that of *energeia*. From the root word *telos*, meaning end, comes the adjective *enteles*, used in ordinary speech to mean complete, perfect, or full-grown. But while *energeia*, being-at-work, is made from the adjective meaning at work and a noun ending, *entelecheia* is made from the adjective meaning complete and the verb *exein*. Thus if we translate *entelecheia* as “completeness” or “perfection,” the contribution the meaning of *exein* makes to the term is not evident. Aristotle probably uses *exein* for two reasons which lead to the same conclusion: First, one of the common meanings of *exein* is “to be” in the sense of to remain, to stay, or to keep in some condition specified by a preceding adverb as in the idioms *skalos exei*, “things are going well,” or *kakos exei*, “things are going badly.” It means “to be” in the sense of to continue to be. This is only one of several possible meanings of *exein*, but there is a second fact which makes it likely that it is the meaning which would strike the ear of a Greek-speaking person of Aristotle’s time. There was then in ordinary use the word *endelecheia*, differing from Aristotle’s word *entelecheia* only by a delta in place of the tau. *Endelecheia* means continuity or persistence. As one would expect, there was a good deal of confusion in ancient times between the invented and undefined term *entelecheia* and the familiar word *endelecheia*. The use of the pun for the serious philosophic purpose of saying at once two things for whose union the language has no word was a frequent literary device of Aristotle’s teacher Plato. In this striking instance, Aristotle seems to have imitated the playful style of his teacher in constructing the most important term in his technical vocabulary. The addition of *exein* to *enteles*, through the joint action of the meaning of the suffix and the sound of the whole, superimposes upon the sense of “completeness” that of continuity. *entelecheia* means continuing in a state of completeness, or being at an end which is of such a nature that it is only possible to be there by means of the continual expenditure of the effort required to stay there. Just as *energeia* extends to *entelecheia* because it is the activity which makes a thing what it is, *entelecheia* extends to *energeia* because it is the end or perfection which has being only in, through, and

during activity. For the remainder of this entry, the word “actuality” translates both *energeia* and *entelecheia*, and “actuality” means just that area of overlap between being-at-work and being-at-an-end which expresses what it means to be something determinate. The words *energeia* and *entelecheia* have very different meanings, but function as synonyms because the world is such that things have identities, belong to species, act for ends, and form material into enduring organized wholes. The word actuality as thus used is very close in meaning to the word life, with the exception that it is broader in meaning, carrying no necessary implication of mortality.

Kosman [1969] interprets the definition in substantially the same way as it is interpreted above, utilizing examples of kinds of *entelecheia* given by Aristotle in *On the Soul*, and thus he succeeds in bypassing the inadequate translations of the word. The Sachs 1995 translation of Aristotle's *Physics* translates *entelecheia* as being-at-work-staying-itself.

## Outdated revision. Total revamp in 2023.

### The Standard Account of Aristotle's View of Motion

We embarked on this quest for the meaning of *entelecheia* in order to decide whether the phrase “transition to actuality” could ever properly render it. The answer is now obviously “no.” An actuality is something ongoing, but only the ongoing activity of maintaining a state of completeness or perfection already reached; the transition into such a state always lacks and progressively approaches the perfected character which an actuality always has. A dog is not a puppy: the one is, among other things, capable of generating puppies and giving protection, while the other is incapable of generation and in need of protection. We might have trouble deciding exactly when the puppy has ceased to be a puppy and become a dog at the age of one year, for example, it will probably be fully grown and capable of reproducing, but still awkward in its movements and puppyish in its attitudes, but in any respect in which it has become a dog it has ceased to be a puppy.



But our concern was to understand what motion is, and it is obviously the puppy which is in motion, since it is growing toward maturity, while the dog is not in motion in that respect, since its activity has ceased to produce change and become wholly directed toward self-maintenance. If the same thing cannot be in the same respect both an actuality and a transition to actuality, it is clearly the transition that motion is, and the actuality that it isn't. It seems that Descartes is right and Aristotle is wrong. Of course it is possible that Aristotle meant what Descartes said, but simply used the wrong word, that he called motion an *entelecheia* three times, at the beginning, middle, and end of his explanation of what motion is, when he really meant not *entelecheia* but the transition or passage to *entelecheia*. Now, this suggestion would be laughable if it were not what almost everyone who addresses the question today believes. Sir David Ross, certainly the most massively qualified authority on Aristotle of those who have lived in our century and written in our language, the man who supervised the Oxford University Press's forty-five year project of translating all the works of Aristotle into English, in a commentary, on Aristotle's definition of motion, writes: "*entelecheia* must here mean 'actualization,' not 'actuality'; it is the passage to actuality that is kinesis" (Physics, text with commentary, London, 1936, p. 359). In another book, his commentary on the Metaphysics, Ross makes it clear that he regards the meaning *entelecheia* has in every use Aristotle makes of it everywhere but in the definition of motion as being not only other than but incompatible with the meaning "actualization." In view of that fact, Ross' decision that "*entelecheia* must here mean 'actualization'" is a desperate one, indicating a despair of understanding Aristotle out of his own mouth. It is not translation or interpretation but plastic surgery.

Ross' full account of motion as actualization (Aristotle, New York, 1966, pp. 81-82) cites no passages from Aristotle, and no authorities, but patiently explains that motion is motion and cannot, therefore, be an actuality. There are authorities he could have cited, including Moses Maimonides, the twelfth century Jewish philosopher who

sought to reconcile Aristotle's philosophy with the Old Testament and Talmud, and who defined motion as "the transition from potentiality to actuality," and the most famous Aristotelian commentator of all time, Averroes, the twelfth century Spanish Muslim thinker, who called motion a passage from non-being to actuality and complete reality. In each case the circular definition is chosen in preference to the one which seems laden with contradictions. A circular statement, to the extent that it is circular, is at least not false, and can as a whole have some content: Descartes' definition amounts to saying "whatever motion is, it is possible only with respect to place," and that of Averroes, Maimonides, and Ross amounts to saying "whatever motion is, it results always in an actuality." An accurate rendering of Aristotle's definition would amount to saying (a) that motion is rest, and (b) that a potentiality, which must be, at a minimum, a privation of actuality, is at the same time that actuality of which it is the lack. There has been one major commentator on Aristotle who was prepared to take seriously and to make sense of both these claims.

Guidated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

#### Thomas' Account of Aristotle's View of Motion

St. Thomas Aquinas, in his interpretation of Aristotle's definition of motion, (*Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, London, 1963, pp. 136-137), observes two principles: (1) that Aristotle meant what he wrote, and (2) that what Aristotle wrote is worth the effort of understanding. Writing a century after Maimonides and Averroes, Thomas disposes of their approach to defining motion with few words: it is not Aristotle's definition and it is an error. A passage, a transition, an actualization, an actualizing, or any of the more complex substantives to which translators have resorted which incorporate in some more or less disguised form some progressive sense united to the meaning of actuality, all have in common that they denote a kind of motion. If motion can be defined, then to rest content with explaining motion as a kind of motion is certainly to err; even if one is to reject Aristotle's definition on fundamental philosophical grounds, as Descartes

was to do, the first step must be to see what it means. And Thomas explains clearly and simply a sense in which Aristotle's definition is both free of contradiction and genuinely a definition of motion. One must simply see that the growing puppy is a dog, that the half formed lump of bronze on which the sculptor is working is a statue of Hermes, that the tepid water on the fire is hot; what it means to say that the puppy is growing, the bronze is being worked, or the water is being heated, is that each is not just the complex of characteristics it possesses right now; in each case, something that the thing is not yet, already belongs to it as that toward which it is, right now, ordered. To say that something is in motion is just to say that it is both what it is already and something else that it isn't yet. What else do we mean by saying that the puppy is growing, rather than remaining what it is, that the bronze under the sculptor's hand is in a different condition from the identically shaped lump of bronze he has discarded, or that the water is not just tepid but being heated? Motion is the mode in which the future belongs to the present, is the present absence of just those particular absent things which are about to be.

Thomas discusses in detail the example of the water being heated. Assume it to have started cold, and to have been heated so far to room temperature. The heat it now has, which has replaced the potentiality it previously had to be just that hot, belongs to it in actuality. The capacity it has to be still hotter belongs to it in potentiality. To the extent that it is actually hot it has been moved; to the extent that it is not yet as hot as it is going to be, it is not yet moved. The motion is just the joint presence of potentiality and actuality with respect to same thing, in this case heat.

In Thomas' version of Aristotle's definition one can see the alternative to Descartes' approach to physics. Since Descartes regards motion as ultimate and given, his physics will give no account of motion itself, but describe the transient static configurations through which the moving things pass. By Thomas' account, motion is not ultimate but is a consequence of the way in which present states of things are ordered toward other actualities which do not belong to them. One

could build on such an account a physics of forces, that is, of those directed potentialities which cause a thing to move, to pass over from the actuality it possesses to another which it lacks but to which it is ordered. Motion will thus not have to be understood as the mysterious departure of things from rest, which alone can be described, but as the outcome of the action upon one another of divergent and conflicting innate tendencies of things. Rest will be the anomaly, since things will be understood as so constituted by nature as to pass over of themselves into certain states of activity, but states of rest will be explainable as dynamic states of balance among things with opposed tendencies. Leibniz, who criticized Descartes' physics and invented a science of dynamics, explicitly acknowledged his debt to Aristotle (see, e.g., *Specimen Dynamicum*), whose doctrine of *entelecheia* he regarded himself as restoring in a modified form. From Leibniz we derive our current notions of potential and kinetic energy, whose very names, pointing to the actuality which is potential and the actuality which is motion, preserve the Thomistic resolutions of the two paradoxes in Aristotle's definition of motion.

Updated revision  
Total revamp in 2023.

### The Limits of Thomas' Account

But though the modern science of dynamics can be seen in germ in St. Thomas' discussion of motion, it can be seen also to reveal difficulties in Thomas' conclusions. According to Thomas, actuality and potentiality do not exclude one another but co-exist as motion. To the extent that an actuality is also a potentiality it is a motion, and to the extent that an actuality is a motion it is a potentiality. The two seeming contradictions cancel each other in the dynamic actuality of the present state which is determined by its own future. But are not potential and kinetic energy two different things? A rock held six feet above the ground has been actually moved identically to the rock thrown six feet above the ground, and at that distance each strains identically to fall to earth; but the one is falling and the other isn't. How can the description which is common to both, when one is mov-

ing and the other is at rest, be an account of what motion is? It seems that everything which Thomas says about the tepid water which is being heated can be said also of the tepid water which has been removed from the fire. Each is a coincidence of a certain actuality of heat with a further potentiality to the same heat. What does it mean to say that the water on the fire has, right now, an order to further heat which the water off the fire lacks? If we say that the fire is acting on the one and not on the other in such a way as to disturb its present state, we have begged the question and returned to the position of presupposing motion to explain motion. Thomas' account of Aristotle's definition of motion, though immeasurably superior to that of Sir David Ross as interpretation, and far more sophisticated as an approach to and specification of the conditions an account of motion would have to meet, seems ultimately subject to the same circularity. Maimonides, Averroes, and Ross fail to say how motion differs from rest. Thomas fails to say how any given motion differs from a corresponding state of balanced tension, or of strain and constraint.

The strength of Thomas' interpretation of the definition of motion comes from his taking every word seriously. When Ross discusses Aristotle's definition, he gives no indication of why the *he toiouton*, or "insofar as it is such," clause should have been included. By Thomas' account, motion is the actuality of any potentiality which is nevertheless still a potentiality. It is the actuality which has not canceled its corresponding potentiality but exists along with it. Motion then is the actuality of any potentiality insofar as it is still a potentiality. This is the formula which applies equally well to the dynamic state of rest and the dynamic state of motion. We shall try to advance our understanding by being still more careful about the meaning of the pronoun *he*.

Thomas' account of the meaning of Aristotle's definition forces him to construe the grammar of the definition in such a way that the clause introduced by the dative singular feminine relative pronoun *he* has as its antecedent, in two cases, the neuter participle *tou ontos*, and in the third, the neuter substantive adjective *tou dunatou*. It is true that this

particular feminine relative pronoun often had an adverbial sense to which its gender was irrelevant, but in the three statements of the definition of motion there is no verb but *estin*. If the clause is understood adverbially, then, the sentence must mean something like: if motion is a potentiality, it is the actuality of a potentiality. Whatever that might mean, it could at any rate not be a definition of motion. Thus the clause must be understood adjectivally, and Thomas must make the relative pronoun dependent upon a word with which it does not agree in gender. He makes the sentence say that motion is the actuality of the potentiality in which there is yet potentiality. Reading the pronoun as dependent upon the feminine noun *entelecheia* with which it does agree, we find the sentence saying that motion is the actuality as which it is a potentiality of the potentiality, or the actuality as a potentiality of the potentiality.

### Facing the Contradictions of Aristotle's Account of Motion

This reading of the definition implies that potentialities exist in two ways, that it is possible to be a potentiality, yet not be an actual potentiality. The beginning of this entry says that Aristotle's definition of motion was made by putting together two terms, actuality and potentiality, which normally contradict each other. Thomas resolved the contradiction by arguing that in every motion actuality and potentiality are mixed or blended, that the condition of becoming-hot of the water is just the simultaneous presence in the same water of some actuality of heat and some remaining potentiality of heat. Earlier it was stated that there was a qualifying clause in Aristotle's definition which seemed to intensify, rather than relieve, the contradiction. This refers to the *he toiouton*, or *he kineton*, or *he dunaton*, which appears in each version of the definition, and which, being grammatically dependent on *entelecheia*, signifies something the very actuality of which is potentiality. The Thomistic blend of actuality and potentiality has the characteristic that, to the extent that it is actual it is not potential and

to the extent that it is potential it is not actual; the hotter the water is, the less is it potentially hot, and the cooler it is, the less is it actually, the more potentially, hot.

The most serious defect in Saint Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's definition is that, like Ross' interpretation, it broadens, dilutes, cheapens, and trivializes the meaning of the word *entelecheia*. An immediate implication of the interpretations of both Thomas and Ross is that whatever happens to be the case right now is an *entelecheia*, as though being at 70 degrees Fahrenheit were an end determined by the nature of water, or as though something which is intrinsically so unstable as the instantaneous position of an arrow in flight deserved to be described by the word which Aristotle everywhere else reserves for complex organized states which persist, which hold out in being against internal and external causes tending to destroy them.

Aristotle's definition of motion applies to any and every motion: the pencil falling to the floor, the white pages in the book turning yellow, the glue in the binding of the book being eaten by insects. Maimonides, Averroes, and Ross, who say that motion is always a transition or passage from potentiality to actuality, must call the being-on-the-floor of the pencil, the being-yellow of the pages, and the crumpled condition of the binding of the book actualities. Thomas, who says that motion is constituted at any moment by the joint presence of actuality and potentiality, is in a still worse position: he must call every position of the pencil on the way to the floor, every color of the pages on the way to being yellow, and every loss of a crumb from the binding an actuality. If these are actualities, then it is no wonder that philosophers such as Descartes rejected Aristotle's account of motion as a useless redundancy, saying no more than that whatever changes, changes into that into which it changes.

We know however that the things Aristotle called actualities are limited in number, and constitute the world in its ordered finitude rather than in its random particularity. The actuality of the adult horse is one, although horses are many and all different from each other. Books and pencils are not actualities at all, even though they

are organized wholes, since their organizations are products of human art, and they maintain themselves not as books and pencils but only as earth. Even the organized content of a book, such as that of the first three chapters of Book Three of Aristotle's *Physics*, does not exist as an actuality, since it is only the new labor of each new reader that gives being to that content, in this case a very difficult labor. By this strict test, the only actualities in the world, that is, the only things which, by their own innate tendencies, maintain themselves in being as organized wholes, seem to be the animals and plants, the ever-the-same orbits of the ever-moving planets, and the universe as a whole. But Aristotle has said that every motion is an *entelecheia*; if we choose not to trivialize the meaning of *entelecheia* to make it applicable to motion, we must deepen our understanding of motion to make it applicable to the meaning of *entelecheia*.

## Outdated revision. What Motion Is Total revamp in 2023

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle argues that if there is a distinction between potentiality and actuality at all, there must be a distinction between two kinds of potentiality. The man with sight, but with his eyes closed, differs from the blind man, although neither is seeing. The first man has the capacity to see, which the second man lacks. There are then potentialities as well as actualities in the world. But when the first man opens his eyes, has he lost the capacity to see? Obviously not; while he is seeing, his capacity to see is no longer merely a potentiality, but is a potentiality which has been put to work. The potentiality to see exists sometimes as active or at-work, and sometimes as inactive or latent. But this example seems to get us no closer to understanding motion, since seeing is just one of those activities which is not a motion. Let us consider, then, a man's capacity to walk across the room. When he is sitting or standing or lying still, his capacity to walk is latent, like the sight of the man with his eyes closed; that capacity nevertheless has real being, distinguishing the man in question from a man who is crippled to the extent of having lost all potential-



ity to walk. When the man is walking across the room, his capacity to walk has been put to work. But while he is walking, what has happened to his capacity to be at the other side of the room, which was also latent before he began to walk? It too is a potentiality which has been put to work by the act of walking. Once he has reached the other side of the room, his potentiality to be there has been actualized in Ross' sense of the term, but while he is walking, his potentiality to be on the other side of the room is not merely latent, and is not yet canceled by, an actuality in the weak sense, the so-called actuality of being on that other side of the room; while he is walking his potentiality to be on the other side of the room is actual just as a potentiality. The actuality of the potentiality to be on the other side of the room, as just that potentiality, is neither more nor less than the walking across the room.

A similar analysis will apply to any motion whatever. The growth of the puppy is not the actualization of its potentiality to be a dog, but the actuality of that potentiality as a potentiality. The falling of the pencil is the actuality of its potentiality to be on the floor, in actuality as just that: as a potentiality to be on the floor. In each case the motion is just the potentiality qua actual and the actuality qua potential. And the sense we thus give to the word *entelecheia* is not at odds with its other uses: a motion is like an animal in that it remains completely and exactly what it is through time. My walking across the room is no more a motion as the last step is being taken than at any earlier point. Every motion is a complex whole, an enduring unity which organizes distinct parts, such as the various positions through which the falling pencil passes. As parts of the motion of the pencil, these positions, though distinct, function identically in the ordered continuity determined by the potentiality of the pencil to be on the floor. Things have being to the extent that they are or are part of determinate wholes, so that to be means to be something, and change has being because it always is or is part of some determinate potentiality, at work and manifest in the world as change.

## Zeno's Paradoxes and Aristotle's Definition of Motion

Consider the application of Aristotle's account of motion to two paradoxes famous in antiquity. Zeno argued in various ways that there is no motion. According to one of his arguments, the arrow in flight is always in some one place, therefore always at rest, and therefore never in motion. We can deduce from Aristotle's definition that Zeno has made the same error, technically called the fallacy of composition, as one who would argue that no animal is alive since its head, when cut off, is not alive, its blood, when drawn out, is not alive, its bones, when removed are not alive, and so on with each part in turn. The second paradox is one attributed to Heraclitus, and taken as proving that there is nothing but motion, that is, no identity, in the world. The saying goes that one cannot step into the same river twice. If the river flows, how can it continue to be itself? But the flux of the river, like the flight of the arrow, is an actuality of just the kind Aristotle formulates in his definition of motion. The river is always the same, as a river, precisely because it is never the same as water. To be a river is to be the always identical actuality of the potentiality of water to be in the sea.

## C

# Aristotle: Metaphysics

*by Joe Sachs*

When Aristotle articulated the central question of the group of writings we know as his *Metaphysics*, he said it was a question that would never cease to raise itself. He was right. He also regarded his own contributions to the handling of that question as belonging to the final phase of responding to it. I think he was right about that too. The *Metaphysics* is one of the most helpful books there is for contending with a question the asking of which is one of the things that makes us human. In our time that question is for the most part hidden behind a wall of sophistry, and the book that could lead us to rediscover it is even more thoroughly hidden behind a maze of misunderstandings.

Paul Shorey, a scholar whose not-too-bad translation of the *Republic* is the Hamilton edition of the *Collected Works of Plato*, has called the *Metaphysics* “a hopeless muddle” not to be made sense of by any “ingenuity of conjecture.” I think it is safe to say that more people have learned important things from Aristotle than from Professor Shorey, but what conclusion other than his can one come to about a work that has two books numbered one, that descends from the sublime description of the life of the divine intellect in its twelfth book to end with two books full of endless quarreling over minor details of the Platonic doctrine of forms, a doctrine Aristotle had already decisively refuted in early parts of the book, those parts, that is, in which he is not defending it? The book was certainly not written as one whole; it was compiled, and once one has granted that, must not one admit that it was compiled badly, crystallizing as it does an incoherent ambivalence toward the teachings of Plato? After three centuries in which no one has much interest in it at all, the *Metaphysics* becomes interesting to nineteenth century scholars just as a historical puzzle: how could such a mess have been put together?

I have learned the most from reading the *Metaphysics* on those oc-

casions when I have adopted the working hypothesis that it was compiled by someone who understood Aristotle better than I or the scholars do, and that that someone (why not call him Aristotle?) thought that the parts made an intelligible whole, best understood when read in that order. My main business here will be to give you some sense of how the *Metaphysics* looks in its wholeness, but the picture I will sketch depends on several hypotheses independent of the main one. One cannot begin to read the *Metaphysics* without two pieces of equipment: one is a set of decisions about how to translate Aristotle's central words. No translator of Aristotle known to me is of any help here; they will all befuddle you, more so in the *Metaphysics* even than in Aristotle's other works. The other piece of equipment, and equally indispensable I think, is some perspective on the relation of the *Metaphysics* to the Platonic dialogues. In this matter the scholars, even the best of them, have shown no imagination at all. In the dialogues, in their view, Plato sets forth a "theory" by putting it into the mouth of Socrates. There is some room for interpretation, but on the whole we are all supposed to know that theory. Aristotle must accept that theory or reject it. If he appears to do both it is because passages written by some Platonist have been inserted into his text, or because things he wrote when he was young and a Platonist were lumped together with other things on similar subjects which he wrote when he was older and his thoughts were different and his own.

### Aristotle and Plato

The Plato we are supposed to know from his dialogues is one who posited that, for every name we give to bodies in the world there is a bodiless being in another world, one while they are many, static while they are changing, perfect while they are altogether distasteful. Not surprisingly, those for whom this is Plato find his doctrine absurd, and welcome an Aristotle whom they find saying that being in its highest form is found in an individual man or horse, that mathematical things are abstractions from sensible bodies, and that, if there

is an ideal man apart from men, in virtue of whom they are all called men, then there must be yet a third kind of man, in virtue of whom the form and the men can have the same name, and yet a fourth, and so on. You can't stop adding new ideal men until you are willing to grant that it was absurd to add the first one, or anything at all beyond just plain men. This is hard-headed, tough-minded Aristotle, not to be intimidated by fancy, mystical talk, living in the world we live in and knowing it is the only world there is. This Aristotle, unfortunately, is a fiction, a projection of our unphilosophic selves. He lives only in a handful of sentences ripped out of their contexts. The true Aristotle indeed takes at face value the world as we find it and all our ordinary opinions about it—takes them, examines them, and finds them wanting. It is the world as we find it which continually, for Aristotle, shows that our ordinary, materialist prejudices are mistaken, and the abandonment of those prejudices shows in turn that the world as we found it was not a possible world, that the world as we must reflect upon it is a much richer world, mysterious and exciting.

Those of you for whom reading the Platonic dialogues was a battle you won by losing, an eye-opening experience from which, if there is no going forward, there is certainly no turning back, should get to know this Aristotle. But you will find standing in your way all those passages in which Aristotle seems to be discussing the dialogues and does so in a shallow way. Each dialogue has a surface in which Socrates speaks in riddles, articulates half-truths which invite qualification and correction, argues from answers given by others as though he shared their opinions, and pretends to be at a loss about everything. Plato never straightens things out for his readers, any more than Socrates does for his hearers. To do so would be to soothe us, to lull us to sleep as soon as we've begun to be distressed by what it feels like to be awake. Platonic writing, like Socratic talk, is designed to awaken and guide philosophic thinking, by presenting, defending, and criticizing plausible responses to important questions. The Platonic-Socratic words have only done their work when we have gone beyond them, but they remain in the dialogues as a collection of

just what they were intended to be — unsatisfactory assertions. Hippocrates Apostle finds 81 places in the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle disagrees with Plato. It is not surprising that Aristotle himself uses Plato's name in almost none of those places. Aristotle is addressing an audience of students who have read the dialogues and is continuing the work of the dialogues. Many, perhaps most, of Aristotle's students would, like scholars today, find theories and answers in Plato's dialogues. Aristotle would not be earning his keep as a teacher of philosophy if he did not force his students beyond that position. Aristotle constantly refers to the dialogues because they are the best and most comprehensive texts he and his students share. Aristotle disagrees with Plato about some things, but less extensively and less deeply than he disagrees with every other author that he names. The *Metaphysics* inevitably looks like an attack on Plato just because Plato's books are so much better than anything left by Thales, Empedocles or anyone else.

My first assumption, then, was that the *Metaphysics* is one book with one complex argument, and my second is that, in cohering within itself, the *Metaphysics* may cohere with the Platonic dialogues. I assume that discussions in the dialogues may be taken as giving flesh to Aristotle's formulations, while they in turn may be taken as giving shape to those discussions. One need only try a very little of this to find a great deal beginning to fall into place. For example, listen to Aristotle in Book I, Chapter 9 of the *Metaphysics*: "the Forms ... are not the causes of motion or of any other change ... And they do not in any way help either towards the knowledge of the other things..or towards their existence ... Moreover, all other things do not come to be from the Forms in any of the usual senses of 'from.' And to say that the Forms are patterns and that the other things participate in them is to use empty words and poetic metaphors." A devastating attack on Plato, is it not? Or is it? Aristotle says that positing the Forms explains no single thing that one wants to know. But doesn't Socrates say in the *Phaedo* that to call beauty itself the cause of beauty in beautiful things is a "safe but stupid answer"—that one must begin with it

but must also move beyond it? Again, everyone knows that the Platonic Socrates claimed that the forms were separate from the things in the sensible world, off by themselves, while Aristotle insisted that the forms were in the things. Recall the *Phaedo* passage just referred to. Does not Socrates say that the cause of heat in a hot thing is not heat itself but fire? Where, then, is the form for Socrates? Aristotle taught that the causes of characteristics of things were to be looked for not in a separate world of forms but in the primary instances of those characteristics right here in the world. This doctrine may seem to be a rejection of Plato's chief postulate, but listen to Aristotle himself explain it in Book II, Chapter 1 of the *Metaphysics*: "of things to which the same predicate belongs, the one to which it belongs in the highest degree is that in virtue of which it belongs also to the others. For example, fire is the hottest of whatever is truly called 'hot', for fire is cause of hotness in the others." Do you hear an echo? Again, Aristotle teaches that form is to be understood as always at work, never static as is the Platonic form, or is it? Do not the Stranger and Theaetetus agree in the *Sophist* that it would be "monstrous and absurd" to deny that life, motion, and soul belong to the intelligible things? Do they not indeed define being as a power to act or be affected? Does not Socrates in the *Theaetetus* entertain the same definition when he construes the world as made up of an infinity of powers to act and be affected? Plato's dialogues do not set forth a theory of forms. They set forth a way to get started with the work of philosophic inquiry, and Aristotle moves altogether within that way. Much in his writings that is a closed book to those who insist on seeing him as Plato's opponent opens up when one lets the dialogues serve as the key.

### Translating Aristotle

Then we shall not hesitate to take whatever light we can find in the dialogues and shine it on Aristotle's text at least to see if anything comes into the light. And this brings me to a third assumption: the English word substance is of no help in understanding Aristotle's word *ousia*.

The central question of the *Metaphysics* is, What is *ousia*? Aristotle claims that it is the same as the question, What is being? and that it is in fact the question everyone who has ever done any philosophy or physics has been asking. Since we do not share Aristotle's language we cannot know what claim he is making until we find a way to translate *ousia*. The translators give us the word substance only because earlier translators and commentators did so, while they in turn did so because still earlier translators into Latin rendered it as *substantia*. Early modern philosophy, in all the European languages, is full of discussions of substance which stem from Latin versions of Aristotle. Though oral traditions keep meanings alive this written tradition has buried Aristotle's meaning irretrievably. We must ignore it, and take our access to the meaning of *ousia* from Plato's use of it, but before we do so a quick look at where the word substance came from may help us bury it.

The earliest Latin translations of Aristotle tried a number of ways of translating *ousia*, but by the fourth century AD, when St. Augustine lived, only two remained in use: *essentia* was made as a formal parallel to *ousia*, from the feminine singular participle of the verb to be plus an abstract noun ending, so that the whole would be roughly equivalent to an English translation being-ness; the second translation, *substantia*, was an attempt to get closer to *ousia* by interpreting Aristotle's use of it as something like "persisting substratum". Augustine, who had no interest in interpreting Aristotle, thought that, while everything in the world possesses *substantia*, a persisting underlying identity, the fullness of being suggested by the word *essentia* could belong to no created thing but only to their creator. Aristotle, who is quite explicit on the point that creation is impossible, believed no such thing, and Augustine didn't think he did. But Augustine's own thinking offered a consistent way to distinguish two Latin words whose use had become muddled. Boethius, in his commentaries on Aristotle, followed Augustine's lead, and hence always translated *ousia* as *substantia*, and his usage seems to have settled the matter. And so a word designed by the anti-Aristotelian Augustine to mean a low and



empty sort of being turns up in our translations of the word whose meaning Aristotle took to be the highest and fullest sense of being. Descartes, in his *Meditations*, uses the word substance only with his tongue in his cheek; Locke explicitly analyzes it as an empty notion of an I-don't-know-what; and soon after the word is laughed out of the vocabulary of serious philosophic endeavor. It is no wonder that the *Metaphysics* ceased to have any influence on living thinking: its heart had been cut out of it by its friends.

### The Meaning of *Ousia* (Being) in Plato

What does *ousia* mean? It is already a quirky, idiomatic word in ordinary use when Plato gets hold of it. By a quirk of our own language one may say indeed that it means substance, but only, I repeat only, in the sense in which a rich man is called a man of substance. You may safely allow your daughter to marry him because you know where he will be and what he will be doing tomorrow and twenty years from now. *Ousia* meant permanent property, real estate, non-transferable goods: not the possessions we are always using up or consuming but those that remain—land, houses, wealth of the kind one never spends since it breeds new wealth with no expense of itself. When Socrates asks Meno for the *ousia* of the bee he is not using a technical philosophical term but a metaphor: what is the estate of a bee that each one inherits simply by being born a bee? A man of substance who has permanent wealth is who he is because of what he owns. A bee is to his permanent and his variable characteristics as a man is to his permanent and his spendable wealth. The metaphor takes a second step when applied to virtue: the varying instances of virtue in a man, a woman, a slave, and the rest must all have some unvarying core which makes them virtues. There must be some single meaning to which we always refer when we pronounce anything a virtue. This is the step Socrates continually insists that Meno must take. But remember, in the slave-boy scene, Socrates twice entices the slave-boy into giving plausible incorrect answers about the side of the double

square. Is there an *ousia* of virtue? Socrates uses the word not as the result of an induction or abstraction or definition, but by stretching an already strained metaphor. People have disposable goods which come and go and *ousiatic* goods which remain; bees have some characteristics in which they differ, and others in which they share; the virtues differ, but are they the same in anything but name? Even if they are, must it be a definition that they share? Not all men have *ousia*. Ordinarily only a few men do. The rest of us work for them, sell to them, marry them, gather in the hills to destroy them, but do not have what they have. Perhaps there are only a few virtues, or only one.

The word *ousia*, as Plato's Socrates handles it, seems to be a double-edged weapon. It explicitly rejects Meno's way of saying what virtue is, but implicitly suggests that the obvious alternative may fail as well. If virtue is not simply a meaningless label used ambiguously for many unconnected things, that does not mean that it must unambiguously name the same content in each of the things it names. Since *ousia* is our metaphor, let us ask what wealth means. If a poor man has a hut and a cow and some stored-up food, are they his wealth? He is certainly not wealthy. On the other hand, King Lear says that "our basest beggars Are in poorest thing superfluous"; no human life is cut so fine as to lack anything beyond what satisfies bare need. The beggar, like the family on welfare, does not have the means to satisfy need, but need not for that reason forego those possessions which give life comfort or continuity. His wealth is derived from the wealth of others. The small farmer may maintain something of the independence a wealthy man enjoys, but one bad year could wipe him out. He will either accumulate enough to become wealthy himself, or his life will remain a small-scale analogy to that of the wealthy. Wealth means, first of all, only that which a few people have and the rest of us lack, but because it means that, it also, at the same time, means secondarily something that all of us possess. There is an ambiguity at work in the meaning of the word "wealth" which is not a matter of a faulty vocabulary and not a matter of language at all: it expresses the way things

are. Wealth of various kinds exists by derivation from and analogy to wealth in the emphatic sense. Indeed Meno, who spontaneously defines virtue by listing virtues, is equally strongly inclined to say that the power to rule over men and possessions is the only virtue there is. He cannot resolve the logical difficulties Socrates raises about his answers, but they are all resolvable. Meno in fact believes that virtue is *ousia* in its simple sense of big money, and that women, children, and slaves can only have virtue derivatively and ambiguously. Socrates' question is one of those infuriatingly ironic games he is always playing. The *ousia* of virtue, according to Meno and Gorgias, is *ousia*.

### *Ousia* in Aristotle

When the word *ousia* turns up in texts of Aristotle, it is this hidden history of its use, and not its etymology, which is determining its meaning. First of all, the word fills a gap in the language of being, since Greek has no word for thing. The two closest equivalents are *to on* and *to chrema*. *To on* simply means whatever is, and includes the color blue, the length two feet, the action walking, and anything at all that can be said to be. *To chrema* means a thing used, used up, spent, or consumed; any kind of possession, namely, that is not *ousia*. *Ousia* holds together, remains, and makes its possessor emphatically somebody. In the vocabulary of money, *ousia* is to *to chremata* as whatever remains constant in a thing is to all theonta that come and go. *Ousia* also carries with it the sense of something that belongs somehow to all but directly and fully only to a few. The word is ready-made to be the theme of Aristotle's investigation of being, because both the word and the investigation were designed by Plato. For Aristotle, the inquiry into the nature of being begins with the observation that being is meant in many ways. It is like Meno's beginning, and it must be subjected to the same Socratic questioning.

Suppose that there is some one core of meaning to which we refer whenever we say that something is. What is its content? Hegel says of being as being:

“it is not to be felt, or perceived by sense, or pictured in imagination...it is mere abstraction...the absolutely negative...just Nothing.”

And isn't he right, as Parmenides was before him? Leave aside all those characteristics in which beings differ, and what is left behind? To Aristotle, this means that being is not a universal or a genus. If being is the comprehensive class to which everything belongs, how does it come to have sub-classes? It would have to be divided with respect to something outside itself. Beings would have to be distinguished by possessing or failing to possess some characteristic, but that characteristic would have to be either a class within being, already separated off from the rest by reference to something prior, or a non-being. Since both are impossible, being must come already divided: the highest genera or ultimate classes of things must be irreducibly many. This is Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, and according to him being means at least eight different things.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

### The Doctrine of Categories

The categories have familiar names: quality, quantity, relation, time, place, action, being-acted upon. The question Socrates asked about things, What is it?, is too broad, since it can be answered truly with respect to any of the categories that apply, and many times in some of them. For example, I'll describe something to you: it is backstage now; it is red; it is three feet high; it is lying down and breathing. I could continue telling you what it is in this fashion for as long as I pleased and you would not know what it is. It is an Irish setter. What is different about that last answer? To be an Irish setter is not to be a quality or quantity or time or action but to be a whole which comprises many ways of being in those categories, and much change and indeterminacy in them. The redness, three-foot-high-ness, respiration and much else cohere in a thing which I have named in its thinghood by calling it an Irish setter. Aristotle calls this way of being *ousia*. Aristotle's logical works reflect upon the claims our speech makes about the world. The principal result of Aristotle's inquiry into the

logical categories of being is, I think, the claim that the thinghood of things in the world is never reducible in our speech to any combination of qualities, quantities, relations, actions, and so on: that *ousia* or thinghood must be a separate category. What happens when I try to articulate the being of a thing such as an Irish setter? I define it as a dog with certain properties. But what then is a dog? It is an animal with certain properties, and an animal is an organism with certain properties, and an organism is a thing with the property life. At each level I meet, as dog, animal, organism, what Aristotle calls secondary *ousia* or secondary thinghood.

I set out to give an account of what makes a certain collection of properties cohere as a certain thing, and I keep separating off some of them and telling you that the rest cohere as a whole. At my last step, when I say that an organism is a living thing, the problem of secondary thinghood is present in its nakedness. Our speech, no matter how scientific, must always leave the question of the hanging-together of things as things a question.

Updated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

### The Central Question of the Metaphysics

Thus the logical inquiries bequeath to the *Metaphysics* its central question, which we are now in a position to translate. The question that was asked of old and will always be asked by anyone who is alive enough to wonder about anything is, What is being? What is a thing? What is the thinghood of things? What makes our world a world of things at all? We are here at the deepest postulate of Aristotelian philosophizing: the integrity of the world as a world and of anything in it which endures as itself for any time at all, is not self-explanatory, is something to be wondered at, is caused.

We are taught that a moving thing, if nothing disturbs it, will continue moving forever. Do you believe that? It is certainly true that a heavy thing in motion is as hard to stop as it was to set in motion, and that we cannot step out of moving automobiles without continuing, for a while, to share their motions. But these are evidences of persis-

tence of motion, not at all the same thing as inertia of motion. There is no evidence of the latter. In principle there cannot be, because we cannot abolish all the world to observe an undisturbed moving thing. There is a powerful and in its way, beautiful, account of the world which assumes inertia, appealing to those experiences which suggest that motion at an unchanging speed is a state no different from that of rest. The hidden premise which leads from that step to the notion of inertia is the assumption that rest is an inert state. If it is not, the same evidence could lead to the conclusion that an unchanging speed is a fragile and vulnerable thing, as unlikely and as hard to come by as an unchanging anything. How can a balloon remain unchanged? It does so only so long as the air inside pushes out no harder and no less hard than the air outside pushes in. Is the air inside the balloon at rest? Can it be at rest as long as it is performing a task? Can the balloon be at rest if the air inside it cannot be? It can certainly remain in a place, like other apparently inert things, say a table. If you pulled the legs from under a table the top would fall, and if you removed the top the legs would fall. Leave them together and leave them alone and they do not move, but is the table at rest? Surely no more so than a pair of arm wrestlers, straining every muscle but unable to budge each other, can be said to be resting. But can't we find an inert thing anywhere in the world? How about a single lump of rock? But if I throw it in the air it will return to find a resting place. It seems to rest only when something blocks it, and if I let it rest on my hand or my head, something will make me uncomfortable. Can the rock be doing nothing? And if we cannot find inertia in a rock, where could it be? An animal is either full of circulating and respirating or it is rotting, and the same seems true of plants. But what in the world is not animal-like, plant-like, rock-like, or table-like? The world contains living and non-living natural beings, and it contains products of human making, and all of them are busy. From Aristotle's wondering and wonderful perspective, everything in the world is busy just continuing to be itself. This is not a "theory" of Aristotle's; it is a way of bringing the world to sight with the questioning intellect awake. Try that way of looking

on for size: the world has nothing to lose for ceasing to be taken for granted. Consider an analogy. Ptolemy is content to say that Venus and Mercury happen to have the same longitudinal period as the sun and that Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn all happen to lag just as far behind the sun in any time as they have moved in anomaly. Copernicus, in the most passionate and convincing part of his argument, shows that these facts can be explained. Lucretius (whom we may substitute for Aristotle's favorite materialist, Empedocles) thought that cats and dogs and giraffes just happened to come about by accumulation, like the sands on the beach. Lucretius' failure to wonder at a giraffe, his reduction of the living to the blind and dead, is, from Aristotle's standpoint, a failure to recognize what is truly one, what is not just a heap, what is genuinely a thing.

The least thoughtful, least alert way of being in the world is to regard everything which remains itself as doing so causelessly, inertly. To seek a cause for the being-as-it-is of any thing is already to be in the grip of the question Aristotle says must always be asked. To seek the causes and sources of the being-as-it-is of everything that is, is to join Aristotle in his Copernican revolution which regards every manifestation of persistence, order, or recurrence as a marvel, an achievement. That everything in the world disclosed to our senses is in a ceaseless state of change, most of us would grant. That the world nevertheless hangs together enough to be experienced at all is a fact so large that we rarely take notice of it. But the two together—change, and a context of persistence out of which change can emerge—force one to acknowledge some non-human cause at work: for whichever side of the world—change or rest, order or dissolution—is simply its uncaused, inert way, the other side must be the result of effort. Something must be at work in the world, hidden to us, visible only in its effects, pervading all that is, and it must be either a destroyer or a preserver.

## The World as Cosmos

That much seems to me to be demonstrable, but the next step is a difficult one to take because the world presents to us two faces: the living and the non-living. The thinghood of living things consists in organized unity, maintained through effort, at work in a variety of activities characteristic of each species; but a rock or a flame or some water or some dirt or some air is a thing in a much different way, unified only by accidental boundaries, indifferent to being divided or heaped together, at work only in some one local motion, up or down. Which is the aberration, life or non-life? For Aristotle the choice need not be made, since the distinction between the two forms of being only results from a confusion. Flesh, blood, bone, and hair would seem inorganic and inanimate if they were not organized into and animated as, say a cat. But earth, air, fire, and water, all of it, is always organized into and animate as the cosmos. The heavens enclose an organized body which has a size, a shape, and a hierarchical structure all of which it maintains by ceaseless, concerted activity. You may think that in believing this, Aristotle betrays an innocence which we cannot recover. But not only Aristotle and Ptolemy, but also Copernicus and Kepler believed the visible heaven to be a cosmos, and not only they, but also, amazingly, Newton himself. In our century, Einstein calculated the volume of the universe, and cosmology has once again become a respectable scientific pursuit. Moderns, for whom the spherical motion of the heavens no longer indicates that the heavens have boundaries, draw the same conclusion from the fact that there is darkness. Anyone who would take the assertion that his outlook is modern to include the denial that there is a cosmos would make a very shallow claim, one having more to do with poetic fashion than with reasoned conviction. The question of the cosmos has not been made obsolete, and the very least we must admit is that the appearance of an inorganic, inanimate nature is not conclusive and would result from our human-sized perspective whether there is a cosmos or not.



If the world is a cosmos, then it is one more instance of the kind of being that belongs to every animal and plant in it. And if that is so, there is nothing left to display any other kind of being. Try it: take inventory. What is there? The color red is, only if it is the color of some thing. Color itself is, only if it is some one color, and the color of a thing. The relation “taller than” is, only if it is of two or more things. What has being but is not a thing must depend on some thing for its being. But on the other hand a mere thing, mere matter as we call it, using the word differently than Aristotle ever does, is an impossibility too. Relatively inert, rock-like being is the being of a part of what comes only in wholes—cosmos, plant, or animal. And all man-made things must borrow their material from natural things and their very holding-together from the natural tendencies of the parts of the cosmos. To be is to be alive; all other being is borrowed being. Any comprehensive account of things must come to terms with the special being of animals and plants: for Lucretius, living things are not marvels but a problem which he solves by dissolving them into the vast sea of inert purposelessness. For Aristotle, as for Plato, wonder is not a state to be dissolved but a beckoning to be followed, and for Aristotle the wonderful animals and plants point the way to being itself, to that being qua being which is the source of all being, for we see it in the world in them and only in them.

Thus when Aristotle begins in Book 7 of the *Metaphysics* to ask what makes a thing a thing, he narrows the question to apply only to living things. All other being is, in one way or another, their effect. He is asking for their cause. At that point, his inquiry into the causes and sources of being itself, simply as being, merges with the inquiry in Book 2 of his *Physics*, where the question is, What is nature? The answer, as well, must be the same, and just as Aristotle concludes that nature is form, he concludes that being is form. Does the material of an animal make it what it is? Yes, but it cannot be the entire or even principal cause. If there is anything that is not simply the sum of its parts, it is an animal. It is continually making itself, by snatching suitable material from its environment and discarding unsuitable mate-

rial. Add some sufficiently unsuitable material, like arsenic, and the sum of parts remains, but the animal ceases to be. The whole which is not accounted for by the enumeration of its parts is the topic of the last section of the *Theaetetus*, where Socrates offers several playful images of that kind of being: a wagon, a melody, the number six, and the example discussed at most length, which Aristotle borrows, the syllable.

### Forms, Wholeness, and Thinghood

Aristotle insists that the syllable is never the sum of its letters. Socrates, of course, argues both sides of the question, and *Theaetetus* agrees both times. Let's try it ourselves. Take the word "put", p-u-t. voice the letters separately, as well as you can, and say them in succession, as rapidly as you can. I think you will find that, as long as you attempt to add sound to sound, you will have a grunt surrounded by two explosions of breath. When you voice the whole syllable as one sound, the a is already present when you begin sounding the p, and the t sound is already shaping the u. Try to pronounce the first two letters and add the third as an afterthought, and you will get two sounds. I have tried all this, and think it's true, but you must decide for yourself. Aristotle says that the syllable is the letters, plus something else besides; Socrates calls the something else a form, an *eidos*, while Aristotle calls it the thinghood of the thing. When I pronounce the syllable "put", I must have in mind the whole syllable in its wholeness before I can voice any of its parts in such a way as to make them come out parts of it. Now a syllable is about as transitory a being as one could imagine: it is made of breath, and it is gone as soon as it is uttered. But a craftsman works the same way as a maker of syllables. If he simply begins nailing and gluing together pieces of wood, metal, and leather, he is not likely to end up with a wagon; to do so, he must have the whole shape and work of the wagon in mind in each of his joinings and fittings. Even so, when he is finished, what he has produced is only held together by nails and glue. As soon as it is made,

the wagon begins falling apart, and it does so the more, the more it is used. All the more perplexing then, is the animal or plant. It is perpetually being made and re-made after the form of its species, yet there is no craftsman at work on it. It is a composite of material and form, yet it is the material in it that is constantly being used up and replaced, while the form remains intact. The form is not in any artist's imagination, nor can it be an accidental attribute of its material. In the *Physics*, nature was traced back to form, and in the first half of the *Metaphysics* all being is traced to the same source. But what is form? Where is it? Is it a cause or is it caused? Most important of all, does it have being alone, on its own, apart from bodies? Does it emerge from the world of bodies, or is a body a thing impossible to be unless a form is somehow already present for it to have? Or is there something specious about the whole effort to make form either secondary to material or primary? Are they perhaps equal and symmetrical aspects of being, inseparable, unranked? Just as ultimate or first material, without any characteristics supplied by form, cannot be, why should not a pure form, not the form of anything, be regarded as its opposite pole and as equally impossible? Or have we perhaps stumbled on a nest of unanswerable questions? If form is the first principle of the science of physics, might it not be a first principle simply, behind which one cannot get, to which one may appeal for explanation but about which one cannot inquire? Aristotle says that if there were not things apart from bodies, physics would be first philosophy. But he calls physics second philosophy, and half the *Metaphysics* lies on the other side of the questions we have been posing. It consists in the uncovering of beings not disclosed to our senses, beings outside of and causal with respect to what we naively and inevitably take to be the whole world.

Aristotle marks the center and turning point of the *Metaphysics* with these words: "One must inquire about (form), for this is the greatest impasse. Now it is agreed that some of what is perceptible are things, and so one must search first among these. For it is preferable to proceed toward what is better known. For learning occurs in

all things in this way: through what is by nature less known toward the things more known. And just as in matters of action the task is to make the things that are good completely be good for each person, from out of the things that seem good to each, so also the task here is, from out of the things more known to one, to make the things known by nature known to him. Now what is known and primary to each of us is often known slightly, and has little or nothing of being; nevertheless, from the things poorly known but known to one, one must try to know the things that are known completely.” (1029a 33—b 11) The forest is dark, but one cannot get out of it without passing through it, carefully, calmly, attentively. It will do no good to move in circles. The passage just quoted connects with the powerful first sentence of the *Metaphysics*: “All human beings are by nature stretched out toward a state of knowing.” Our natural condition is one of frustration, of being unable to escape a task of which the goal is out of reach and out of sight. Aristotle here likens our frustration as theoretical beings to our condition as practical beings: unhappiness has causes—we achieve it by seeking things—and if we can discover what we were seeking we might be able to make what is good ours. Similarly, if we cannot discern the goal of wisdom, we can at least begin examining the things that stand in our way.

### The Being of Sensible Things

The next section of the *Metaphysics*, from Book 7, Chapter 4 through Book 9, is the beginning of an intense forward motion. These books are a painstaking clarification of the being of the things disclosed to our senses. It is here that Aristotle most heavily uses the vocabulary that is most his own, and everything he accomplishes in these books depends on the self-evidence of the meanings of these expressions. It is these books especially which Latinizing translators turn into gibberish. Words like essence, individual, and actuality must either be vague or be given arbitrary definitions. The words Aristotle uses are neither vague nor are they conceptual constructions; they

call forth immediate, direct experiences which one must have at hand to see what Aristotle is talking about. They are not the kinds of words that books can explain; they are words of the kind that people must share before there can be books. That is why understanding a sentence of Aristotle is so often something that comes suddenly, in an insight that seems discontinuous from the puzzlement that preceded it. It is simply a matter of directing one's gaze. We must try to make sense of Books 7-9 because they are crucial to the intention of the *Metaphysics*. Aristotle has an argument independent of those books, which he makes in Book 8 of the *Physics* and uses again in Book 12 of the *Metaphysics* that there must be an immortal, unchanging being, ultimately responsible for all wholeness and orderliness in the sensible world. And he is able to go on in Book 12 to discover a good deal about that being. One could, then, skip from the third chapter of Book 7 to Book 12, and, having traced being to form, trace form back to its source. Aristotle would have done that if his whole intention had been to establish that the sensible world has a divine source, but had he done so he would have left no foundation for reversing the dialectical motion of his argument to understand the things in the world on the basis of their sources. Books 7-9 provide that foundation.

The constituents of the world we encounter with our senses are not sensations. The sensible world is not a mosaic of sensible qualities continuous with or adjacent to one another, but meets our gaze organized into things which stand apart, detached from their surroundings. I can indicate one of them to you by the mere act of pointing, because it has its own boundaries and holds them through time. I need not trace out the limits of the region of the visual field to which I refer your attention, because the thing thrusts itself out from, holds itself aloof from what is visible around it, making that visible residue mere background. My pointing therefore has an object, and it is an object because it keeps being itself, does not change randomly or promiscuously like Proteus, but holds together sufficiently to remain the very thing at which I pointed. This way of being, Aristotle calls being a "this". If I want to point out to you just this red of just this region of

this shirt, I will have to do a good deal more than just point. A “this” as Aristotle speaks of it is what comes forth to meet the act of pointing, is that for which I need not point and say “not that or that or that but just this,” but need do nothing but point, since it effects its own separation from what it is not.

A table, a chair, a rock, a painting—each is a this, but a living thing is a this in a special way. It is the author of its own this-ness. It appropriates from its surroundings, by eating and drinking and breathing, what it organizes into and holds together as itself. This work of self-separation from its environment is never finished but must go on without break if the living thing is to be at all. Let us consider as an example of a living this, some one human being. Today his skin is redder than usual, because he has been in the sun; there is a cut healing on his hand because he chopped onions two days ago; he is well educated, because, five years ago, his parents had the money and taste to send him to Harvard. All these details, and innumerable many more, belong to this human being. But in Aristotle’s way of speaking, the details I have named are incidental to him: he is not sunburned, wounded on the hand, or Harvard-educated because he is a human being. He is each of those things because his nature bumped into that of something else and left him with some mark, more or less intended, more or less temporary, but in any case aside from what he is on his own, self-sufficiently. What he is on his own, as a result of the activity that makes him be at all, is: two-legged, sentient, breathing, and all the other things he is simply as a human being. There is a difference between all the things he happens to be and the things he necessarily is on account of what he is. Aristotle formulates the latter, the kind of being that belongs to a thing not by happenstance but inevitably, as the “what it kept on being in the course of being at all” for a human being, or a duck, or a rosebush. The phrase to *en einai* is Aristotle’s answer to the Socratic question, *ti esti?* What is a giraffe? Find some way of articulating all the things that every giraffe always is, and you will have defined the giraffe. What each of them is throughout its life, is the product at any instant for any one of them,

of the activity that is causing it to be. That means that the answer to the question “What is a giraffe?”, and the answer to the question “What is this giraffe?” are the same. Stated generally, Aristotle’s claim is that a this, which is in the world on its own, self-sufficiently, has a what-it-always-was-to-be, and is just its what-it-always-was-to-be. This is not a commonplace thought, but it is a comprehensible one; compare it with the translators’ version, “a per-se individual is identical with its essence.”

### Matter and Form in Aristotle

The living thing as it is present to my looking seems to be richer, fuller, more interesting than it can possibly be when it is reduced to a definition in speech, but this is a confusion. All that belongs to the living thing that is not implied by the definition of its species belongs to it externally, as a result of its accidental interactions with the other things in its environment. The definition attempts to penetrate to what it is in itself, by its own activity of making itself be whole and persist. There is nothing fuller than the whole, nothing richer than the life which is the winning and expressing of that wholeness, nothing more interesting than the struggle it is always waging unnoticed, a whole world of priority deeper and more serious than the personal history it must drag along with the species-drama it is constantly en-acting. The reduction of the living thing to what defines it is like the reduction of a rectangular block of marble to the form of Hermes: less is more. Strip away the accretion of mere facts, and what is left is that without which even those facts could not have gained admittance into the world: the forever vulnerable foundation of all that is in the world, the shaping, ruling form, the incessant maintenance of which is the only meaning of the phrase self-preservation. Indeed even the bodily material of the living thing is present in the world only as active, only as forming itself into none of the other things it might have been but just this one thoroughly defined animal or plant. And this, finally, is Aristotle’s answer to the question, What is

form? Form is material at work according to a persisting definiteness of kind. Aristotle's definition of the soul in *De Anima*, soul is the being-at-work-staying-the-same of an organized body, becomes the definition of form in Book 8 of the *Metaphysics*, and is, at that stage of the inquiry, his definition of being.

Book 9 spells out the consequences of this clarification of form. Form cannot be derivative from or equivalent with material, because material on its own must be mere possibility. It cannot enter the world until it has achieved definiteness by getting to work in some way, and it cannot even be thought except as the possibility of some form. Books 7-9 demonstrate that materiality is a subordinate way of being. The living body does not bring form into the world, it must receive form to come into the world. Form is primary and causal, and the original source of all being in the sensible world must be traced beyond the sensible world, to that which confers unity on forms themselves. If forms had no integrity of their own, the world and things could not hang together and nothing would be. At the end of Book 9, the question of being has become the question of formal unity, the question, What makes each form one? In the woven texture of the organization of the *Metaphysics*, what comes next, at the beginning of Book 10, is a laying out of all the ways things may be one. Glue, nails, and rope are of no use for the problem at hand, nor, any longer, are natural shapes and motions, which have been shown to have a derivative sort of unity. All that is left in Aristotle's array of possibilities is the unity of that of which the thinking or the knowing is one.

This thread of the investigation, which we may call for convenience the biological one, converges in Book 12 with a cosmological one. The animal and plant species take care of their own perpetuation by way of generation, but what the parents pass on to the offspring is an identity which must hold together thanks to a timeless activity of thinking. The cosmos holds together in a different way: it seems to be literally and directly eternal by way of a ceaseless repetition of patterns of locomotion. An eternal motion cannot result from some other motion,



but must have an eternal, unchanging cause. Again, Aristotle lays out all the possibilities. What can cause a motion without undergoing a motion? A thing desired can, and so can a thing thought. Can you think of a third? Aristotle says that there are only these two, and that, moreover, the first reduces to the second. When I desire an apple it is the fleshy apple and not the thought of it toward which I move, but it is the thought or imagining of the fleshy apple that moves me toward the apple. The desired object causes motion only as an object of thought. Just as the only candidate left to be the source of unity of form among the animals and plants was the activity of thinking, so again the only possible unmoved source for the endless circlings of the stars is an eternal activity of thinking. Because it is deathless and because the heavens and nature and all that is depend upon it, Aristotle calls this activity God. Because it is always altogether at work, nothing that is thought by it is ever outside or apart from it: it is of thinking, simply. Again, because it is always altogether at work, nothing of it is ever left over outside of or apart from its work of thinking: it is thinking, simply. It is the pure holding-together of the pure holdable-together, activity active, causality caused. The world is, in all its being most deeply, and in its deepest being wholly, intelligible. So far is Aristotle from simply assuming the intelligibility of things, that he requires twelve books of argument to account for it. All being is dependent on the being of things; among things, the artificial are derived from the natural; because there is a cosmos, all natural things have being as living things; because all living things depend on either a species-identity or an eternal locomotion, there must be a self-subsisting activity of thinking.

The fact that there are a Book 13 and a Book 14 to the *Metaphysics* indicates that, in Aristotle's view, the question of being has not yet undergone its last transformation. With the completion of Book 12, the question of being becomes: What is the definition of the world? What is the primary intelligible structure that implies all that is permanent in the world? Books 13 and 14 of the *Metaphysics* examine the only two answers that anyone has ever proposed to that question

outside of myths. They are: that the divine thinking is a direct thinking of all the animal and plant species, and that it is a thinking of the mathematical sources of things. The conclusions of these two books are entirely negative. The inquiry into being itself cannot come to rest by transferring to the divine source the species-identities which constitute the world, nor can they be derived from their mathematical aspects. Aristotle's final transformation of the question of being is into a question. Books 13 and 14 are for the sake of rescuing the question as one which does not and cannot yield to a solution but insists on being faced and thought directly. Repeatedly, through the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that the deepest things must be simple. One cannot speak the truth about them, nor even ask, a question about them, because they have no parts. They have no articulation in speech, but only contact with that which thinks. The ultimate question of the *Metaphysics*, which is at once What is all being at its roots? and What is the life of God?, and toward which the whole *Metaphysics* has been designed to clear the way, takes one beyond the limits of speech itself. The argument of the *Metaphysics* begins from our direct encounter with the sensible world, absorbs that world completely into speech, and carries its speech to the threshold of that on which world and speech depend. The shape of the book is a zig-zag, repeatedly encountering the inexpressible simple things and veering away. By climbing to that life which is the being-at-work of thinking, and then ending with a demonstration of what that life is not, Aristotle leaves us to disclose that life to ourselves in the only way possible, in the privacy of lived thinking. The *Metaphysics* is not an incomplete work: it is the utmost gift that a master of words can give.

## D

### Aristotle: Ethics

*by Joe Sachs*

Standard interpretations of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* usually maintain that Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) emphasizes the role of habit in conduct. It is commonly thought that virtues, according to Aristotle, are habits and that the good life is a life of mindless routine.

These interpretations of Aristotle's ethics are the result of imprecise translations from the ancient Greek text. Aristotle uses the word *hexis* to denote moral virtue. But the word does not merely mean passive habituation. Rather, *hexis* is an active condition, a state in which something must actively hold itself.

Virtue, therefore, manifests itself in action. More explicitly, an action counts as virtuous, according to Aristotle, when one holds oneself in a stable equilibrium of the soul, in order to choose the action knowingly and for its own sake. This stable equilibrium of the soul is what constitutes character.

Similarly, Aristotle's concept of the mean is often misunderstood. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle repeatedly states that virtue is a mean. The mean is a state of clarification and apprehension in the midst of pleasures and pains that allows one to judge what seems most truly pleasant or painful. This active state of the soul is the condition in which all the powers of the soul are at work in concert. Achieving good character is a process of clearing away the obstacles that stand in the way of the full efficacy of the soul.

For Aristotle, moral virtue is the only practical road to effective action. What the person of good character loves with right desire and thinks of as an end with right reason must first be perceived as beautiful. Hence, the virtuous person sees truly and judges rightly, since beautiful things appear as they truly are only to a person of good character. It is only in the middle ground between habits of acting and principles of action that the soul can allow right desire and right reason to make their appearance, as the direct and natural response of a

free human being to the sight of the beautiful.

## A Habit

In many discussions, the word “habit” is attached to the Ethics as though it were the answer to a multiple-choice question on a philosophy achievement test. Hobbes’ *Leviathan*? Self-preservation. Descartes’ *Meditations*? Mind-body problem. Aristotle’s *Ethics*? Habit. A faculty seminar I attended a few years ago was mired in the opinion that Aristotle thinks the good life is one of mindless routine. More recently, I heard a lecture in which some very good things were said about Aristotle’s discussion of choice, yet the speaker still criticized him for praising habit when so much that is important in life depends on openness and spontaneity. Can it really be that Aristotle thought life is lived best when thinking and choosing are eliminated?

On its face this belief makes no sense. It is partly a confusion between an effect and one of its causes. Aristotle says that, for the way our lives turn out, “it makes no small difference to be habituated this way or that way straight from childhood, but an enormous difference, or rather all the difference.” (1103b, 23-5) Is this not the same as saying those lives are nothing but collections of habits? If this is what sticks in your memory, and leads you to that conclusion, then the cure is easy, since habits are not the only effects of habituation, and a thing that makes all the difference is indispensable but not necessarily the only cause of what it produces.

We will work through this thought in a moment, but first we need to notice that another kind of influence may be at work when you recall what Aristotle says about habit, and another kind of medicine may be needed against it. Are you thinking that no matter how we analyze the effects of habituation, we will never get around the fact that Aristotle plainly says that virtues are habits? The reply to that difficulty is that he doesn’t say that at all. He says that moral virtue is a *hexis*. Hippocrates, Aristotle, and others, translate *hexis* as habit, but that is not at all what it means. The trouble, as so often in these

matters, is the intrusion of Latin. The Latin *habitus* is a perfectly good translation of the Greek *hexis*, but if that detour gets us to *habit* in English we have lost our way. In fact, a *hexis* is pretty much the opposite of a *habit*.

The word *hexis* becomes an issue in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Socrates makes the point that knowledge can never be a mere passive possession, stored in the memory the way birds can be put in cages. The word for that sort of possession, *ktêsis*, is contrasted with *hexis*, the kind of having-and-holding that is never passive but always at work right now. Socrates thus suggests that, whatever knowledge is, it must have the character of a *hexis* in requiring the effort of concentrating or paying attention. A *hexis* is an active condition, a state in which something must actively hold itself, and that is what Aristotle says a moral virtue is.

Some translators make Aristotle say that virtue is a disposition, or a settled disposition. This is much better than calling it a "habit," but still sounds too passive to capture his meaning. In *De Anima*, when Aristotle speaks of the effect produced in us by an object of sense perception, he says this is not a disposition (*diathesis*) but a *hexis*. (417b, 15-17) His whole account of sensing and knowing depends on this notion that receptivity to what is outside us depends on an active effort to hold ourselves ready. In Book VII of the *Physics*, Aristotle says much the same thing about the way children start to learn: they are not changed, he says, nor are they trained or even acted upon in any way, but they themselves get straight into an active state when time or adults help them settle down out of their native condition of disorder and distraction. (247b, 17-248a, 6) Curtis Wilson once delivered a lecture at St. John's College, in which he asked his audience to imagine what it would be like if we had to teach children to speak by deliberately and explicitly imparting everything they had to do. We somehow set them free to speak, and give them a particular language to do it in, but they—Mr. Wilson called them "little geniuses"—they do all the work.

Everyone at St. John's has thought about the kind of learning that

does not depend on the authority of the teacher and the memory of the learner. In the *Meno* it is called “recollection.” Aristotle says that it is an active knowing that is always already at work in us. In Plato’s image we draw knowledge up out of ourselves; in Aristotle’s metaphor we settle down into knowing. In neither account is it possible for anyone to train us, as Gorgias has habituated Meno into the mannerisms of a knower. Habits can be strong but they never go deep. Authentic knowledge does engage the soul in its depths, and with this sort of knowing Aristotle links virtue. In the passage cited from Book VII of the *Physics*, he says that, like knowledge, virtues are not imposed on us as alterations of what we are; that would be, he says, like saying we alter a house when we put a roof on it. In the *Categories*, knowledge and virtue are the two examples he gives of what *hexis* means (8b, 29); there he says that these active states belong in the general class of dispositions, but are distinguished by being lasting and durable. The word “disposition” by itself he reserves for more passive states, easy to remove and change, such as heat, cold, and sickness.

In the *Ethics*, Aristotle identifies moral virtue as a *hexis* in Book II, chapter 4. He confirms this identity by reviewing the kinds of things that are in the soul, and eliminating the feelings and impulses to which we are passive and the capacities we have by nature, but he first discovers what sort of thing a virtue is by observing that the goodness is never in the action but only in the doer. This is an enormous claim that pervades the whole of the *Ethics*, and one that we need to stay attentive to. No action is good or just or courageous because of any quality in itself. Virtue manifests itself in action, Aristotle says, only when one acts while holding oneself in a certain way. This is where the word *hexis* comes into the account, from *pecho*, the stance in which one holds oneself when acting. The indefinite adverb is immediately explained: an action counts as virtuous when and only when one holds oneself in a stable equilibrium of the soul, in order to choose the action knowingly and for its own sake. I am translating as “in a stable equilibrium” the words *bebaiōs kai ametakinētos*; the first of these adverbs means stably or after having taken a stand, while the

second does not mean rigid or immovable, but in a condition from which one can't be moved all the way over into a different condition. It is not some inflexible adherence to rules or duty or precedent that is conveyed here, but something like a Newton's wheel weighted below the center, or one of those toys that pops back upright whenever a child knocks it over.

This stable equilibrium of the soul is what we mean by having character. It is not the result of what we call "conditioning." There is a story told about B. F. Skinner, the psychologist most associated with the idea of behavior modification, that a class of his once trained him to lecture always from one corner of the room, by smiling and nodding whenever he approached it, but frowning and faintly shaking their heads when he moved away from it. That is the way we acquire habits. We slip into them unawares, or let them be imposed on us, or even impose them on ourselves. A person with ever so many habits may still have no character. Habits make for repetitive and predictable behavior, but character gives moral equilibrium to a life. The difference is between a foolish consistency wholly confined to the level of acting, and a reliability in that part of us from which actions have their source. Different as they are, though, character and habit sound to us like things that are linked, and in Greek they differ only by the change of an epsilon to an eta, making *Íthos* from *ethos*.

We are finally back to Aristotle's claim that character, *Íthos*, is produced by habit, *ethos*. It should now be clear though, that the habit cannot be any part of that character, and that we must try to understand how an active condition can arise as a consequence of a passive one, and why that active condition can only be attained if the passive one has come first. So far we have arranged three notions in a series, like rungs of a ladder: at the top are actives states, such as knowledge, the moral virtues, and the combination of virtues that makes up a character; the middle rung, the mere dispositions, we have mentioned only in passing to claim that they are too shallow and changeable to capture the meaning of virtue; the bottom rung is the place of the habits, and includes biting your nails, twisting your

hair, saying “like” between every two words, and all such passive and mindless conditions. What we need to notice now is that there is yet another rung of the ladder below the habits.

We all start out life governed by desires and impulses. Unlike the habits, which are passive but lasting conditions, desires and impulses are passive and momentary, but they are very strong. Listen to a child who can’t live without some object of appetite or greed, or who makes you think you are a murderer if you try to leave her alone in a dark room. How can such powerful influences be overcome? To expect a child to let go of the desire or fear that grips her may seem as hopeless as Aristotle’s example of training a stone to fall upward, were it not for the fact that we all know that we have somehow, for the most part, broken the power of these tyrannical feelings. We don’t expel them altogether, but we do get the upper hand; an adult who has temper tantrums like those of a two-year old has to live in an institution, and not in the adult world. But the impulses and desires don’t weaken; it is rather the case that we get stronger.

Aristotle doesn’t go into much detail about how this happens, except to say that we get the virtues by working at them: in the give-and-take with other people, some become just, others unjust; by acting in the face of frightening things and being habituated to be fearful or confident, some become brave and others cowardly; and some become moderate and gentle, others spoiled and bad-tempered, by turning around from one thing and toward another in the midst of desires and passions. (1103 b, 1422) He sums this up by saying that when we are at-work in a certain way, an active state results. This innocent sentence seems to me to be one of the lynch-pins that hold together the *Ethics*, the spot that marks the transition from the language of habit to the language appropriate to character. If you read the sentence in Greek, and have some experience of Aristotle’s other writings, you will see how loaded it is, since it says that a *hexis* depends upon an *energeia*. The latter word, that can be translated as being-at-work, cannot mean mere behavior, however repetitive and constant it may be. It is this idea of being-at-work, which is central to



all of Aristotle's thinking, that makes intelligible the transition out of childhood and into the moral stature that comes with character and virtue. (See Aristotle: Motion for as discussion *energeia*.)

The moral life can be confused with the habits approved by some society and imposed on its young. We at St. John's College still stand up at the beginning and end of Friday-night lectures because Stringfellow Barr—one of the founders of the current curriculum — always stood when anyone entered or left a room. What he considered good breeding is for us mere habit; that becomes obvious when some student who stood up at the beginning of a lecture occasionally gets bored and leaves in the middle of it. In such a case the politeness was just for show, and the rudeness is the truth. Why isn't all habituation of the young of this sort? When a parent makes a child repeatedly refrain from some desired thing, or remain in some frightening situation, the child is beginning to act as a moderate or brave person would act, but what is really going on within the child? I used to think that it must be the parent's approval that was becoming stronger than the child's own impulse, but I was persuaded by others in a study group that this alone would be of no lasting value, and would contribute nothing to the formation of an active state of character. What seems more likely is that parental training is needed only for its negative effect, as a way of neutralizing the irrational force of impulses and desires.

We all arrive on the scene already habituated, in the habit, that is, of yielding to impulses and desires, of instantly slackening the tension of pain or fear or unfulfilled desire in any way open to us, and all this has become automatic in us before thinking and choosing are available to us at all. This is a description of what is called "human nature," though in fact it precedes our access to our true natural state, and blocks that access. This is why Aristotle says that "the virtues come about in us neither by nature nor apart from nature" (1103a, 24-5). What we call "human nature," and some philosophers call the "state of nature," is both natural and unnatural; it is the passive part of our natures, passively reinforced by habit. Virtue has the aspect of

a second nature, because it cannot develop first, nor by a continuous process out of our first condition. But it is only in the moral virtues that we possess our primary nature, that in which all our capacities can have their full development. The sign of what is natural, for Aristotle, is pleasure, but we have to know how to read the signs. Things pleasant by nature have no opposite pain and no excess, because they set us free to act simply as what we are (1154b, 15-21), and it is in this sense that Aristotle calls the life of virtue pleasant in its own right, in itself (1099a, 6-7, 16-17). A mere habit of acting contrary to our inclinations cannot be a virtue, by the infallible sign that we don't like it.

Our first or childish nature is never eradicated, though, and this is why Aristotle says that our nature is not simple, but also has in it something different that makes our happiness assailable from within, and makes us love change even when it is for the worse. (1154b, 21-32) But our souls are brought nearest to harmony and into the most durable pleasures only by the moral virtues. And the road to these virtues is nothing fancy, but is simply what all parents begin to do who withhold some desired thing from a child, or prevent it from running away from every irrational source of fear. They make the child act, without virtue, as though it had virtue. It is what Hamlet describes to his mother, during a time that is out of joint, when a son must try to train his parent (III, iv, 181-9):

Assume a virtue if you have it not.  
That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat  
Of habits evil, is angel yet in this,  
That to the use of actions fair and good  
He likewise gives a frock or livery,  
That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight,  
And that shall lend a kind of easiness  
To the next abstinence; the next more easy;  
For use almost can change the stamp of nature...

Hamlet is talking to a middle-aged woman about lust, but the pattern applies just as well to five-year-olds and candy. We are in a position

to see that it is not the stamp of nature that needs to be changed but the earliest stamp of habit. We can drop Hamlet's "almost" and rid his last quoted line of all paradox by seeing that the reason we need habit is to change the stamp of habit. A habit of yielding to impulse can be counteracted by an equal and opposite habit. This second habit is no virtue, but only a mindless inhibition, an automatic repressing of all impulses. Nor do the two opposite habits together produce virtue, but rather a state of neutrality. Something must step into the role previously played by habit, and Aristotle's use of the word *energeia* suggests that this happens on its own, with no need for anything new to be imposed. Habituation thus does not stifle nature, but rather lets nature make its appearance. The description from Book VII of the Physics of the way children begin to learn applies equally well to the way human character begins to be formed: we settle down, out of the turmoil of childishness, into what we are by nature.

We noticed earlier that habituation is not the end but the beginning of the progress toward virtue. The order of states of the soul given by Aristotle went from habit to being-at-work to the hexis or active state that can give the soul moral stature. If the human soul had no being-at-work, no inherent and indelible activity, there could be no such moral stature, but only customs. But early on, when first trying to give content to the idea of happiness, Aristotle asks if it would make sense to think that a carpenter or shoemaker has work to do, but a human being as such is inert. His reply, of course, is that nature has given us work to do, in default of which we are necessarily unhappy, and that work is to put into action the power of reason. (1097b, 24-1098a, 4) Note please that he does not say that everyone must be a philosopher, nor even that human life is constituted by the activity of reason, but that our work is to bring the power of logos forward into action. Later, Aristotle makes explicit that the irrational impulses are no less human than reasoning is. (1111 b, 1-2) His point is that, as human beings, our desires need not be mindless and random, but can be transformed by thinking into choices, that is desires informed by deliberation. (1113a, 11) The characteristic human way of being-at-work

is the threefold activity of seeing an end, thinking about means to it, and choosing an action. Responsible human action depends upon the combining of all the powers of the soul: perception, imagination, reasoning, and desiring. These are all things that are at work in us all the time. Good parental training does not produce them, or mold them, or alter them, but sets them free to be effective in action. This is the way in which, according to Aristotle, despite the contributions of parents, society, and nature, we are the co-authors of the active states of our own souls (1114b, 23-4).

## The Mean

Now this discussion has shown that habit does make all the difference to our lives without being the only thing shaping those lives and without being the final form they take. The same discussion also points to a way to make some sense of one of the things that has always puzzled me most in the *Ethics*, the insistence that moral virtue is always in its own nature a mean condition. Quantitative relations are so far from any serious human situation that they would seem to be present only incidentally or metaphorically, but Aristotle says that “by its thinghood and by the account that unfolds what it is for it to be, virtue is a mean.” (1107a, 7-8) This invites such hopeless shallowness as in the following sentences from a recent article in the journal *Ancient Philosophy* (Vol. 8, pp. 101-4): “To illustrate... 0 marks the mean (e.g. Courage);... Cowardice is -3 while Rashness is 3... In our number language... ‘Always try to lower the absolute value of your vice.’ ” This scholar thinks achieving courage is like tuning in a radio station on an analog dial. Those who do not sink this low might think instead that Aristotle is praising a kind of mediocrity, like that found in those who used to go to college to get “gentlemen’s C’s.” But what sort of courage could be found in these timid souls, whose only aim in life is to blend so well into their social surroundings that virtue can never be chosen in preference to a fashionable vice? Aristotle points out twice that every moral virtue is an extreme (1107a, 8-9, 22-4), but he

keeps that observation secondary to an over-riding sense in which it is a mean.

Could there be anything at all to the notion that we hone in on a virtue from two sides? There is a wonderful image of this sort of thing in the novel *Nop's Trials* by Donald McCaig. The protagonist is not a human being, but a border collie named Nop. The author describes the way the dog has to find the balance point, the exact distance behind a herd of sheep from which he can drive the whole herd forward in a coherent mass. When the dog is too close, the sheep panic and run off in all directions; when he is too far back, the sheep ignore him, and turn in all directions to graze. While in motion, a good working dog keeps adjusting his pace to maintain the exact mean position that keeps the sheep stepping lively in the direction he determines. Now working border collies are brave, tireless, and determined. They have been documented as running more than a hundred miles in a day, and they love their work. There is no question that they display virtue, but it is not human virtue and not even of the same form. Some human activities do require the long sustained tension a sheep dog is always holding on to, an active state stretched to the limit, constantly and anxiously kept in balance. Running on a tightrope might capture the same flavor. But constantly maintained anxiety is not the kind of stable equilibrium Aristotle attributes to the virtuous human soul.

I think we may have stumbled on the way that human virtue is a mean when we found that habits were necessary in order to counteract other habits. This does accord with the things Aristotle says about straightening warped boards, aiming away from the worse extreme, and being on guard against the seductions of pleasure. (1109a, 30-b9) The habit of abstinence from bodily pleasure is at the opposite extreme from the childish habit of yielding to every immediate desire. Alone, either of them is a vice, according to Aristotle. The glutton, the drunkard, the person enslaved to every sexual impulse obviously cannot ever be happy, but the opposite extremes, which Aristotle groups together as a kind of numbness or denial of the senses (1107b, 8), miss

the proper relation to bodily pleasure on the other side. It may seem that temperance in relation to food, say, depends merely on determining how many ounces of chocolate mousse to eat. Aristotle's example of Milo the wrestler, who needs more food than the rest of us do to sustain him, seems to say this, but I think that misses the point. The example is given only to show that there is no single action that can be prescribed as right for every person and every circumstance, and it is not strictly analogous even to temperance with respect to food. What is at stake is not a correct quantity of food but a right relation to the pleasure that comes from eating.

Suppose you have carefully saved a bowl of chocolate mousse all day for your mid-evening snack, and just as you are ready to treat yourself, a friend arrives unexpectedly to visit. If you are a glutton, you might hide the mousse until the friend leaves, or gobble it down before you open the door. If you have the opposite vice, and have puritanically suppressed in yourself all indulgence in the pleasures of food, you probably won't have chocolate mousse or any other treat to offer your visitor. If the state of your soul is in the mean in these matters, you are neither enslaved to nor shut out from the pleasure of eating treats, and can enhance the visit of a friend by sharing them. What you are sharing is incidentally the 6 ounces of chocolate mousse; the point is that you are sharing the pleasure, which is not found on any scale of measurement. If the pleasures of the body master you, or if you have broken their power only by rooting them out, you have missed out on the natural role that such pleasures can play in life. In the mean between those two states, you are free to notice possibilities that serve good ends, and to act on them.

It is worth repeating that the mean is not the 3 ounces of mousse on which you settled, since if two friends had come to visit you would have been willing to eat 2 ounces. That would not have been a division of the food but a multiplication of the pleasure. What is enlightening about the example is how readily and how nearly universally we all see that sharing the treat is the right thing to do. This is a matter of immediate perception, but it is perception of a special kind, not that

of any one of the five senses, Aristotle says, but the sort by which we perceive that a triangle is the last kind of figure into which a polygon can be divided. (1142a, 28–30) This is thoughtful and imaginative perceiving, but it has to be perceived. The childish sort of habit clouds our sight, but the liberating counter-habit clears that sight. This is why Aristotle says that the person of moral stature, the *spoudaios*, is the one to whom things appear as they truly are. (1113a, 30–1) Once the earliest habits are neutralized, our desires are disentangled from the pressure for immediate gratification, we are calm enough to think, and most important, we can see what is in front of us in all its possibility. The mean state here is not a point on a dial that we need to fiddle up and down; it is a clearing in the midst of pleasures and pains that lets us judge what seems most truly pleasant and painful.

Achieving temperance toward bodily pleasures is, by this account, finding a mean, but it is not a simple question of adjusting a single varying condition toward the more or the less. The person who is always fighting the same battle, always struggling like the sheep dog to maintain the balance point between too much and too little indulgence, does not, according to Aristotle, have the virtue of temperance, but is at best self-restrained or continent. In that case, the reasoning part of the soul is keeping the impulses reined in. But those impulses can slip the reins and go their own way, as parts of the body do in people with certain disorders of the nerves. (1102b, 14–022) Control in self-restrained people is an anxious, unstable equilibrium that will lapse whenever vigilance is relaxed. It is the old story of the conflict between the head and the emotions, never resolved but subject to truces. A soul with separate, self-contained rational and irrational parts could never become one undivided human being, since the parties would always believe they had divergent interests, and could at best compromise. The virtuous soul, on the contrary, blends all its parts in the act of choice.

This is arguably the best way to understand the active state of the soul that constitutes moral virtue and forms character. It is the condition in which all the powers of the soul are at work together, making

it possible for action to engage the whole human being. The work of achieving character is a process of clearing away the obstacles that stand in the way of the full efficacy of the soul. Someone who is partial to food or drink, or to running away from trouble or to looking for trouble, is a partial human being. Let the whole power of the soul have its influence, and the choices that result will have the characteristic look that we call “courage” or “temperance” or simply “virtue.” Now this adjective “characteristic” comes from the Greek word *charaktēr*, which means the distinctive mark scratched or stamped on anything, and which is apparently never used in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the sense of character of which we are speaking, the word for which is *êthos*, we see an outline of the human form itself. A person of character is someone you can count on, because there is a human nature in a deeper sense than that which refers to our early state of weakness. Someone with character has taken a stand in that fully mature nature, and cannot be moved all the way out of it.

But there is also such a thing as bad character, and this is what Aristotle means by vice, as distinct from bad habits or weakness. It is possible for someone with full responsibility and the free use of intellect to choose always to yield to bodily pleasure or to greed. Virtue is a mean, first because it can only emerge out of the stand-off between opposite habits, but second because it chooses to take its stand not in either of those habits but between them. In this middle region, thinking does come into play, but it is not correct to say that virtue takes its stand in principle; Aristotle makes clear that vice is a principled choice that following some extreme path toward or away from pleasure is right. (1146b, 22-03) Principles are wonderful things, but there are too many of them, and exclusive adherence to any one of them is always a vice.

In our earlier example, the true glutton would be someone who does not just have a bad habit of always indulging the desire for food, but someone who has chosen on principle that one ought always to yield to it. In Plato’s *Gorgias*, Callicles argues just that, about food, drink, and sex. He is serious, even though he is young and still open



to argument. But the only principled alternative he can conceive is the denial of the body, and the choice of a life fit only for stones or corpses. (492E) This is the way most attempts to be serious about right action go astray. What, for example, is the virtue of a seminar leader? Is it to ask appropriate questions but never state an opinion? Or is it to offer everything one has learned on the subject of discussion? What principle should rule?—that all learning must come from the learners, or that without prior instruction no useful learning can take place? Is there a hybrid principle? Or should one try to find the midway point between the opposite principles? Or is the virtue some third kind of thing altogether?

Just as habits of indulgence always stand opposed to habits of abstinence, so too does every principle of action have its opposite principle. If good habituation ensures that we are not swept away by our strongest impulses, and the exercise of intelligence ensures that we will see two worthy sides to every question about action, what governs the choice of the mean? Aristotle gives this answer: “such things are among particulars, and the judgment is in the act of sense-perception.” (1109b, 23–4) But this is the calmly energetic, thought-laden perception to which we referred earlier. The origin of virtuous action is neither intellect nor appetite, but is variously described as intellect through-and-through infused with appetite, or appetite wholly infused with thinking, or appetite and reason joined for the sake of something; this unitary source is called by Aristotle simply *anthropos*. (1139a, 34, b, S–7) But our thinking must contribute right reason (*ho orthos logos*) and our appetites must contribute right desire (*hí orthí orexis*) if the action is to have moral stature. (1114b, 29, 1139a, 24–6, 31–2) What makes them right can only be the something for the sake of which they unite, and this is what is said to be accessible only to sense perception. This brings us to the third word we need to think about.

## The Noble

Aristotle says plainly and repeatedly what it is that moral virtue is for the sake of, but the translators are afraid to give it to you straight. Most of them say it is the noble. One of them says it is the fine. If these answers went past you without even registering, that is probably because they make so little sense. To us, the word “noble” probably connotes some sort of high-minded naiveté, something hopelessly impractical. But Aristotle considers moral virtue the only practical road to effective action. The word “fine” is of the same sort but worse, suggesting some flimsy artistic soul who couldn’t endure rough treatment, while Aristotle describes moral virtue as the most stable and durable condition in which we can meet all obstacles. The word the translators are afraid of is to *kalon*, the beautiful. Aristotle singles out as the distinguishing mark of courage, for example, that it is always “for the sake of the beautiful, for this is the end of virtue.” (111 S b, 12-13) Of magnificence, or large-scale philanthropy, he says it is “for the sake of the beautiful, for this is common to the virtues.” (1122 b, 78) What the person of good character loves with right desire and thinks of as an end with right reason must first be perceived as beautiful.

The Loeb translator explains why he does not use the word “beautiful” in the Nicomachean Ethics. He tells us to *kalon* has two different uses, and refers both to “(1) bodies well shaped and works of art ... well made, and (2) actions well done.” (p. 6) But we have already noticed that Aristotle says the judgment of what is morally right belongs to sense-perception. And he explicitly compares the well made work of art to an act that springs from moral virtue. Of the former, people say that it is not possible add anything to it or take anything from it, and Aristotle says that virtue differs from art in that respect only in being more precise and better. (1106b, 10–15) An action is right in the same way a painting might get everything just right. Antigone contemplates in her imagination the act of burying her brother, and says “it would be a beautiful thing to die doing this.” (Antigone, line 72) This is called “courage.” Neoptolemus stops Philoctetes from killing

Odysseus with the bow he has just returned, and says “neither for me nor for you is this a beautiful thing.” (Philoctetes, line 1304) This is a recognition that the rightness of returning the bow would be spoiled if it were used for revenge. This is not some special usage of the Greek language, but one that speaks to us directly, if the translators let it. And it is not a kind of language that belongs only to poetic tragedy, since the tragedians find their subjects by recognizing human virtue in circumstances that are most hostile to it.

In the most ordinary circumstances, any mother might say to a misbehaving child, in plain English, “don’t be so ugly.” And any of us, parent, friend, or grudging enemy, might on occasion say to someone else, “that was a beautiful thing you did.” Is it by some wild coincidence that twentieth-century English and fourth-century BC Greek link the same pair of uses under one word? Aristotle is always alert to the natural way that important words have more than one meaning. The inquiry in his *Metaphysics* is built around the progressive narrowing of the word “being” until its primary meaning is discovered. In the *Physics* the various senses of motion and change are played on like the keyboard of a piano, and serve to uncover the double source of natural activity. The inquiry into ethics is not built in this fashion; Aristotle asks about the way the various meanings of the good are organized, but he immediately drops the question, as being more at home in another sort of philosophic inquiry. (1096b, 26–32) It is widely claimed that Aristotle says there is no good itself, or any other form at all of the sort spoken of in Plato’s dialogues. This is a misreading of any text of Aristotle to which it is referred. Here in the study of ethics it is a failure to see that the idea of the good is not rejected simply, but only held off as a question that does not arise as first for us. Aristotle praises Plato for understanding that philosophy does not argue from first principles but toward them. (1095a, 31–3)

But while Aristotle does not make the meanings of the good an explicit theme that shapes his inquiry, he nevertheless does plainly lay out its three highest senses, and does narrow down the three into two and indirectly into one. He tells us there are three kinds of good to-

ward which our choices look, the pleasant, the beautiful, and the beneficial or advantageous. (1104b, 31–2) The last of these is clearly subordinate to the other two, and when the same issue comes up next, it has dropped out of the list. The goods sought for their own sake are said to be of only two kinds, the pleasant and the beautiful. (1110b, 9–12) That the beautiful is the primary sense of the good is less obvious, both because the pleasant is itself resolved into a variety of senses, and because a whole side of virtue that we are not considering in this lecture aims at the true, but we can sketch out some ways in which the beautiful emerges as the end of human action.

Aristotle's first description of moral virtue required that the one acting choose an action knowingly, out of a stable equilibrium of the soul, and for its own sake. The knowing in question turned out to be perceiving things as they are, as a result of the habituation that clears our sight. The stability turned out to come from the active condition of all the powers of the soul, in the mean position opened up by that same habituation, since it neutralized an earlier, opposite, and passive habituation to self-indulgence. In the accounts of the particular moral virtues, an action's being chosen for its own sake is again and again specified as meaning chosen for no reason other than that it is beautiful. In Book III, chapter 8, Aristotle refuses to give the name courageous to anyone who acts bravely for the sake of honor, out of shame, from experience that the danger is not as great as it seems, out of spiritedness or anger or the desire for revenge, or from optimism or ignorance. Genuinely courageous action is in no obvious way pleasant, and is not chosen for that reason, but there is according to Aristotle a truer pleasure inherent in it. It doesn't need pleasure dangled in front of it as an extra added attraction. Lasting and satisfying pleasure never comes to those who seek pleasure, but only to the philokalos, who looks past pleasure to the beautiful. (1099a, 15–17, 13)

In our earlier example of temperance, I think most of us would readily agree that the one who had his eye only the chocolate mousse found less pleasure than the one who saw that it would be a better thing to share it. And Aristotle does say explicitly that the target the

temperate person looks to is the beautiful. (1119b, 15–17) But since there are three primary moral virtues, courage, temperance, and justice, it is surprising that in the whole of Book V, which discusses justice, Aristotle never mentions the beautiful. It must somehow be applicable, since he says it is common to all the moral virtues, but in that case it would seem that the account of justice could not be complete if it is not connected to the beautiful. I think this does happen, but in an unexpected way.

Justice seems to be not only a moral virtue, but in some pre-eminent way the moral virtue. And Aristotle says that there is a sense of the word in which the one we call “just” is the person who has all moral virtue, insofar as it affects other people. (1129b, 26–7) In spite of all this, I believe that Aristotle treats justice as something inherently inadequate, a condition of the soul that cannot ever achieve the end at which it aims. Justice concerns itself with the right distribution of rewards and punishments within a community. This would seem to be the chief aim of the lawmakers, but Aristotle says that they do not take justice as seriously as friendship. They accord friendship a higher moral stature than justice. (1155a, 23–4) It seems to me now that Aristotle does too, and that the discussion of friendship in Books VIII and IX replaces that of justice.

What is the purpose of reward and punishment? I take Aristotle’s answer to be *homonoia*, the like-mindedness that allows a community to act in concord. For the sake of this end, he says, it is not good enough that people be just, while if they are friends they have no need to be just: (1155a, 24–9) So far, this sounds as though friendship is merely something advantageous for the social or political good, but Aristotle immediately adds that it is also beautiful. The whole account of friendship, you will recall, is structured around the threefold meaning of the good. Friendships are distinguished as being for use, for pleasure, or for love of the friend’s character.

Repeatedly, after raising questions about the highest kind of friendship, Aristotle resolves them by looking to the beautiful: it is a beautiful thing to do favors for someone freely, without expecting a return

(1163a, 1, 1168a, 10–13); even in cases of urgent necessity, when there is a choice about whom to benefit, one should first decide whether the scale tips toward the necessary or the beautiful thing (1165a, 4–5); to use money to support our parents is always more beautiful than to use it for ourselves (1165a, 22–4); someone who strives to achieve the beautiful in action would never be accused of being selfish (1168b, 25–8). These observations culminate in the claim that, “if all people competed for the beautiful, and strained to do the most beautiful things, everything people need in common, and the greatest good for each in particular, would be achieved ...for the person of moral stature will forego money, honor, and all the good things people fight over to achieve the beautiful for himself.” (1169a, 8–11, 20–22) This does not mean that people can do without such things as money and honor, but that the distribution of such things takes care of itself when people take each other seriously and look to something higher.

The description of the role of the beautiful in moral virtue is most explicit in the discussion of courage, where the emphasis is on the great variety of things that resemble courage but fail to achieve it because they are not solely for the sake of the beautiful. That discussion is therefore mostly negative. We can now see that the discussion of justice was also of a negative character, since justice itself resembles the moral virtue called “friendship” without achieving it, again because it does not govern its action by looking to the beautiful. The discussion of friendship contains the largest collection of positive examples of actions that are beautiful. There is something of a tragic feeling to the account of courage, pointing to the extreme situation of war in which nothing might be left to choose but a beautiful death. But the account of friendship points to the healthy community, in which civil war and other conflicts are driven away by the choice of what is beautiful in life. (1155a, 24–7) By the end of the ninth book, there is no doubt that Aristotle does indeed believe in a primary sense of the good, at least in the human realm, and that the name of this highest good is the beautiful.

And it should be noticed that the beautiful is at work not only in

the human realm. In *De Anima*, Aristotle argues that, while the soul moves itself in the act of choice, the ultimate source of its motion is the practical good toward which it looks, which causes motion while it is itself motionless. (433a, 29–30, b, 11–13) This structure of the motionless first mover is taken up in Book XII of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle argues that the order of the cosmos depends on such a source, which causes motion in the manner of something loved; he calls this source, as one of its names, “the beautiful,” that which is beautiful not in seeming but in being. (1072a, 26-b, 4) Like Diotima in Plato’s *Symposium*, Aristotle makes the beautiful the good itself.

A final word, on the fact that the beautiful in the *Ethics* is not an object of contemplation simply, but the source of action: In an article on the *Poetics*, I discussed the intimate connection of beauty with the experience of wonder. The sense of wonder seems to be the way of seeing which allows things to appear as what they are, since it holds off our tendencies to make things fit into theories or opinions we already hold, or use things for purposes that have nothing to do with them. But this is what Aristotle says repeatedly is the ultimate effect of moral virtue, that the one who has it sees truly and judges rightly, since only to someone of good character do the things that are beautiful appear as they truly are (1113 a, 29-35), that practical wisdom depends on moral virtue to make its aim right (1144a, 7-9), and that the eye of the soul that sees what is beautiful as the end or highest good of action gains its active state only with moral virtue (1144a, 26–33). It is only in the middle ground between habits of acting and between principles of action that the soul can allow right desire and right reason to make their appearance, as the direct and natural response of a free human being to the sight of the beautiful.

## E

### Aristotle: Politics

*by Joe Sachs*

Among the works of Aristotle, the *Politics* unexpectedly proves to be more difficult in some ways than the others. Part of the blame can be laid on the work itself; for compared to many other works by Aristotle, and especially to its cousin, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Politics* is looser in structure and less polished in style. For example, much has been made of the disjointedness between the end of Book III and beginning of Book IV (So much so that Werner Jaeger claims that Chapter 18 of Book III is an interpolation of a different author). In addition, the similarity between this chapter and the beginning of Book VII has led many to believe that Books III and VII belong to one unit, whereas Books IV–VI belong to a different unit and were inserted at a later date. These and other apparent inconsistencies have caused much trouble in our attempts to interpret the *Politics*. They also help explain why so much of the literature is about the question of whether the work is a coherent whole, and, if not, whether the contradictions and incoherencies are in the form, the “doctrine,” or both.

The rest of the blame, however, probably lies with us. Since such complaints are not limited to the *Politics*, but are leveled, to various degrees, against almost all of Aristotle’s works, they perhaps reveal a deeper discomfort. That is, it may well be that the *Politics* appears disjointed and confused not because it is so itself, but because we are so accustomed to a certain way of seeing politics—a way that thinks of politics as a “common power” that “overawes” us, as a tool for purposes beyond itself, and ultimately as a “science” that is based on “clear and distinct” things that have their roots in our perceptive faculties. In addition, contrary to Aristotle’s other works (particularly the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*), the terminology in the *Politics* seems relatively familiar to us. This often convinces us—usually without our even realizing it—that Aristotle thinks about politics in the same way that we do today; as a consequence, we come to expect a sim-



ilar familiarity in the reasoning and structure of the book. Therefore, if the Politics does not conform to that expectation but instead appears disjointed, we think it must be because the manuscript has been damaged, altered, mis-edited, or interpolated; or because there are some “hidden teachings;” or because Aristotle himself gradually “developed” and “matured” in his thinking on politics.

There may well be merit to some of these claims. But pursuing them would lead us down a path which I am not prepared to take. A different approach is to ask: Can we engage the Politics in a fruitful way by taking the text as given, thereby avoiding the traps of exegetical expertise and modern prejudices? Let us begin such an inquiry by first considering Aristotle’s approach to politics in general and then investigating some of the key issues in the text.

### Politics as an Organic Growth

Despite using familiar terms to describe politics, Aristotle actually sees it in a rather different light. To begin with, since politics is the affairs of the city, to understand politics, one must first understand the city. At the beginning of Book I, Aristotle describes how the city comes into being. This description of the transition from the household to the village and then to the city actually bears a resemblance to Machiavelli’s description of the emergence of political rule in his *Discourses on Livy*. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle characterizes this movement toward the city as a *growth*, and in so doing separates himself from Machiavelli and other modern thinkers. For Machiavelli describes a city as an alliance for safety and security, whereas Aristotle describes it as a growth toward an organic whole with its end in full self-sufficiency. From plowing the field and reproducing children to forming colonies and attending assemblies, the city comes into being as our activities expand and grow. Therefore, alongside the growth of our body, there is another growth—the growth of our activity. Just as the growth of the body produces a physical whole, the growth of our activity produces an organic whole of

its own—the city.

That our activity is not random and extraneous but rather forms an organic whole may sound odd to our modern ears. Yet it may seem less so if one reflects upon the following example: If someone walking down the street trips over a rock and falls, we would tend to call this an “accident” (since no one plans on tripping over things and there is no real reason or logic behind such random occurrences). But if one thinks about it more carefully, it becomes clear that this so-called “randomness” never occurs to a whole class of beings—worms. Therefore, this “tripping over” is something that belongs to a particular type of being, namely those that raise their bodies above the ground, particularly those that walk on two legs. Hence, one may say that a particular being brings along with it particular types of “accidents” and at the same time eliminates others. In this sense, there are no “accidents”—each being’s activities fully conform to its nature and form a whole.

To Aristotle, political activity seems to be of such a nature. It is not some random activity that we happen to do, but an organic growth in itself that conforms to our being: just as the city is the end of human associations and forms a whole with the household and village, so too is politics the end of all types of rule and forms a whole with the types in the household and village. Therefore, contrary to the Hobbesian notion that politics causes human beings to be less complete (since through it we lose some of our rights), politics according to Aristotle is just the opposite: it is the very activity that completes us. Those who do not need a city cease to be human beings—they are either beasts or gods.

In keeping with the city’s similarity to organic growth, politics is an ordered activity, but it is not an order derived from logical deduction. Likewise, Aristotle’s *investigation* of politics has a guiding principle, but it is not one long logical sequence with one single beginning. It may involve multiple beginnings and follow along multiple paths. These multiple beginnings and paths are meant to be grasped and understood as a whole, even though the presentation of this under-

standing has to be broken up and arranged on pages in a sequence. This inherent tension between the understanding of the whole and its presentation in parts may be at the root of much of the discontent over the organization of the book. But if one takes a step back and looks at the book as a whole, one might see that these “inconsistencies” are the result of Aristotle’s unique way of thinking about politics. For, as mentioned earlier, the most natural beginning of politics is always the living human being already in real life—being in a household, being a son or a father, a wife or a mother—not a fragmented being reduced to his perceptive faculties and placed in an imaginary “state of nature.” This is a beginning that is familiar to us both in experience and in opinion, and that is easily sooken about by many. But as Aristotle points out elsewhere, what is most familiar to us is not always what is most clear in itself. The former may serve us well as the beginning of investigation, but the latter is prior in its intelligibility. While the city as a compound being is further away from us and is made of parts, it is at the same time the place where human beings become more intelligible because in it we fully realize ourselves. To investigate the city, Aristotle has to “uncompound” it. However, this “uncompounding” into its smaller parts is not the same as modern analysis, nor are the smaller parts analytical units. This can be seen in the claim that although the city is preceded by the household and village, it is in another sense actually *prior*. Each of these parts does not exist in isolation but already aims at the city. Otherwise, it would be like the stone hand, which has the looks of a real hand, but is in fact dead.

Within this general approach to politics—that the city is a whole whose parts contain an image of that whole, the discussions of various specific topics follow a similar path. For example, the *Politics* ends more or less with a discussion of the best forms of government in Book VII. Yet this issue is already present at the very beginning as the forms of rule in the household. Our experiences in a household—and the different accounts of and opinions about these experiences—serve as the beginning of our thinking about the best form

of political rule. But, because of the various forms of inequality in the household, its different types of rule are only images of the true forms in the city. If one stays only at the level of the household without moving toward the city (which is exactly what happens to the barbarian tribes), one cannot hope to understand the best forms of government. Hence, investigating the city, its origin, its components and its citizens will ultimately require a new start. Yet, this is not a separate investigation. The question of forms of government is embedded in each of the stages of a city's growth and is present throughout. The end of Book III raises the question about the best form of government: Book IV begins with a broad discussion of this question from the view of one single knowledge; Book VII makes a fresh start on the same question, but with an eye to how the best governments are related to the best life. Viewed separately, these appear disjointed because each looks like a new beginning along a different path. But if they are read together, they each contribute to the inquiry and are parts of a whole. It is this dialectical thinking that weaves together the parts and the whole, the more familiar and the more intelligible, the opinions and the philosophic inquiries. This back-and-forth between various parts may appear sloppy, confusing, and even disorienting; but it ultimately pushes us to read the whole investigation carefully before deciding upon what the best form of government is.

Before ending this section and turning to the book itself, a few words on another important aspect of Aristotle's thinking on politics are needed. In Books IV through VII, Aristotle mentions two types of best government: the "best simply" and the "best possible." This language is familiar and perhaps reminds us of the distinction made by Machiavelli between the "real" and the "imaginary" republics. Yet it seems that Aristotle's "best simply" and "best possible" regimes are much more nuanced and complicated, especially in the case of the latter. In the general articulation, the "best possible" is a type of middle regime based on a "mixing." But this mixing can mean different things: In one sense it may be understood as the mixing of degrees of wealth; in another, of wealth and freedom; in yet another, of wealth

and virtue. There is no formula because the “best possible” is not based on a rigid claim about the inherent flaw in our nature and its failure to measure up against some theoretical ideal. Rather, it is based on the fact that political associations are real living communities. As such, they are inevitably conditioned by their separate histories, traditions, customs, geographies, etc., all of which will tend to give rise to sets of unique professions and temperaments. These in turn will affect the political behaviors of their citizen bodies. This brings us to the important aspect of Aristotle’s thinking on politics—practical judgment. Since the “best possible” is not based on a universal formula of human nature, one cannot really get it from book learning. It thus falls to those who have the experience and prudence to study it and inquire about it. A true politician, therefore, not only has to have the knowledge about the best form of government, but also the long and wide experiences that are necessary to make a sound judgment on how to make the right mixture (what to mix and how to mix them) for his own city. This is why Aristotle famously claims at the beginning of his Ethics that politics is not a suitable subject for the young.

Now that we have looked at Aristotle’s general approach to politics, let us turn to some of the key issues in the Politics.

“A human being by nature is an animal meant for the city”—*Politics* I, 2

It has been said that passages at the end the Nicomachean Ethics subordinate the Politics to the Ethics. Is this really true, or does the Politics stand on its own and have its intrinsic value separate from the Ethics?

A comparison of two passages is a good place to start. The first one is from the Ethics:

And what is referred to as *self-sufficiency would be present most of all in the contemplative life*, for while the wise and the just person, and the rest, are in need of the things that are necessary for living, when they are

E.2. “A human being by nature is an animal meant for the city”—Politics I, 2

sufficiently equipped with such things, a just person still needs people toward whom and with whom he will act justly, and similarly with the temperate and the courageous person and each of the others, but the wise person is able to contemplate even when he is by himself, and more so to the extent that he is the more wise. He will contemplate better, no doubt, when he has people to work with, but he is still the most self-sufficient person.” (Ethics 1177a 27, italics added)

Compare it to the following passage from the Politics,

“The complete association made of more than one village is a city, since at that point, so to speak, *it gets to the threshold of full self-sufficiency*, coming into being for the sake of living, but being for the sake of living well...*For it is their end, and nature is an end; for what each thing is when it has reached the completion of its coming into being is that which we say is the nature of each, as with a human being, a horse, a house.* And that for the sake of which, the end, is also the best, and self-sufficiency is both an end and what is best.” (Politics 1152b 35, italics added)

There is something curious about there being two completions for man. Since a complete being cannot be further completed, how can both the contemplative life and the city be said to complete man? With the help of a passage in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*—namely, that the end of every being is work and activity—we can further refine the question: what activity does contemplative life lack? Or, to put the question in a slightly different way, what is the activity which, though present in the contemplative life, cannot be fully explored in the *Ethics* and, therefore, must be articulated again in the *Politics*?

If we think through how the completion described in the *Politics* differs from that in the *Ethics*, we will gain a better understanding of the *Politics*. Since Aristotle never directly discusses exactly how the city completes us or what exactly the deficiency is that cannot be overcome by the other types of associations, one has to trace his argument back to Chapter 2 of Book I to see what it entails:

Now it is necessary that there first be a pairing together of those who do not have the power to be without each other, such as a female and a male for the sake of generation (and this not out of choice but just as in the other animals and plants, by a nature striving to leave behind another like itself), and something naturally ruling and ruled for preservation. (1252a 25–31)

Since as individuals we are incomplete in two ways—we cannot generate or preserve ourselves—then, by necessity, there are two types of pairings we require for completion: that of male and female for generation, and that of naturally ruling and ruled for preservation. Until the coming into being of the city, Aristotle doesn't introduce any other types of pairings. This may lead one to conclude that the city completes us because it contains these two types of pairings.

Of these two, it is clear that the first type is of only secondary importance; for although human beings choose particular mates, the male-female pairing itself is not the result of a deliberate choice and is therefore not special to being human, but is shared with other animals and even plants. This may also explain why, when referring to human generative pairings, Aristotle uses a word meaning “coupling” (*sunduazesthai*) instead of one meaning marriage. Therefore, however it completes us, it does so for those parts of us that we share in common with animals and plants, and hence does not complete us as humans.

What is left then is the second type of pairing, the naturally ruling and ruled. Hence, let us for now proceed with the assumption that the activity whose lack renders us incomplete is that of the ruling and ruled. Indeed, the second half of the above quote leads us one step further in this direction:

“For that which has the power to foresee by thinking is naturally ruling and naturally mastering, but what has the power to carry out those things with the body is ruled and is naturally slavish; hence the same thing is advantageous to a master and to a slave. *And by nature, the female and the slave are distinct.* (For nature does nothing stingily, the way the bronze-workers make the Delphic knife, but one thing for one job, since in that way, by serving not for many jobs but for one, each of the instruments accomplishes its working in the most beautiful manner).” (1252a 30–b 5, italics added)

A careful reading of this passage shows that what were originally presented as two types of pairings are not, strictly speaking, two separate kinds at all, for the comparison between the female and the slave implies that the second pairing actually underpins both kinds: at the

root of the male-female pairing lies the pairing of ruling and being ruled. The female, who was initially presented as being for the sake of generation, is now shown to have a much different role; she is subject to a type of rule which differs fundamentally from that to which a slave is subject. On this view, one might say that there is only one type of pairing, that of the ruling and ruled, but it takes different forms because of the different types of work that each pairing accomplishes, generation for that of a male and female, and daily necessity for that of a master and slave.

Therefore, it is by the fulfillment of the need to rule and be ruled that the city completes us, and hence “a human being by nature is an animal meant for the city” because he/she has *by nature* the need to rule and be ruled.

One may raise a question at this point: If it is the ruling and being ruled that complete us, and if this is also present in other associations (such as the household) why cannot the full completion be achieved in the household? In other words, why must there be a city? One obvious difference between the rule in the city and those in the other associations is that only the former is a rule among equals, while the rest are rules among unequals. These latter include rules between the parent and the child and between the master and the slave, and they are based on natural distinctions between the ruling and the ruled. For, compared to the adult citizens, “the slave wholly lacks the deliberative capacity...and the child has it, but incomplete.” If it is the city which completes us, the rule among unequals which exists in the household and village must be of secondary importance. A little reflection on what Aristotle says in the following short sentence shows us why:

Why a human being is an animal meant for a city, more than every sort of bee and every sort of herd animal, is clear. For nature, as we claim, does nothing uselessly, and a human being, alone among the animals, has speech. (1253a11)

Since we are not the only animals that are deemed political by Aristotle, and since nature does nothing uselessly, the passage seems to



be saying that nature has also privileged certain members of these other “political” animals and endowed them with foresight. For example, a new queen bee seems to have the foresight of picking a Suitable place for a new hive, whereas worker bees do not. Hence, when the time comes, she will lead and the workers will follow. Among these animals, therefore, the rule is fundamentally unequal and naturally so because in essence it is a kind of rule whose excellence is not based on an excellence in work but on a natural endowment and a natural distinction that cannot be overcome. Hence, when we look to the kinds of rule among human beings, the same reasoning can apply: any forms of rule that are based on natural distinctions—such as those between master and slave, and those between parents and offspring—are similar to that between the queen and the worker and should be deemed inferior. Aristotle makes this clear in another passage:

The kind of rule is always better when those ruled are better, as when the one ruled is a human being rather than a beast, since the work is better that is carried out by those who are better, and wherever one rules and another is ruled there is something that is *their* work (1254a 25, italics added)

Unequal rule therefore is an inferior rule because it is over inferior subjects, and it consequently produces inferior work. The rule in the city is better because it is a rule over better subjects, and with the rule over better subjects comes *better* work. It is particularly important to notice that the above passage starts with the better work only on the part of those ruled—a ruled human being can do better work than a domesticated animal—but it ends with the implied better work on both parts, the ruling and the ruled. Aristotle does not say directly in this passage what the better work of the ruler is, but one can get a very good idea by considering two other passages from Books I and III:

And while the voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and belongs also to the other animals on that account (since their nature goes this far, having a perception of pain and pleasure and communicating these to one another), speech is for disclosing what is advantageous and what is

E.2. *“A human being by nature is an animal meant for the city”—Politics I, 2*

harmful, and so too what is just and what is unjust. For this is distinctive of human beings in relation to the other animals, to be alone in having a perception of good and bad, just and unjust, and the rest, and it is an association involving these things that makes a household and a city. (1253a 11)

Hence in the case of political offices too, whenever they are organized on a basis of equality and similarity among the citizens, they expect to take turns ruling. In former times, in a way that was natural, they expected to take turns doing public service, while having someone look after their good in return, just as, when that person was ruling before, someone had looked after his advantage. (1279a 10)

If one looks at these two passages in relation to each other, it becomes clear that the second one is predicated on the first: namely, that a citizen can convince another citizen to take care of his own interests is based on the capacity for speech and the ability to persuade in making clear what is advantageous and just. Therefore, while the rule among unequals is based upon force or natural distinctions, the rule among equals (that is, rule in the city) is based upon persuasion. Therefore, whereas the former rule relies on inborn foresight or brute strength (natural and often insurmountable differences), the latter relies on reason and speech (our highest capacities). Since the better capacity yields the better work, rule among equals is better and more properly human. In this sense, Aristotle’s take on the city is different from Plato’s, who claims that a good man does not want to rule because the proper rule aims at the interest of the ruled. To Aristotle, the city is precisely the place where, through its political rule, both the ruler and the ruled can do their best work—something that is impossible within the confines of the household or village.

In addition, the rule in the city and rules in the household or village do not just differ in degree along a continuum, but in kind. That is, it is not that the rule in the household, without the city, can complete us partly, and the city, when it comes along, picks up from where the household leaves off and completes us fully. In fact, it is just the opposite:

For every household is under kingly rule by the eldest, and so their colonies are too, through their family connection. And this is what

Homer is talking about when he says ‘each one is a law unto children and wives...’ (1252b 23)

one who is cityless as a result of nature rather than by choice is either insignificant or more powerful than a human being. He is like the person reviled by Homer as ‘without fellowship, without law, without a hearth,” for someone of that sort is at the same time naturally bent on war, since he is in fact like an unpaired piece on a checker-board...and one who is no part of a city, either from lacking the power to be in an association or from needing nothing on account of self-sufficiency, is for that reason either a beast or a god. (1253a 5–29)

Without the city, then, the rules in the household and village actually become destructive to human beings; for just like the relationship between the growth of the whole and that of the parts, where the latter is beneficial only in relation to the former (without respect to which it can be cancerous and harm the body) so too is the relationship between the rules in the household/village and that in the city. If the unequal rules in the household do not aim at the rule among equals in the city, the inferior work produced by them will turn human beings into Cyclopes with a natural bent toward war and cannibalism. Only in the city, then, are we completed as humans, because our fundamental need to rule and be ruled (though present in different forms in the other associations) gets transformed in the city, so that it is fulfilled in a way that is beneficial to us, rather than turning us into Cyclopean beasts.

At this point, a question may be raised about an issue that has not been explored thus far—the rule of husband over wife. For Aristotle does mention that this rule is political, which seems to mean that in essence it is a rule among equals. If this is unqualifiedly true, then, it would seem that one would not need the city, for all aspects of the need to rule and be ruled could be fulfilled in the household.

There is indeed a longstanding debate over what Aristotle truly thinks about this rule. The source of this difficulty comes partly from various claims by Aristotle that seem rather ambiguous, but primarily from an example that Aristotle uses to describe the relationship between husband and wife in Book I, Chapter 12, which involves the

story of the Egyptian King Amasis,

Now in most instances of political rule there is an interchange among those who rule and are ruled, since they tend by nature to be on an equality and have no difference; nevertheless, whenever one rules and another is ruled, the former wants there to be a difference in formalities, words, and tokens of respect, as Amasis said in the story about the footpan. The male is always related to the female in this manner. (1259b 5)

Many have argued that this example shows that, to Aristotle, the difference between male and female is really a matter of convention, just like the difference between the footpan and the statue (for the underlying material is the same). If, however, one looks carefully into the Amasis story, this conclusion becomes questionable. The details of this story are in Book II, Section 172 of Herodotus' History:

Now at the first the Egyptians despised Amasis and held him in no great regard, because he had been a man of the people and was of no distinguished family; but afterwards Amasis won them over to himself by wisdom and not willfulness. Among innumerable other things of price which he had, there was a foot-basin of gold in which both Amasis himself and all his guests were wont always to wash their feet. This he broke up, and of it he caused to be made the image of a god, and set it up in the city, where it was most convenient; and the Egyptians went continually to visit the image and did great reverence to it. Then Amasis, having learnt that which was done by the men of the city, called together the Egyptians and made known to them the matter, saying that the image had been produced from the foot-basin, into which formerly the Egyptians used to vomit and make water, and in which they washed their feet, whereas now they did to it great reverence; and just so, he continued, had he himself now fared, as the foot-basin; for though formerly he was a man of the people, yet now he was their king, *and he bade them accordingly honor him and have regard for him.* (italics added)

The story indeed conveys the connotation that there is no inherent difference between high birth and low birth, just as there is no inherent difference between the gold made into a footpan and the gold made into a statue. When Aristotle applies this story to the relations of male and female, the moral does appear to be that there is no inherent difference between the members of either pair and that the apparent difference is the product of convention.

Although this interpretation is reasonable, it relies on only one of the two (if not more) possible readings of the story (the one which locates the analogy between the husband and wife, and the footpan and statue). If one really reflects upon it, however, it becomes clear that the logic behind this interpretation risks rendering the story unintelligible by turning Amasis into a fool rather than the wise person that Herodotus claims him to be—for if the respect paid to the statue is essentially conventional (because, the argument goes, the statue is made of the same material as that of the footpan), then would it not be dangerous for Amasis to expose it? For, after all, how can he expect any respect from the Egyptians if it is publically acknowledged that he is composed of the same “material” as they are?

An alternative (and perhaps more plausible) way of relating the story to what Aristotle says is to compare the husband and wife to the ‘footpan-Amasis’ and the ‘statue-Amasis;’ for although these two Amases are composed of the same “material,” they have different desires. This reading, which takes into consideration the difference between human beings and inanimate objects, helps bring to light two crucial points about the political world and the world of inanimate objects. First, the inanimate gold is indifferent to whether it is made into a footpan or a statue, but Amasis is not indifferent to whether he is a commoner or king. Second, in the political world, the statue—Amasis’ desire for “tokens of respect” from the Egyptians does not automatically fulfill itself. For while the Egyptians come of their own will to pay respect to the statue, it is not clear at all whether they would do the same for Amasis. It seems that Amasis understands the situation rather well: He does not just sit there like a statue and wait for the Egyptians to come; he bade them to honor him.

It might be interesting to note that the bidding does not just occur at the end of the story. In fact, it is clear that the very unfolding of Amasis’ design—which Herodotus calls “wise”—consists of a series of biddings: from having the footpan broken up, to having it made into a status and then moved to a very public place. Without the ability to bid and command, Amasis’ wisdom and foresight would not have

come to fruition. In this sense, these biddings themselves become the embodiment of Amasis’ wisdom.

Viewed in this light, Aristotle’s reference to the story takes on a different meaning. Rather than hinting at a true equality between the husband and wife, Aristotle may actually be implying that the true foundation for equality in political rule is not “material.” Just like Amasis, all political rulers desire “tokens of respect,” even though they are composed of the same “material” as those ruled. Although these tokens of respect may create apparent differences among citizens, the situation is equalized in the city as citizens take turns ruling and being ruled. In the household, however, the situation is different; the female, for whatever reasons—be they physical or otherwise—cannot command. Therefore, although the rule between husband and wife is political, the equality that underlies this rule is not unqualified, since the tokens of respect in this situation are not reciprocated. In the following two passages, we can come to further understand Aristotle’s distinction between male and female:

For this is distinctive of human beings in relation to the other animals, to be alone in having a perception of good and bad, just and unjust, and the rest, and it is an association involving these things that makes *a household and a city*. (1253a 11, italics added)

The slave wholly lacks the deliberative capacity, while the female has it, but without authority.

The first passage is particularly important since it reveals that the household, just like the city, is not merely a place for necessities, but also a place where there exists the perception of good and bad and just and unjust. Through these two passages, Aristotle clearly indicates that the female has the deliberative capacity, and nature places her on the same footing with the male in terms of the perception of good and bad as well as just and unjust. Yet, the difference between the two is not just conventional, but real—though, again, not in the material sense. The “without authority” in the second quote immediately reminds us of the “bidding” in the Amasis story. Without the authority to command, certain types of work are not available to the

female, and consequently, neither is the opportunity to rule and be ruled in turns.

Whatever one might think of Aristotle's view about women, it is worth mentioning that the lower (political) position of women does not necessarily lead to their diminished role in Aristotle's thinking. In Book I, Chapter 2 Aristotle says,

Among the barbarians, though, the female and the slave have the same rank. The reason is that they do not have that which by nature rules, but their association becomes that of a female slave and a male slave. (1252b5)

Taken by itself, this passage seems to show that the cause for the low status of women among the barbarians is that their men by nature cannot rule. However, it does not explain why if the men cannot rule, both men and women are in a slavish condition. If one reads this passage in conjunction with the aforementioned one about the rulers being better when the ruled are better, the direction of the causality of the social degradation is circular—it is just as possible to read Aristotle as saying that the barbarian men cannot rule because they have a naturally flawed way of treating their women. It is the degrading of their women that ultimately leads to the degrading of the barbarian men.

## The Best Form of Government

If ruling and being ruled in the city completes us, then what role do different forms of government, especially the best ones, play? In Book VII, Aristotle gives two “definitions” of the best forms of government:

Now it is manifest that the best regime must be that arrangement in which anyone might act best and live blessedly. (1324a 23)

And since our proposed task is to get a look at the best form of government, and this is the one by which a city would be best governed, and the one governed best is that in which there is the greatest possibility for the city to be happy, it is clear that the question of what happiness is must not be passed over. (1332a 5)

Straightforward as these definitions may seem, they do not readily lead to a clear understanding of the issue. This is in large part due to various things that Aristotle says in Book III and IV about the best forms of government, where it is not clear how they are related to one another or to the notion of best rule discussed earlier.

At first glance, Aristotle's discussion of the best forms of government can be put into two categories, each of which has difficulties. The first category is what Aristotle calls the "best simply:" kingship and aristocracy in the true sense. Part of the reasoning is presented toward the end of Book III:

And since we claim there are three right forms of government, the best of these would necessarily be the one managed by the best people, and this is the sort of government in which one person, or a whole family or multitude, would turn out to be surpassing in virtue compared to all the rest together, the latter capable of being ruled while the former are capable of ruling with a view to the life most worthy of choice...it is clear that one would organize a city under an aristocracy or kingship in the same manner and by the same means that a man becomes excellent. (1288a 33)

Since it is not possible for a large number of people to each have the best virtues (except those related to military excellence) it is natural that the "best simply" governments be aristocracy and kingship. In addition to the discussions of aristocracy in Book III, there are others in parts of Book IV. But despite this, it is unclear how seriously Aristotle takes these "best simply" forms of government. There are obviously some practical concerns: these "best simply" require a large amount of resources which many cities cannot afford. And with regard to aristocracy in particular, Aristotle says:

For it is only just to refer to the form of government made up of those who are the best people simply on the basis of virtue, and not by some particular assumption about good men, as aristocracy, for in it alone the same person is a good man and a good citizen. (1293b 5)

Of course, how plausible it is to have a city composed of all good people is the question—one which Aristotle appears to have rejected elsewhere.



But Aristotle also seems to indicate that beyond these practical concerns may lie an even deeper reason for the impossibility of the “best simply” regimes. In Book II, Aristotle criticizes Plato’s Republic for giving exclusive rule to the guardians and for having the citizens hold all property in common:

For a city is by nature a certain kind of multiplicity; by becoming more of a one it would turn from a city into a household and from a household into a human being. For we would claim that a household is more of a one than a city is, and a single person than a household; so even if someone were capable of doing this, it ought not to be done, since it would abolish the city. And a city is made up not only of a multiplicity of human beings, but also of human beings differing in form, for no city comes about from people all alike. For a city and an alliance are different. (1261a 18, italics added)

Yet what Aristotle here criticizes is precisely what the “best simply,” as discussed in the *Politics*, resemble. By excluding other citizens from ruling, these governments move the city toward unity, and turn it into something like a household in the sense that the rulers in these regimes are so far above the rest in virtue that they are like fathers to their children. It seems, then, that in these “best simply” governments, there is an inherent tendency to transform the city (and, thereby, itself) into what it is not.

In Book IV, Aristotle elaborates upon this point by comparing the city to a living animal;

“For we are agreed that every city has not just one part but more than one. It is the same as, if we intended to get a grasp of the species of animals, we would first separate out the things it is necessary for every animal to have (such as certain sense organs, something suited to work on and absorb food, such as a mouth and digestive tract, and in addition to these, parts by means of which each of the kinds moves).” (1290b 25)

This comparison shows that the city is made of diverse parts that are different in kind, and these parts have to fit so that the “animal” can be a real living animal. But the “best simply” governments seem to violate this:

For it is surely not appropriate to kill or exile or ostracize such a person,

or to claim he deserves to be ruled in his turn. *For while it is not the natural thing for the part to exceed to the whole, this is what has happened with someone who has such a great superiority.* (1288a 25, italics added)

In this view, the “best simply” governments—by containing within themselves far superior parts (their rulers) —destroy the very proportionality that is necessary for the city (if it ought to resemble the living animal). There is something monstrous about undoing the very being from which one has sprung. Amongst human beings this is called patricide, one of the most heinous of crimes. Perhaps this is why Aristotle acknowledges in the above passage that the “best simply,” when considered with a view to the best rule —the rule among equals—are “unnatural.” If the best rule in the city is the one which completes us to the highest degree, it is difficult to see how this can be achieved through these “best simply” governments as these threaten to alter the nature of rule in the city to the point of its undoing.

The second category—the “best possible” governments for most cities and most people—also presents difficulties. Many have claimed that by the “best possible” Aristotle means a mixed regime with a large “middle class.” This argument is based on passages from Book IV, especially the following two:

It is evident, though, that the middle form is best, since it alone is free of faction. For where the middle range is large, factions and schisms among the citizens occur least. And large cities are more free of faction for the same reason, because the middle part is large. (1296a 5–10)

And in a place where the number of those in the middle group exceeds either both extremes together, or even just one of the two, it is possible for there to be lasting constitutional rule. For there is no fear that the rich would ever conspire with the poor against them, since neither side would ever want to be subject to the other one, and if they were looking for a more communal arrangement, they would not find any other besides this one. They would not put up with ruling by turns because of their distrust of one another; but the most trusted person everywhere is a neutral arbiter, and the one in the middle is a neutral arbiter. (1296b 38–1297a 8)

From these passages and several others, it is quite obvious that Aristotle has an apparent preference for a city with a large “middle group.”

What this “middle group” means, though, is not entirely clear. For if the “middle group” is really the same as the middle class in the modern sense, and the middle regime is the best regime, then the most important thing that a city can do would be to develop its economy and form a large middle class—in other words, to become a modern liberal democracy. If this does not sound right, then the meaning of the “middle group” in Aristotle warrants a more careful examination.

In all relevant passages of Book IV, various forms of the word *mesos* (the word that for Aristotle denotes a “middle group”) are used to describe the “middle,” and indeed it does carry the meaning of a middle position between two extremes. However, the word can also mean “impartial,” “moderate,” and “undetermined.” Whereas the first meaning is a middle in a spatial sense, the rest have the connotation of a middle in attitude and thinking. Likewise, Aristotle uses the same word to describe the “mean” condition between two extremes in moral virtues. Taking all this into account, it seems plausible that when Aristotle uses *mesos* to describe the middle he intends something more complex than simply a “middle class” in the sense of property possessions.

Let’s look at Aristotle’s description of the “middle” regime. By definition, the “middle” regime, or constitutional rule, is “a mixture of oligarchy and democracy.” In Book IV, Chapter 8, Aristotle adds,

For since there are three things disputing over equality in the government—freedom, wealth, and virtue...it is clear that the mixture of the pair consisting of the well-off and the needy ought to be called constitutional rule, while the mixture of the three, compared to the others, most deserves the name aristocracy, aside from its true and primary form. (1294a 20)

One can see two things from this. First, the middle form of government is based not on a homogeneous middle but on a “mixture,” the coming together of two. Second, whereas this coming together at first appears to consist of two groups, the wealthy and the needy, when we recall Aristotle’s emphatic condemnation of the redistribution of wealth in Book III, it seems that the coming together of the

wealthy and the needy cannot be a mixture of property possessions simply. In fact, we have seen Aristotle making it clear that the relevant mixture is not of property, but of principles—namely, wealth and freedom. Just how wealth and freedom—which seem to differ in kind—can be mixed is a rather perplexing question.

At first, Aristotle seems to indicate that it can be accomplished by mixing offices in the same way as one might fit together the pieces of a broken coin.

For in oligarchies, they assess a fine against the well-off for not doing jury services and do not assign a fee for the needy, while in democracies, they assign a fee for the needy and no fine for the well-off. To have them both is a common ground and mean between these forms, and hence is suited to constitutional rule, since it is a mixture of both. (1294a 38)

However, in Book IV, Chapter 9, Aristotle offers a short but intriguing new way of thinking about mixing. Having just discussed how to mix offices from one regime with those from the other, he says,

This, then, is the manner of mixing them, and what marks out democracy and oligarchy as having been well mixed is that it is possible to speak of the same form of government as democracy or oligarchy, since it is clear that it is because they are beautifully mixed that people who speak that way are led to do so. The mean also has this character, since each of the extremes is evident in it, which is exactly what happens in the Spartan form of government. For many people try to speak of it as being a democracy, since its arrangement includes a number of democratic features. *First of all, for example, in regard to the bringing up of children, those of the rich are brought up like those of the poor, and the manner in which they are educated is one for which the children of the poor also have the means. And likewise in the next stage of life, and once they become men, the same is true, since there is no way in which a rich person is distinguished from a poor one; what pertains to food is the same for everyone at the common meals, and the clothing rich people wear is of such a sort as any poor person whatever is capable of providing.* What is more, of the two highest offices, the populace chooses the one and takes part in the other (since they choose the elders and participate in the ephorate). But others call it an oligarchy because it includes a number of oligarchic features; for instance all ruling offices are elected and none chosen by lot, and a small number have authority over penalties of death and exile, and there are

many other such things. (1294b 15–35, italics added)

This passage is worth quoting at length since, in the italicized portion especially, it is clear that the mixing Aristotle is interested in is less of offices and properties than of actions; namely, it is about how two extreme groups, the rich and the poor, can come together by acting toward a middle in their everyday life—from raising and educating their children, to taking their daily meals. And not only does it extend horizontally to cover nearly all aspects of daily living, it also extends vertically to cover one's entire lifespan. It is rather telling that although there is no mention of a middle with respect to property in Sparta, Aristotle still considers this a “beautifully mixed” middle regime. This must mean that Aristotle thinks that a middle regime can be composed of a middle not of property possessions, but of actions—through two “extremes” (i.e., the poor and the rich) acting toward the middle. From this perspective, then, the middle regime would not result from having similar properties and offices (a “middle possession”) but from similar actions (a “middle doing”).

A middle in this sense is consistent with a reference Aristotle makes to the Ethics in his discussion of the middle regime:

For if it was beautifully said in the Ethics that the happy life is one in accord with unimpeded virtue, and that virtue is a mean, then the mean in life, consisting of a mean condition every person is capable of attaining, would necessarily be best, and these same terms would necessarily also apply to the virtue and vice of a city and a government, since a form of government is one sort of life of a city. (1295a 37)

The mean condition of virtue is not a middle point on a line between its two extremities, since human action is not a static line upon which one can stand. The virtue courage, for example, is not in its true sense a fixed point between two extremes (cowardice and recklessness), because what ought to be feared is not always the same: charging the enemy could be deemed courageous in one situation but reckless in another just as retreating could be deemed cowardly in one situation but courageous in another. Therefore, simply reading books and “possessing” a definition of courage are of no help at

all. Real courage involves a right knowing of what to fear and when to fear, and this can only be achieved through repeated actions concerning fearful things while aiming at becoming courageous. Hence, Aristotle says that in one sense—and the truest sense—courage is what a truly courageous man does.

The discussion of the middle regime likewise emphasizes doing and acting. Even when there is no “middle possession” of property present in a city, the middle regime can still be formed through long and repeated actions by the two extreme groups, as illustrated by the example of Sparta. And this acting toward the middle, since it involves two extreme groups, will inevitably involve a constant deliberation and making of choices on the part of these groups, affecting the thinking and attitude of each. Hence, the activity itself, by constantly aiming at the middle, becomes the middle regime.

In this sense, the “middle possession” of property becomes incidental in the same way that numbers are incidental in relation to the more fundamental principles like wealth. In his discussion of oligarchy in Book III, Chapter 8, Aristotle defines oligarchy in terms of wealth, not the number of rulers. The characteristically smaller number of rulers is incidental to, or an external sign of, the principle because it just so happens that wealth is usually concentrated in the hands of the few. Similarly, acting toward the middle can be thought of as the essential principle of the middle regime, while a “middle possession” of properties is incidental to it (as a small number of rulers is to wealth in an oligarchy). If we indeed accept this middle action as the essential characteristic of the middle regime, then it is by this—and not its incidental quality of a middle property possession—by which we ought to understand such a regime.

The middle activity also serves as a link between the best rule and the best form of government. In Book IV, chapter 11, Aristotle says,

Also, those in the middle range are least likely to avoid ruling or be eager to rule, and both these things are harmful to cities. And in addition to these things, those who have an overabundance of the goods of fortune—strength, wealth, friends, and other things of that sort—do not

want to be ruled and do not even know how to....But those who suffer from an extreme state of neediness in these things are too broken in spirit. Consequently, the latter sort of people do not know how to rule, but only how to be ruled under a slavish rule, while the former sort do not know how to be ruled in any way at all, but only to rule the way slavemasters rule. (1295b 12–22)

As one can see, the obstacle to the best kind of rule (citizens taking turns ruling and being ruled) is the habitual —often hostile—attitude of the different groups toward one another: envy, arrogance, pettiness, and slavishness. Aristotle's depiction of the Spartan form of government shows how the middle activity provides remedies for these animosities: Though lacking a "middle possession," the rich and poor in Sparta come together in the activity of sharing food, clothing, education and child-rearing, all while the poor remain poor and the rich remain rich. Since the middle activity is the result of active and deliberate choice by two non-middle groups rather than something simply allotted to the members of a materially homogenous bloc or to a small number of office holders, it imparts a greater effect upon the souls of its participants, and hence, more effectively alleviates the overbearing attitude of the rich and the broken spirit of the poor, and thereby eliminates factions that can be so harmful to the city. It is in this sense that the full meaning of *mesos* becomes clearer: It is not merely (or perhaps not even) characterized by a large middle class, but, more essentially, by its moderation, impartiality and "undetermined" appearance—one cannot tell whether the city is under an oligarchy or a democracy because, although there are rich and poor people, it is hard to tell who's who since in their everyday life, all act toward the middle.

Hence, one perhaps should not be surprised by Aristotle's seemingly odd claim that the "best possible" government actually has not often existed. For just as the mean condition which constitutes virtue is attainable by every person though rarely achieved, so too is it with every city and the middle regime.

## The Politics and Its Relations to the Ethics and the Rhetoric

Where the Politics stands in relation to the other works of Aristotle is always an interesting question. For the purpose of this introduction, though, the discussion will be limited to how the Politics is related to its two closest cousins, the Ethics and the Rhetoric (as all three deal with human affairs).

Let's begin by considering the relation of the Politics to the Ethics, which Aristotle explicitly addresses toward the end of the Ethics. The discussion seems to have two parts: First, since virtue does not come from nature, and habituation is unpleasant to the young, politics—especially lawmaking—prepares people for virtue by giving force and strength to good habituation, just as the soil has to be worked on first if it is to foster the seed. Second, since one needs not only knowledge but also experience to become virtuous, politics provides the “practical life” in which experiences can be gained and virtues fostered and exercised. Both of these aspects seem to subordinate the Politics to the Ethics: the first makes it preparatory for virtue, the second useful for it.

A parallel can be drawn to the way Aristotle talks about the relation of the Politics to the Rhetoric. Consider the following two passages in Chapter 8 of Book I of the Rhetoric:

The greatest and the most decisive of all things that contributes to being able to be persuasive and to do a beautiful job at giving advice is to have a grasp of all forms of government. (1365b 20)

So the future or present things we need to strive for in making exhortations, and the things among which we need to find persuasive arguments having to do with what is advantageous, and also the means and manner for us to be equipped to deal with the kinds of character and customary practices in the various forms of government, to an extent commensurate with the present occasion, have been stated; these things are investigated with precision in the Politics. (1366a 18)

In the first passage, Aristotle states that the understanding of various forms of government is the greatest and most decisive contrib-



utor to being able to make persuasive arguments. In the second, he says that the study of various forms of government (along with other things) are investigated “with precision” in the *Politics*. Therefore, just as the *Ethics* treats issues related to virtue with more precision than the less theoretical *Politics* (which describes a political life through which virtues can be fostered and exercised), so too does the *Politics* treat the political life with more precision than the *Rhetoric* (which describes practical activities in the political life such as making persuasive arguments). This resembles a proportion in which degree of ‘practicality’ defines the equal relationships: as the *Ethics* is to the *Politics*, so is the *Politics* to the *Rhetoric*. Ordered from most to least practical, then, it appears the *Politics* stands in the middle, with *Ethics* on the one side and the *Rhetoric* on the other.

But if one looks to other places in these books, their relations seem less orderly, more complicated and yet, in a way, more reciprocal. Whether the *Politics* is still in the middle among these complex relations is worth exploring.

Let’s first revisit the *Politics*’ relation to the *Ethics* and then its relation to the *Rhetoric*. At the beginning of the *Politics*, Aristotle states that since the city aims at the most sovereign goods, it is therefore the most sovereign of all associations and encompasses all others. In Book VIII, Chapter 9 of the *Ethics*, he expands on this idea:

But all communities are like parts of the political community, for people come together for some advantage, and to provide for something that contributes to life, and the political community seems to gather together from the beginning, and to remain together, for the sake of what is advantageous... So the other communities aim at what is advantageous in a partial way; for example, sailors aim at what results from a voyage for making money, or something of that sort, and fellow soldiers aim at what results from warfare, grasping at money or victory or a city... But all of these appear to be under the political community, since the political community aims not at a present advantage but one that extends to all of life. (1160a 9–25)

These passages seem to place the relationship between the *Ethics* and the *Politics* in a different light. For the city now is the entity that

encompasses not only all communities, but also what is advantageous for all of life. In a passage quoted earlier, Aristotle goes even further in linking politics to the soul.

And this leads straight to a consideration of the soul, for there is in it by nature something ruling and something ruled, of which we claim there are different virtues, as of the part having reason and the irrational part. It is evident, then, that things are the same in the other cases as well, so that most things are ruling or ruled by nature. For it is in different ways that the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child, and while the parts of the soul are present in them all, they are present in differing ways. For the Slave wholly lacks the deliberative capacity, while the female has it, but without authority, and the child has it, but incomplete.” (1260a 5–15)

Compared to similar passages regarding the soul in the *Ethics*, this is a much more forceful description in the sense that it makes politics the pattern of the human soul. According to this passage, politics is not an external activity that we do “out there,” but an internal activity among parts of the soul. This relationship of the soul is exhibited externally by various types of rule—one can therefore tell the condition of a man’s soul by looking at the type of rule in which he is engaged. Politics, then, is the soul writ large and is the most fundamental work of a human being. A human being is a political animal who needs to rule and be ruled because the human soul is of such a nature. And this need becomes more complex as one matures. One will need to know whom to rule and by whom to be ruled, as well as at which time and in what manner each of these is fitting. As this ruling-ruled relationship becomes more complex, virtue also becomes more complex. What was simply “courage” now branches out into different types of courage. The mean in moral virtues, which changes according to different circumstances, must also be affected by ruling and ruled relations. What is truly at work is not courage, but the courage that belongs to one who is ruling, or one who is ruled, to a man or a woman. Therefore, “those who speak in general terms are fooling themselves, saying that virtue is the good condition of the soul, or acting rightly, or anything of that sort.” For the general terms do not make clear what the appropriate work is for each human being,

and politics is that which gives the moral virtues their appropriateness. Therefore, politics is the underpinning activity through which moral virtues become real and achievable. For moral virtues imply the proper ordering of the soul, which in turn implies the proper ruling-ruled relationship among different parts of the soul. If we return to the metaphor of the soil preparing for the seed, we can now see that the soil is not merely a physical platform upon which the seed grows; it also “nurtures” the seed, as Aristotle says. The same can be said about politics—it “nurtures” ethics. It is the living force that allows and assists the seed to grow and flourish. In this way, the relationship between the Ethics and the Politics is perhaps similar to that of the household and city—for in one way the household is prior, but in another the city is prior. Similarly, in one sense the Ethics is prior, but in another it must presuppose the Politics.

We now turn to the second two terms in the aforementioned proportion, the Politics and the Rhetoric, with a special attention to one type of rhetoric—the advisory rhetoric. It has been said that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a refutation of Socrates’ view of rhetoric as expressed in *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*. Whether this is true or not—and if it is true, to what extent they disagree—remains a question. However, the following passages from the Rhetoric seem to show that Aristotle differs from Socrates in at least some respects:

To the extent one tries to make either dialectic or this art [rhetoric] into a kind of knowledge rather than a power, he will unwittingly obliterate their nature by the transformation, re-making them into knowledge of some underlying subject matter rather than of arguments only. (1359b 15)

Even though the same proceeding applies to speaking to public assemblies and to lawcourt, the business of the public assembly is of greater beauty and greater civic importance than that involved in private transactions. (1354b 25)

In the first passage, Aristotle appears to contradict Socrates’ claim that true rhetoric should be grounded in knowledge; in the second, he seems to disagree that true rhetoric can only be practiced in private settings, claiming instead that public rhetoric has a greater beauty

and a rightful place. Together these form a general view of rhetoric: namely, that it is not knowledge but a power of seeing what is persuasive broadly (that is, in any subject matter). If it were made a proper knowledge, it would cease to be rhetoric in the strict sense of the word, since it would no longer be characteristically broad in scope, but restricted to a particular subject matter. Rhetoric, then, has a very special place among arts: despite being an art, it is not grounded in knowledge and is not restricted to one particular type of expertise; rather, it remains open to a wide range of issues in the realm of human action. Within this general sphere, advisory rhetoric is particularly important because its beauty lies precisely in the public arena.

One may wonder what ground there is for Aristotle to make such claims. Since the current inquiry is about the relationship between the Politics and the Rhetoric, we will approach the question from this perspective, considering here a passage from each:

For nature, as we claim, does nothing uselessly, and a human being, alone among animals, has speech. And while the voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and belongs also to the other animals on that account... speech is for disclosing what is advantageous and what is harmful, and so too what is just and what is unjust. (1253a 9)

The end is different for each of these... For the advisory speaker, it is what is advantageous or harmful, since someone who exhorts is advising something as best, and someone who warns is warning against something as worse; other things, that it is just or unjust, beautiful or shameful, they take as side-issues to that. (1358b25)

In the passage from the Politics, Aristotle claims that human beings alone are endowed with the power of speech for the purpose of disclosing what is advantageous and harmful, and we see in the passage from the Rhetoric that this is exactly what is said regarding the end of advisory rhetoric. Clearly then, rhetoric—especially advisory rhetoric—is a uniquely human activity and has its source in nature. From the Politics' point of view, advisory rhetoric is a better cause in the realm of human action because it moves human beings to act by employing reason and persuasion rather than something extraneous like force or coercion. In a public speech, this use

of reason and the power of speech is an expression of the foresight to see what means of persuasion are available for any given issue and the ability to present alternatives and articulate the advantages and disadvantages of each. This ability to present alternatives is in turn related to another uniquely human quality—the sense of time. Advisory rhetoric is specifically linked to the future, for, when it comes to this type of persuasion, it is meaningless to present alternatives and opposites that were in the past or are in the present because only alternatives in the future can be acted upon and therefore deliberated and advised about. This inherent connection to our sense of time further illuminates why rhetoric occupies a rightful place in human arts, since it involves a kind of foresight and seeing of which no other animals are capable.

Ultimately, however, the legitimacy of advisory rhetoric and rhetoric in general has its justification in one extraordinary ability that underlies all the others mentioned above—our ability to reason to opposite conclusions. This ability is so unusual that it goes beyond not only animal instinct but also most of the human arts. According to Aristotle dialectic is the only other art with this ability, which is the reason why rhetoric is said to be analogous to it.

Yet, as discussed earlier, certain types of human associations—the private domains of household and village —do not encourage this extraordinary human activity. This is because the forms of rule in the household and village are for the most part based on inequalities and natural distinctions, and these tend to transform these private interactions into either instructions (between parents and children), or coercion (between masters and slaves). Even the rule between husband and wife is not favorable to the exercise of rhetoric because of the lack of authority on the part of women. For rhetoric to be fully exercised, there has to be a place where individuals can be taken out of their narrow and private domain and placed with others who are like them. It is here that the crucial role of politics becomes apparent: It is only in the city that people meet one another as equals (as citizens). Furthermore, of the two primary public institutions where rhetoric

is commonly exercised—the public assembly and the court—the former surpasses the latter because it is there that the citizens' interests and the common public interests intersect. In a properly functioning public assembly, all members are equal, physical strength plays no role, both the future of the city and the private interests at hand are discussed, and decisions will affect both others and oneself. To move other members on any given issue, one has to be able to present what he sees as the alternatives and opposites, the reasons and justifications that lead to each, and how they are related to the common interest as well as to one's own. It is only in the city, therefore, that rhetoric as a uniquely human activity can be fully at work. It is then reasonable to say that if nature does nothing in vain and she endows human beings with the power of speech to disclose advantage and harm, and if an important part of rhetoric (advisory rhetoric) is aimed at such disclosures, then the city is the place where nature's work comes to full fruition. Without the city, nature would have done something in vain.

It is worth noticing that among different forms of government, public assembly plays the most important role in the “best possible” government (constitutional rule), since in it citizens take turns ruling the city, making decisions by coming together for discussion and debate. It is interesting to note that rhetoric, the counterpart to dialectic, finds the best place for its practice in the “best possible” form of government. If the contemplation described in the *Ethics* is primarily a private activity, and rhetoric a kind of beholding, then rhetoric is perhaps an imitation of contemplation in the public arena. If this is true, then the city in general—and the constitutional rule in particular—provides the ground where private contemplation and its public counterpart meet. The *Politics*, then, would indeed be the middle term of the *Ethics* and *Rhetoric*, for through it the two types of contemplation—theoretical and rhetorical, private and public—connect.

## F

# Nations by Consent

*by Murray Rothbard, Fall 1994*

Libertarians tend to focus on two important units of analysis: the individual and the state. And yet, one of the most dramatic and significant events of our time has been the reemergence—with a bang—in the last five years of a third and much neglected aspect of the real world, the “nation.” When the “nation” has been thought of at all, it usually comes attached to the state, as in the common word, “the nation-state,” but this concept takes a particular development of recent centuries and elaborates it into a universal maxim. In the last five years, however, we have seen, as a corollary of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, a vivid and startlingly swift decomposition of the centralized State or alleged nation-State into its constituent nationalities. The genuine nation, or nationality, has made a dramatic reappearance on the world stage.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

### The Reemergence of the Nation

The “nation,” of course, is not the same thing as the state, a difference that earlier libertarians and classical liberals such as Ludwig von Mises and Albert Jay Nock understood full well. Contemporary libertarians often assume, mistakenly, that individuals are bound to each other only by the nexus of market exchange. They forget that everyone is necessarily born into a family, a language, and a culture. Every person is born into one or several overlapping communities, usually including an ethnic group, with specific values, cultures, religious beliefs, and traditions. He is generally born into a “country.” He is always born into a specific historical context of time and place, meaning neighborhood and land area.

The modern European nation-state, the typical “major power,” began not as a nation at all, but as an “imperial” conquest of one nationality—usually at the “center” of the resulting country, and based

in the capital city—over other nationalities at the periphery. Since a ‘nation’ is a complex of subjective feelings of nationality based on objective realities, the imperial central states have had varying degrees of success in forging among their subject nationalities at the periphery a sense of national unity incorporating submission to the imperial center. In Great Britain, the English have never truly eradicated national aspirations among the submerged Celtic nationalities, the Scots and the Welsh, although Cornish nationalism seems to have been mostly stamped out. In Spain, the conquering Castilians, based in Madrid, have never managed—as the world saw at the Barcelona Olympics—to erase nationalism among the Catalans, the Basques, or even the Galicians or Andalusians. The French, moving out from their base in Paris, have never totally tamed the Bretons, the Basques, or the people of the Languedoc.

It is now well known that the collapse of the centralizing and imperial Russian Soviet Union has lifted the lid on the dozens of previously suppressed nationalisms within the former U.S.S.R., and it is now becoming clear that Russia itself, or rather “the Russian Federated Republic,” is simply a slightly older imperial formation in which the Russians, moving out from their Moscow center, forcibly incorporated many nationalities including the Tartars, the Yakuts, the Chechens, and many others. Much of the U.S.S.R. stemmed from imperial Russian conquest in the nineteenth century, during which the clashing Russians and British managed to carve up much of central Asia.

The “nation” cannot be precisely defined; it is a complex and varying constellation of different forms of communities, languages, ethnic groups, or religions. Some nations or nationalities, such as the Slovenes, are both a separate ethnic group and a language; others, such as the warring groups in Bosnia, are the same ethnic group whose language is the same but who differ in the form of alphabet, and who clash fiercely on religion (the Eastern Orthodox Serbs, the Catholic Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims, who, to make matters more complicated, were originally champions of the Manichaeen



Bogomil heresy).

The question of nationality is made more complex by the interplay of objectively existing reality and subjective perceptions. In some cases, such as Eastern European nationalities under the Habsburgs or the Irish under the British, nationalisms, including submerged and sometimes dying languages, had to be consciously preserved, generated, and expanded. In the nineteenth century this was done by a determined intellectual elite, struggling to revive peripheries living under, and partially absorbed by, the imperial center.

### The Fallacy of “Collective Security”

The problem of the nation has been aggravated in the twentieth century by the overriding influence of Wilsonianism on U.S. and world-wide foreign policy. I refer not to the idea of “national self-determination,” observed mainly in the breach after World War I, but to the concept of “collective security against aggression.” The fatal flaw in this seductive concept is that it treats nation-states by an analogy with individual aggressors, with the “world community” in the guise of a cop-on-the-corner. The cop, for example, sees A aggressing against, or stealing the property of B; the cop naturally rushes to defend B’s private property, in his person or possessions. In the same way, wars between two nations or states are assumed to have a similar aspect: State A invades, or “aggresses against,” State B; State A is promptly designated “the aggressor” by the “international policeman” or his presumptive surrogate, be it the League of Nations, the United Nations, the U.S. President or Secretary of State, or the editorial writer of the August New York Times. Then the world police force, whatever it may be, is supposed to swing promptly into action to stop the “principle of aggression,” or to prevent the “aggressor,” be it Saddam Hussein or the Serbian guerrillas in Bosnia, from fulfilling their presumed goals of swimming across the Atlantic and murdering every resident of New York or Washington, D.C.

A crucial flaw in this popular line of argument goes deeper than

the usual discussion of whether or not American air power or troops can really eradicate Iraqis or Serbs without too much difficulty. The crucial flaw is the implicit assumption of the entire analysis: that every nation-state "owns" its entire geographical area in the same just and proper way that every individual property owner owns his person and the property that he has inherited, worked for, or gained in voluntary exchange. Is the boundary of the typical nation-state really as just or as beyond cavil as your or my house, estate, or factory!

It seems to me that not only the classical liberal or the libertarian, but anyone of good sense who thinks about this problem, must answer a resounding "No." It is absurd to designate every nation-state, with its self-proclaimed boundary as it exists at any one time, as somehow right and sacrosanct, each with its "territorial integrity" to remain as spotless and unbreached as your or my bodily person or private property. Invariably, of course, these boundaries have been acquired by force and violence, or by interstate agreement above and beyond the heads of the inhabitants on the spot, and invariably these boundaries shift a great deal over time in ways that make proclamations of "territorial integrity" truly ludicrous.

Take, for example, the current mess in Bosnia. Only a couple of years ago, Establishment opinion, Received Opinion of Left, Right, or Center, loudly proclaimed the importance of maintaining "the territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia, and bitterly denounced all secession movements. Now, only a short time later, the same Establishment, only recently defending the Serbs as champions of "the Yugoslav nation" against vicious secessionist movements trying to destroy that "integrity," now reviles and wishes to crush the Serbs for "aggression" against the "territorial integrity" of "Bosnia" or "Bosnia-Herzegovina," a trumped-up "nation" that had no more existence than the "nation of Nebraska" before 1991. But these are the pitfalls in which we are bound to fall if we remain trapped by the mythology of the "nation-state" whose chance boundary at time  $t$  must be upheld as a property-owning entity with its own sacred and inviolable "rights," in a deeply flawed analogy with the rights of private property.

To adopt an excellent stratagem of Ludwig von Mises in abstracting from contemporary emotions: Let us postulate two contiguous nation-states, “Ruritania” and “Fredonia.” Let us assume that Ruritania has suddenly invaded eastern Fredonia, and claims it as its own. Must we automatically condemn Ruritania for its evil “act of aggression” against Fredonia, and send troops, either literally or metaphorically, against the brutal Ruritarians and in behalf of “brave, little” Fredonia? By no means. For it is very possible that, say, two years ago, eastern Fredonia had been part and parcel of Ruritania, was indeed western Ruritania, and that the Rurs, ethnic and national denizens of the land, have been crying out for the past two years against Fredonian oppression. In short, in international disputes in particular, in the immortal words of W. S. Gilbert:

Things are seldom what they seem,  
Skim milk masquerades as cream.

The Beloved international cop, whether it be Boutros Boutros-Ghali or U.S. troops or the New York Times editorialist had best think more than twice before leaping into the fray.

Americans are especially unsuited for their self-proclaimed Wilsonian role as world moralists and policemen. Nationalism in the U.S. is peculiarly recent, and is more of an idea than it is rooted in long-standing ethnic or nationality groups or struggles. Add to that deadly mix the fact that Americans have virtually no historical memory, and this makes Americans peculiarly unsuited to barreling in to intervene in the Balkans, where who took what side at what place in the war against the Turkish invaders in the fifteenth century is far more intensely real to most of the contenders than is yesterday’s dinner.

Libertarians and classical liberals, who are particularly well-equipped to rethink the entire muddled area of the nation-state and foreign affairs, have been too wrapped up in the Cold War against communism and the Soviet Union to engage in fundamental thinking on these issues. Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed and the Cold War is over, perhaps classical liberals will feel free to think anew about these critically important problems.

## Rethinking Secession

First, we can conclude that not all state boundaries are just. One goal for libertarians should be to transform existing nation-states into national entities whose boundaries could be called just, in the same sense that private property boundaries are just; that is, to decompose existing coercive nation-states into genuine nations, or nations by consent.

In the case, for example, of the eastern Fredonians, the inhabitants should be able to secede voluntarily from Fredonia and join their comrades in Ruritania. Again, classical liberals should resist the impulse to say that national boundaries “don’t make any difference.” It’s true, of course, as classical liberals have long proclaimed, that the less the degree of government intervention in either Fredonia or Ruritania, the less difference such a boundary will make. But even under a minimal state, national boundaries would still make a difference, often a big one to the inhabitants of the area. For in what language—Ruritanian or Fredonian or both?—will be the street signs, telephone books, court proceedings, or school classes of the area?

In short, every group, every nationality, should be allowed to secede from any nation-state and to join any other nation-state that agrees to have it. That simple reform would go a long way toward establishing nations by consent. The Scots, if they want to, should be allowed by the English to leave the United Kingdom, and to become independent, and even to join a Gaelic Confederation, if the constituents so desire.

A common response to a world of proliferating nations is to worry about the multitude of trade barriers that might be erected. But, other things being equal, the greater the number of new nations, and the smaller the size of each, the better. For it would be far more difficult to sow the illusion of self-sufficiency if the slogan were “Buy North Dakotan” or even “Buy 56th Street” than it now is to convince the public to “Buy American.” Similarly, “Down with South Dakota,” or a fanion, “Down with 55th Street,” would be a more difficult sell

than spreading fear or hatred of the Japanese. Similarly, the absurdities and the unfortunate consequences of fiat paper money would be far more evident if each province or each neighborhood or street block were to print its own currency. A more decentralized world would be far more likely to turn to sound market commodities, such as gold or silver, for its money.

## The Pure Anarcho-Capitalist Model

I raise the pure anarcho-capitalist model in this paper, not so much to advocate the model per se as to propose it as a guide for settling vexed current disputes about nationality. The pure model, simply, is that no land areas, no square footage in the world, shall remain "public"; every square foot of land area, be they streets, squares, or neighborhoods, is privatized. Total privatization would help solve nationality problems, often in surprising ways, and I suggest that existing states, or classical liberal states, try to approach such a system even while some land areas remain in the governmental sphere.

Unaltered revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

### Open Borders, or the Camp-of-the-Saints Problem

The question of open borders, or free immigration, has become an accelerating problem for classical liberals. This is first, because the welfare state increasingly subsidizes immigrants to enter and receive permanent assistance, and second, because cultural boundaries have become increasingly swamped. I began to rethink my views on immigration when, as the Soviet Union collapsed, it became clear that ethnic Russians had been encouraged to flood into Estonia and Latvia in order to destroy the cultures and languages of these peoples. Previously, it had been easy to dismiss as unrealistic Jean Raspail's anti-immigration novel *The Camp of the Saints*, in which virtually the entire population of India decides to move, in small boats, into France, and the French, infected by liberal ideology, cannot summon the will to prevent economic and cultural national destruction. As cultural

and welfare-state problems have intensified, it became impossible to dismiss Raspail's concerns any longer.

However, on rethinking immigration on the basis of the anarcho-capitalist model, it became clear to me that a totally privatized country would not have "open borders" at all. If every piece of land in a country were owned by some person, group, or corporation, this would mean that no immigrant could enter there unless invited to enter and allowed to rent, or purchase, property. A totally privatized country would be as "closed" as the particular inhabitants and property owners desire. It seems clear, then, that the regime of open borders that exists *de facto* in the U.S. really amounts to a compulsory opening by the central state, the state in charge of all streets and public land areas, and does not genuinely reflect the wishes of the proprietors.

Under total privatization, many local conflicts and "externality" problems—not merely the immigration problem—would be neatly settled. With every locale and neighborhood owned by private firms, corporations, or contractual communities, true diversity would reign, in accordance with the preferences of each community. Some neighborhoods would be ethnically or economically diverse, while others would be ethnically or economically homogeneous. Some localities would permit pornography or prostitution or drugs or abortions, others would prohibit any or all of them. The prohibitions would not be state imposed, but would simply be requirements for residence or use of some person's or community's land area. While statists who have the itch to impose their values on everyone else would be disappointed, every group or interest would at least have the satisfaction of living in neighborhoods of people who share its values and preferences. While neighborhood ownership would not provide Utopia or a panacea for all conflict, it would at least provide a "second-best" solution that most people might be willing to live with.

## Enclaves and Exclaves

One obvious problem with the secession of nationalities from centralized states concerns mixed areas, or enclaves and exclaves. Decomposing the swollen central nation-state of Yugoslavia into constituent parts has solved many conflicts by providing independent nationhood for Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats, but what about Bosnia, where many towns and villages are mixed? One solution is to encourage more of the same, through still more decentralization. If, for example, eastern Sarajevo is Serb and western Sarajevo is Muslim, then they become parts of their respective separate nations.

But this of course will result in a large number of enclaves, parts of nations surrounded by other nations. How can this be solved? In the first place, the enclave/exclave problem exists right now. One of the most vicious existing conflicts, in which the US has not yet meddled because it has not yet been shown on CNN, is the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian exclave totally surrounded by, and therefore formally within, Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh should clearly be part of Armenia. But, how then, will Armenians of Karabakh avoid their present fate of blockade by Azeris, and how will they avoid military battles in trying to keep open a land corridor to Armenia?

Under total privatization, of course, these problems would disappear. Nowadays, no one in the U.S. buys land without making sure that his title to the land is clear; in the same way, in a fully privatized world, access rights would obviously be a crucial part of land ownership. In such a world, then, Karabakh property owners would make sure that they had purchased access rights through an Azeri land corridor.

Decentralization also provides a workable solution for the seemingly insoluble permanent conflict in Northern Ireland. When the British partitioned Ireland in the early 1920s, they agreed to perform a second, a more micro-managed, partition. They never carried through on this promise. If the British would permit a detailed,

parish by parish, partition vote in Northern Ireland, however, most of the land area, which is majority Catholic, would probably hive off and join the Republic: such counties as Tyrone and Fermanagh, southern Down, and southern Armagh, for example. The Protestants would probably be left with Belfast, county Antrim, and other areas north of Belfast. The major remaining problem would be the Catholic enclave within the city of Belfast, but again, an approach to the anarcho-capitalist model could be attained by permitting the purchase of access rights to the enclave.

Pending total privatization, it is clear that our model could be approached, and conflicts minimized, by permitting secessions and local control, down to the micro-neighborhood level, and by developing contractual access rights for enclaves and exclaves. In the U.S., it becomes important, in moving toward such radical decentralization, for libertarians and classical liberals—indeed, for many other minority or dissident groups—to begin to lay the greatest stress on the forgotten Tenth Amendment and to try to decompose the role and power of the centralizing Supreme Court. Rather than trying to get people of one's own ideological persuasion on the Supreme Court, its power should be rolled back and minimized as far as possible, and its power decomposed into state, or even local, judicial bodies.

### Citizenship and Voting Rights

One vexing current problem centers on who becomes the citizen of a given country, since citizenship confers voting rights. The Anglo-American model, in which every baby born in the country's land area automatically becomes a citizen, clearly invites welfare immigration by expectant parents. In the U.S., for example, a current problem is illegal immigrants whose babies, if born on American soil, automatically become citizens and therefore entitle themselves and their parents to permanent welfare payments and free medical care. Clearly the French system, in which one has to be born to a citizen to become



an automatic citizen, is far closer to the idea of a nation-by-consent.

It is also important to rethink the entire concept and function of voting. Should anyone have a “right” to vote? Rose Wilder Lane, the mid-twentieth century U.S. libertarian theorist, was once asked if she believed in womens’ suffrage. “No,” she replied, “and I’m against male suffrage as well.” The Latvians and Estonians have cogently tackled the problem of Russian immigrants by allowing them to continue permanently as residents, but not granting them citizenship or therefore the right to vote. The Swiss welcome temporary guest-workers, but severely discourage permanent immigration, and, a fortiori, citizenship and voting.

Let us turn for enlightenment, once again, to the anarcho-capitalist model. What would voting be like in a totally privatized society? Not only would voting be diverse, but more importantly, who would really care? Probably the most deeply satisfying form of voting to an economist is the corporation, or joint-stock company, in which voting is proportionate to one’s share of ownership of the firm’s assets. But also there are, and would be, a myriad of private clubs of all sorts. It is usually assumed that club decisions are made on the basis of one vote per member, but that is generally untrue. Undoubtedly, the best-run and most pleasant clubs are those run by a small, self-perpetuating oligarchy of the ablest and most interested, a system most pleasant for the rank-and-file nonvoting member as well as for the elite. If I am a rank-and-file member of, say a chess club, why should I worry about voting if I am satisfied with the way the club is run? And if I am interested in running things, I would probably be asked to join the ruling elite by the grateful oligarchy, always on the lookout for energetic members. And finally, if I am unhappy about the way the club is run, I can readily quit and join another club, or even form one of my own. That, of course, is one of the great virtues of a free and privatized society, whether we are considering a chess club or a contractual neighborhood community.

Clearly, as we begin to work toward the pure model, as more and more areas and parts of life become either privatized or micro-

decentralized, the less important voting will become. Of course, we are a long way from this goal. But it is important to begin, and particularly to change our political culture, which treats “democracy,” or the “right” to vote, as the supreme political good. In fact, the voting process should be considered trivial and unimportant at best, and never a “right,” apart from a possible mechanism stemming from a consensual contract. In the modern world, democracy or voting is only important either to join in or ratify the use of the government to control others, or to use it as a way of preventing one’s self or one’s group from being controlled. Voting, however, is at best, an inefficient instrument for self-defense, and it is far better to replace it by breaking up central government power altogether.

In sum, if we proceed with the decomposition and decentralization of the modern centralizing and coercive nation-state, deconstructing that state into constituent nationalities and neighborhoods, we shall at one and the same time reduce the scope of government power, the scope and importance of voting and the extent of social conflict. The scope of private contract, and of voluntary consent, will be enhanced, and the brutal and repressive state will be gradually dissolved into a harmonious and increasingly prosperous social order.

## G

### Natural Elites, Intellectuals, and the State

*by Hans Hermann Hoppe, July 21, 2006*

A state is a territorial monopolist of compulsion, an agency which may engage in continual, institutionalized property rights violations and the exploitation of private property owners through expropriation, taxation, and regulation.

But how do states come into existence? There are two theories on the origin of states. One view is associated with names such as Franz Oppenheimer, Alexander Ruestow, and Albert Jay Nock, and claims that states originated as the result of the military conquest of one group by another. This is the theory of the exogeneous origin of the state.

But this view has been severely criticized on historical as well as theoretical grounds by ethnographers and anthropologists such as Wilhelm Muehlmann. These critics point out that not all states originated from external conquest. Indeed, critics consider the view that the very first states were the result of nomadic herdsman superimposing themselves on settled farmers as chronologically false. Moreover, this view suffers theoretically from the problem that conquest itself seems to presuppose a state-like organization among the conquerors. Hence, the exogeneous origin of states requires a more fundamental theory of the endogeneous origin of the state.

Such a theory has been presented by Bertrand de Jouvenel . According to his view, states are the outgrowth of natural elites: the natural outcome of voluntary transactions between private property owners is non-egalitarian, hierarchical, and elitist. In every society, a few individuals acquire the status of an elite through talent. Due to superior achievements of wealth, wisdom, and bravery, these individuals come to possess natural authority, and their opinions and judgments enjoy wide-spread respect. Moreover, because of selective mating, marriage, and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, positions of natural authority are likely to be passed on within a

few noble families. It is to the heads of these families with long-established records of superior achievement, farsightedness, and exemplary personal conduct that men turn with their conflicts and complaints against each other. These leaders of the natural elite act as judges and peacemakers, often free of charge out of a sense of duty expected of a person of authority or out of concern for civil justice as a privately produced “public good.”

The small but decisive step in the transition to a state consists precisely of the monopolization of the function of judge and peacemaker. This occurred once a single member of the voluntarily acknowledged natural elite was able to insist, despite the opposition of other members of the elite, that all conflicts within a specified territory be brought before him. Conflicting parties could no longer choose any other judge or peacemaker.

## Outdated revision.

### Origin of Monarchy

Once the origin of a state is seen as the outgrowth of a prior, hierarchically structured order of natural elites, it becomes clear why mankind, insofar as it was subject to government at all, has been under monarchical (rather than democratic) rule for most of its history. There have been exceptions, of course: Athenian democracy, Rome until 31 BC, the republics of Venice, Florence, and Genoa during the Renaissance, the Swiss cantons since 1291, the United Provinces (the Netherlands) from 1648 until 1673, and England under Cromwell. But these were rare occurrences, and none of them remotely resembled modern, one-man-one-vote democratic systems. Rather, they too were highly elitist. In Athens, for instance, no more than 5% of the population voted and was eligible for positions of rulership. It was not until after the end of World War I that mankind truly left the monarchical age.

## Power Monopolized

From the moment when a single member of the natural elite successfully monopolized the function of judge and peacemaker, law and law enforcement became more expensive. Instead of being offered free of charge or in exchange for voluntary payment, it was financed by a compulsory tax. At the same time, the quality of law deteriorated. Rather than upholding ancient private property laws and applying universal and immutable principles of justice, a monopolistic judge, who did not have to fear losing clients as the result of being less than impartial, would pervert the existing law to his own advantage.

How was this small yet decisive step of monopolizing law and order by a king, which predictably led to higher prices and a lower quality of justice, possible? Certainly, other members of the natural elite would resist any such attempt. Yet this is why the eventual kings typically aligned themselves with the “people” or the “common man.” Appealing to the always popular sentiment of envy, kings promised the people cheaper and better justice in exchange for and at the expense of taxing—cutting down size—their own betters (the king’s competitors.) Second, kings enlisted the help of the class of intellectuals.

## Role of Intellectuals

The demand for intellectual services could be expected to grow with increasing standards of living. However, most people are concerned with rather earthly and mundane affairs, and have little use for intellectual endeavors. Apart from the Church, the only people with a demand for the services of intellectuals were members of the natural elite—as teachers for their children, personal advisors, secretaries, and librarians. Employment for intellectuals was precarious and payment typically low. Furthermore, while the members of the natural elite were only rarely intellectuals themselves (i.e., people spending all of their time on scholarly pursuits) but were instead people concerned with the conduct of earthly enterprises, they were typically at

least as bright as their intellectual employees, so the esteem for the achievements of “their” intellectuals was only modest.

It is hardly surprising, then, that intellectuals, suffering from a greatly inflated self-image, resented this fact. How unjust that those—the natural elites—who were taught by them were actually their superiors and led a comfortable life while they—the intellectuals—were comparatively poor and dependent. It is also no wonder that intellectuals could be won over easily by a king in his attempt to establish himself as the monopolist of justice. In exchange for their ideological justification of monarchical rule, the king could not only offer them better and higher-status employment, but as royal court intellectuals they finally could pay the natural elites back for their lack of respect.

Still, the improvement of the position of the intellectual class was only moderate. Under monarchical rule, there was a clear-cut distinction between the ruler (the king) and the ruled, and the ruled knew that they could never become ruler. Accordingly, there was considerable resistance not only by the natural elites but also by the common people against any increase in the king’s power. It was thus extremely difficult for the king to raise taxes, and the employment opportunities for intellectuals remained highly limited. In addition, once safely entrenched, the king did not treat his intellectuals much better than did the natural elites. And given that a king controlled larger territories than natural elites ever did, to fall out of his favor was even more dangerous and made the intellectuals’ position in some ways more capricious.

An inspection of the biographies of leading intellectuals—from Shakespeare to Goethe, from Descartes to Locke, from Marx to Spencer—shows roughly the same pattern: until well into the 19th century, their work was sponsored by private donors, members of the natural elite, princes, or kings. Falling in or out of favor with their sponsors, they frequently changed employment and were geographically highly mobile. While this often meant financial insecurity, it contributed not only to a unique cosmopolitanism of intellectuals (as indicated by their proficiency in numerous languages,) but also to an

unusual intellectual independence. If one donor or sponsor no longer supported them, many others existed who would happily fill the gap. Indeed, intellectual and cultural life flourished the most, and the independence of intellectuals was the greatest, where the position of the king or the central government was relatively weak and that of the natural elites had remained relatively strong.

## Rise of Democracy

A fundamental change in the relationship between the state, natural elites, and intellectuals only occurred with the transition from monarchical to democratic rule. It was the inflated price of justice and the perversions of ancient law by kings as monopolistic judges and peacekeepers that motivated the historical opposition against monarchy. But confusion as to the causes of this phenomenon prevailed. There were those who recognized correctly that the problem was with monopoly, not with elites or nobility. However, they were far outnumbered by those who erroneously blamed the elitist character of the ruler for the problem, and who advocated maintaining the monopoly of law and law enforcement and merely replacing the king and the highly visible royal pomp with the “people” and the presumed decency of the “common man.” Hence the historic success of democracy.

How ironic that monarchism was destroyed by the same social forces that kings had first stimulated and enlisted when they began to exclude competing natural authorities from acting as judges: the envy of the common men against their betters, and the desire of the intellectuals for their allegedly deserved place in society. When the king’s promises of better and cheaper justice turned out to be empty, intellectuals turned the egalitarian sentiments the kings had previously courted against the monarchical rulers themselves. Accordingly, it appeared logical that kings, too, should be brought down and that the egalitarian policies, which monarchs had initiated, should be carried through to their ultimate conclusion: the monopolistic con-

trol of the judiciary by the common man. To the intellectuals, this meant by them, as the people's spokesmen.

As elementary economic theory could predict, with the transition from monarchical to democratic one-man-one-vote rule and the substitution of the people for the king, matters became worse. The price of justice rose astronomically while the quality of law constantly deteriorated. For what this transition boiled down to was a system of private government ownership—a private monopoly—being replaced by a system of public government ownership—a publicly owned monopoly.

A “tragedy of the commons” was created. Everyone, not just the king, was now entitled to try to grab everyone else's private property. The consequences were more government exploitation (taxation); the deterioration of law to the point where the idea of a body of universal and immutable principles of justice disappeared and was replaced by the idea of law as legislation (made, rather than found and eternally “given” law); and an increase in the social rate of time preference (increased present-orientation).

A king owned the territory and could hand it on to his son, and thus tried to preserve its value. A democratic ruler was and is a temporary caretaker and thus tries to maximize current government income of all sorts at the expense of capital values, and thus wastes.

Here are some of the consequences: during the monarchical age before World War I, government expenditure as a percent of GNP was rarely higher than 5%. Since then it has typically risen to around 50%. Prior to World War I, government employment was typically less than 3% of total employment. Since then it has increased to between 15 and 20%. The monarchical age was characterized by a commodity money (gold) and the purchasing power of money gradually increased. In contrast, the democratic age is the age of paper money whose purchasing power has permanently decreased.

Kings went deeper and deeper into debt, but at least during peacetime they typically reduced their debt load. During the democratic



era government debt has increased in war and in peace to incredible heights. Real interest rates during the monarchical age had gradually fallen to somewhere around 2½%. Since then, real interest rates (nominal rates adjusted for inflation) have risen to somewhere around 5%—equal to 15th-century rates. Legislation virtually did not exist until the end of the 19th century. Today, in a single year, tens of thousands of laws and regulations are passed. Savings rates are declining instead of increasing with increasing incomes, and indicators of family disintegration and crime are moving constantly upward.

### Fate of Natural Elites

While the state fared much better under democratic rule, and while the “people” have fared much worse since they began to rule “themselves,” what about the natural elites and the intellectuals? As regards the former, democratization has succeeded where kings made only a modest beginning: in the ultimate destruction of the natural elite and nobility. The fortunes of the great families have dissipated through confiscatory taxes, during life and at the time of death. These families’ tradition of economic independence, intellectual farsightedness, and moral and spiritual leadership have been lost and forgotten.

Rich men exist today, but more frequently than not they owe their fortunes directly or indirectly to the state. Hence, they are often more dependent on the state’s continued favors than many people of far-lesser wealth. They are typically no longer the heads of long-established leading families, but “nouveaux riches.” Their conduct is not characterized by virtue, wisdom, dignity, or taste, but is a reflection of the same proletarian mass-culture of present-orientation, opportunism, and hedonism that the rich and famous now share with everyone else. Consequently—and thank goodness—their opinions carry no more weight in public opinion than most other people’s.

Democracy has achieved what Keynes only dreamt of: the “euthanasia of the rentier class.” Keynes’s statement that “in the long run we are all dead” accurately expresses the democratic spirit of

our times: present-oriented hedonism. Although it is perverse not to think beyond one's own life, such thinking has become typical. Instead of ennobling the proletarians, democracy has proletarianized the elites and has systematically perverted the thinking and judgment of the masses.

## Fate of Intellectuals

On the other hand, while the natural elites were being destroyed, intellectuals assumed a more prominent and powerful position in society. Indeed, to a large extent they have achieved their goal and have become the ruling class, controlling the state and functioning as monopolistic judge.

This is not to say that democratically elected politicians are all intellectuals (although there are certainly more intellectuals nowadays who become president than there were intellectuals who became king.) After all, it requires somewhat different skills and talents to be an intellectual than it does to have mass-appeal and be a successful fundraiser. But even the non-intellectuals are the products of indoctrination by tax-funded schools, universities, and publicly employed intellectuals, and almost all of their advisors are drawn from this pool.

There are almost no economists, philosophers, historians, or social theorists of rank employed privately by members of the natural elite. And those few of the old elite who remain and who might have purchased their services can no longer afford intellectuals financially. Instead, intellectuals are now typically public employees, even if they work for nominally private institutions or foundations. Almost completely protected from the vagaries of consumer demand ("tenured"), their number has dramatically increased and their compensation is on average far above their genuine market value. At the same time the quality of their intellectual output has constantly fallen.

What you will discover is mostly irrelevance and incomprehensibility. Worse, insofar as today's intellectual output is at all relevant and comprehensible, it is viciously statist. There are exceptions, but

if practically all intellectuals are employed in the multiple branches of the state, then it should hardly come as a surprise that most of their ever-more voluminous output will, either by commission or omission, be statist propaganda. There are more propagandists of democratic rule around today than there were ever propagandists of monarchical rule in all of human history.

This seemingly unstoppable drift toward statism is illustrated by the fate of the so-called Chicago School: Milton Friedman, his predecessors, and his followers. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Chicago School was still considered left-fringe, and justly so, considering that Friedman, for instance, advocated a central bank and paper money instead of a gold standard. He wholeheartedly endorsed the principle of the welfare state with his proposal of a guaranteed minimum income (negative income tax) on which he could not set a limit. He advocated a progressive income tax to achieve his explicitly egalitarian goals (and he personally helped implement the withholding tax). Friedman endorsed the idea that the State could impose taxes to fund the production of all goods that had a positive neighborhood effect or which he thought would have such an effect. This implies, of course, that there is almost nothing that the state can not tax-fund!

In addition, Friedman and his followers were proponents of the shallowest of all shallow philosophies: ethical and epistemological relativism. There is no such thing as ultimate moral truths and all of our factual, empirical knowledge is at best only hypothetically true. Yet they never doubted that there must be a state, and that the state must be democratic.

Today, half a century later, the Chicago-Friedman school, without having essentially changed any of its positions, is regarded as right-wing and free-market. Indeed, the school defines the borderline of respectable opinion on the political Right, which only extremists cross. Such is the magnitude of the change in public opinion that public employees have brought about.

Consider further indicators of the statist deformation brought about by the intellectuals. If one takes a look at election statistics,

one will by and large find the following picture: the longer a person spends in educational institutions, someone with a PhD, for instance, as compared to someone with only a BA, the more likely it is that this person will be ideologically statist and vote Democrat. Moreover, the higher the amount of taxes used to fund education, the lower SAT scores and similar measurements of intellectual performance will fall, and I suspect even further will the traditional standards of moral behavior and civil conduct decline.

Or consider the following indicator: in 1994 it was called a “revolution” and Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, was called a “revolutionary” when he endorsed the New Deal and Social Security, and praised civil rights legislation, i.e., the affirmative action and forced integration which is responsible for the almost complete destruction of private property rights, and the erosion of freedom of contract, association, and disassociation. What kind of a revolution is it where the revolutionaries have wholeheartedly accepted the statist premises and causes of the present disaster? Obviously, this can only be labeled a revolution in an intellectual environment that is statist to the core.

Quintessential revision  
Total revamp in 2023.

### History & Ideas

The situation appears hopeless, but it is not so. First, it must be recognized that the situation can hardly continue forever. The democratic age can hardly be “the end of history,” as the neoconservatives want us to believe, for there is also an economic side to the process.

Market interventions will inevitably cause more of the problems they are supposed to cure, which leads to more and more controls and regulations until we finally reach full-blown socialism. If the current trend continues, it can safely be predicted that the democratic welfare state of the West will eventually collapse as did the “people’s republics” of the East in the late 1980s. For decades, real incomes in the West have stagnated or even fallen. Government debt and the cost of the “social insurance” schemes have brought on the prospect of an economic meltdown. At the same time, social conflict has risen

to dangerous heights.

Perhaps one will have to wait for an economic collapse before the current statist trend changes. But even in the case of a collapse, something else is necessary. A breakdown would not automatically result in a roll-back of the State. Matters could become worse.

In fact, in recent Western history, there are only two clear-cut instances where the powers of the central government were actually reduced, even if only temporarily, as the result of a catastrophe: in West Germany after World War II under Ludwig Erhard, and in Chile under General Pinochet. What is necessary, besides a crisis, is ideas—correct ideas—and men capable of understanding and implementing them once the opportunity arises.

But if the course of history is not inevitable (and it is not) then a catastrophe is neither necessary nor unavoidable. Ultimately, the course of history is determined by ideas, be they true or false, and by men acting upon and being inspired by true or false ideas. Only so long as false ideas rule is a catastrophe unavoidable. On the other hand, once correct ideas are adopted and prevail in public opinion—and ideas can, in principle, be changed almost instantaneously—a catastrophe will not have to occur at all.

## Role of Intellectuals

This brings me to the role intellectuals must play in the necessary radical and fundamental change in public opinion, and the role that members of the natural elites, or whatever is left of them, will also have to play. The demands on both sides are high, yet as high as they are, to prevent a catastrophe or to emerge successfully from it, these demands will have to be accepted by both as their natural duty.

Even if most intellectuals have been corrupted and are largely responsible for the present perversities, it is impossible to achieve an ideological revolution without their help. The rule of the public intellectuals can only be broken by anti-intellectual intellectuals. Fortunately, the ideas of individual liberty, private property, freedom

of contract and association, personal responsibility and liability, and government power as the primary enemy of liberty and property, will not die out as long as there is a human race, simply because they are true and the truth supports itself. Moreover, the books of past thinkers who expressed these ideas will not disappear. However, it is also necessary that there be living thinkers who read such books and who can remember, restate, reapply, sharpen, and advance these ideas, and who are capable and willing to give them personal expression and openly oppose, attack, and refute their fellow intellectuals.

Of these two requirements—intellectual competency and character—the second is the more important, especially in these times. From a purely intellectual point of view, matters are comparatively easy. Most of the statist arguments that we hear day in and out are easily refuted as more or less economic nonsense. It is also not rare to encounter intellectuals who in private do not believe what they proclaim with great fanfare in public. They do not simply err. They deliberately say and write things they know to be untrue. They do not lack intellect; they lack morals. This in turn implies that one must be prepared not only to fight falsehood but also evil—and this is a much more difficult and daring task. In addition to better knowledge, it requires courage.

As an anti-intellectual intellectual, one can expect bribes to be offered—and it is amazing how easily some people can be corrupted: a few hundred dollars, a nice trip, a photo-op with the mighty and powerful are all too often sufficient to make people sell out. Such temptations must be rejected as contemptible. Moreover, in fighting evil, one must be willing to accept that one will probably never be “successful.” There are no riches in store, no magnificent promotions, no professional prestige. In fact, intellectual “fame” should be regarded with utmost suspicion.

Indeed, not only does one have to accept that he will be marginalized by the academic establishment, but he will have to expect that his colleagues will try almost anything to ruin him. Just look at Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard. The two greatest economists

and social philosophers of the 20th century were both essentially unacceptable and unemployable by the academic establishment. Yet throughout their lives, they never gave in, not one inch. They never lost their dignity or even succumbed to pessimism. On the contrary, in the face of constant adversity, they remained undaunted and even cheerful, and worked at a mind-boggling level of productivity. They were satisfied in being devoted to the truth and nothing but the truth.

### Role of Natural Elites

It is here that what is left of the natural elites comes into play. True intellectuals, like Mises and Rothbard, can not do what they need to do without the natural elites. Despite all obstacles, it was possible for Mises and Rothbard to make themselves heard. They were not condemned to silence. They still taught and published. They still addressed audiences and inspired people with their insights and ideas. This would not have been possible without the support of others. Mises had Lawrence Fertig and the William Volker Fund, which paid his salary at NYU, and Rothbard had The Ludwig von Mises Institute, which supported him, helped publish and promote his books, and provided the institutional framework that allowed him to say and write what needed to be said and written, and that can no longer be said and written inside academia and the official, statist establishment media.

Once upon a time, in the pre-democratic age, when the spirit of egalitarianism had not yet destroyed most men of independent wealth and independent minds and judgments, this task of supporting unpopular intellectuals was taken on by individuals. But who can nowadays afford, single-handedly, to employ an intellectual privately, as his personal secretary, advisor, or teacher of his children? And those who still can are more often than not deeply involved in the ever more corrupt big government-big business alliance, and they promote the very same intellectual cretins who dominate statist academia. Just think of Rockefeller and Kissinger, for instance.

Hence, the task of supporting and keeping alive the truths of private property, freedom of contract and association and disassociation, personal responsibility, and of fighting falsehoods, lies, and the evil of statism, relativism, moral corruption, and irresponsibility can nowadays only be taken on collectively by pooling resources and supporting organizations like the Mises Institute, an independent organization dedicated to the values underlying Western civilization, uncompromising and far removed even physically from the corridors of power. Its program of scholarships, teaching, publications, and conferences is nothing less than an island of moral and intellectual decency in a sea of perversion.

To be sure, the first obligation of any decent person is to himself and his family. He should—in the free market—make as much money as he possibly can, because the more money he makes, the more beneficial he has been to his fellow man.

But that is not enough. An intellectual must be committed to the truth, whether or not it pays off in the short run. Similarly, the natural elite have obligations that extend far beyond themselves and their families.

The more successful they are as businessmen and professionals, and the more others recognize them as successful, the more important it is that they set an example: that they strive to live up to the highest standards of ethical conduct. This means accepting as their duty, indeed as their noble duty, to support openly, proudly, and as generously as they possibly can the values that they have recognized as right and true.

They receive in return intellectual inspiration, nourishment, and strength, as well as the knowledge that their name will live forever as outstanding individuals who rose above the masses and made a lasting contribution to mankind.

The Ludwig von Mises Institute can be a mighty institution, a model for the restoration of genuine learning, and a near university of teaching and scholarship. Even if we do not see our ideas triumph



during our lifetime, we will know and be eternally proud that we gave it our all, and that we did what every honest and noble person had to do.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

# H

## What Must be Done

*by Hans Hermann Hoppe, January 24–25, 1997*

A slightly more appropriate title<sup>1</sup> would be “Society, State, and Liberty: The Austro-Libertarian Strategy of Social Revolution.” So I want to step up things a little bit after all these moderate talks that you have heard before. I want to end with some rather concrete strategic advice, but in order to give this first I have to diagnose what the problem is otherwise the cure might be worse than the disease. And this diagnosis involves some sort of systematic reconstruction or theoretical explanation of human history.

### Society and Cooperation

Let me begin with a few words about society. Why is there society? Why do people cooperate? Why is there peaceful cooperation rather than permanent war among mankind? Austrians, and in particular Misesians, emphasize the fact that we do not need to assume anything like sympathy or love for other people in order to explain this. Self-interest—that is, to prefer more over less—is entirely sufficient to explain this phenomenon of cooperation. Men cooperate because they are able to recognize that production under division of labor is more productive than self-sufficient isolation. Imagine just that we would withdraw from division of labor, and you would immediately recognize that we would be desperately poor and most of mankind would immediately die out.

Note one important thing here, and I’ll come back to this. What this explanation implies and what it does not imply: It does not imply of course that there will be always and without any exception or disturbance nothing but peace among men. There are always robbers and murderers around, and every society somehow has to deal with these

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<sup>1</sup>Vladimir Lenin in 1902 titled a book *What is to be Done?* (or *What Must Be Done*) which describes his plans to bring Communism to Russia. Hoppe uses the same title to describe his plans to bring Libertarianism to American society.

types. But what it does imply is that the Hobbesian account of the emergence of peaceful cooperation is fundamentally misconceived.

Thomas Hobbes assumed that people would be permanently at each others throats if it were not for some independent third party—that is the State of course—to make peace among them. Now, you notice immediately what kind of curious construction this. People are assumed to be bad wolves, and they can be turned into sheep if another third wolf is made to rule above them. If this third party is also a wolf, as obviously he must be, then even if he can make peace between two individuals, this obviously implies that there would be a permanent war between the ruling wolf and the two wolves that are now peacefully cooperating with each other.

What this implies is something of great importance. There must be no State, or there must be no independent third party, in order to have cooperation between two individuals. Which you can also recognize immediately if you just look, for instance, at the international scenery. There exists no such thing as a world government—at least not yet—and still, people of different countries still cooperate peacefully with each other. Or, even out of the greatest social chaos, cooperation always emerges again.

What this boils down to is simply that peaceful cooperation between humans is a perfectly natural and constantly reemerging phenomenon; and out of this cooperation then, and equally naturally, and equally driven by self-interest, comes capital formation, and money, the medium of exchange, and then the division of labor ultimately expands to the entire globe, and likewise money, commodity money, also becomes a worldwide used commodity money. Material living standards increase for everyone, and based on higher material living standards, an ever more elaborate superstructure of non-material goods, that is civilization—science, arts, literature, and so forth—can be developed and maintained.

## Protection and the State

But something can and obviously has happened that disrupts and distorts or even derails this normal, self-interest driven development. And this is of course the State, which I will define initially, rather abstractly, as a compulsorily-funded territorial monopolist of protection. That is, a monopolist of defense and the provision and enforcement of law and order.

Now how does a State originate? While this is generally, and I think intentionally, confused, it should be made clear right from the outset that law and order, or protection of property, and State law, and State order, and State protection are not one and the same thing; they are not identical things. Just as property and social cooperation based on the division of labor are natural, so the human desire to have one's property protected against natural and social disasters, such as crime, is a completely natural desire. And in order to satisfy this desire, there is first and foremost self-protection. Precaution, insurance (individual or cooperative), vigilance, self-defense, and punishment.

And let there be absolutely no doubt as to the effectiveness of a protection system based on peoples willingness to defend themselves. This is how law and order was maintained for most of the time for most of mankind. In every village, even up to this day, law and order is basically maintained in this way. The American Wild West, which was not exactly "wild" as compared to the current situation, that's the way law and order was maintained, by people being willing to defend themselves.

Moreover, the division of labor will then naturally affect the production of security and protection services. The higher standards of living grow, the more people will, besides relying on self-defense measures, also want to partake in the advantages of the division of labor, and attach themselves for protection to a specializes protector, to providers of law and order, justice, and protection. And naturally, every person will look for this particular task to persons or institutions who have something to protect themselves—who have the means to

assure effective protection and have a reputation as just and impartial judges. In every society of more than the most minimal degree of complexity, there will quickly emerge specific individuals, who on account of having property to defend, having a good reputation and so forth, will assume the role of judges and peacemakers and protectors. And again, every single village up to this day, every small community, and even the Wild West of course, illustrate the truth of this conclusion.

Protection is also possible without a State. This should be absolutely obvious, but in an age of statist obfuscation and confusion, it is increasingly necessary to emphasize this elementary and yet as we will see, very dangerous insight. The decisive step in diverting human history from its natural course—the original sin of mankind, so to speak—occurs with the monopolization of the provision of protection, defense, security, and order: the monopolization of these tasks by a single one of these initially numerous protectors at the exclusion of all others. A protection monopoly exists once a single agency or a single person can effectively insist that everyone on a given territory must exclusively come to him for justice and protection. That is, that no one can rely exclusively or solely on self-defense, or attach himself for protection to somebody else. Once this monopoly is reached, then funding of this protector is no longer entirely voluntary, but in part becomes compulsory.

And, as standard Austrian economics predicts, once there is no longer free entry into the business of property protection, or any other business for that matter, the price of protection will rise, and the quality of protection will fall. The monopolist will become increasingly less of a protector of our property, and increasingly more a protection racket, or even a systematic exploiter of property owners. He will become an aggressor against and a destroyer of the people and their property that he was initially supposed to protect.

Now what is easily described in abstract terms (monopoly) is in practice a painstaking and lengthy task. How can anyone get away with barring all other protectors from competition? And why would

the people and especially the excluded other potential peacemakers and judges allow such a thing to happen, that one individual monopolizes this service? Now the answer regarding the original of the State is in detail very complicated, but in its general structure is very easy to recognize.

First, every state, that is every monopolistic protection agency, must begin, or can only originate on an extremely small territorial level, such as a village. It is practically inconceivable that a world State, or a protection monopoly encompassing the entire world population could come into existence from scratch.

The second thing we have to notice is that not just anyone become a local protection monopoly. Rather, the local protection monopolists are initially members of the natural social elite. That is, they are initially accomplished and acknowledged members of society. They were also, before they reached the position of a monopolist, previously chosen voluntarily as protectors. Only as established and recognized elites, whose authority is essentially voluntary, is it possible for them to make this decisive step toward monopolization and get away with it.

That is to say, every initial local government or state originates in the form of personal or private lordships or of princely rule. No one would entrust just anyone with the maintenance of law, order, and justice, and in particular if this person or agency had a monopoly for this particular task. Instead, people would look for protection obviously from someone known, and known to be a knowledgeable person, and only such a person, a noble or an aristocrat, can possibly attain a monopoly position initially.

Historically, by the way, if one looks at modern or ancient history, States everywhere are basically first princely States, and only later do they become democratic States. And even though it is true that States must begin only locally and usually as princely States, it still took hundreds of years before anything resembling the modern State came into existence.

## The Impossibility of Limited Government

Now, once the protection monopoly is in place, a logic of its own is set in motion. Every monopolist takes advantage of his position. The price of protection will go up, and more importantly, the content of the law, that is the product quality, will be altered to the advantage of the monopolist and at the expense of others. Justice will be perverted, and the protector becomes increasingly an exploiter and an expropriator. More specifically, as the result of the territorial monopolization of protection, two tendencies are generated. First, a tendency towards the extensification of exploitation, and second, a tendency towards the intensification of exploitation.

Originally local institutions, States have an inherent tendency, driven by self-interest, of wanting more income rather than less—toward territorial expansion. The more subjects a State protects—or rather exploits—the better it is. The competition between States—that is, territorial monopolists—is an eliminative competition: either I am the monopolist or you are the monopolist of ripping people off.

Moreover, with numerous States, people can easily move with their feet. However, a loss of population from the point of view of the State, is a bothersome problem. Hence, States almost automatically come into conflict with each other, and one way of solving this conflict, from a statist viewpoint, is territorial expansion: either by means of war or intermarriage, and sometimes by outright purchase. Ultimately, this tendency would come to a halt only with the establishment of a one-world single state.

The second tendency is the intensification of exploitation. Extensifying exploitation—ripping people off—of a State monopoly, implies in and of itself an intensification, because the smaller the number of competing states—that is, the larger the State territories become—the less are the opportunities of voting with one's feet. And under the scenario of a world State, wherever one goes, the tax and regulation structure is the same. That is, with the threat of immigration gone,

monopolistic exploitation will naturally increase—that is to say, the price of protection will rise, and the quality will fall.

### Monarchy vs. Democracy

However, even apart from this, as soon as a protection monopoly exists, for any given sized territory, the monopolist will try to intensify his exploitation and increase his income and wealth at the expense of the protected subjects to the maximum extent possible. As long as the monopoly is held by a single person, like a prince or a king, and especially when it is a hereditary monopoly, then it is in the monopolist's interest, because he owns the monopoly and the capital value of it, to preserve the value of his property. He will exploit little today in order to exploit more tomorrow.

Popular resistance against expansion of State power will be very high if there is a single person in charge because there is obviously no free entry into the State apparatus, and the benefits of the monopoly accrue to a single man and his extended family—that is, the hereditary nobility. Accordingly, the public resentment and vigilance is heightened, and attempts to intensify exploitation find quick and severe limitations. People hated the king because they realized that “he is the ruler and we are ruled by him.”

Predictably, a great push forward in the State's desire for intensified exploitation occurred only in conjunction with the reform of the State—drawn out over centuries—from a princely to a democratic State. Under modern majoritarian democracy—that is, the type of State that came into full bloom after World War I on a world wide scale—the monopoly and exploitation do not disappear. Majoritarian democracy is not a system of self-rule and self-defense. State and people are not one and the same thing. With the substitution of an elected parliament and presidents for an unelected prince or king, protection remains as much a monopoly as it was before. What happens is only this: the territorial protection monopoly becomes now public rather than private property. Instead of a prince who regards



it as his private property, a temporary and interchangeable caretaker is put in charge of the protection racket. The caretaker does not own the protection racket. Instead, he is just allowed to use the current resources for his own advantage. He owns usufruct but he does not own the capital value. This does not eliminate the self-interest driven tendency toward increased exploitation. To the contrary, it only makes exploitation less rational and less calculating, and more shortsighted and more wasteful.

Moreover, because entry into a democratic government is open—everyone can become president—resistance against State property invasions is reduced. This leads to the same result: increasingly under democratic conditions, the worst will rise to the top of the State in free competition. Competition is not always good. Competition in the field of becoming the shrewdest aggressor against private property is nothing to be greeted. And this is precisely what democracy amounts to.

Princes and kings were dilettantes as rulers, and normally had a good measure of natural elite upbringing and value system so as to act often enough simply as a good household father would have done. Democratic politicians on the other hand, are and must be professional demagogues, constantly appealing to even the basest—and that is typically egalitarian instincts—as every vote is obviously as good as any other. And because publicly elected politicians are never held personally accountable for official public service, they are far more dangerous, from the viewpoint of those who want their property to be protected and want security, than any king has ever been.

If you combine these two tendencies that I mentioned, inherent in a State: intensification—exploiting the domestic population, and extensification; then you get a one-world democracy, with a one-world paper currency issued by a world central bank.

## Current Conditions

At this moment, let me simply take stock. Here we are at the end of the 20th century, closer than ever to the end-state of a one-world State, at least closer than ever before in history. The United States is the sole superpower and the world's top cop. At the same time, democracy has become almost universal, and the world's leading power, the United States, is the world's leading champion of democracy.

Some neoconservatives such as Francis Fukuyama pointed out that this must be the end of history. One world democracy, we almost reached it. Now, from an Austro-libertarian point of view, matters look somewhat different. Under highly centralized democracy, or let me call it highly centralized mob rule, the security of private property has almost completely disappeared. The price of protection is enormous, and the quality of justice dispensed has gone downhill constantly. It has deteriorated to the point where the idea of immutable laws of justice, of natural law, has almost entirely disappeared from public consciousness. Law is considered nothing but State-made law—positive law. Law and justice is whatever the State says it is. There is still private property in name, but in practice private property owners have been almost completely expropriated. Rather than protecting people from invaders and invasions of person and property, the State has increasingly disarmed its own people, and stripped them of their most elementary right to self-defense.

Moreover, private property owners are no longer free to include or exclude other people from their property as they see fit. This is the right to include if you want, or exclude if you want, is an essential ingredient of private property. And this entails a defense mechanism; it is an anti-invasion method that you can kick people off your property. But this right to kick people off your property, especially commercial property, has been entirely taken away from you. And with this right gone—and no one can today hire or fire, buy or sell, include or exclude from his property at will—with all of this gone, is

also another method of defending oneself from invasion.

The State, which was supposed to protect us, has in fact rendered us completely helpless. It robs its subjects of more than half their income, to be distributed according to public sentiment, rather than according to principles of justice. It subjects our property to thousands of arbitrary and invasive regulations. We can no longer freely hire and fire whoever we want, for whatever reason we deem good and necessary. We cannot sell or buy whatever we want, to whoever we want, and wherever we want. We cannot charge prices freely as we wish, we cannot associate and disassociate, separate ourselves with whoever we want, or with whoever we do not want.

Instead of protecting us, then, the State has delivered us and our property to the mob and mob instincts. Instead of safeguarding us, it impoverishes us, it destroys our families, local organizations, private foundations, clubs and associations, by drawing all of them increasingly into its own orbit. And as a result of all of this, the State has perverted the public sense of justice and of personal responsibility, and bred and attracted an increasing number of moral and economic monsters and monstrosities.

### Strategy: Stopping the Statist Disease

How can the State and the statist disease be stopped? Now I will come to my strategic considerations. First off, three fundamental insights or guiding principles must be recognized. First: that the protection of private property and of law, justice, and law enforcement, is essential to any human society. But there is no reason whatsoever why this task must be taken on by one single agency, by a monopolist. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the case that as soon as you have a monopolist taking on this task, he will with necessity destroy justice and render us defenseless against foreign as well as domestic invaders and aggressors.

It is then one's ultimate goal which one has to keep in mind is the demonopolization of protection and justice. Protection, security, de-

fense, law, order, and arbitration in conflicts can and must be supplied competitively—that is, entry into the field of being a judge must be free.

Second, because a monopoly of protection is the root of all evil, any territorial expansion of such a monopoly is per se evil too. Every political centralization must be on principle grounds rejected. In turn, every attempt at political decentralization—segregation, separation, secession and so forth—must be supported.

The third basic insight is that a democratic protection monopoly in particular must be rejected as a moral and economic perversity. Majority rule and private property protection are incompatible. The idea of democracy must be ridiculed: it is nothing else but mob rule parading as justice. To be labeled a democrat must be considered the worst of all possible compliments! This does not mean that one may not participate in democratic policies; I will come to that a little bit later.

But one must use democratic means only for defensive purposes; that is, one may use an anti-democratic platform to be elected by an anti-democratic constituency to implement anti-democratic—that is, anti-egalitarian and pro-private property—policies. Or, to put it differently, a person is not honorable because he is democratically elected. If anything, this makes him a suspect. Despite the fact that a person has been elected democratically, he may still be a decent and honorable man; we have heard one before.

From these principles we now come to the problem of application. The basic insights—that is: monopolized protection, a State, will inevitably become an aggressor and lead to defenselessness; and political centralization and democracy are means of extensifying and intensifying exploitation and aggression—while these basic insights give us a general direction in the goal, they are obviously not yet sufficient to define our actions and tell us how to get there.

How can the goal of demonopolized protection and justice possibly be implemented given the present circumstances of central-

ized—almost world democracy—as at least temporarily our starting point from which we have to begin. Let me try to develop an answer to this question by elaborating first in what respect the problem, and also the solution to it, has changed in the course of the last 150 years—that is, since around the middle of the 19th century.

### Top-Down Reform: Converting the King

The problem up to 1914 was comparatively small and the possible solution was comparatively easy then; and today as we will see, matters are more difficult and the solution is far more complicated. By mid-19th century, in Europe as well as in the United States, not only was the degree of political centralization far less pronounced than it is now; the Southern War of Independence had not yet taken place, and neither Germany nor Italy existed as unified States.

But in particular, the age of mass democracy had hardly begun at this time. In Europe, after the defeat of Napoleon, countries were still ruled by kings and princes, and elections and parliaments played little roles and were in addition restricted to extremely small numbers of major property owners. Similarly, in the United States, government was run by small aristocratic elites, and the vote was restricted by severe property requirements. After all, only those people who have something to be protected should be running those agencies that do the protection.

One hundred and fifty or even one hundred years ago, only the following thing was essentially necessary in order to solve the problem. It would have been necessary only to force the king to declare that from now on, every citizen would be free to choose his own protector, and pledge allegiance to any government that he wanted. That is, the king would no longer presume to be anyone's protector, unless this person had asked him, and met his prize that the king would have asked for such service.

Now what would have happened in this case? What would have happened, let's say, if the Austrian emperor had made such a decla-

ration in 1900? Let me try to give a brief sketch or scenario of what I think would likely have happened in this situation.

First, everyone, upon this declaration, would have regained his unrestricted right to self-defense, and would have been free to decide if he wanted more or better protection than that afforded by self-defense, and if so, where and from whom to secure this protection. Most people in this situation undoubtedly would have chosen to take advantage of the division of labor, and rely, in addition to self-defense, also on specialized protectors.

Second, on the lookout for protectors, almost everyone would have looked to persons or agencies who own or are able to acquire the means to assure the task of protection—that is, who have themselves a stake in the to-be protected territory in the form of substantial property holdings—and who possess an established reputation as reliable, prudent, honorable, and just.

It is safe to say that no one would have considered an elected parliament up to this task. Instead, almost everyone would have turned for help to one or more of three places: either the king himself, who is now no longer a monopolist; or a regional or local noble, magnate, or aristocrat; or a regional, national, or even international operating insurance company.

Obviously, the king himself would fulfill these requirements that I just mentioned, and many people would have voluntarily chosen him as their protector. At the same time, however, many people also would have seceded from the king; of these, a large proportion would have likely turned to various regional nobles or magnates, who are now natural instead of hereditary nobility. And on a smaller territorial scale these local nobles would be able to offer the same advantages as protectors as the king himself would be able to offer. And this shift to regional protectors would bring about a significant decentralization in the organization and structure of the security industry. And this decentralization would only be reflective of, and in accordance with, private or subjective protection interests—that is, the centralization tendency that I mentioned before has also led to

an overcentralization of the protection business.

Lastly, nearly everyone else, especially in the cities, would have turned for protection to commercial insurance companies, such as fire insurers. Insurance and private property protection are obviously very closely related matters. Better protection leads to lower insurance payoffs. And by insurers entering the protection market, quickly protection contracts, rather than unspecified promises, would have become the standard product form in which protection would have been offered.

Further, by virtue of the nature of insurance, the competition and cooperation between various protection insurers would promote the development of universal rules of procedure, evidence, conflict resolution, and arbitration. As well, it would promote the simultaneous homogenization and dehomogenization of the population into various classes of individuals with different group risks regarding their property protection, and accordingly, different protection insurance premiums. All systematic and predictable income and wealth redistribution between different groups within the population as it existed under monopolistic conditions would be immediately eliminated. And this would of course make for peace.

Most importantly, the nature of protection and defense would have been fundamentally altered. Under monopolistic conditions, there is only one protector; whether it is monarchical or democratic makes no difference in this respect, a government is invariably conceived of as defending and protecting a fixed and contiguous territory. Yet this feature is the outcome of a compulsory protection monopoly. With the abolition of a monopoly, this feature would immediately disappear as highly unnatural or even artificial. There might have been a few local protectors who defended just one contiguous territory. But there would have also been other protectors, such as the king or insurance agencies, whose protection territory consisted of widespread patchworks of discontinuous bits and pieces and stretches. And the "borders" of every government would be in constant flux. In cities in particular, it would not be more unusual for two neighbors to have

different protection agencies, than it is to have different fire insurers.

This patchwork structure of protection and defense improves protection. Monopolistic, contiguous defense presumes that the security interests of the entire population living in a given territory are somehow homogeneous. That is, that all people in a given territory have the same sort of defense interests. But this is a highly unrealistic and actually untrue assumption. Actually, peoples' security needs are highly heterogeneous. People may just own property in one location, or numerous territorially widely dispersed locations, or they may be largely self-sufficient, or only dependent on a very few people in their economic dealings; or on the other hand, they may be deeply integrated into the market and dependent economically on thousands and thousands of people strewn out over large territories.

The patchwork structure of the security industry would merely reflect this reality of highly diversified security needs that exist for various people. As well, this structure would in turn stimulate the development of a corresponding protective weaponry. Rather than producing and developing weapons and instruments of large scale bombing, instruments would be developed for protecting small-scale territories without collateral damage.

In addition, because all interregional redistribution of income and wealth would be eliminated in a competitive system, the patchwork structure would also offer the best assurance of interterritorial peace. The likelihood and the extent of interterritorial conflict would be reduced if there are patchworks. And because every foreign invader, so to speak, would almost instantly, even if he invaded only a small piece of land, run into the opposition and military and economic counter-attacks by several independent protecting agencies, likewise the danger of foreign invasions would be reduced.

Indirectly, it is already clear at least partially how and why it has become so much more difficult to reach this solution in the course of the last one hundred and fifty years. Let me point out some of the fundamental changes that have occurred which make all of these problems far bigger. First, it is no longer possible to carry out the re-



forms from the top-down. Classical liberals, during the old monarchical days, could and did in fact frequently think and could actually realistically believe in simply converting the king to their view, and ask him to abdicate his power, and everything else would have almost automatically fallen into place.

Today, the State's protection monopoly is considered public instead of private property, and government rule is no longer tied to any particular individual, but to specified functions, exercised by unnamed or anonymous individuals as members of a democratic government. Hence, the one or few man conversion strategy does no longer work. It doesn't matter if one converts a few top government officials—the president and a handful of senators—because, within the rules of democratic government, no single individual has the personal power of abdicating the government's monopoly of protection. Kings had this power; presidents don't.

The president can only resign from his position, only to be taken over by someone else. But he cannot dissolve the government protection monopoly, because supposedly the people own the government, and not the president himself. Under democratic rule then, the abolition of the government's monopoly of justice and protection requires either that a majority of the public and of their elected representatives would have to declare the government's protection monopoly and accordingly all compulsory taxes abolished, or even more restrictive, that literally no one would vote and the voter turnout would be zero. Only in this case could the democratic protection monopoly be said to be effectively abolished. But this would essentially mean that it was impossible to ever rid ourselves of an economic and moral perversion. Because nowadays it is a given that everyone, including the mob, does participate in politics, and it is inconceivable, that the mob should ever, in its majority or even in its entirety, should renounce or abstain from exercising its right to vote, which is nothing else than exercising the opportunity to loot the property of others.

Moreover, even if one assumes against all odds that this was achieved, the problems do not end. Because another fundamental

sociological truth in the age of modern egalitarian mass democracy is the almost complete destruction of natural elites. The king could abdicate his monopoly and the security needs of the public still would have been almost automatically been taken care of because there existed for mostly the king himself, and also regional and local nobles and major entrepreneurial personalities, a clearly visible and established natural, voluntarily acknowledged elite and a multilayered structure of hierarchies, and rank orders to which people could turn with their desire to be protected.

### The Disappearance of Natural Elites

Today, after less than one century of mass democracy, there exists no such natural elites and social hierarchies to which one could immediately turn for protection. Natural elites and hierarchical social orders and organizations, that is people and institutions commanding an authority and respect independent of the State, are even more intolerable and unacceptable to a democrat and more incompatible with the democratic spirit of egalitarianism than they were a threat to any king or to any prince. And because of that, under the democratic rules of the game, all independent authorities, all independent institutions have been systematically wiped or diminished through economic measures to insignificance. Today, no one person or institution outside of government itself possesses genuine national or even regional authority. Rather than people of independent authority we now merely have an abundance of people who are prominent: sports and movie stars, pop stars, and of course politicians. But these people, while they may be able to set trends and shape fashions, do not possess any such thing as natural personal social authority.

This is true in particular of politicians: they may be great stars now, every day they are on TV and the subject of public debate, but this is almost entirely due to the fact that they are a part of the current State apparatus with its monopolistic powers. Once this monopoly was dissolved, these “stars” of politics would become non-entities, because

in real life they are mostly nothings, hacks, and half-wits. And only democracy allows them to rise to these elevated positions. Left to their own devices, left to their own personal achievements, they are, with almost no exception, complete nobodies. Put bluntly, once the democratic government—Congress—had declared that from now on everyone would be free to choose his own judge and protector, such that he still can but no longer must choose the government for protection, who in his right mind would ever choose them?! That is, the current members of Congress and the federal government: who would choose them voluntarily as their judge and protector?! To raise this question is to answer it. Kings and princes possessed real authority; there was coercion involved, no question whatsoever, but they received a significant amount of voluntary support.

In contrast, democratic politicians are generally held in contempt, even by their own mob constituency. But then there is also no one else to whom one might turn for protection. Local and regional politicians are basically posing the same sort of problem, and with the abolition of their monopoly powers, they obviously do not offer an attractive alternative to this problem either. Nor are there any great entrepreneurial personalities standing in the wings, and insurance companies in particular, have become almost entirely creatures of the egalitarian democratic state, and thus appear as little trustworthy as anybody else to take over this particularly important task of protection and justice.

Thus, if one did today what the king could have done a hundred years ago, there would be the immediate danger of having in fact social chaos, or of “anarchy” in the bad sense. People would indeed at least temporarily become highly vulnerable and defenseless. So then the question becomes: is there no way out? Let me sum up the answer in advance: Yes, but rather than by means of the top-down reform, one’s strategy must now be that of a bottom-up revolution. And instead of one battle, on a single front, a liberal-libertarian revolution now will have to involve many battles on many fronts. That is, we want guerrilla warfare rather than conventional warfare.

## The Role of Intellectuals

Before explaining this answer as another step in the direction of this goal, a second sociological fact has to be recognized: the change of the role of intellectuals, of education, and of ideology. As soon as the protection agency becomes a territorial monopolist—that is, a State—it is turned from a genuine protector into a protection racket. And in light of resistance on the part of the victims of this protection racket, a State is in need of legitimacy, of intellectual justification for what it does. The more the State turns from a protector to a protection racket—that is, with every additional increase in taxes and regulation—the greater does this need for legitimacy become.

In order to assure correct statist thinking, a protection monopolist will employ its privileged position as the protection racket to quickly establish an education monopoly. Even during the 19th century under decidedly undemocratic monarchical conditions, education, at least on the level of elementary schooling and university education, was already largely monopolistically organized and compulsorily funded. And it was largely from the ranks of the royal government teachers and professors, that is, those people who had been employed as intellectual bodyguards of kings and princes, from where the monarchical rule and the privileges of kings and nobles was ideologically undermined and instead egalitarian ideas were promoted, in the form of democracy and socialism.

This was with good reason from the point of view of the intellectuals. Because democracy and socialism in fact multiply the number of educators and intellectuals, and this expansion of the system of government public education in turn has led to an ever greater flood of intellectual waste and pollution. The price of education, as the price of protection and justice, has gone up dramatically under monopolistic administration, all the while the quality of education, just as the quality of justice, has continuously declined. Today, we are as unprotected as we are uneducated.

Without the continued existence of the democratic system and

of publicly funded education and research, however, most current teachers and intellectuals would be unemployed or their income would fall to a small fraction of its present level. Instead of researching the syntax of Ebonics, the love life of mosquitoes, or the relationship between poverty and crime for \$100 grand a year, they would research the science of potato growing or the technology of gas pump operation for \$20 grand.

The monopolized education system is by now as much of a problem as the monopolized protection and justice system. In fact, government education and research and development is the central instrument by which the State protects itself from public resistance. Today, intellectuals are as important or even more so, from the point of view of the government, for the preservation of the status quo, than are judges, policemen, and soldiers.

And just as one cannot convert the democratic system from the political top-down, so it also cannot be expected that this conversion will come down from within the established system of public education and public universities. This system cannot be reformed. It is impossible for liberal-libertarians to infiltrate and take over the public education system, as the democrats and socialists could when they replaced the monarchists.

From the point of view of classical liberalism, the entire system of publicly, or tax-funded education must go, root and branch. And with this conviction, it is obviously impossible for anyone to make a career within these conditions. I will not ever be able to become the president of the university. My views bar me from making a career like this. Now this is not to say that education and intellectuals do not play a role in bringing about a libertarian revolution. To the contrary, as I explained before, everything hinges ultimately on the question of whether or not we will succeed in delegitimizing and exposing as an economic and moral perversity, democracy and the democratic monopoly of justice and protection.

This is obviously nothing but an ideological battle. But it would be wrongheaded to assume that official academia will be of any help in

this endeavor. On the government dole, educators and intellectuals will tend to be statist. Intellectual ammunition and ideological direction and coordination can only come from outside of established academia, from centers of intellectual resistance—from an intellectual counterculture outside and independent of, and in fundamental opposition to the government monopoly of protection as well as of education, such as the Mises Institute.

## A Bottom-Up Revolution

At last to the detailed explanation of the meaning of this bottom-up revolutionary strategy. For this, let me turn to my earlier remarks about the defensive use of democracy, that is, the use of democratic means for non-democratic, libertarian pro-private property ends. Two preliminary insights I have already reached here.

First, from the impossibility of a top-down strategy, it follows that one should expend little or no energy, time, and money on nationwide political contests, such as presidential elections. And also not on contests for central government, in particular, less effort on senatorial races than on house races, for instance.

Second, from the insight into the role of intellectuals, in the preservation of the current system, the current protection racket, it follows that one should likewise expend little or no energy, time, or money trying to reform education and academia from the inside. By endowing free enterprise or private property chairs within the established university system, for instance, one only helps to lend legitimacy to the very idea that one wishes to oppose. The official education and research institutions must be systematically defunded and dried up. And to do so all support of intellectual work, as an essential task of this overall task in front of us, should of course be given to institutions and centers determined to do precisely this.

The reasons for both of these pieces of advice are straightforward: Neither the population as a whole nor all educators and intellectuals in particular are ideologically completely homogeneous. And even

## *H. What Must be Done*

if it is impossible to win a majority for a decidedly anti-democratic platform on a nationwide scale, there appears to be no insurmountable difficulty in winning such a majority in sufficiently small districts, and for local or regional functions within the overall democratic government structure. In fact, there seems to be nothing unrealistic in assuming that such majorities exist at thousands of locations. That is, locations dispersed all over the country but not evenly dispersed. Likewise, even though the intellectual class must be by and large regarded as natural enemies of justice and protection, there exists at various locations isolated anti-intellectual intellectuals, and as the Mises Institute proves, it is very well possible to assemble these isolated figures around an intellectual center, and give them unity and strength, and a national or even an international audience.

But what then? Everything else falls almost automatically from the ultimate goal, which must be kept permanently in mind, in all of one's activities: the restoration from the bottom-up of private property and the right to property protection; the right to self-defense, to exclude or include, and to freedom of contract. And the answer can be broken down into two parts.

First, what to do within these very small districts, where a pro-private property candidate and anti-majoritarian personality can win. And second, how to deal with the higher levels of government, and especially with the central federal government. First, as an initial step, and I'm referring now to what should be done on the local level, the first central plank of one's platform should be: one must attempt to restrict the right to vote on local taxes, in particular on property taxes and regulations, to property and real estate owners. Only property owners must be permitted to vote, and their vote is not equal, but in accordance with the value of the equity owned, and the amount of taxes paid. That is, similar to what Lew Rockwell already explained has happened in some places in California.

Further, all public employees—teachers, judges, policemen—and all welfare recipients, must be excluded from voting on local taxes and local regulation matters. These people are being paid out of taxes

and should have no say whatsoever how high these taxes are. With this platform one cannot of course win everywhere; you cannot win in Washington, D.C. with a platform like this. but I dare say that in many locations this can be easily done. The locations have to be small enough and have to have a good number of decent people.

Consequently, local taxes and rates as well as local tax revenue will inevitably decrease. Property values and most local incomes would increase whereas the number and payment of public employees would fall. Now, and this is the most decisive step, the following thing must be done, and always keep in mind that I am talking about very small territorial districts, villages.

In this government funding crisis which breaks out once the right to vote has been taken away from the mob, as a way out of this crisis, all local government assets must be privatized. An inventory of all public buildings, and on the local level that is not that much—schools, fire, police station, courthouses, roads, and so forth—and then property shares or stock should be distributed to the local private property owners in accordance with the total lifetime amount of taxes—property taxes—that these people have paid. After all, it is theirs, they paid for these things.

These shares should be freely tradeable, sold and bought, and with this local government would essentially be abolished. If it were not for the continued existence of higher superior levels of government, this village or city would now be a free or liberated territory. What would consequently happen to education and more importantly, what would happen to property protection and justice?

On the small local level, we can be as certain, or even more so than we could have been one hundred years ago about what would have happened if the king abdicated, that what would happen is roughly this: all material resources that were previously devoted to these functions—schools, police stations, courthouses—still exist, and so does the manpower. The only difference is that they are now privately owned, or temporarily unemployed in the case of public employees. Under the realistic assumption that there continues to be a



local demand for education and protection and justice, the schools, police stations, and courthouses will be still used for the very same purposes. And many former teachers, policemen and judges would be rehired or resume their former position on their own account as self-employed individuals, except that they would be operated or employed by local “bigshots” or elites who own these things, all of whom are personally known figures. Either as for-profit enterprises, or as, and what seems to be more likely, some mixture of charitable and economic organization. Local “bigshots” frequently provide public goods out of their own private pocket; and they obviously have the greatest interest in the preservation of local justice and peace.

And this is all easy enough to see to work for schools and policemen, but what about judges and justice? Recall that the root of all evil is compulsory monopolization of justice, that is one person says this is right. Accordingly judges must be freely financed, and free entry into judgeship positions must be assured. Judges are not elected by vote, but chosen by the effective demand of justice seekers. Also don’t forget that on the small local level under consideration, one is talking actually about a demand for one or very few judges only. Whether this or these judges are then employed by the private courthouse association or stock company, or are self-employed individuals who rent these facilities or offices, it should be clear that only a handful of local people, and only widely known and respected local personalities—that is, members of the natural local elite—would have any chance whatsoever of being so selected as judges of local peace.

Only as members of the natural elite will their decision possess any authority and become enforceable. And if they come up with judgments that are considered to be ridiculous, they will be immediately displaced by other local authorities that are more respectable. If you proceed along these lines on the local level, of course it cannot be avoided that one will come into direct conflict with the upper and especially the federal level of government power. How to deal with this problem? Wouldn’t the *federales* simply crush any such attempt?

They would surely like to, but whether or not they can actually do

so is an entirely different question, and to recognize this, it is only necessary to recognize that the members of the governmental apparatus always represent, even under conditions of democracy, merely a teeny proportion of the total population. And even smaller is the proportion of central government employees.

This implies that a central government cannot possibly enforce its legislative will, or perverted law, upon the entire population unless it finds widespread local support and cooperation in doing so. This becomes particularly obvious if one imagines a large number of free cities or villages as I described them before. It is practically impossible, manpower-wise, as well as from a public relations standpoint, to take over thousands of territorially widely dispersed localities and impose direct federal rule on them.

Without local enforcement, by compliant local authorities, the will of the central government is not much more than hot air. Yet this local support and cooperation is precisely what needs to be missing. To be sure, so long as the number of liberated communities is still small, matters seem to be somewhat dangerous. However, even during this initial phase in the liberation struggle, one can be quite confident.

It would appear to be prudent during this phase to avoid a direct confrontation with the central government and not openly denounce its authority or even abjure the realm. Rather, it seems advisable to engage in a policy of passive resistance and non-cooperation. One simply stops to help in the enforcement in each and every federal law. One assumes the following attitude: "Such are your rules, and you enforce them. I cannot hinder you, but I will not help you either, as my only obligation is to my local constituents."

Consistently applied, no cooperation, no assistance whatsoever on any level, the central government's power would be severely diminished or even evaporate. And in light of the general public opinion, it would appear highly unlikely that the federal government would dare to occupy a territory whose inhabitants did nothing else than trying to mind their own business. Waco, a teeny group of freaks, is one thing. But to occupy, or to wipe out a significantly large group

of normal, accomplished, upstanding citizens is quite another, and quite a more difficult thing.

Once the number of implicitly seceded territories has reached a critical mass, and every success in one little location promotes and feeds on the next one, it will become inevitably further radicalized to a nationwide, municipalization movement, with explicitly secessionist local policies and openly and contemptuously displayed non-compliance with federal authority.

And it is in this situation then, when the central government will be forced to abdicate its protection monopoly and the relationship between the local authorities that reemerge and the central authorities, who are about to lose their power, can be put on a purely contractual level, and one might regain the power to defend one's own property again.

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

# I

## A Program for Right-Wing Populism

*by Murray Rothbard, January 1992*

### What is Right-Wing Populism?

The basic right-wing populist insight is that we live in a statist country and a statist world dominated by a ruling elite, consisting of a coalition of Big Government, Big Business, and various influential special interest groups. More specifically, the old America of individual liberty, private property, and minimal government has been replaced by a coalition of politicians and bureaucrats allied with, and even dominated by, powerful corporate and Old Money financial elites (e.g., the Rockefellers, the Trilateralists); and the New Class of technocrats and intellectuals, including Ivy League academics and media elites, who constitute the opinion-moulding class in society. In short, we are ruled by an updated, twentieth-century coalition of Throne and Altar, except that this Throne is various big business groups, and the Altar is secular, statist intellectuals, although mixed in with the secularists is a judicious infusion of Social Gospel, mainstream Christians. The ruling class in the State has always needed intellectuals to apologize for their rule and to sucker the masses into subservience, i.e., into paying the taxes and going along with State rule. In the old days, in most societies, a form of priestcraft or State Church constituted the opinion-moulders who apologized for that rule. Now, in a more secular age, we have technocrats, “social scientists,” and media intellectuals, who apologize for the State system and staff in the ranks of its bureaucracy.

Libertarians have often seen the problem plainly, but as strategists for social change they have badly missed the boat. In what we might call “the Hayek model,” they have called for spreading correct ideas, and thereby converting the intellectual elites to liberty, beginning with top philosophers and then slowly trickling on down through the decades to converting journalists and other me-

dia opinion-moulders. And of course, ideas are the key, and spreading correct doctrine is a necessary part of any libertarian strategy. It might be said that the process takes too long, but a long-range strategy is important, and contrasts to the tragic futility of official conservatism which is interested only in the lesser-of-two-evils for the current election and therefore loses in the medium, let alone the long, run. But the real error is not so much the emphasis on the long run, but on ignoring the fundamental fact that the problem is not just intellectual error. The problem is that the intellectual elites benefit from the current system; in a crucial sense, they are part of the ruling class. The process of Hayekian conversion assumes that everyone, or at least all intellectuals, are interested solely in the truth, and that economic self-interest never gets in the way. Anyone at all acquainted with intellectuals or academics should be disabused of this notion, and fast. Any libertarian strategy must recognize that intellectuals and opinion-moulders are part of the fundamental problem, not just because of error, but because their own self-interest is tied into the ruling system.

Why then did communism implode? Because in the end the system was working so badly that even the nomenklatura got fed up and threw in the towel. The Marxists have correctly pointed out that a social system collapses when the ruling class becomes demoralized and loses its will to power; manifest failure of the communist system brought about that demoralization. But doing nothing, or relying only on educating the elites in correct ideas, will mean that our own statist system will not end until our entire society, like that of the Soviet Union, has been reduced to rubble. Surely, we must not sit still for that. A strategy for liberty must be far more active and aggressive.

Hence the importance, for libertarians or for minimal government conservatives, of having a one-two punch in their armor: not simply of spreading correct ideas, but also of exposing the corrupt ruling elites and how they benefit from the existing system, more specifically how they are ripping us off. Ripping the mask off elites is “negative campaigning” at its finest and most fundamental.

This two-pronged strategy is

1. to build up a cadre of our own libertarians, minimal-government opinion-moulders, based on correct ideas; and
2. to tap the masses directly, to short-circuit the dominant media and intellectual elites, to rouse the masses of people against the elites that are looting them, and confusing them, and oppressing them, both socially and economically.

But this strategy must fuse the abstract and the concrete; it must not simply attack elites in the abstract, but must focus specifically on the existing statist system, on those who right now constitute the ruling classes.

Libertarians have long been puzzled about whom, about which groups, to reach out to. The simple answer: everyone, is not enough, because to be relevant politically, we must concentrate strategically on those groups who are most oppressed and who also have the most social leverage.

The reality of the current system is that it constitutes an unholy alliance of “corporate liberal” Big Business and media elites, who, through big government, have privileged and caused to rise up a parasitic Underclass, who, among them all, are looting and oppressing the bulk of the middle and working classes in America. Therefore, the proper strategy of libertarians and paleos is a strategy of “right-wing populism,” that is: to expose and denounce this unholy alliance, and to call for getting this preppie-underclass-liberal media alliance off the backs of the rest of us: the middle and working classes.

## A Right-Wing Populist Program

A right-wing populist program, then, must concentrate on dismantling the crucial existing areas of State and elite rule, and on liberating the average American from the most flagrant and oppressive features of that rule. In short:

1. Slash Taxes. All taxes, sales, business, property, etc., but espe-

## *I. A Program for Right-Wing Populism*

cially the most oppressive politically and personally: the income tax. We must work toward repeal of the income tax and abolition of the IRS.

2. **Slash Welfare.** Get rid of underclass rule by abolishing the welfare system, or, short of abolition, severely cutting and restricting it.
3. **Abolish Racial or Group Privileges.** Abolish affirmative action, set aside racial quotas, etc., and point out that the root of such quotas is the entire “civil rights” structure, which tramples on the property rights of every American.
4. **Take Back the Streets: Crush Criminals.** And by this I mean, of course, not “white collar criminals” or “inside traders” but violent street criminals—robbers, muggers, rapists, murderers. Cops must be unleashed, and allowed to administer instant punishment, subject of course to liability when they are in error.
5. **Take Back the Streets: Get Rid of the Bums. Again:** unleash the cops to clear the streets of bums and vagrants. Where will they go? Who cares? Hopefully, they will disappear, that is, move from the ranks of the petted and cosseted bum class to the ranks of the productive members of society.
6. **Abolish the Federal Reserve; Attack the Banksters.** Money and banking are recondite issues. But the realities can be made vivid: the Fed is an organized cartel of banksters, who are creating inflation, ripping off the public, destroying the savings of the average American. The hundreds of billions of taxpayer handouts to S&L banksters will be chicken-feed compared to the coming collapse of the commercial banks.
7. **America First.** A key point, and not meant to be seventh in priority. The American economy is not only in recession; it is stagnating. The average family is worse off now than it was two decades ago. Come home America. Stop supporting bums abroad. Stop all foreign aid, which is aid to banksters and their bonds and their export industries. Stop gloabaloney, and let’s solve our

problems at home.

8. **Defend Family Values.** Which means, get the State out of the family, and replace State control with parental control. In the long run, this means ending public schools, and replacing them with private schools. But we must realize that voucher and even tax credit schemes are not, despite Milton Friedman, transitional demands on the path to privatized education; instead, they will make matters worse by fastening government control more totally upon the private schools. Within the sound alternative is decentralization, and back to local, community neighborhood control of the schools.

Further: We must reject once and for all the left-libertarian view that all government-operated resources must be cesspools. We must try, short of ultimate privatization, to operate government facilities in a manner most conducive to a business, or to neighborhood control. But that means: that the public schools must allow prayer, and we must abandon the absurd left-atheist interpretation of the First Amendment that “establishment of religion” means not allowing prayer in public schools, or a creche in a schoolyard or a public square at Christmas. We must return to common sense, and original intent, in constitutional interpretation.



## J Anarcho-Tyranny, U.S.A.

*by Samuel Francis, July 1994*

On the morning of September 22, 1993, a law-abiding citizen named B.W. Sanders was driving his car down the street in Raleigh, North Carolina, when all of a sudden he found himself flagged down by a policeman and presented with a ticket for \$25, Mr. Sanders, it turned out. had not been wearing his seat belt, and under a new state law, that crime carries the penalty he received. But in this case it was not just a traffic cop who flagged down Mr. Sanders. It was a force of some six dozen police officers as well as the governor of North Carolina himself, James B. Hunt. The governor was searching for a photo-op with which to advertise both the new seat belt law and his own personal devotion to law and order. Not only the 70 or more police officers but also an innumerable supply of newspaper reporters and TV newsmen were on the scene to record the governor's triumph over the forces of lawlessness, and the next day Mr. Sanders' wicked ways were recorded in the public press for his family, his employers, his neighbors, and indeed posterity to gander at. To make doubly certain that criminals like Mr. Sanders got the message loud and clear, Governor Hunt held a news conference near the state capital and harangued a crowd of some 150 police officers and state troopers, who were able to take time off from the apprehension of public enemies like Mr. Sanders to attend the governor's words. "I took an oath to protect the people of North Carolina," intoned the Tar Heel State's answer to Dirty Harry, "and this is one way we must do it. . . . Folks, we're serious. We mean it. We're going to do this." And indeed, serious he is. As part of the war on the unbuckled seat belt crisis, the Raleigh News and Observer reported, "Law officers in all 100 counties [of the state] will intensify their efforts to find and cite motorists not using their seat belts. Agencies will compete against each other, winning cash for turning in the best performance."

Governor Hunt's grandstanding might be harmless enough were it not for certain other facts about certain other crimes in North Car-

olina that also sometimes make the news. Only a week before the apprehension and public humiliation of Mr. Sanders, the same newspaper reported on the state's prison crisis. It seems that North Carolina has another new law in addition to the one on seat belts. This other law, passed by the General Assembly, imposes a cap on how many inmates can be incarcerated in the state prison, and the crisis is that, under this cap, most of the inmates now eligible for parole were imprisoned for violent and assaultive crimes. Most of the less dangerous criminals have already been turned loose, and now the prison system must release public enemies even more dangerous than drivers who do not buckle their seat belts. Since last June, no less than 14 parolees (including one of the men now charged with the murder of Michael Jordan's father) have been arrested and charged with murder, and another parolee, a veteran of the state's death row, murdered his girlfriend and then committed suicide, thereby unfairly depriving Governor Hunt of yet another photo-op. Last August alone, North Carolina paroled 3,700 prison inmates. One might think that if the governor of the state and the 150 police officers and state troopers who took time out of their public jobs to listen to him slap himself on the back for busting poor Mr. Sanders were really interested in upholding their oaths of office, they might turn their attention to the results of releasing hardened and violent criminals who have already been caught, sentenced, and imprisoned.

But the saga of the Napoleon of Crime in the homely person of B.W. Sanders is not an isolated incident. It is a representative tale that illustrates what I take to be an entirely new form of government, one that as far as I can tell is unique in human history and unknown to political theory, ancient or modern. Probably no other society has failed as dismally as the United States in the late 20th century to meet the basic test of any civilization: to enforce simple order and protect the lives and property of its members. History knows of many societies that have succumbed to anarchy when the central government proved unable to control warlords, rebels, and marauding invaders. But anarchy is not quite the problem here.

In the United States today, the government performs many of its functions more or less effectively. The mail is delivered (sometimes); the population, or at least part of it, is counted (sort of); and taxes are collected (you bet). You can accuse the federal leviathan of many things—corruption, incompetence, waste, bureaucratic strangulation—but mere anarchy, the lack of effective government, is not one of them. Yet at the same time, the state does not perform effectively or justly its basic duty of enforcing order and punishing criminals, and in this respect its failures do bring the country or important parts of it close to a state of anarchy. But that semblance of anarchy is coupled with many of the characteristics of tyranny, under which innocent and law-abiding citizens are punished by the state or suffer gross violations of their rights and liberty at the hands of the state. The result is what seems to be the first society in history in which elements of both anarchy and tyranny pertain at the same time and seem to be closely connected with each other and to constitute more or less opposite sides of the same coin.

This condition, which in some of my columns I have called “anarcho-tyranny,” is essentially a kind of Hegelian synthesis of what appear to be dialectical opposites, the combination of oppressive government power against the innocent and the law-abiding and, simultaneously, a grotesque paralysis of the ability or the will to use that power to carry out basic public duties such as protection of public safety. And it is characteristic of anarcho-tyranny that it not only fails to punish criminals and enforce legitimate order but also criminalizes the innocent, that at the same time the governor of North Carolina grotesquely fails to uphold his famous oath to protect the citizens of his state by keeping convicted felons in prison, he has no problem finding the time to organize a massive waste of his time and the taxpayers’ money to hound and humiliate a perfectly innocent citizen for the infraction of a trivial traffic law.

In fact, we criminalize the innocent all the time in the United States today—through asset seizure laws that confiscate your property even before you’re convicted of possessing illegal drugs; through manda-

tory brainwashing programs designed to reconstruct your mind with “sensitivity training,” “human relations,” and rehabilitation if you display politically incorrect ideas on certain occasions; through prosecuting people like Bernhard Goetz who use guns to defend themselves; and through gun control laws in general. Under anarcho-tyranny, gun control laws do not usually target criminals who use guns to commit their crimes. The usual suspects are noncriminals who own, carry, or use guns against criminals—like the Korean store owners in Los Angeles or like Mr. Goetz, who spent several months in jail after picking off the three hoodlums who were making ready to liberate him from life and limb.

Indeed, the government response to crime is by far the best illustration of anarcho-tyranny. On the one hand, police forces are better equipped, better trained, and more expensive than ever before in history. Police routinely use computers, have access to nationwide information banks, and carry weapons and communication gadgets that most tyrants of the past would drool over. Yet the police seem utterly baffled by the murder rate. None of their high-tech whiz-bang helps much to catch serious criminals after they have struck, to stop them before they strike, or to keep them off the streets after they are caught. But while the police cannot do much about murderers, rapists, and robbers, they are geniuses at nabbing less serious lawbreakers. They can crack down on tax-dodgers and speeders, jaywalkers and pornography patrons, seat belt nonbucklers and epithet-emitters, gun owners and graffiti-scratchers.

Obviously, such desperate characters are not the reason decent people are scared to walk the streets at night, and no matter how many of them you put in the pokey, civilization and the order it is based on will not survive unless you control the streets. Under anarcho-tyranny, the goal is to avoid performing such basic functions as stopping real crime and to think up purely fictitious functions that will raise revenue, enhance the power of the police or bureaucrats, and foster the illusion that the state is doing its job. The victims of these new functions and laws are precisely otherwise law-abiding and inno-

cent citizens. It's easier and more profitable to enforce the law against the marginal lawbreaker than against those habitually committed to spreading mayhem.

One example of a victim of anarcho-tyranny is a man named Keith Jacobson, an elderly farmer and school bus driver in Nebraska. Mr. Jacobson has a sexual fixation on children, and while that constitutes a sexual perversion, he says he has never satisfied his fixation by having sex with a child, and indeed prior to 1987 he had never been arrested at all. However, he does like to peruse pornography that depicts children engaged in sexual poses and activities, and when in 1987 he received in the mail some solicitations to purchase some of this smut, he ordered it. Eventually, this material arrived and he went to his local post office to pick it up. When he returned to his farm, he found two federal postal inspectors waiting for him. They promptly arrested him and charged him with violating federal statutes forbidding the purchase of child pornography through the mail, and it turned out that the material he had bought had in fact been produced by the postal service itself and sent through the mail by the postal service in an undercover sting operation conducted by the postal service. For some years, postal inspectors had devoted their energies to ferreting out Mr. Jacobson's perverse habits, encouraging them, and then, finally, pouncing on him. As a result, Mr. Jacobson lost his farm to pay for his legal defense, he lost his job as a school bus driver, and he lost all his friends and standing in his small community when his sexual habits came to light. Eventually, the Supreme Court exonerated him, but in the meanwhile his life had been totally ruined.

The rationale for the harassment and entrapment of Keith Jacobson was that child pornography, illegal under federal law, is often produced in foreign countries like Denmark or Mexico and that the law cannot reach those who produce it and who often kidnap or seduce children into taking part in it. Therefore, law enforcement has to concentrate on the consumers of child pornography rather than on its producers, in order to deter the trade. This, of course, is a transparent sophism.

In my view, there is every reason for the federal government to ban the import of child pornography into the United States, to ban interstate traffic in it, and to prohibit sending it through the mails, but the target of the law should be and originally was supposed to be those who produce it and distribute it for profit, as well as those who kidnap, trade in, or seduce children. It is those individuals who cause the social evil of child pornography, not casual consumers of it, let alone those who buy it only because the federal government has enticed them into buying it, as Mr. Jacobson did, and if the producers are ordinarily beyond the reach of the law, it does not follow that law-abiding citizens like Jacobson should be targeted, persecuted, and ruined.

The Jacobson case is particularly important because in a way it was a kind of prototype for the later cases of David Koresh and Randy Weaver, and it may reflect a deliberate strategy by which admittedly bizarre people are selected for persecution. Few people can be expected to rush to the defense of a religious crackpot like Koresh, a white separatist like Weaver, or a pedophile like Jacobson when their rights are threatened, and conservatives in particular can be expected to overlook the procedural irregularities in these cases if they disapprove of or condemn the substance of what the targets are doing, but once these cases become precedents, citizens who are considerably less bizarre in their personal habits and beliefs than many conservatives will be safe for the anarcho-tyrants to hit.

Indeed, the entrapment and destruction of Keith Jacobson is typical of anarcho-tyranny. Having passed a law that is virtually unenforceable against those it was ostensibly intended to reach, government turns its efforts against those it was not intended to punish, which means the law-abiding. If you cannot or will not punish the criminal, criminalize and punish the innocent and then boast of how you are being tough on crooks. The same dynamic of anarcho-tyranny is evident in the notorious asset seizure laws. There are a number of cases on record of homeowners or owners of planes or boats who have lost their property because small amounts of drugs, often noth-

ing more than marijuana, were found in or on them, often because an employee, guest, or family member, rather than the actual owner, had possession of the drug. These cases are bad enough in themselves, but the most notorious, which has received virtually no attention in the national press as far as I know except for a column by Paul Craig Roberts, concerns Donald Scott of Malibu. Perhaps the case is better known in California than it is in the rest of the country, but Mr. Scott's victimization by anarcho-tyranny caused him to pay an even higher price than Randy Weaver or David Koresh or Keith Jacobson.

Mr. Scott was a millionaire who had inherited his fortune and lived in a five million dollar estate in Malibu. One night he was awakened by the sound of his front door crashing in, and, evidently thinking his house was being invaded by robbers, he got up, seized a gun, and went out to protect his life and home. Actually, he was right; his home had been invaded by robbers, in the form of a 30-man raiding party composed of Los Angeles Sheriff's Office personnel, federal drug agents, and the California National Guard. When Mr. Scott appeared with a gun in his hand, they shot him dead in his own home. The killers claimed to have some reason to think that Mr. Scott's wife was using drugs, though apparently no drugs were ever found. They also happened to have in their files an appraisal of Mr. Scott's estate and notes on the value of adjacent property, and one legal expert who has examined the case believes the purpose of the whole raid was simply to seize private property for the U.S. Treasury under federal assets seizure laws on the fabricated pretext of drug use. The murderers of Mr. Scott pled self-defense and were let off.

Again, as with federal child pornography statutes, there should be no problem with laws that include as punishment for drug dealing the confiscation of property or assets. But under some of the asset seizure laws, property can be confiscated prior to conviction and often with little attention to the actual or serious guilt of the property owner, and they are virtual bottomless pits by which law enforcement agencies can essentially steal private property to bolster their own budgets. As with other anarcho-tyrannical measures, real drug dealers, who often

contrive to hide their assets, are frequently not affected; the law falls mainly on law-abiding citizens.

Yet probably the most common example of anarcho-tyranny in practice are gun control laws, and as you know there is now a concerted effort across the country to abolish private gun ownership entirely. That goal used to be a kind of hidden agenda of the gun control lobby, and every nutty gun control measure that was introduced was accompanied by sneering denials that it would go any further. But in recent years the agenda has come out of the closet. Congressman Major Owens of New York actually introduced a constitutional amendment last year to repeal the Second Amendment, and before he did so, conservative columnist George Will had already endorsed its repeal; this is perhaps the first time in history that a congressman has proposed repealing part of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Owens says that the Second Amendment is “not needed” in the United States today, and Mr. Will argues that what he calls “police saturation” will provide an adequate substitute for the private security offered by guns. “Police saturation,” or as Mr. Will describes it, “a policeman on every corner,” is of course a euphemism for a police state, and it is entirely characteristic of Mr. Will’s brand of Fascism Properly Understood.

The fact is that the police and the criminal justice system do not offer protection, nor can they. We have too many policemen in this country already; to go back to Raleigh for a moment, where the governor is so zealous about his oath to protect the citizens, I recall that when I happened to visit the city some months ago, there had been a serious car accident in the middle of the afternoon that tied up local traffic for hours. I rode by the site of the accident around eight o’clock that night, and even though there was no congestion at all, even though the vehicles involved had long since been removed and whatever people were injured had long since been taken to the hospital, there were five police vehicles and five policemen still on the scene. It is not at all uncommon in this country to see speed traps, sobriety checks, etc., that take up the time of five or six or more policemen for several hours. In Washington, it is a regular feature of



the morning rush hour from northern Virginia to see several local policemen wandering around in traffic in the middle of Route 395 just before you reach the 14th Street Bridge for the purpose of pulling over drivers who were driving on the shoulders of the road. As long as the police can afford to assign personnel to these trivial functions or to such perennial aggravations as parking enforcement at a time when urban crime rates are higher than ever, there is no reason to talk about the need for yet more policemen, nor is there any reason to call in the National Guard, the Special Forces, or Boutros-Boutros and his Blue Helmets to do the job civilian authorities refuse to do.

In any case, the policemen we already have seem to spend an inordinate amount of their time enforcing the law against the marginal lawbreaker and avoiding enforcement against serious criminals. This became a national scandal in the Los Angeles riots when police actually arrested store owners who were carrying weapons to protect themselves against the rioters while carefully avoiding confrontations with rioters and, in at least one case, even passed by a store that was being looted.

In Virginia, we have a recent and outstanding example of anarcho-tyranny at work in Governor Douglas Wilder's "one gun a month" law. Since last July in Virginia, it has been illegal to buy more than one handgun a month, on the reasoning, offered by the BATF, that more than 40 percent of the guns used in crimes in New York and Washington are imported from Virginia, where gun control laws are lax. The gunrunners, vows a BATF spokesman, just "fill up their trunks" with firepower and "hightail it up Interstate 95." One hopes they do not drive on the shoulders of the road or leave their seat belts unbuckled.

What never seems to occur to any of these anarcho-tyrants is that Virginians were able to buy guns legally (and as many as they wanted) and still avoid murdering each other as much as New Yorkers and Washingtonians do. Thus, in 1989, there were about 72 murders for every 100,000 people in the District of Columbia but less than 8 per 100,000 in the whole state of Virginia. In the same year, the Big Apple took a bite out of the lives of nearly 26 people per 100,000. The

point is that in Virginia people buy guns legally and do not slaughter each other with them the way they do in New York and Washington, even though both cities have strict gun control laws and Virginia had virtually none. Unable or unwilling to punish the criminals who sell guns, buy them, or use them in these metropolises, the anarcho-tyrants must therefore punish law-abiding Virginians by restricting their gun rights. Under anarcho-tyranny, government fails to enforce the laws and perform the functions it has a legitimate duty to enforce and perform, while it invents laws and functions it has no legitimate duty or valid reason to make or carry out.

While one characteristic of anarcho-tyranny is its propensity to criminalize and punish the innocent and the law-abiding while refusing to punish the criminals, another is its refusal to enforce the laws it has already enacted and to enact more laws that have no effect on real crime and that further criminalize the innocent or restrict their rights. Governor Wilder's law shows this, and it is interesting that barely two months after the law went into effect in Virginia, the BATF announced that 40 percent of the guns now used in Washington crimes come from Maryland, so we must have a similar law there. The logical conclusion, of course, is that there should be a United Nations Convention on Handguns, under which handguns would be outlawed everywhere in the world, with international sanctions and tribunals against the provinces of the New World Order that fail to obey and with contingents of blue berets, presumably armed with handguns themselves, to enforce it. I suggest General Aidid as the commander of the force.

Colorado's new law forbidding minors from owning guns is also a recent instance of gun control anarcho-tyranny. Passed this summer on the grounds that too many minors are killing each other with guns, the law merely imposes a five-day jail sentence on any minor who possesses a gun (except sometimes). Of course, no minor with a gun who is disposed to commit a crime with it is likely to be deterred by five days in jail; most such teenagers spend a good part of their adolescence in and out of jail. The only people who will be

so deterred will be otherwise law-abiding minors who carry guns to protect themselves from their not-so-law-abiding cohorts whom the anarcho-tyrants do nothing to control.

Yet one of my favorite examples of anarcho-tyranny is the crime bill that Congress considered last year. Its most notable feature was the authorization of the death penalty for no less than 51 different crimes, so that senators could boast to their constituents of the Draconian retribution they are itching to visit upon wrongdoers. That sounds really tough, but the new capital crimes included such exotic offenses as genocide, treason, and espionage, and inflicting death for these would protect the average citizen on the street about as much as directing traffic regulates pigeon droppings. The average housewife usually is not too worried that Pol Pot or Julius Rosenberg will jump her when she walks through the supermarket parking lot at night.

Many of the other 48 offenses for which the law would have executed you simply protect officeholders. The bill authorized the death penalty for murdering the President, members of Congress, members of the Cabinet and the Supreme Court, court officers, and relatives of a federal official; for the killers of jurors, witnesses, crime victims, informants, foreign officials, state officials assisting federal officials; and, specifically, for the murderers of officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, including horse inspectors, poultry inspectors, egg inspectors, nuclear regulatory inspectors, and meat inspectors. Senators who voted for the bill do not have to worry about losing the egg-inspector vote.

It then proceeded to dispatch to the scaffold a whole penal colony of atrocity-doers: aircraft hijackers; those who commit arson on federal property; those who commit murder in the course of a violent crime, murder in the course of depriving someone of his civil rights, murder in the course of depriving someone of his religious rights, murder in the course of a kidnapping or a bank robbery, terrorist murders abroad, hostage-taking, murder for hire, murder in the course of racketeering, and murder while serving a life sentence. The latter is particularly interesting, since about the only person a lifer could

murder would be either a prison guard or another prisoner. But there is no reason why a prison guard or a convict (or, for that matter, the President, a federal chicken doctor, or a visiting dogcatcher from Denmark) should enjoy what amounts to more protection of the law than a gas station attendant.

The crime bill also offered a generous serving of gun control chocolate sauce and the usual swag for local and state police as well as some \$300 million for “drug emergency areas,” also known as “cities,” that just can’t say no to federal boodle. Then it gets back to more meaningless death penalties: death for anybody who commits a crime with a firearm if the weapon has moved across state or national boundaries. Death again for anybody who intentionally kills someone in the District of Columbia in a drug-related crime. And death once more for the much-dreaded “drug kingpins,” laboriously defined in the bill as those who have had at least three prior felony convictions with minimum prison sentences of at least 20 years each and who are operating drug enterprises with at least five employees and grossing \$10 million a year. Whether convicts who meet this otiose definition are any more common than spies, traitors, and genocide-committers is not clear, but my guess is that they are virtually a legal fiction never heard of outside of Miami Vice reruns.

Death, death, death, death, cried the senators as they packed the bill off to the House. You would think this was the most bloodthirsty crowd of lawmakers since Madame Defarge knitted socks in front of the guillotine. But before you come to such a conclusion, there is one little secret you ought to know: not since 1963 has the federal government executed anybody, nor does it have any facilities for carrying out an execution. For all the blood poured forth on the Senate floor in and over this bill and its grisly provisions, it was a fair bet that not a single person would ever have gone to the gallows under it. That is because enforcing the death penalty has nothing to do with passing more laws to buck up those already on the books that are not enforced anyway, but instead depends on whether those who pass and execute the laws are serious about justice. In any event, the bill died in con-

ference, though its descendant stalks the Congress today in President Clinton's "policeman on every corner" bill, this time with no less than 64 new capital offenses. Who knows what they are? Who cares, since the lawmakers who concocted them have no intention of enforcing them anyway. My guess is that the mega-death penalty bill last year was never intended to pass, that it was just grandstanding for the senators, who intended to execute the bill itself before any real murderer was executed under its stupid and redundant provisions.

Yet one interesting thing about the bill is that it shows how conservatives in Congress have totally abandoned the principle of federalism. One congressional staffer in a Republican office told me that the bill's death penalty provisions were intended to enforce the death penalty in states that "refused" to enact it themselves—in other words, to sneak around the principle of federalism and states' rights and to force a criminal statute down the throats of unwilling states. I believe strongly in the death penalty for a number of criminal offenses, and I believe every state ought to pass it and enforce it effectively, but under no circumstances should the federal government be able to force or dragoon any state into adopting the death penalty or any other criminal statute it does not want or believe in. Obviously, it was mainly conservatives who were pushing the mega-death bill, so let us endure no more sermons from these Solons about "judicial activism" or other violations of federalism when those violations tread on local interests that are politically important to the lawmakers. Having surrendered the federalist and states' rights principles, they cannot expect those principles to be respected by others who have more uses for the federal leviathan than turning it into an oversized gas chamber.

There are several reasons why anarcho-tyranny flourishes. In the first place, it is obviously an easy way for government bureaucrats and lawmakers to enhance their own power and the public funds at their disposal by playing on legitimate and wellfounded fears of citizens over crime. It might seem that it would be just as easy for anarcho-tyrants to actually do something about crime instead of rehearsing all

the pretenses of doing something about it. But the fact is that there is almost nothing the government today can do about crime. The essential reason for this is that, since the promulgation of the Incorporation Doctrine by the Supreme Court and the ensuing Warren revolution in criminal law, the control of the criminal justice system has been removed from the control of lawmakers and elected officials as well as from law enforcement and is now almost entirely subordinate to the judicial system. Thus, there can be no local politician who wins election by promising and carrying out an effective program of crime-fighting because any effective laws or punishments he might enact will be dependent on the consent of the courts. Since law enforcement remains primarily a local and state function but is effectively under the control of federal courts, local law-and-order leaders can do nothing effective and have to make do with anarcho-tyrannical applesauce. While crime and public safety remain important and legitimate concerns of voters, the response of politicians and police almost has to be to promise the false and dangerous solutions of anarcho-tyranny, to change subtly the definition of crime by expanding it to include the innocent and the law-abiding, and to avoid any serious challenge to real criminals. And institutionalizing anarcho-tyrannical functions in such agencies as the BATF merely creates incentives for its bureaucrats to pursue the kind of dangerous and useless measures the bureau has become notorious for. Under anarchy, the state creates a problem (which sometimes actually has some connection to reality), declares an emergency or crisis—the drug war, drug emergency areas, the carjacking crisis. Islamic fundamentalism—and then exploits that problem as an instrument by which it continues to enhance its power, though neither the fake problem it exploits nor the real problem that exists is affected. The anarchy that anarcho-tyranny breeds thus serves as the rationale for the tyranny it builds, and the dynamic of anarcho-tyranny is essentially the same “ratchet effect” that Robert Higgs identifies as the principal source of Big Government in the 20th century.

But there is also another reason why anarcho-tyranny flourishes.

Throughout this century, in tandem with the emergence of the leviathan state, there has occurred a managed pacification and manipulation of the citizens, with the result that Americans are increasingly habituated to an entirely passive role in government, economy, culture, and now even basic social functions such as childrearing and health care. This process of pacification is closely related to the managerial revolution in the United States and the emergence of centralized, technically skilled elites that specialize in the usurpation of previously autonomous social functions. Hence, just as Americans in the mass-managerial regime are dependent on mass corporations, offices, and factories for their livelihoods, just as they are dependent on mass political parties and illusory mass participation in the political process, just as they are dependent on and engulfed by the mass culture that is continuously fed to them in spectator sports, television, film, art, music, and popular literature, and just as in all these dimensions of life Americans increasingly surrender the active and participatory roles that republican government demands, so too in an anarcho-tyranny we are habituated to an entirely passive role in securing our protection from criminals. George Will's "police saturation" is indeed the logical and practical outcome of this kind of mass pacification, as more and more Americans swallow the lie that they are too stupid and too reckless to protect themselves, their homes, and their families and that cops who could barely make it through high school and bureaucrats who cannot support themselves outside a government payroll must do it for them.

Yet there are signs that some Americans are not buying into the lie of anarcho-tyranny, that at least as far as crime and personal safety are concerned, some are awakening to the ancient lesson of republican government, that in order to govern yourself politically you must first be able to govern yourself personally and morally and that that lesson means assuming responsibility for your own protection. For months in 1987 in Detroit, citizens complained to the police about teenage prostitutes from a crack house in the neighborhood who solicited old men and adolescents on the street, about drug dealers fir-

ing guns in the air for fun, and about a shoot-out between drug gangs while neighborhood children played in the street. Not once did the police respond to any of the repeated calls. Then one day after the shoot-out, two local men named Angelo Parisi and Perry Kent walked up the street, set fire to the crack house, and burned it to the ground, and within minutes police arrived to charge them with two counts of arson and assault with a deadly weapon. With community support, both men were acquitted by a jury of all charges, and there are stories similar to theirs in other American cities.

Soon after the Los Angeles riots, the New York Times recounted the story of a 20-year-old janitor, David Penso, who enjoyed the less-than-bracing experience of watching a local discount store being looted and burned by rioters as Los Angeles police cars drove past and did absolutely nothing. Mr. Penso—unlike George Bush, Jack Kemp, Bill Clinton, and George Will—learned something. “The cops were there,” he told the Times, “but they didn’t do anything. The only way people can be protected in Los Angeles is if they protect themselves with guns.” Some months before the Los Angeles riots, the Washington Post carried a story about women and guns, reporting that there are now about 12 million of them across the country, and one of them, a woman named Paxton Quigley in Beverly Hills, a former activist for gun control and now owner of a gun store that offers firearms training to women, told the Post, “We cannot depend on anyone to protect us. We must do it ourselves. And the only way is to acquire the firepower it takes to dissuade violent criminals.”

Mr. Parisi and Mr. Kent, Miss Quigley and Mr. Penso, have discovered the dirty little secret that can sweep anarcho-tyranny out of office, that anarcho-tyranny flourishes only when citizens surrender their rights and their duties of protecting themselves, assuming responsibility for themselves, and governing themselves and that when the anarcho-tyrants promise to take over and perform these duties themselves, they are uttering a lie that leads to slavery and the jungle at the same time. When anarcho-tyranny flourishes, it protects no one except the elites who fatten on it, and it encourages only the with-



ering of self-government and responsibility. In the movie *The Magnificent Seven*, the bandit leader, played by Eli Wallach, says of the Mexican peasants he is robbing and killing, "If God had not wanted them sheared, he would not have made them sheep." The peasants in the end show that they are not sheep, not by hiring gunfighters and killers to do their fighting for them, which is what we do when we set up the BATF and "police saturation," but by learning how to fight for themselves. Sheep do not need to fight for themselves; they have shepherds who do it for them, until the day comes when the shepherds lead their sheep to slaughter. Only when more Americans learn the lessons these citizens have learned, the lessons the peasants in *The Magnificent Seven* had to learn, and only when they are willing to act on those lessons will anarcho-tyranny itself wither away; only when Americans take back their own streets themselves will they have any streets that are safe. In the words of Lord Byron, "Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow."

Outdated revision.  
Total revamp in 2023.

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## Anarcho-Tyranny—Where Multiculturalism Leads

*by Samuel Francis, Dec 30, 2004*

In Europe, if not in the United States, some people are beginning to grasp that just maybe they made a mistake when they decided to welcome millions of immigrants over the last several decades. The most recent European to get it is former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who has been making noises about the damage he and his colleagues have inflicted on their own societies. Interviewed in a Hamburg newspaper last month, Mr. Schmidt confessed, “The concept of multiculturalism is difficult to make fit with a democratic society” and that importing thousands of Turkish “gastarbeiter,” or foreign guest workers, into Germany over the last several decades was a bit of a boo-boo. As the London Daily Telegraph reported the story, Mr. Schmidt, Social Democratic chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982,

“...said that the problems resulting from the influx of mostly Turkish Gastarbeiter, or guest workers, had been neglected in Germany and the rest of Europe. They could be overcome only by authoritarian governments, he added, naming Singapore as an example.” [Turkish workers a mistake, claims Schmidt, by Hannah Cleaver, November 25, 2004]

He’s hardly the first to see this, although admittedly, at the age of 85, he’s just a wee bit behind the curve. As long ago as 1990, I wrote, in an article in *Chronicles* magazine,

“The late Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the dominions of the Habsburgs and the Romanoffs, among others, all presided over a kind of rainbow coalition of nations and peoples, who for the most part managed to live happily because their secret compulsions to spill each other’s blood was restrained by the overwhelming power of the despots and dynasties who ruled them.

“Political freedom relies on a shared political culture as much as on the oppositions and balances that social differentiation creates, and when the common culture disintegrates under the impact of mass migrations, only institutionalized force can hold the regime together.” [July,

1990]

That's a bit of a mouthful, but I gather it's what Mr. Schmidt was driving at. To have freedom on a stable political basis, you have to have a homogeneous culture and society, composed of people who share the same values and beliefs. If they don't share them, you can hold them together only by force. That lesson is becoming clear in Europe, where the brutal murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh last month by an Islamic fanatic shows what happens when you destroy homogeneity by importing fragments of alien and hostile cultures. Much the same lesson ought to be clear in this country, not only from the 9/11 atrocities themselves but from the recent slaughter of six white deer hunters in Wisconsin by a disgruntled Asian immigrant.

"Society cannot exist," wrote the great eighteenth century conservative Edmund Burke, "unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more of it there must be without." Restraints come from within when a population shares cultural and moral values; when they don't, external force has to provide the restraints. Only a week or so after the murder of Mr. Van Gogh in Holland, the neighboring country of Belgium outlawed its main opposition party, the Vlaamsblok, for being a "racist organization." The Vlaamsblok, which two opinion polls found was the most popular political party in Flanders the month before, was notable mainly for its strong opposition to immigration. That's what made it "racist" and that's why it had to go.

This month Great Britain simply arrested two of its leading opponents of immigration, Nick Griffin of the British National Party and the party's founder John Tyndall, on charges of "inciting racial hatred." Each, it seems, had made (in private meetings secretly taped by undercover informants) derogatory (or perhaps merely critical) remarks about Islam. The arrests are transparent efforts by the British overclass to muzzle rising political challengers, but they're also part of the drift toward authoritarianism that mass immigration provokes.

We see the drift in this country, with the Patriot Act and its spawn at airports and in random searches of law-abiding citizens—all because our own overclass will not enforce standing laws against illegal immigration and does nothing to halt the transformation of American society by millions of aliens. Unwilling to control immigration and the cultural disintegration it causes, the authorities instead control the law-abiding. This is precisely the bizarre system of misrule I have elsewhere described as “anarcho-tyranny”—we refuse to control real criminals(that’s the anarchy) so we control the innocent (that’s the tyranny).

What is now becoming obvious in Europe, even to decrepit socialists like Helmut Schmidt, ought to be no less obvious to our own decrepit rulers here. It’s already obvious to those they rule. All they need is a leader with the guts and brains to say it out loud.

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